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CHAPTER 2-1 
The Creation and Economic Regulation of Housing 
Markets: A Comparison of the Experiences of 
Singapore and Korea 
by 
Sock-Yong Phang 
1. Introduction 
Privatization, creation of markets and economic regulation are terms 
that few would immediately associate with the housing sector.   
Mainstream housing markets in most of the free market economies of the 
developed world are regarded as competitive markets, with little need for 
economic regulation of the market. Regulations that attempt to control 
behavior directly are generally limited to policies relating to rent control, 
the provision of rental housing or rental allowances for lower income 
groups, as well as land use regulations and building controls.   
From the early 1980s, as part of the Thatcher government’s 
privatization program, privatization of social housing has contributed to 
the transformation of housing tenure structure in the UK (Whitehead, 
1993).  In the1990s, privatization of previously state owned housing on a 
massive scale has also made major contributions to economic recovery 
and restructuring in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union as well as 
China (Lea and Renaud, 1995).  In many of these instances, the 
government withdrew from these newly created housing markets, 
allowing market forces to subsequently determine prices, housing 
demand and supply.   
An area of policy concern as evident by the growing literature has 
been that of the appropriate response of monetary policy to asset price 
bubbles, including bubbles in real estate markets (Filardo, 2004; Herring 
and Wachter, 2002).  While there is generally a lack of confidence that 
central banks can both identify circumstances in which asset prices have 
deviated from fundamentals and then act in a welfare improving manner, 
policy makers in Singapore and Korea have intervened extensively in 
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their respective housing markets often directly impacting housing prices.  
The housing sectors of Singapore and Korea are highly unusual in the 
extent of government involvement and intervention.  A large segment of 
the housing market comprises housing built by the government and sold 
to households who do not have complete ownership rights, as these 
markets are heavily regulated to prevent speculation and profiteering.  
Section 2 of this paper describes the phases of housing policy in 
Singapore from the post war period of chronic housing shortage to the 
present period of excess housing stock.  In Section 3, the numerous 
instruments used by the government to regulate supply, demand and 
prices in the various housing segments are described.  Section 4 briefly 
describes the phases of Korea’s housing policies and Section 5 concludes 
by drawing relevant lessons from Singapore’s experience in creating and 
regulating housing markets for Korea. 
2. Phases in Singapore’s Housing Policy 
Singapore is a densely populated high-income city-state with 4.2 
million people and a land area of only 697 square kilometers. Of the 4.2 
million people in 2004, 3.5 million were residents (citizens and permanent 
residents) and 0.7 million were foreigners.1 Its Gross Domestic Product in 
2004 was S$181 billion or US$109 billion.2   The World Development 
Report 2004 estimated Singapore's 2002 GNI per capita at US$29,610 
(using purchasing power parity GNI and exchange rates), ranking it 19th 
highest in its PPP GNI per capita list.   
A British colony from 1819, Singapore attained self-government in 
1959, joined the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 and became an 
independent city-state in 1965.  The People's Action Party that was 
elected in 1959 has been returned to power at every election since.  
During the politically traumatic 1960s, the government concentrated on 
issues of employment creation and housing provision, adopting a 
strategy of export oriented growth through attracting foreign investment.   
Table 1 shows the Gross Domestic Product for 1970, 1980, 1990 and 
2000 -- real GDP more than doubled in each decade.  For much of its 
history since independence, Singapore enjoyed high economic growth 
rates accompanied by full employment, with a tight labour market 
necessitating the importation of foreign workers (see Figure 1).  In the 
period after independence and prior to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, 
1985 stood out as the only year when the city-state experienced negative 
                                                 
1   In the 1990s, the growth rate for foreigners was 9.3% compared to 1.8% for local 
residents.  Department of Statistics, Census of Population 2000. 
2   Ministry of Trade and Industry, Economic Survey of Singapore 2004.  The nominal 
exchange rate in May 2005 approximates S$1.64 to US$1. 
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GDP growth; pre-Asian financial crisis unemployment rates were 
generally frictional in nature and below four percent.  Economic growth 
rates since 1997 has however been more volatile with growing concern 
over structural unemployment (above five percent for 2002 to 2004). 
Singapore’s economic growth record and ability to attract foreign 
investments stem from effective public sector planning and management 
of its economy and society.  A network of competent and reliable 
institutions and government linked companies provides rich public 
sector capacity.  The Singapore government plays an extensive and multi-
dimensional developmental role in the economy. The state owns four-
fifths of the land and determines the deployment of substantial domestic 
savings.  The scope of public enterprises in Singapore encompasses 
manufacturing, trading, financial, transport and other services.  This 
reliance on the public sector as the catalyst for change, with private 
initiative to fill the gaps, is most visible in the areas of urban housing and 
infrastructure development.  Housing policy in Singapore has gone 
through a number of distinct phases as summarized in Table 2.  
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Table 1.   Key Indicators of Singapore’s Housing Sector 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Total Population (millions) 
Resident population (millions) 
Non-resident population (000s) 
Resident homeownership rate 
Resident population in HDB dwellings 
2.075 
2.014 
61 
29% 
36% 
2.414 
2.282 
132 
59% 
73% 
3.047 
2.736 
311 
88% 
87% 
4.017 
3.263 
755 
92% 
86% 
Macroeconomic data 
GDP (S$m, 1995 market prices) 
GNP per capita (S$ current) 
Unemployment rate 
Exchange rate (S$/ US$) 
Gross National Saving/GNP 
Gross Capital Formation/GNP 
Residential Construction/GNP 
Housing Loans 
Total  Housing Loans (S$m) 
Housing Loans/GDP 
HDB Mortgage Loans/Housing Loans 
Banks’ housing loans*/Housing Loans 
 
$16,207 
$2,825 
6% 
S$3.09 
19.3% 
32.2% 
6.2% 
 
$215 
4% 
58% 
42% 
 
$37,959 
$9,941 
3.5% 
S$2.14 
34.2% 
42.2% 
5.9% 
 
$2,421 
10% 
60% 
40% 
 
$77,299 
$22,645 
1.4% 
S$1.81 
43.9% 
31.6% 
5.2% 
 
$19,151 
29% 
54% 
46% 
 
$162,162 
$42,212 
3.5% 
S$1.73 
51.5% 
27.6% 
6.18% 
 
$101,384 
64% 
59% 
41% 
Central Provident Fund 
Balance Due Members (S$m current) 
Employee Contribution Rate 
Employer Contribution Rate 
 
$777 
8.0% 
8.0% 
 
$9,551 
18.0% 
20.5% 
 
$40,646 
23.0% 
16.5% 
 
$90,298 
20.0% 
12.0% 
Prices 
CPI (Nov 97–Oct 98=100) 
Private House Price Index (1998=100) 
HDB Resale Price Index (1998=100) 
Price of new 4-room HDB flat in new 
town location (≈ 100 sq m in S$) 
Housing Price Affordability (4-rm 
HDB flat price to GNP per capita) 
 
36.5 
- 
- 
 
$12,500 
 
4.42 
 
68.2 
27.3 
- 
 
$24,200 
 
2.43 
 
85.2 
57.7 
34.1 
 
$76,100 
 
3.36 
 
101.1 
130.3 
104.9 
 
$98,000 
 
2.32 
Housing Stock (HS) 
Public sector built 
Private sector built 
4-room and larger HDB flats/HS (%) 
Dwelling units per 1000 persons 
Dwelling units per 1000 residents 
Resident households (000) 
Housing stock/resident households 
305,833 
120,138 
185,695 
1% 
147 
152 
380.5 
80.4 
467,142 
337,198 
129,944 
13% 
194 
205 
509.5 
91.7 
690,561 
574,443 
116,118 
40% 
227 
252 
661.7 
104.4 
1,039,677 
846,649 
193,028 
51% 
259 
319 
923.3 
112.6 
Note:  * includes Finance Houses & Credit POSB 
Sources:  Various Singapore government publications and websites. 
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Table 2.   Phases of Housing Policy in the Post-war Period 
Housing developments Year 
What happened? Why? 
 
Phase 
1947 Rent control at 1939 rents To protect tenants at a time of severehousing shortages 
1955 Central Provident Fund (CPF) 
To provide social security for the 
working population 
1959 Self governing colony 
1960 Housing & Development Board (HDB) 
To provide housing for all those who 
needed them 
1963 Merger with Malaysia 
1964 HDB’s Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) 
To enable the lower income group to 
own their own homes 
1965 Independence: Separation from Malaysia 
1966 Land Acquisition Act To facilitate land acquisition by the state 
1968 CPF Approved Housing Scheme 
To allow CPF savings to be used to 
support the HDB’s HOS 
1971 Resale market for HOS To allow owners of HOS flats to exit the sector 
I. 
Developing 
housing 
policies and 
institutions to 
cope with 
building 
shortages 
1979 Easing of restrictions on resale of HOS flats 
To facilitate upgrading to a second new 
HDB flat as well as residential mobility 
within the sector 
1981 CPF Approved Residential Properties Scheme 
To allow CPF savings to be used for 
private housing mortgage payments 
1985 First economic recession since independence 
1988 Phasing out of rent control To facilitate private sector participation in the conservation of historical areas. 
1989 
Citizenship requirement 
and income ceilings for 
resale flats lifted 
To allow permanent residents access to 
resale HOS flats.  To facilitate residential 
mobility 
II.  
Deregulation 
as shortages 
eased 
1993 More housing loans for HDB resale flats 
To bring HDB housing loans policy for 
resale flats closer to market practices 
1994 CPF housing grants To facilitate demand side housing subsidies for resale HOS flats 
1995 Executive Condominiums 
To provide private housing at affordable 
prices to the upper-middle income 
group 
1996 Anti-speculation measures To curb speculative activities and rapid rise in housing prices 
III. 
Financial 
liberalization 
and 
housing price 
inflation 
1997 Asian financial crisis 
2002 Caps on CPF withdrawals for housing 
To reduce risk of over concentration of 
household assets in housing 
2003 HDB downsizes In view of fall in demand for new flats and 17500 unsold HDB flats in 2002 
IV. 
Surplus 
housing stock 
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Figure 1.    Real GDP Growth and Unemployment Rate, 1973-2004 
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2.1 Phase I: Building shortages 
The immediate postwar period in Singapore was characterized by 
chronic housing shortages.  In 1947, the British colonial government 
implemented rent control to protect tenants – premises built on or after 7 
September 1947 had rents pegged to rates which existed on 1 August 
1939.  The Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT), the then town planning 
authority, stepped up public housing construction, building an estimated 
20,907 units between 1947 and 1959.  At the time of self-government in 
1959, deplorable housing conditions and housing shortages exacerbated 
by rapid post-war population growth prevailed.  The then newly elected 
People’s Action Party government made housing a priority area of policy 
concern.  Housing institutions and policies were developed 
systematically and comprehensively to advance social development and 
economic growth.  There exists a vast literature on various aspects of the 
housing sector in Singapore (see for example books by Castells et al. 
(1990) for comparison with Hong Kong; Chua (1997); Low and Aw (1997); 
Phang (1992); Wong and Yeh (1985); and the sample of articles referenced 
here).  Here we provide a brief overview of the institutions and policies 
that have shaped the housing sector: the Housing and Development 
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Board and the Central Provident Fund. 
The Housing and Development Board   The Housing and Development 
Board (HDB) was set up as a statutory board in 1960, replacing the SIT, to 
provide `decent homes equipped with modern amenities for all those 
who needed them’.  A target of 110,000 dwelling units was set for 1960 to 
1970.  From 1964, the HDB began offering housing units for sale at below 
market prices, on 99-year leasehold basis, under its Home Ownership 
Scheme (HOS).  The HDB was able to price its units below market prices 
mainly because HDB flats are built on state owned land, much of which 
had been compulsorily acquired from private landowners at below 
market prices (Phang, 1996).  This was made possible by the Land 
Acquisition Act, enacted in 1966, which abolished eminent domain 
provisions. 
The political and economic motivations for the HOS are perhaps best 
understood in the words of the then Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew:   
 
My primary preoccupation was to give every citizen a stake in the 
country and its future.  I wanted a home-owning society.  I had seen 
the contrast between the blocks of low-cost rental flats, badly 
misused and poorly maintained, and those of house-proud owners, 
and was convinced that if every family owned its home, the country 
would be more stable (page 116)…I had seen how voters in capital 
cities always tended to vote against the government of the day and 
was determined that our householders should become homeowners, 
otherwise we would not have political stability.  My other 
important motive was to give all parents whose sons would have to 
do national service a stake in the Singapore their sons had to defend.  
If the soldier’s family did not own their home, he would soon 
conclude he would be fighting to protect the properties of the 
wealthy. I believed this sense of ownership was vital for our new 
society which had no deep roots in a common historical experience 
(Lee, 2000, p. 117). 
 
Policies were introduced to achieve the goal of a home-owning society.  
Table 1 shows the rapid increase in the HDB housing stock: from 120,138 
units in 1970 to 846,649 units in 2000.  The homeownership rate for the 
resident population increased from 29 percent in 1970 to 92 percent by 
2000.  Singapore’s large public housing sector is therefore in ownership 
terms, a largely privatized sector.  However, ownership tenure of a HDB 
dwelling differs in many aspects from ownership of a private dwelling.  
Ownership rights are limited by numerous regulations concerning 
eligibility conditions for purchase, resale, subletting and housing loans. 
The Central Provident Fund   While HDB and related construction 
finance and land policy brought about a transformation of the housing 
supply side, demand for homeownership was `created’ by directing 
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savings in the Central Provident Fund (CPF) towards housing.  The CPF 
had been in existence before the HDB, having been established as a 
pension plan in 1955 by the colonial government to provide social 
security for the working population in Singapore.  The scheme required 
contributions by both employers and employees, respectively, of a certain 
percentage of the individual employee’s monthly salary toward the 
employee’s personal and portable account in the fund.  All employers are 
required to contribute monthly to the fund.  The bulk of contributions can 
only be withdrawn for specific purposes (of which housing dominates), 
on retirement at age 55, or on permanent incapacitation of the contributor 
concerned.  The interest rate on CPF Ordinary Account savings is based 
on a weighted average of 1-year fixed deposit and month-end savings 
rates of the local banks, subject to a minimum of 2.5 percent.  Savings in 
the Special and Medisave accounts earn additional interest of 1.5 
percentage points above the normal CPF interest rate. 
The CPF became an important institution for financing housing 
purchases from September 1968 when legislation was enacted to allow 
withdrawals from the fund to finance the purchase of housing sold by the 
HDB and subsequently sold by other public sector agencies as well.  The 
contribution rates at the inception of the CPF in 1955 were five percent of 
the monthly salary for employees and five percent for employers.   From 
1968, the rates were adjusted upward and peaked at 25 percent of wages 
for both employers and employees from 1984 to 1986.  Contribution rates 
are currently 20 percent of wages for employees and 13 percent of wages 
for employers, up to a salary ceiling of $5,000. Contribution rates are 
lower for workers above 55 years of age, and proportion of contributions 
allocated for investments, retirement, and healthcare (in the Ordinary, 
Special and Medisave accounts) also varies with age (Asher, 2004).  Rates 
have varied depending on economic conditions and changes to 
contribution rates have been used as a macroeconomic stabilization 
instrument to limit inflation or to reduce wage cost. 
The HDB provides mortgage loans and mortgage insurance to 
purchasers of its leasehold flats (both new and used).  The typical loan 
quantum is 80 percent of the price of the new flat and the maximum 
repayment period is 30 years.  The mortgage interest rate charged by the 
HDB is pegged at 0.1 percentage points above the CPF ordinary account 
savings interest rate, which in term is based on savings rates offered by 
the commercial banks, subject to a minimum of 2.5 percent.  The HDB is a 
recipient of government loans to finance its mortgage lending, interest of 
which is pegged to the prevailing CPF savings rate.  The mortgage 
lending rate charged by the HDB to homeowners is 0.1 percentage point 
higher than the rate that it borrows from the government, thus ensuring 
the sustainability of the financing arrangement.  Housing loans for 
private housing are provided by commercial banks and finance houses.  
A schematic view of how housing is financed in Singapore is shown in 
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Figure 2.  Phang (2001) provides an analysis of how the process has 
contributed to housing wealth formation.  
2.2 Phase II (1979 - early 1990s): Deregulation and creation of 
resale market 
The desirability of any asset is determined to a large extent by its 
liquidity.  Ease of trade determines the efficiency of a market. The 
promotion of ownership of subsidized new HDB dwellings therefore had 
to be accompanied by policies concerning the secondary market for that 
housing.     However, from the perspective of public policy, there was 
early concern that given the then general housing shortage, HDB 
dwellings should not become a vehicle for speculation by allowing the 
price subsidies to be capitalized on a secondary market.  Resale 
regulations were therefore extremely onerous in the early days of the 
housing program.  These regulations were eased as the housing stock 
increased over time and the housing market became more mature (Phang, 
1992, pages 92-4). 
Prior to 1971, there was no resale market for owner-occupied HDB 
dwellings.  HDB required owners who wished to sell their flats to return 
them to the HDB at the original purchase price plus the depreciated cost 
of improvements.  In 1971, a resale market was created when the HDB 
allowed owners who had resided in their flats for a minimum of three 
years to sell their flats at market prices to buyers of their choice who 
satisfied the HDB eligibility requirements for homeownership. However, 
these households were debarred from applying for public housing for a 
year.  The debarment period was increased to two and a half years in 
1975.  The minimum occupancy period before resale was increased to five 
years in 1973 and has remained in place since. 
The debarment period, a great deterrent for any household 
considering sale of its dwelling, was abolished in 1979 thereby greatly 
facilitating exchanges within the public housing sector.  This was 
replaced by a five percent levy on the transacted price of the dwelling to 
`reduce windfall profits’.  A system of graded resale levy based on flat 
type was introduced in 1982, and rules regarding circumstances under 
which levies could be waived were fine-tuned in the 1980s (Phang, 1992, 
page 93).  The resale levy system ensures that the subsidy on the second 
new flat purchased by the household from the HDB is smaller than that 
for the first flat.  
Between 1968 and 1981, CPF savings could only be withdrawn for 
purposes of down payment, stamp duties, mortgage, and interest 
payments incurred for the purchase of public-sector-built housing.3  In 
                                                 
3 A relatively minor scheme introduced in 1978 allowed withdrawals to be made for the 
purchase of shares in Singapore Bus Services, the then monopoly provider of public bus services. 
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1981, the scheme was extended to allow for withdrawals for mortgage 
payments for the purchase of private housing.   From 1984, rules 
governing the use of CPF savings have been gradually liberalized to 
allow for withdrawals for medical and education expenses, insurance, 
and investments in various financial assets (Asher, 2004).   
Only citizens, non-owners of any other residential property, 
households with a minimum size of two persons with household incomes 
below the income ceiling set by the HDB were eligible to purchase new or 
resale HDB flats prior to 1989.  In 1989, residential mobility was enhanced 
when the income ceiling restriction was removed for HDB resale flats; the 
resale market was opened to permanent residents as well as private 
property owners who had to owner-occupy their HDB flat.  HDB flat-
owners who could not own any other residential property before, could 
also invest in private sector built dwellings.  From 1991, single citizens 
above the age of 35 have been allowed to purchase HDB resale flats for 
owner-occupancy.   
 
CHAPTER 2-1  The Creation and Economic Regulation of Housing Markets 
 
153 
 
 
Residential Welfare and Housing Policies: The Experience and Future of Korea 154
2.3 Phase III (early 1990s – 1997): Financial liberalization and 
housing price inflation 
The HDB also provides loans to buyers of resale HDB flats.  Loan 
financing prior to 1993 was based on 80 percent of 1984 HDB new flat 
(posted) prices.  As both new and resale prices rose (see Figure 3), 
households purchasing resale flats had to pay an increasing larger 
proportion of the price in cash.  In 1993 HDB moved its mortgage 
financing terms closer to market practice by granting loan financing of up 
to 80 percent of current valuation or the declared resale price of the flat, 
whichever is lower.  In 1993, the CPF Board also began to allow 
withdrawals of CPF savings to be used to meet interest payments on 
mortgage loans for resale HDB and private housing purchases.  Before 
this, CPF members were allowed to withdraw only up to 100 percent of 
the value of these properties at the time of purchase.   
Deregulation of the HDB resale market has been accompanied by an 
increase in the number of transactions.  The transaction volume of resale 
HDB flats increased from fewer than 800 units in 1979, to 13000 units in 
1987, 60000 units in 1999, and 31000 in 2004 (HDB Annual Reports). 
Resale transactions as a proportion of total (new and resale) owner-
occupied public housing transactions, were three percent, 37 percent, 64 
percent and 68 percent in 1979, 1987, 1999, and 2004 respectively.  The 
increase in the demand for resale flats in the latter half of the 1990s is in 
part due to the introduction of demand side housing grants.   
In 1994, demand-side subsidies in the form of CPF housing grants for 
the purchase of resale HDB flats were introduced.  This represents a shift 
from total reliance on subsidies tied to new flats to a system of partial 
reliance on subsidies tied to resale flats.  The subsidy is deposited into the 
CPF account of the eligible household when it applies to purchase a 
resale HDB flat.  Under the scheme, the government provides the first 
time applicant household with a grant of $30000 to purchase a HDB 
resale flat close to either parents' or married child's residence.  In 1995, the 
grant was increased to $50000.  The government also introduced a more 
general grant of $40 000 for eligible households that purchase a resale flat 
which does not need to satisfy the criterion of being close to 
parents/married child's residence.    
The shift towards constrained housing grants for the purchase of 
housing on the secondary market was necessary for the following reasons.  
In the first three decades of the HDB’s existence, annual supply of new 
public housing added substantially to the housing stock particularly in 
the early 1980s.  It was a rapid rate that was consistent with high income 
and population growth combined with a situation of grave housing 
shortage. The supply policies of the HDB that were suitable under the 
above circumstances had to be reviewed as population growth stabilized 
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and as basic housing needs were generally met.   
In cities of developed countries, new construction of housing is a 
small percentage of existing stock and comprises mostly high quality 
housing.  Even as the construction of the basic 1 to 3-room HDB flats have 
been phased out, the construction of 4-room HDB flats may eventually 
meet with the same fate.  The housing board’s ongoing modernization of 
older estates and its selective en-bloc redevelopment scheme (under 
which old apartment blocks are repurchased, demolished, and new 
estates built) will be even more important then.  Owner-occupier 
subsidies (which almost all new households and a large proportion of 
existing households have come to expect as a right of citizenship4) will, as 
a matter of economic efficiency if not political efficacy, has to be 
increasingly in the form housing grants for the purchase of existing 
housing rather than subsidized prices for the purchase of a new unit.   
Financial liberalization as well as the positive macroeconomic factors 
resulted in rapidly rising housing prices in the early 1990s.  Figure 3 
shows the trends for private and resale public housing price indices as 
well as the Consumer Price Index.5 In response to the growing concern 
over the affordability of private housing, the government introduced the 
Executive Condominium (EC) scheme, a hybrid public-private house 
type in 1995. The EC scheme also facilitated the HDB's withdrawal from 
the upper-middle-income housing market, allowing it to close the queue 
for its Executive Flats. Its similarity with 99-year leasehold private 
condominiums provides the government with another instrument on the 
supply side to impact private housing prices. The government auctions 
land for the development of EC units to housing developers (private as 
well as government-linked companies) who are responsible for design, 
construction, pricing, arrangements for financing and estate management. 
Applicant households have to satisfy eligibility conditions and abide by 
resale and other regulations governing these units.   
Despite an increase in HDB supply of new housing, the introduction 
of the EC scheme as well as increase in government land sales for private 
housing development,  housing prices continued to soar (with the private 
housing price index more than tripling between 1990 and 1996).  On 15 
May 1996, the government introduced a package of anti-speculation 
measures to curb real estate speculation.  These include capital gains 
taxes on the sale of any property within three years of purchase, stamp 
duty on every sale and sub-sale of property, limitation of housing loans 
                                                 
4  The HDB has been described as `a ticket to an easier life for the average Singaporean' and 
`a cash cow for the milking of housing subsidies' (The Straits Times, 19 April 1997). 
5 The price indices are compiled by the Urban Redevelopment Authority and the Housing 
and Development Board and are not quality-controlled.  While it would be more 
appropriate to use hedonic price indices for housing, these are not available.  It is likely that 
the quality of housing transacted (both in the public and private sectors) has been improving 
over time.   
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to 80 percent of property value, as well as limiting foreigners to non S$ 
denominated housing loans.  The immediate effect of these measures was 
to cool the property market which however entered a slump with the 
onset of the Asian economic crisis in 1997 (see Figure 3).  
2.4 Phase IV (1998 - present): Surplus housing stock  
In response to the fall in demand for housing during the Asian crisis, 
that was particularly pronounced in 1998, the government halted land 
sales and also ended its long standing policy of not providing housing 
subsidies for singles by introducing a $15000 CPF housing grant for 
eligible single persons to purchase resale 3-room or smaller flats.  As 
housing prices declined further, the wait list to purchase new HDB flats 
disappeared and CPF housing grants were reduced in stages over ten 
months from January to October 1999 -- $500 per month for the Single 
Citizen housing grant, and $1,000 per month for the other housing grants. 
(In FY 2003/2004, 7,260 households purchased a resale flat under the CPF 
housing grant scheme.) 
Both the private and public housing sectors were faced with a 
situation of declining prices and unsold units.  A study in 2001 estimated 
unsold housing stock of about 19,800 units for the private sector 
(Monetary Authority of Singapore, 2001).  With more than 17,500 unsold 
new flats in early 2002, the HDB suspended its Registration for Flat or 
queuing system, diverting remaining and new applicants to its Built-To-
Order programme under which flats are built only when there is 
sufficient demand for them.   
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Figure 3 .     Singapore’s CPI and Nominal House Price Indices 
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Notes:  CPI, 1975 - 2004 (Nov 1997 – Oct 98 = 100); Private house price index, 1975 – 2004 
(1998 Q4=100); HDB resale price index, 1990 – 2004 (1998 Q4 = 100). 
Sources: Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry, Economic Survey of Singapore; 
Singapore Urban Redevelopment Authority, Real Estate Information System; 
Singapore Housing and Development Board website. 
 
In July 2003, in a major restructuring exercise, the HDB’s 3000 strong 
Building and Development Division6  was re-organized and the HDB 
Corporation Private Limited (HDB Corp) set up as a fully-owned 
subsidiary of HDB.   In November 2004, HDB divested its 100 percent 
shareholding in HDB Corp to the government’s investment holding 
company, Temasek Holdings.  HDB Corp has been assigned 
responsibility for the design and development of all HDB projects until 
June 2006.   The subsidiaries of HDB Corp now include the Surbana 
group of companies which have also ventured into housing development 
                                                 
6  At the time of restructuring HDB’s staff strength was 8,000, including 3,000 in the 
Building and Development Division. The new HDB Corp took in about 800 to 1,000 staff. 
Ministry of National Development, Housing and Development Board Press Release, 26 
February 2003. 
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projects overseas.   
The HDB provides loans to purchasers of both new and resale flats, 
with the CPF having first claim on a property if a borrower defaults on 
his loan, thus protecting the CPF savings of the purchaser.  Interest rate is 
at the CPF savings rate plus 0.1 percentage point. The recent low interest 
rate environment has however given rise to the anomaly where interest 
rates for commercial bank housing loans have been lower than HDB’s 
`subsidised’ loans (as there is a 2.5 percent floor on the CPF ordinary 
account savings rate).  From September 2002, commercial banks have 
been given the go-ahead to compete for a slice of the $63 billion HDB 
loans market pie.  However, as is the case for private housing, banks 
instead of the CPF would be given first claim for such housing loans.   
3. Instruments for Regulation of Housing Markets 
Housing tenure forms in Singapore are incredibly complex, with 
public-private hybrids defined by ownership or rental as well as HDB or 
private. A different set of regulations govern each segment of the housing 
market.  Land ownership is also further defined by freehold, state-owned 
leasehold (and number of years of remaining leasehold), fully owned or 
part owned (strata-title) status.   Given the large number of foreigners 
living, working or studying in Singapore, population and housing 
statistics in Singapore make a distinction between resident and non-
resident population (see Table 1).  Resident population comprises 
Singapore citizens and permanent residents.  Non-resident population 
comprised 19 percent of the total population in 2000.  The housing 
options available to permanent residents and non-residents are also 
limited by regulations governing the different segments of the markets.  
Official government statistics, including census data on housing and 
household often refers only to characteristics of the resident population.  
The housing market however caters to both groups and there is often 
confusion when statistics on the resident population are misinterpreted 
as referring to the total population or housing stock (see Table 3).      
We infer from census data (see Table 3) that 40,813 or 4.2 percent of 
households in 2000 were non-resident households.  While 88 percent of 
923,325 resident households reside in HDB flats, 79 percent of the 964,138 
occupied dwellings were HDB flats, with 21 percent of occupied 
dwellings being private sector housing.  The total housing stock in 2000 
was 1,039,677 units, of which 81percent were HDB housing (see Table 1). 
The housing vacancy rate in 2000 (occupied dwellings to housing stock) 
was about 7 percent. Within the private housing sector, 15,367 of the 
40,813 foreign households were owner-occupiers in 2000 (data from URA 
REALIS) – a homeownership rate of 38 percent. As such, the 
homeownership rate based on occupied dwellings rather than resident 
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households would have been 90 percent. With regard to the housing 
stock, 83 percent were owner-occupied, 10 percent were tenanted, and 7 
percent were vacant units.  The private housing and rental sectors are 
therefore larger than reference to statistics on the resident population 
alone would suggest.   
Table 3.  Occupied Houses and Resident Households, 2000 
 
Occupied 
houses by type 
of dwelling 
Resident household 
distribution by 
type of dwelling 
Resident Home 
Ownership rate 
by dwelling type 
Total  964,138 923,325  
Total % 100.0% 100.0% 92.3% 
HDB flats   79.1%   88.0% 93.2% 
     1- & 2-room     4.8%    5.0% 19.2% 
     3-room   22.9%   25.7% 96.4% 
     4-room   29.5%   33.2% 98.3% 
     5-room & Executive   21.4%   23.7% 98.7% 
     Others     0.5%     0.4% 60.4% 
Condominiums & Private 
Flats    7.9%     6.0% 82.8% 
Private houses   6.3%    5.1% 90.3% 
Others   6.7%    0.9% 83.8% 
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics (2001), Singapore Population. 
  
The housing market can be subdivided according to the different 
regulations governing each distinct market.  Here we discuss in greater 
detail the instruments used for regulating five submarkets: owner-
occupied HDB housing, rental HDB, owner-occupied private housing, 
hybrid regulated private housing, and rental private housing.   
(i)  Owner-occupied public housing sector 
As can be seen from the data, the dominant housing sector is the HDB 
owner-occupied sector.  The owners of a new HDB flat purchase a 99-
year leasehold title on the flat.  The government retains ownership of the 
land and common areas within the estate.  Management and maintenance 
of the estate is the responsibility of the town council which is chaired by 
the Member of Parliament for the constituency.  As such, the state 
remains very involved even after the HDB flats are sold; the HDB 
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regulates the sector in numerous ways: 
• Price:  The HDB determines the prices at which new flats are sold. 
Housing prices differ by flat size, design and location.  HDB prices for 
its new flats are not market prices – they were considered subsidized 
prices in the past when there were long waiting lists of up to 140,000 
households in the mid 1990s.  In the recent period of surplus HDB 
housing, the HDB did not adjust its prices downwards to clear its 
housing stock, fearing the impact on the rest of the housing market.   
Prices for 3- and 4-room flats sold by the HDB are pegged to average 
household income levels to ensure that at least 90 percent of all 
households can afford a 3-room repurchased flat7 and 70 percent a new 
4-room flat (HDB Annual Report 1996/97, p.17).  The ratio of the 
average price of a 5-room flat to per capita GNP has been below 6.5.  
This is comparable to the range of housing price affordability ratios for 
the OECD countries.8   In the first quarter of 2005, the price range for 4-
room flats purchased directly from the HDB was between $85,000 and 
$297,000, while the range for 5-room flats was between $161,000 and 
$450,000, with prices varying with location and design.   
In June 2005, the HDB launched a Design, Build and Sell Scheme 
(DBSS) under which the government tenders out land for public 
housing development to private developers.  The developer who is 
awarded the tender will undertake the entire development from 
planning, design and construction to sale of flats at market prices.  
However, the flats remain as HDB flats with 99-year leaseholds and are 
subject to all HDB eligibility criteria, rules and conditions. First time 
home owners will be eligible to receive a demand side subsidy in the 
form of the $30000 (or $40000) CPF housing grant. 
• Supply: The supply of new HDB flats available each year is dependent 
on the HDB’s building programme.  In its first decade 1960-1970, the 
HDB built 117,000 dwelling units; 241,000 units were completed 
between 1971 and 1980; for 1981-1990, 309,000 units were built; and in 
2000, the HDB welcomed its 800,000th home owner in a symbolic key 
hand-over ceremony celebrating the organisation's 40th anniversary. 
• Demand: Demand is regulated by eligibility rules which include 
household income (income ceiling of S$3,000 for those purchasing 3-
room flats and S$8,000 for those purchasing 4-room or larger HDB flats), 
non-ownership of private properties at the time of application, 
Singapore citizenship status, and minimum household size of two.  
Demand for a second subsidized flat is regulated by a time-bar: 
                                                 
7   The HDB purchases 3-room flats in the resale market and sells them to eligible 
households at a price discount. 
8   Miles (1994, p.98) presents estimates of the average price of a new house as proportion of 
per capita GDP in 1990: UK (6.6), US (5.4), France (5.3), Germany (10.6), Netherlands (4.8), 
Sweden (4.1), Japan (9.2), Italy (5.7) and Canada (5.9). 
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households can apply to purchase another flat from the HDB 5 years 
after taking possession of their first flat.  The time bar was 5 years prior 
to 1997 and was increased to 10 years in 1997 when the demand for 
new flats from second-time applicants was very high.  In 2005, the time 
bar was reduced to 5 years.   
• Resale rules for HDB flats have included: 
- No resale is allowed; the flat is returned to the HDB (prior to 1971). 
- Resale is allowed, the owner is debarred from applying to purchase a 
HDB flat for x years (1971-1979). 
- The owners has to satisfy a minimum occupancy period of five years 
before resale if  they have enjoyed a subsidy; and 2.5 year if they had 
purchased a resale flat with no housing subsidy (since 1973). 
- Households who purchase a second subsidized HDB flat or a 
Executive Condominium unit are required to pay a resale levy 
(ranging from 10 percent to 25 percent depending on flat type) on the 
resale price of the first flat sold.  
- Eligibility criteria to purchase resale flats were similar to HDB new 
flats, i.e., limited to citizens, non-owners of other residential 
properties, and households with minimum size of two persons and 
with household income below the ceilings set by the HDB (prior to 
1989). 
- Since 1989, the resale market has been opened to permanent residents 
as well as owners of private residential properties; there is no more 
income ceiling restriction. 
- Singles (above the age of 35) were allowed to purchase 3-room or 
smaller resale flats as a sole occupier outside the central urban estates 
from 1991.  In 1998, the government announced that singles would 
also be eligible for the CPF housing grant when purchasing resale 
flats.  The restriction on flat location was lifted in August 2001.  In 
August 2004, rules were further relaxed to allow singles to buy any 
resale HDB flat. 
- HDB approval for resale is also subject to the Ethnic Integration Policy 
which promotes ethnic harmony in public housing estates by 
maintaining prescribed block and neighbourhood proportions in 
each ethnic group. Under this policy, no further resale of flats to a 
particular ethnic group is allowed if it increases the proportion of the 
affected ethnic group beyond the prescribed limit in the block or 
neighbourhood. There is no restriction on sellers and buyers from the 
same ethnic group as it will not further increase the ethnic group's 
proportion in the block or neighbourhood.  
 
     There is significant mobility within the housing sector, with 58 percent 
of households in 2000 having changed residences during 1991-2000 
(Singapore Census of Population, 2000).   
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• Subletting rules: 
During the earlier period of housing shortage, owners of HDB flats 
were not allowed to sublet their flats or even rooms within their flats 
without the HDB’s permission.  In 1990, they were allowed to sublet 
rooms in their flats but not the entire flat without having to obtain 
permission from the HDB.  These rules have been relaxed recently `give 
flat owners greater flexibility to monetize their flat’ and to provide 
more rental housing options. From January 2003, HDB flat owners who 
owned a non-subsidized resale flat and who did not have any 
outstanding HDB loan, and who have occupied the flat for at least 10 
years were allowed to sublet their whole flat, with the permission of the 
HDB.   Later the same year (in October 2003), the rules were further 
relaxed to allow owners of all HDB flats who have occupied their flats 
for 15 years or more to sublet their whole flat.  The objective was to 
allow flat owners in financial difficulty to generate some income to tide 
over their problems.  In March 2005, the minimum occupation period 
for subletting of the whole flat was reduced from 15 years to 10 years 
for all HDB flat owners even if they have an outstanding HDB loan; 
and from 10 years to 5 years for owners without an outstanding HDB 
loan.  (There is another set of HDB rules governing persons eligible to 
be subtenants of HDB flats.) 
• Financing :  
   The CPF-HDB framework that was established for the financing of 
housing and that is responsible for the existence and size of the HDB 
sector has been described in the previous section.  The HDB allows a 
maximum loan repayment period of 65 years minus the applicant's age, 
or 30 years, whichever is shorter.  The mortgage lending rate charged 
by the HDB to homeowners is 0.1 percentage point higher than the CPF 
ordinary account savings rate.  While financing for new HDB flats is 
relatively straightforward (80 percent of sale price), the financing of 
resale HDB flats purchased at market prices is subject to the HDB’s 
valuation policy for these flats.  In April 1993, subsidized mortgage 
loans provided by the HDB for purchase of resale flats were increased 
to 80 percent of the market value or resale price, whichever is lower.  
Previously, the mortgage loan provided by the HDB to a buyer of a 
resale flat was based on up to 80 percent of the HDB 1984 sale price for 
a comparable new flat.   
    Since 1994, CPF Housing Grants have been introduced for the purchase 
of resale flats provided the household meets eligibility conditions.  
First-timer married couples can buy a resale HDB flat and apply for a 
CPF Housing (Family) Grant to assist them in the purchase.  The grant 
is $30,000 to buy a resale flat from the open market or $40,000 if they 
buy a flat within the same town or within 2km of their parents' home.  
The grant for singles (monthly income below $3000) is $11,000. 
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(ii) Private owner-occupied sector   
 The high-end private housing sector caters largely to the upper 
echelons of Singapore society, expatriates, and foreign investors. 
 • Price:  Prices for private housing are market determined.  The 
government however affects prices through its policies and activities 
that impact the market directly and indirectly through the HDB 
market.  Figure 3 shows the price indices for HDB resale flats and 
private housing.  A study by Phang and Wong (1997) shows private 
housing prices are highly correlated with prices for new HDB flats.  
Moreover, the timing of government policies relating to the use of CPF 
savings for housing finance, and the liberalization of rules on public 
homeownership criteria as well as housing finance had significant 
impacts on private housing prices. Ong and Sing (2002) studied the 
inter-market price discovery process between the private and public 
resale markets and found significant evidence that the two markets 
were integrated.  They hypothesize that a rise in HDB resale prices 
increases the affordability of private housing to HDB sellers wishing to 
upgrade from public to private housing.  
• Supply: Over time, dwindling private land supply (freehold and 999 
year leaseholds) has increased the importance of government land sales 
(99 year leaseholds) for residential development in determining the 
level of new supply.  In the past decade, the number of private 
dwelling units expected to be built from the government land sales 
program each year has varied from zero to 9000.  Land sales were 
effectively suspended between November 1997 and end 1999 due to 
poor market sentiments.  In 2001, the government announced a 
reduction in supply of land for housing from the expected 6,000 to 
7,000 units each year to about 4,000 units, and the setting up of a 
Reserve List.  Under the Reserve List system, the Government will only 
release a site for sale if an interested party submits an application to 
have the site put up for tender with an offer of a minimum purchase 
price acceptable to the Government. The successful applicant must 
undertake to submit a bid for the site in the ensuing tender at or above 
the minimum price offered in the application (see Phang, 2000 and 
Phang et.al., 2002 for details).  
On the supply side, strata title legislation as well as planning 
regulations on density, land use and redevelopment of private 
properties can affect the responsiveness of private supply to market 
conditions.  In 1999, the Land Titles (Strata) Amendment Act was 
passed.  An en bloc sale can go through provided at least 90 percent or 
80 percent of share values (depending on whether the project is less 
than or greater than 10 years old) agree to the sale.  Previous to this 
amendment, 100 percent of the owners had to agree to the sale. 
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Government-linked companies such as Capitaland and Keppel Land 
(and more recently HDB Corp) also compete in the housing developers 
market thus reducing the oligopolistic power of a few large private 
developers in the small private housing market. 
• Demand: Government regulations affect the sector in other important 
ways.  Foreigners are prohibited from owning private landed 
properties and private flats in buildings of less than six storeys without 
government approval.  Foreign demand for housing assets in 
Singapore is thus effectively confined to the private flats and 
condominiums.   
• Anti-speculation measures: In May 1996, to cool the property market, the 
government announced a package of measures to curb real estate 
speculation:    
- capital gains arising from the sale of any property within 3 years of 
purchase would be taxed as income.   
- stamp duty would be levied on every sale and sub-sale of property.   
- housing loans would be limited to 80% of the property value.  
- foreigners purchasing property in Singapore would be limited to non 
S$ denominated housing loans.   
- In Oct 2001, the income tax on gains from sale of properties was 
removed. Restrictions on S$ housing loans to foreigners were also 
lifted. 
 
• CPF rules on withdrawal for housing: Liberalization of the rules governing 
the use of  Central Provident Fund savings have been used by the 
government to enhance housing affordability, as well as to provide 
stimulus to the property market during a recession.   
- In 1981, the use of CPF savings for housing was extended to private 
housing. Members were allowed to use 90 percent of their CPF 
Ordinary account balances and monthly contributions to redeem one 
housing loan or to buy one residential property.  Withdrawals were 
not to exceed 80 percent of the value of the property at the time of 
purchase, which either had to be on freehold land or had a remaining 
lease of at least 75 years.  In the event of a sale, the amount withdrawn 
had to be returned and a three year lapse was necessary before 
savings could be withdrawn again. 
- In 1984, the single property and three year lapse rules were removed. 
- In 1985, the 90 percent of balances withdrawal limit was removed.   
- In 1988, the  80  percent  valuation  withdrawal limit was  replaced 
with a 100 percent limit (which did not include interest payments on 
loans). 
- In 1992, the remaining lease of at least 75 years was reduced to 60 years. 
- In 1993, the CPF allowed withdrawals of CPF savings to be used to 
meet interest payments on mortgage loans for resale HDB and private 
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housing purchases.  This liberalization in housing finance regulations 
helped fuel the asset bubble in the next few years 
- In 2002, concerns over the risk of over allocation of retirement savings 
for housing resulted in the reintroduction of withdrawal limits.  The 
government announced that there would be a cap on CPF 
withdrawals for private and HDB resale housing.  The CPF 
withdrawal limit for housing purchase would be first set at 150% 
(from 1st January 2003) of the value of the property and be reduced to 
120% over 5 years. The market impact of this was mitigated by 
allowing buyers to use their CPF savings to pay half of the 20% down 
payment.  Down payment rules for the purchase of non-subsidized 
HDB resale flats would be aligned with those for private housing 
over a period of five years.  
Table 4.   Phasing in Reductions in CPF withdrawal Limits 
CPF Withdrawal Limit Implementation Date 
150% 
144% 
138% 
132% 
126% 
120% 
1st Jan 2003 
1st Jan 2004 
1st Jan 2005 
1st Jan 2006 
1st Jan 2007 
1st Jan 2008 
Source: www.cpf.gov.sg 
(iii) Hybrid regulated private housing 
Executive Condominiums (EC) are classified as private housing, but 
purchasers face many of the restrictions that apply to HDB homeowners.  
As mentioned earlier, the government auctions state land on 99 year 
leasehold basis for the development of EC units to housing developers 
(private as well as government-linked companies) who are responsible 
for design, construction, pricing, arrangements for financing and estate 
management.   The scheme was announced in 1995.  In 1996 and 1997, the 
government sold land for 2000 and EC 4000 units, respectively.  Land 
sales were halted in 1998 and 1999, and land for the development of 
another 3000 units was sold in the year 2000.   
The HDB regulates this housing sector in the following ways: 
• Price:  The price is set by the developer. 
• Supply: Supply is determined by the government land sales 
programme. 
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• Demand: Applicant households have to satisfy eligibility conditions 
and abide by resale and other regulations governing these units. 
(household income below S$10,000 per month) and have to abide by 
the resale and other regulations governing these units.  Buyers of EC 
cannot buy a HDB flat directly from the government again.   
• Financing of new flats: First time home-owners are eligible for the CPF 
housing grant which can be used toward the down payment. 
• Resale conditions: The units can be sold only after five years to Singaporeans 
and permanent residents, and can be sold after ten years to foreigners.   
(iv) Rental private housing 
Rent control has been completely phased out and rents in the non-
controlled private housing sector are market determined, with the sector 
catering primarily to foreigners in Singapore.   
(v) Rental public housing 
Rental housing provided by the HDB is the social housing sector for 
Singaporeans, especially since rent control in the private housing sector 
has been phased out.  It is completely regulated by the HDB which 
provides primarily 1 or 2-room flats for families.  The tenant’s household 
income must not exceed S$1,500 per month at the time of application.  
Households in the income ceiling range of between S$801 to S$1,500 pay 
monthly rentals pegged at 30 percent of the market rent. For households 
with incomes not exceeding S$800, the monthly rentals are around ten 
percent of the market rate.  A proportion of HDB’s rental units also cater 
to `transitional' families waiting for their Home Ownership flat as well as 
to foreign workers in Singapore.    
The HDB rental sector in which the housing unit is privately owned 
(i.e. sold on 99 year leasehold basis) has been enlarged significantly since 
2003 with changes to HDB’s subletting rules (see above).  In this sector, 
rents are market determined.    
4. Korea’s Housing Policy9
Government’s role in housing supply and housing price ceilings 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Korean government viewed housing as 
producing a lower return compared with manufacturing and export 
                                                 
9 This section draws from the articles by Kim (2004), Kim (1997), Koh (2004), Chung and 
Kim (2004), Park (2005),  and Lee (2000).  
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industries, and hence discouraged resources from flowing into housing.  
As the government controlled the process of large scale land 
development, it consequently also determined the volume of new 
housing supply.  Permits for land development were monopolized by the 
public sector to prevent private developers from enjoying large windfall 
profits (Kim, 1997).  The Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) 
was established in 1962 and the Korea Housing Bank established in 1967 
as a supplier of housing finance to assist home purchases of moderate-
income families.  
The public sector (which includes central and local governments and 
the KNHC) supplied some 863,000 new dwellings comprising about 13% 
of new housing for the period 1962-1971.  Between 1972 and 1976, 
housing produced by the public sector increased to 761,000 or 30% of new 
housing supply, most of which were small housing units for low income 
housing.  To cope with house price increases and rampant speculation, 
the government introduced a price ceiling in 1977 to ensure new housing 
was affordable.  In 1978, the government also implemented size 
distribution regulations by making it compulsory to allocate at least 40% 
of the residential land developed by public agencies to the production of 
dwellings of less than 85 sq m of floor area. This ratio was raised to 50% 
in 1981, 70% in 1991, and 75% in 1992. This requirement was 
subsequently extended to private developers as well (Lee, 2000).   
Anti-speculation measures in the form of punitive taxes on capital 
gains from real estate transactions were imposed.  These measures of the 
late 1970s caused housing prices to decline and the industry suffered a 
severe recession in 1980.  To help revive the industry, the government 
relaxed anti-speculation measures by lowering the capital gains tax rate.  
Strong anti-speculation measures were reinstated soon again after prices 
increased, with `the Catch-22 situation repeated almost every three years’ 
(Koh, 2004).  In 1981, price controls were suspended for housing with 85 
sq m or more in floor space which resulted in a 38% increase from the 
previous 1,000,000 won/pyong ceiling in a few months in Seoul.  In 
response to public criticism, the Seoul city government reestablished the 
price ceiling, albeit at 1,340,000 won/pyong. 
Eligibility criteria and rules for allocation were also established for 
these new and below market price housing.  Priority is given to those 
who have saved with the Housing Subscription Savings in the order of 
the amount and the period of savings.  Eligible homebuyers are selected 
on the basis of `bond-bidding’10 and then by a random draw.  Dwellings 
                                                 
10 The `bond-bidding’ system was introduced in 1983 to discourage speculative motives in 
housing purchase and to `tax away’ a portion of the windfall gains from home purchasers.  
A home purchaser had to participate in the competitive bidding process when purchasing a 
newly built condominium unit.  The successful purchaser was obliged to purchase 
government bonds in an amount as pledged in the bid before the housing sale was officially 
executed (Koh, 2004). 
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that are smaller than 60 sq m in net floor space and 50% of those with a 
net floor space from 60 to 65 sq m are reserved for households who do 
not own any other dwelling.  Transfer of ownership of deposit providing 
eligibility is prohibited and renting and resale of house purchased is 
banned for a certain period of time (currently two years).  After 
purchasing the first apartment, the buyer is allowed to bid for a second 
newly built apartment unit only after five years (this was increased from 
three years to reduce demand) (Koh, 2004). 
The government’s role in the supply of housing increased to 44% of 
the total in the 1977-1981 period, and 48% of the total in 1982-1986 when 
1,155,071 units were built by the public sector.  This was however 
insufficient to meet the increase in demand and the housing supply ratio 
declined to 71% in 1980 and was 72% in 1990 (see Table 5). Using Mills 
(1987) method of comparing social rate of return between housing and 
non-housing capital, Kim and Suh (1991) tested the hypothesis that Korea 
under-invested in housing until the late 1980s.  Their results showed that 
too little capital had been allocated to housing in the period 1970 to 
1986.11
Table 5.    Population, Household and Housing Stock in Korea: 1960-2000 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Population (000) 24,989 31,435 37,407 43,390 46,125 
Households (000) (H) 4,378 5,576 7,969 11,355 14,391 
Home ownership rate na 72% 59% 50% 54% 
Ordinary Households (000)(A) 4,135 5,197 7,470 10,223 11,928 
Ordinary to Total Households 
(A/H) 94.4 93.2 93.7 90.0 79.7 
Housing Stock (000) (B) 3,464 4,359 5,318 7,374 11,472 
Housing Supply Ratio (B/A) 83.8 83.9 71.2 72.4 96.2 
Housing Supply Ratio (B/H) 79.1 78.2 66.7 64.9 79.7 
Source: Park (2005). 
                                                 
11 As cited in Kim (2004). 
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It was not until 1988 that the government moved decisively to address 
the housing shortage problem by announcing a massive increase in 
housing supply.  This change in housing policy materialized in an 
ambitious drive to build two million new dwellings between 1989 and 
1992.  As a result, annual housing production increased by more than 
100% from 227,000 for 1977-1986 period to 550,000 during the next 10 
years.  The government designed different packages of subsidies and 
finance for different income groups, with provisions for the bottom 50% 
of households in the income distribution.   
The uniform price ceiling on new houses was modified in 1989 to take 
into account production (land and standard construction)12 cost and also 
a profit margin for developers.  Conversion of agriculture land made 
available a large increase in land for development and the supply of housing 
loans was also increased substantially.  The total number of dwellings 
was 6.1 million in 1985 and increased to 9.6 million by 1995 and 11.5 
million by 2000, raising the housing supply ratio in the process. This 
commitment to increasing housing supply contributed to a house price 
decline in 1991; house prices remained stable as housing stock increased. 
As the housing shortage eased, the government lifted price controls on 
new housing in phases starting in 1995.  The requirement of compulsory 
allocation for small-sized dwellings was removed in 1996 for regions 
where the housing supply ratio was more than 90%.  Housing prices took 
a downturn in 1998 during the period of the Asian economic crisis, when 
housing values decreased by 12.4%.  To support the housing market, sale 
price regulations as well as compulsory allocation for small sized dwellings 
for new developments were removed after the 1997 economic crisis.   
The national owner-occupancy rate which was 59 percent in 1980, 
dipped to an time low of 50% in 1990, and increased to 54% in 2000 (Park, 
2005).   However, the urban owner-occupancy rate fell from 47% in 1980 
to 43% in 1990, and increased to 50% in 2000, while the rural owner-
occupancy rate declined from 87% to 80% percent from 1985-2000. The 
majority of the tenants live in the private rental sector, as only 3.4% of the 
total housing stock in 2002 comprised permanent or long term public 
rental housing (Koh, 2004).  There is very little government intervention 
in the private rental sector.  While a Tenancy Protection Law provides for 
a 5% cap on annual rent increase, the cap is not binding (Kim, 1997).  
Rents for permanent and long term public rental housing are set by the 
government and are about 25% of market rents (Koh, 2004), but these 
comprise only a small fraction of the rental housing stock.  In 2002, the 
Korean government announced a One Million National Rental Housing 
Units construction plan from 2003 to 2012 to solve the problem of 
shortage of affordable rental housing for low income families (Park, 2005).   
                                                 
12 Land costs were to be assessed by the government for each project and standard 
construction cost are to be announced by the government publicly every year (Koh, 2004). 
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Housing finance 
According to Kim (2004), market based housing finance is a recent 
phenomenon in Korea.  The primary mortgage market used to be 
dominated by the National Housing Fund (NHF) providing below 
market rate loans to low to moderate income households who purchase 
public housing.  The NHF receives funding through the government 
budget, national housing bonds, housing lottery, NHF bonds, contractual 
savings, foreign loans, amortized funds and other related funds.  NHF 
loans are for 20 years at 3-5% interest rate per year (Lee, 2000).  (Prior to 
1981, the NHF was the public housing fund managed by the Korea 
Housing Bank.)  The Korea Housing Bank serves a somewhat higher 
income clientele with amortizing mortgages of 10-15 years in maturity.  
However, there was a substantial amount of credit rationing in their 
operation.  A ceiling on loan amount per household was enforced so that 
the loan-to-value ration was typically below 30%.  Only new houses were 
eligible for loans, and households with particular income or job profile 
were given priority.  However, the market has changed significantly with 
financial deregulation in the early 1990s and the privatization of KHB in 
1997.  The size of the primary market has increased substantially while 
more diverse products have been marketed and loan-to-value ratio has 
increased as competition among financial institutions intensified (Kim, 
2004).   
The MBS Company Act came into effect in 1999 and the Korea 
Mortgage Corporation (KoMoCo) was established in December 1999 to 
create the secondary mortgage market to raise low cost funds for housing 
on a long-term basis.  KoMoCo was merged with the Housing Loans 
Guaranty Fund to form Korea Housing Finance Corporation (KHFC) as a 
state-owned financial institution in March 2004.  The objective of the 
KHFC is to promote homeownership for low and middle income families 
through making long term mortgage available.  KHFC purchases long 
term fixed rate mortgages from commercial banks following 
underwriting guidelines (maturity up to 20 years and maximum loan to 
value ratio of 70%) and packages mortgage-backed securities. 
In addition to the formal housing finance system, Korea has the 
chonse housing finance mechanism, which emerged `naturally’ from the 
environment of high inflation, financial repression, and housing 
shortages.  Under this arrangement, the tenant gives the landlord a lump 
sum deposit in lieu of monthly rental payments.  The deposit is fully 
refunded at the end of the lease. Chonse has become less important in 
recent years as interest rates have fallen, and monthly rental contracts 
and mortgage financing have become more popular. 
The housing mortgage market in Korea is relatively small by 
developed country standards (Kim, 2004).  The outstanding balance of 
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mortgage loans amount to 13.4% of GPD in 2001, although this does not 
include loans originated and held by insurance and mortgage companies.  
The vast majority of loans are short term bullet mortgages with 3 year 
maturity.  In 2002, three quarters of new originations have had maturities 
of less than 3 years.  In contrast to loan to value ratios of 67 percent and 
above in other developed countries, the loan to value ratio in Korea is low 
at about 40%.  According to Kim (2004), the average LTV on consumer 
loans originated by Kookmin Bank between 1999 and 2003 was slightly 
over 30% and only about 10%of the loans had a LTV exceeding 50%.   
Figure 4. Growth Rates in Housing and Chonsei Prices in Korea, 1987-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Note: Right vertical scale is for ratio of chonse price to housing price.   
Source: Park (2005). 
 
House price bubbles and anti-speculation measures 
Housing prices recovered in 1999 and `boomed’ between 2000 and 
2003, exceeding GDP growth by a wide margin (see Figure 4). The ratio of 
housing price to household annual income ratio increased to about 6 for 
the country and 10 for Seoul.  Fearing the development of a bubble, in 
late 2003, the government tightened anti-speculation measures with 
prohibition of sale of housing pre-sales contracts, upward adjustment of 
property tax, and a drastic increase in capital gains tax (up to 82.5% of 
gains where a seller holds more than three apartments at the time of 
transfer).  In a study of the causes for the housing price spiral, Chung and 
Kim (2004) concluded that the `contribution of speculative demand to the 
determination of housing price is much more important than that of 
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normal housing demand’.  They attributed the surge in speculative 
housing demand since 2000 to low interest rates, rapid increase in money 
supply, and `above all the government policy of economic recovery based 
on very liberal housing policy including the allowance of selling the pre-
sale contract’.   
Chung and Kim (2004) also concluded that the bubble is much less 
serious than the earlier Japanese bubble because of low loan-to-value 
ratio and greater housing shortage in Korea.  The authors recommended 
that housing pre-sales contracts should continue to be prohibited from 
being traded.  Capital gains taxation however has limitations as an anti-
speculation device as `low price elasticity of housing demand means 
forward shifting of the tax burden leading to housing price hike’.  It 
might also affect the supply of housing. The authors recommended that 
the best way of fighting speculation and stabilizing housing price is 
through a sustained increase in housing production, and reducing land 
cost through more aggressive land banking and well pre-planned land 
supply through better regional development planning.   
5. Conclusion: Singapore’s Experience and Implications 
for Korea? 
Despite the obvious differences in the size of the two countries, there 
are many similarities in the underlying approach toward the housing 
sector for Korea and Singapore.  In both countries, while there is general 
adherence to largely market oriented policies in other sectors of the 
economy, both governments have intervened extensively in the housing 
sector to regulate all the key components of: supply of development land, 
quantity, size distribution and quality of housing supply, housing prices, 
speculative activities, as well as demand for housing through detailed 
rules on eligibility for housing and housing finance.  The origin of 
extensive government intervention lies in the post war chronic housing 
shortage, with government led mass production as the most expedient 
solution to the crisis. 
Many of these policies, targeted at more than half the population or 
housing stock, impact the entire housing market directly as well as 
indirectly.  Within the public housing sector, the bulk of resources have 
been channeled to the provision of housing for sale for the mainstream 
population, with a relative neglect of rental public housing provision for 
the lowest income group who cannot afford homeownership.  A large 
proportion of households became middle class through the home owner 
subsidy system which allowed the price subsidy to be subsequently 
capitalized. 
Singapore has had a longer history of extensive government 
intervention of the housing market, as well as a larger public sector share 
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of the housing stock.  It has also moved from a situation of chronic 
housing shortage in the 1960s and 1970s to the present situation of 
surplus with housing vacancy rates above 5 percent.  Singapore’s recent 
housing experience clearly indicates that the path of government 
intervention is far from being a linear one. The housing sector has gone 
through a period of being tightly regulated up to late 1970s, followed by 
phased deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s, and then re-regulation 
especially in the housing finance area from 2000.  In this concluding 
section, some possible implications of Singapore’s experience with 
housing market regulation and deregulation in five areas are discussed: 
(i) Supply of residential land and housing 
Supply of land: Backed by powerful land acquisition laws, the Singapore 
government embarked on land acquisition for development purposes, 
often before the need arose.  Government land banking and meticulous 
land use planning remain important instruments governing land use and 
land supply in Singapore.  In the case of Korea, land was compulsorily 
acquired only as the need arises.  During the period of housing price 
increases in the early 1990s, the Singapore government announced a 
program of annual land sales to allay fears of future housing shortages.  
The program was suspended from late 1997 to 1999 due to poor market 
sentiments during the Asian crisis.  When prices recovered partially in 
2000, the government resumed its land sales program to the dismay of 
property developers.  A compromise was reached in 2001 when a Reserve 
List was set up to better gauge market demand for residential land for 
development.  Under the Reserve List system, the Government will only 
release a site for sale if an interested party submits an application to have 
the site put up for tender with an offer of a minimum purchase price 
acceptable to the Government. The successful applicant must undertake 
to submit a bid for the site in the ensuing tender at or above the 
minimum price offered in the application. The Reserve List instrument 
has allowed the Singapore government a better gauge of demand for 
residential land, and has also provided a stabilizing effect on housing 
prices.  An adequate supply of residential land for private sector 
development remains the most effective measure to ensure affordable 
housing supply.  
 
Privatization of housing supply: With respect to the privatization of housing 
supply to targeted households, Singapore certainly has more to learn 
from Korea than the reverse.  Singapore launched its Executive 
Condominium scheme (for eligible households with incomes below 
$10,000 per month) in 1996 and the HDB only recently announced its 
Design, Build and Sell scheme.   
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Size distribution of housing supply:  During the earlier period of housing 
shortage, the bulk of HDB flats constructed were 3-room or smaller flats 
(69 sq m or less).  3-room flats (54 to 65 sq m) comprised 88 percent, 60 
percent, 31, and 0 percent of HDB flats sold in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s, respectively.  As incomes and housing expectations rise, the HDB 
has moved to meet the rising aspirations of the population through the 
construction of larger flats (83 to 145 sq m) for sale, thus apparently 
favoring the middle and upwardly mobile income groups.  While this has 
attracted criticism from some quarters, such a strategy is efficient as there 
a large stock of dwellings of small sizes is already in existence.  New 
construction activity should therefore target sectors where the supply is 
still lacking.  The government has instead met the housing needs of the 
lower income group through providing housing grants to purchase resale 
flats and the HDB has also purchased 3-room resale flats at market prices 
for resale to low income households at below market prices, as well as for 
rental to foreign workers.  The 3-room HDB sector was also opened to 
singles above the age of 35 from 1991. 
For Korea, size distribution requirements prior to 1997 would have 
resulted in a housing stock where 75 percent of the dwellings built in the 
1990s are 85 sq m or smaller.  The relaxation of size distribution 
requirements would have brought about an increase in the number of 
larger dwelling units, which because of their relative scarcity will 
command a premium.  It is likely that as housing prices rise, the 
government will come under increasing pressure to resume size 
distribution requirements for smaller dwelling units to meet the needs of 
those who wish to purchase subsidized new housing.  In the future, there 
may arise a need for the Korean government to consider demand side 
subsidies for both rental and sale sectors.   
 
Redevelopment of high rise estates: In the past, the government exercised its 
powers of eminent domain to acquire agriculture land, as well as low 
density or low income housing and squatter settlements for 
redevelopment.  Since the early 1990s, government acquisition of housing 
for redevelopment has been more often the case of the HDB acquiring old 
HDB neighborhood and estates for en bloc redevelopment.  For private 
sector housing redevelopment, in order for private redevelopments to be 
more responsiveness to market conditions, the Land Titles (Strata) 
Amendment Act was passed in 1999.  An en bloc sale can go through 
provided at least 90 percent or 80 percent of share values (depending on 
whether the project is less than or greater than 10 years old) agree to the 
sale.  Previous to this amendment, 100 percent of the owners of an 
apartment or condominium development had to agree to the sale which 
had been an obstacle to the redevelopment of some private housing 
estates.  As the urban housing stock ages, the Korean government may 
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similarly need to provide for the retirement of older condominiums. 
 
Retrofitting and upgrading of old estates: As the stock of public sector built 
dwellings ages, the HDB has been involved in estate upgrading projects 
which have involved another round of housing related subsidies for 
households involved. The upgrading works include improvements of 
local public areas, elevator replacement, renovations for elevators to stop 
on every floor, and even additional living space for each dwelling unit.  
Further government involvement even though the dwellings have been 
already sold will need to be planned and budgeted for. 
(ii) Housing price regulation and anti-speculation measures 
Price setting: Price setting for new flats by the HDB in Singapore and price 
ceilings in Korea have been used to ensure that new housing built are 
affordable to the targeted beneficiaries.  However as these were much 
lower than the market prices (in the past), the schemes attracted  long 
waiting list and necessitated complex rules for allocation of the rights to 
purchase as well as a ban on resale of the housing for a period of time 
after purchase.  These highly distortive price regulations also had 
numerous efficiency and equity implications.  In Singapore, the HDB 
tried to set its price differentials to reflect market demand in the 1990s, 
while Korea began phasing in price decontrol from 1995 after housing 
prices had stabilize.  One of the effects of the Asian economic crisis was a 
sharp decline in housing prices in both countries, causing the gap 
between the controlled price and market price of housing to disappear in 
Singapore and to narrow in Korea.  The policy response in Korea was the 
removal of price regulations while HDB continued to maintain its prices 
(instead of lowering them to clear its surplus stock) in an effort to support 
housing prices.  Singapore’s `Executive Condominium Scheme’ and 
recent `Design, Built and Sell Scheme (DBSS)’ involves tendering land to 
private developers, setting eligibility criteria, and not specifying prices at 
which the dwellings should be sold.  However, the EC and DBSS are 
project specified schemes and the HDB continues to retain the option of 
selling housing at prices it determines.  These prices however have 
become more reflective of market conditions. In the case of Korea, the 
`Cost Linking System’ instead of a uniform price ceiling for pricing public 
housing for sale is certainly more efficient.   
 
Anti-speculation measures for public housing:   Anti-speculation measures in 
the public housing sector in Singapore take the form of minimum period 
of occupation before rental or resale is allowed (the period for non-
subsidized resale flats is shorter) as well as minimum period between 
purchase of first flat and application for a second subsidized flat.   Sale of 
the first subsidized HDB flat either attracts a levy (calculated as a percent 
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of the resale price) or a premium on the price paid for the second 
subsidized flat when the second flat is purchased.  While blunt, these 
rules do serve a useful purpose of minimizing speculation in the public 
housing sector.  Singapore continues to regulate its public housing sector 
after the flats have been sold, so that a distinct HDB resale sector coexists 
with a private housing sector.  Its rules in this regard are more stringent 
than Korea’s, partly because it does not have anti-speculation measures in 
its private housing sector. 
 
Anti-speculation measures in private housing sector:   As an international 
financial centre, the Singapore government has avoided implementing 
anti-speculation measures and capital gains taxes generally.  The anti-
speculation measures implemented in 1996 were the first instance when 
such measures were implemented.  With the exception of the 80 percent 
limit on housing loan-to-value, the measures were phased out in 2001.  In 
contrast, Korea has a history of utilizing anti-speculative measures to 
influence price changes for the entire housing market.  According to Koh 
(2004), there is little evidence that these measures have been effective in 
controlling speculative behavior. This is not surprising given the 
persistent situation of housing shortage based on the ratio of housing 
stock to total households (see Table 5).  As pointed out by various authors, 
depending on the specifics of the situation, capital gains taxation might 
`lock-in’ supply as well as discourage new production thus exacerbating 
the problem.  Eventually, the burden is shifted to the buyer resulting in 
further price increases (Koh, 2004; Chung and Kim, 2004).  Kim (2004) 
concludes that raising property taxation can lower housing asset prices 
only at the cost of smaller housing stock and higher rents in the long run.   
 
Real estate information system: Speculation thrives on rumors and market 
inefficiencies and the availability of a well functioning, up-to-date and 
transparent real estate information system can do much to reduce the 
inefficiency of the market.  The internet has played a major role in 
leveling the playing field where real estate information is concerned.  In 
recent years, Singapore’s Urban Redevelopment Authority has done 
much to make private sector real estate transaction and relevant market 
information easily accessible on its website.  The HDB has only more 
recently followed its example by making information on HDB resale flat 
transactions available on its website. 
 (iii) Regulating demand for public housing 
Eligibility criteria for new flats: As the housing shortage eased, the 
Singapore government relaxed the eligibility criteria for the purchase of 
new HDB flats over time through phased increases in the income ceiling 
for eligibility (from $1000 income per month in 1964 to the present $8000).  
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The time period between first purchase and second application has also 
been used to regulate demand.  In Singapore’s case it has been changed 
from five to ten years to reduce demand and reduced from ten to five 
years again recently.  
 
Eligibility criteria for resale flats: For resale HDB flats, eligibility to purchase 
was extended to permanent residents (to attract potential emigrants), 
owners of private dwellings, and soon after to singles as well.    Again, 
the rules stipulating eligibility for singles (above age 35) were limiting 
when first introduced with regard to location and flat type and were 
relaxed over time.  Singles constitute a growing proportion of the 
population in Singapore and their housing needs were catered to as the 
housing shortage eases.  The proportion of one person households in 
Singapore increased from 5.2% to 8.2% from 1990 to 2000.  The proportion 
of 1 person households living alone in a dwelling unit increased from 
72% to 91% over the same period, partly as a result of HDB liberalization 
of its rules in 1991.  A similar trend of an increase in the number of non-
ordinary households in Korea is evident from Table 5.  Their proportion 
increased very significantly from 10% in 1990 to 20% in 2000.  If one were 
to consider the total number of households in Korea rather than the 
number of ordinary households (see last row of Table 5), the housing 
shortage situation in 2000 is much worst at 20% rather than 4%!  Housing 
policy cannot continue to ignore the housing needs of `non-ordinary’ 
households as their numbers increase in the future. 
 
Demand side subsidies: In the earlier period of housing shortage, 
government involvement on the supply side to build new housing 
especially for low and middle income housing was both necessary and 
more efficient.  However, together with administered prices, planned 
locations, and prohibitions on resale for a period of time, these policies 
generated much inefficiency.  In the context where there is no longer a 
housing shortage, demand-side subsidies operating through the HDB 
resale market are more efficient (as well as more equitable) and have been 
implemented in Singapore since the early 1990s.  They have proven to be 
more popular than subsidized new HDB flats in outlying areas.  
Eligibility for these housing grants has also been extended to singles.  
Another aspect of the program involves the HDB purchasing 3-room flats 
in the resale market, retrofitting them, and making them available for sale 
are a price below the market price to eligible low income households.  A 
move towards demand side subsidies is a direction the Korean 
government might wish to consider in the future. 
(iv) Housing finance deregulation and re-regulation 
Singapore’s experience with liberalization of CPF savings for use for 
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housing, as well as HDB rules on housing loans for its resale flats serves 
to demonstrate the powerful impact that the availability of housing credit 
can have on housing prices.  It is highly likely that liberalization in the 
housing finance market has contributed to the recent Korean housing 
boom.  Changes to the allowable loan-to-value ratio can have potentially 
great impact to increase or suppress housing prices and its use to manage 
housing price is certainly controversial and has to be weighed carefully.   
(v) Rental market 
Housing policy bias towards homeownership resulted in a relative 
neglect of the rental sector.  However, Singapore has since abandoned an 
earlier target to achieve a full homeownership society.  Recent declines in 
housing asset prices as well as increases in unemployment rates have 
been a painful lesson for households as well as policymakers on the risk 
of overinvestment in housing (Phang, 2005).  Instead, there is now a 
much greater appreciation of the importance of a well functioning rental 
market that serves a number of purposes: an option for low income 
households, the permanently or temporarily unemployed, young families 
and singles, foreign workers and students, as well as elderly persons 
needing to monetize their housing assets.  Given the surplus housing 
situation, the HDB however has not constructed new rental housing but 
has instead liberalized its rules on subletting of apartments by HDB 
owners, while the Korean government has announced a One Million 
National Rental Housing Units construction plan from 2003 to 2012.  
These measures will hopefully bring about a more optimal housing 
tenure mix in both countries in the longer run. 
The housing market is certainly one of the trickiest markets to regulate 
well. While a burgeoning literature on the efficacy of government/central 
bank intervention to dampen housing asset prices has developed in 
recent years, the governments of Korea and Singapore have apparently 
ventured deep into territory where others have hesitated to tread.  In both 
economies, the governments exercise relatively large control over land 
and capital resource allocations, and are likely to continue doing so.  A 
complex framework of interlocking policies and regulations exists for the 
housing sector.  Both citizenry’s and business sector responses to housing 
shortages and housing price increases and falls have been to assume that 
it is the government’s responsibility to alleviate them and to exert pressure 
on the government to intervene. While some may view this state of affairs 
as totally undesirable, given the prevailing ethos, large scale intervention 
by the government was expected and acceptable and remains the case.  
Given the extensive government involvement, a key challenge is that of 
how the risks of government failure, in terms of adverse impacts on 
housing prices, efficiency and equity, can be minimized.  In this aspect, 
there is much that the two countries can learn from each other. 
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Comments on   
 “The Creation and Economic Regulation of Housing Markets: 
A Comparison of the Experiences of Singapore and Korea” 
Jae-young Son 
( Konkuk University)  
1. Housing policies deals with land acquisition and development, 
infrastructure investment, housing construction, and sale and 
management of houses, not to mention those minor issues such as 
taxes and finances. Professor Phang's paper amazes me how one can 
describe and analyse such a complex issue in such an efficient manner. 
Whatever I and many Korean researchers know about Singaporean 
housing market have come from Prof. Phang's past papers, and the 
current paper adds much new information for her Korean fans. 
We are alarmed, however, that she now comes as a competitor in the 
housing research market. Prof. Phang's description of Korean situation 
are accurate and up to date. Her analyses of problems and predictions 
of future policy issues are in line with the better thinkings of Korean 
researchers. So, I congratulate Prof. Phang for her excellent job in 
analyzing the Singaporean and Korean housing markets and identify 
common issues. This work will serve as platform for future 
comparative studies for many scholars in both countries.  
 
2. I do not need recapitulate the entire paper, but I will list up several 
similarities in the two markets.  
   
A) In both countries, housing policies started at a stage of grave 
housing shortage. The governments thus concentrated on building 
a large number of houses in the most expedient ways. Naturally, 
the government became involved in land development, housing 
construction, and housing sale, and as a result, the role of the 
government are much larger than most other countries. Over the 
years, the severity of housing shortage has diminished, and 
various deregulation measures have been introduced.  
 
B) In both countries, sale of new houses has accompanied a large 
subsidy. The major source of the subsidy has been cheap land. 
Singapore nationalized much of nation's land and released it later, 
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and Korea has employed power of compulsory purchase 
whenever the need arises.  
 
C) Subsidy attracts buyers, and the government has to allocate houses 
based on complex set of qualifications, waiting periods, and in the 
end, a lottery. Many of Korean households have jumped up to the 
status of middle class by winning a below-market priced house. I 
am sure houses played the same role in household wealth 
formation in Singapore.  
 
D) There must be large number of low income households who 
cannot afford to purchase a house even at a subsidized price. They 
have been largely left out in Korea for a long time. The same seems 
to be true in Singapore.  
 
E) All housing markets are subject to cycles, and in some cases the 
housing price inflation is beyond anyone's expectation. When this 
happened in Korea and in Singapore, the respective government 
reacted by blaming speculation for the price hike. Policy menus 
are similar: capital gains tax or something similar, restriction of 
housing purchase or sale, and limitations on housing finance.  
 
3. Of course, I notice some pronounced differences.  
 
A) Difference in scale cannot be ignored. The entire housing stock in 
Singapore is a little over one million. Korea frequently builds more 
than half a million houses in one year. In both cases, houses are 
mostly built in densely populated high rise complexes, but in 
Korea such a large number of houses simply cannot fit in a small 
area. As a result, land development frequently amounts to 
building an entirely new city which requires good planning and 
large scale infrastructure investments. For many reasons, private 
and public developers were allowed to ignore such requirements, 
and currently we can observe not only successes but also failures.  
 
B) Singapore has been much more ambitious than Korea by aiming at 
100% home ownership. In fact, housing sector has not been a 
priority policy concern except for periods of acute housing price 
inflation. Even in those periods, the major policy tool was 
regulatory power, rather than budgetary or financial resources. As 
explained in Prof. Phang's paper, housing loans are given only to 
buyers of small houses, and LTV was around 30%. On the contrary, 
Singapore employed housing finance extensively to promote home 
ownership. Truly commercial primary housing finance market 
opened in Korea only in 1998.  
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C) The most interesting information contained in the paper was that 
"the average price of a 5-room flat to per capita GNP has been 
below 6.5"(p. 17). Usually we calculate the ratio of house price to 
household income, i.e. the price income ratio(PIR), and I assume 
the number is just that. Otherwise, the PIR comes down too low. 
Even then, I wonder how Singapore maintain the ratio so low, 
given the limited supply of land. When we compare Singapore 
with Hong Kong, the puzzle becomes more intense.  
The PIR in Korea varies depending on locality, type of house, and 
vintage, but in the most important market, the apartment market 
in Seoul shows the PIR over 10. The high PIR limits LTV, since 
high LTV can cause affordability problem.  
 
4. I wish Prof. Phang would incorporate the above points in future 
revisiont of the paper. Again, I congratulate Prof. Phang for her 
extraordinary achievement.  
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activities have contributed to the housing price hike on one hand and to 
verify the presence of bubble in housing price on the other. In order to 
estimate the impact of speculation on housing price, a new devise is applied; 
the value of the explained variation coming from a regression analysis is 
decomposed into the percentage share of each independent variable 
including the variable for speculation. The presence of bubble is verified 
through three estimation methods: the long-run equilibrium, the 
fundamental market value(or discounted cash flow) and the price-income 
ratio. 
This study has produced a set of interesting findings. First, in Gangnam 
District, one of the most affluent areas in Seoul, speculative demand has a 
strong impact on housing price about five times the normal housing 
demand. Second, there are indeed bubbles in housing price, but their 
magnitude differs widely depending upon the estimation methods applied. 
Third, the fear that the bust of bubbles might lead to general economic 
collapse is neither well founded nor likely to arise; the problem of bubbles in 
Korea appears to be much less serious than those in Japan in the late 80s and 
early 90s. Fourth, the best way of fighting speculation is not the sudden 
increase in capital gains tax or any other drastic anti-speculative measures, 
but orderly and sustained increase in the supply of housing.  
1. Introduction 
One of the most serious social and economic problems in Korea in recent 
years has been the never-ending housing price spiral. Housing price in 
Seoul, Daijon and other large cities increased by more than thirty percent on 
average between 2001 and 2003. The continuous increase in housing price 
has resulted in worsening affordability for a great number of households for 
decent housing, workers' demand for higher wage, loss of competitiveness 
of business and even the weakening desire to work.  
A way to measure the seriousness of housing price is the ratio of housing 
price to household's annual income (PIR). The PIR for the country as a 
whole is about six times, while it is about ten to twelve times in Seoul as 
against about three or four times in advanced countries. Under theses 
circumstances, it is quite normal to look for the causes of the housing price 
hike and ways to contain price inflation. A large number of people, 
including academics, government policy makers, politicians and people on 
the street, believe that the fundamental reason for the price hike is housing 
speculation. The government has, therefore, adopted a series of 
anti-speculation measures, consisting primarily of the prohibition of the 
sales of housing purchase right(via pre-sale contract), upward adjustment of 
property tax rate, and especially drastic increase in capital gains tax. 
Unfortunately however, these measures have not brought about housing 
price stability partly because of wrong timing and low price elasticity of 
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housing demand. Because of low price elasticity, a good part of the increase 
in the capital gains tax has led to further rise in housing price. 
What the government policy makers have been concerned about over the 
last few years are; 1) the degree to which speculation has contributed to 
housing price spiral; 2) existence of bubble and if so, where and how much; 
and 3) the efficacy of anti-speculation measures. This study addresses itself 
to these three related questions. It wants to verify if housing speculation is 
indeed a reason for the housing price crisis and, if so, by how much. To 
estimate the relative importance of speculation in the determination of 
housing price, the study has devised a simple method of decomposing the 
explained value of the dependent variable. This method shows the 
percentage of the contribution of each independent variable to the 
determination of the dependent variable. Also attempted is to ascertain the 
existence of "bubble" in the housing price, being caused by housing 
speculation. The presence of bubble has provoked much controversy in 
Korea, because if the bubble busts, the economy may result in a serious 
economic slowdown as it happened in Japan in the early 1990s. Finally the 
study wants to investigate if some of the anti-speculation measures really 
work in curbing speculative purchase behavior. 
Before touching on the three questions in detail the study reviews major 
anti-speculation measures very briefly.  
2. Housing Price Stabilization Measures in Recent Years: A 
Brief Summary 
The government policy toward housing dramatically changed after the 
financial crisis of 1997. Most of the government controls over the housing 
market were either loosened, readjusted, or completely eliminated. Over 140 
measures were announced between May 1998 and July 2001, to streamline 
the housing sector and almost 100 of them were geared toward revitalizing 
the housing market by activating housing investment demand. From the 
government's point of view what was urgent was to create jobs as the 
unemployment rate went up as high as 16% and the home building industry 
nearly collapsed. The unemployment rate was particularly high among the 
blue collar workers and manual laborers, and an easy way to reduce it was 
to help the home building industry recover quickly from the recession 
because the industry was highly labor intensive. 1  Accordingly the 
                                            
1 Effects of the housing construction upon the national economy are not easy to assess., but they 
are generally known to be very substantial. For example, the input-output analysis found that 
the income multiplier was 1.98, implying that one unit of housing investment generates almost 
two units of value added in real terms. Employment generation coefficient is also high relative 
to those generated by other investments. The figure estimated runs as high as 0.27. Clearly, 
housing investment significantly affects nation's output, and thus, economic growth. (See 
"Changing Perspectives for the Korean Housing Industry." a paper presented at the 
International Conference on Urban Development Strategies: an Era of Global Competition, 
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government policies were primarily focused on attracting investment 
monies into the housing market and thus, making home purchases more 
secure and profitable. 
The most important of all the measures was abandonment of the housing 
price control system and related market intervention measures as of 
February 1998; home builders became free to set their own prices of the 
multi-family condominiums. The elimination resulted in a sharp rise in 
purchase price, while improving housing quality to some extent. Those who 
advocated repeal of the price control would hope that it might lead to some 
severe competition among the home builders, thus maintaining competitive 
price at best while simultaneously upgrading the housing quality standards.  
The government either pumped out a large amount of its own funds or 
channeled the private funds into the housing market to stimulate the 
housing construction. These funds helped expand the housing finance credit 
and subsidize new home buyers with very attractive home loan packages 
with interest rates 2% to 5% lower than the market rate. It also used the 
National Housing Fund (NHF) and the World Bank money to help the 
ailing housing industry. And there were other measures, primarily designed 
for the homebuilders to produce more housing for the low and moderate 
income households. Various incentives were provided to this end, including 
reduction of corporate income tax, low interest construction loans, and sale 
of government developed residential land at the prices, 20-30% cheaper than 
the market prices. 
All the actions taken by the government during the recovery period 
might have been necessary to some extent, but they also had serious 
negative side effects on housing sector. Most critical was the price hike; 
home prices have gone up so rapidly over the last three years that an 
ordinary household in Seoul can't afford to buy even a moderately sized 
home. Good quality housing with good location is almost out of reach for 
the majority of households in Seoul. A small number of the well-to-do 
dominate the market, leaving the majority almost inaccessible. Many fear 
that the housing price spiral, if unchecked, will eventually lead to inflation 
and very skewed distribution of income and wealth. In fact inequality in 
income and asset distribution is getting worse; a recent estimate for GINI 
index for asset is as high as 0.915 while that of income is 0.312. Also there is 
a fear of bubble which may eventually bust and end up with to economic 
recession. The policy makers of the current administration have been very 
much concerned about the housing situation and believed that the only way 
to mitigate the problem is to contain the price hike. As a result a series of 
very strong anti-speculation measures have been announced since the 
fourth quarter of 2001.  
There are four types of anti-speculation measures; taxation, financial 
                                                                                                    
Korea-United Kingdom Joint Workshop, Seoul, Korea, Oct. 1994  
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restriction, land use control, and administrative decrees. On the other hand 
various efforts have been made to increase the housing supply through new 
construction in both inner city area and in government-designated new 
towns. New towns are mostly located far away from the center of major 
metropolitan areas. And new housing units within the inner city area have 
been supplied largely in the form of, what is called, 'reconstruction' 
(gentrification.) 
Over 70 anti-speculation measures were announced during the period of 
2001-2003, but most of them had not worked adequately until the 10.29 
measures were put into effect (announced on October 29th, 2003). They are 
summarized as follows;  
1) establishment of real transaction price report system whereby both 
sellers and buyers will be fined if they falsely report the real transaction 
prices when they register the properties in subject with local agencies 
proper. 
2) strengthening of the tax systems, including development gains tax, 
property holding tax, and real estate transfer income tax (capital gains tax),  
3) designation of "speculation zones", including speculation prone zone, 
speculation area, and overly speculative zone where special investigations 
are made regularly to deter any speculative behavior or wrongdoing in 
housing transactions. 
4)reduction of LTV ratio from 60% to 40% to reduce demand for home 
purchase.  
All these measures were intended to discourage speculative purchases. 
Heavy taxes are imposed as the government uses real transaction price as 
the tax base rather than the government's standardized price(ie, assessed 
value). It serves as tax base only in areas as designated as speculation zones. 
Also those who own more than two separate housing units ought to pay 
higher capital gains taxes when they make a profit by selling one of them.  
Speculative activities have been most visible within the inner city areas, 
either being already designated for 'reconstruction area' or being eligible for 
such a designation. Thus, the anti-speculative measures have been primarily 
targeted to the old dwelling structures within these areas. The law allowed 
property owners to demolish existing low-rise multi-family apartment units 
of over 20 years or older and to replace them with new condominium units 
at a maximum density as measured by the floor-to-area ratio (FAR). The 
FAR was once allowed up to 480% when the program was actively 
promoted in late 1990's. The reason behind implementing such a program 
was to expand housing stock in a city like Seoul where new residential land 
is hard to find and housing shortage is serious enough to incur periodic 
housing crisis.  
Reconstruction projects thrived since 2001 because they began to yield 
lucrative profits for investors and developers alike. As a result many people 
jumped into reconstruction investment. The units being eligible for 
reconstruction project have been the easy target for housing speculation, 
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thus causing their prices to sharply rise, which has in turn influenced those 
of the existing units nearby as well.  
Now the government faces a dilemma; on the one hand reconstruction 
project has to be promoted for the expansion of housing stock in inner city 
area, but it must be discouraged in order to disparage the housing 
speculation on the other. This prompted the government to draw up a new 
law, called "urban and residential environment realignment act." The law 
mandates cities to adopt a comprehensive urban and residential realignment 
plan, to designate a priori the improvement areas accordingly, and to specify 
development phases, land uses and FAR. It also requires them to raise the 
safety standards for reconstruction-eligible buildings so that structurally 
sound and architecturally valuable units could be prevented from being 
destroyed for speculative purpose. Government also wants to recapture 
development windfall gains both in the form of capital gains tax and 
'donating' rental apartments for the economically disadvantaged, in 
addition to impact fees to cover the costs of building the basic infrastructure 
facilities..How effective these measures have been, however, remains to be 
seen.  
3. Speculation and Housing Price  
3.1 Literature Survey 
Generally there are three approaches that have been extensively used to 
define and determine real estate prices; hedonic price approach, market 
behavior approach and real estate forecasting modeling approach. Hedonic 
price model has been widely used as it measures the importance on the 
value that the market places on the individual attributes of a housing unit. It 
views housing as a heterogeneous bundle of attributes that actually make up 
the services of a housing unit. The model can be easily specified; the hedonic 
price function is estimated by regressing either rent or housing price as 
dependent variable on the characteristics of a housing unit as independent 
variables. The partial derivatives of these functions with respect to a 
characteristic are the hedonic prices. 2  They are used in many ways; 
developing an index to compare the cost of housing in different cities, real 
estate assessment, and consumer demand. 
There have been many hedonic regression studies done in Korea from as 
early as 1979 (Lim Gill et al) and 1981 (Kim J). The early works primarily 
focused on estimating the demand parameters, the price elasticity in 
particular, using hedonic price index. More recently an extensive hedonic 
                                            
2 For detail, see Rosen, S. (1974) "Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in 
Pure Competition, Journal of Political Economy 82: 35-55  
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studies were performed by Chung and Kang (2001). This study defines a 
housing unit as a bundle of three characteristics, including housing 
characteristics, spatial characteristics and environmental characteristics. The 
first one comprises the size, story, construction year; the second comprises 
quality of education, distance to the urban center, access to subway stations, 
and residential location. The third represents the view only.  
The models seem to behave properly; they are well fit as their coefficients 
of determination came up with 0.91 for 1994 model, 0.90 for 1998 model and 
0.93 for 2001 model. But some variables turned out to be statistically 
insignificant as their t-values were relatively low, including access to 
subway station in both 1994 and 2001 models and view in 1998 model. The 
rest of variables were statistically significant. From the study results one can 
make a few conclusions.  
First of all the factors that influence the housing price most are 
residential location, distance to the city center and number of stories. 
Secondly, the quality of education became relatively more important in 
recent years while previously important factors such as the number of 
stories if the subject was an apartment complex, and the year of construction 
became less so as time went on. Thirdly, the quality of education is certainly 
significant, but not so much in monetary terms. For example, the quality of 
education was worth only 5.52 million won while the size, residential 
location and access to subway station were worth 30.33 million won, 152.2 
million won and 17.42 million won, respectively. Consequently the 
argument is not plausible that good quality of education is the key factor for 
rapid rise in home price in Gangnam area. In other words it is very likely 
that the importance of education is in fact exaggerated as a primary cause 
for the price hike. 
The second approach is that of forecasting model. A number of attempts 
have been made to forecast real estate prices in recent years. They use time 
series analysis, more specifically either VAR model or traditional ARIMA 
model, which basically assumes that the future variation in real estate price 
depends largely on the past price behavior in the market. Accordingly the 
dependent variable for ARIMA model is the current real estate price and the 
explanatory variables are the past prices.  
The advantage of using ARIMA model is that it is more likely to 
correctly predict the short-term future price, but the disadvantage is that one 
can't add any independent variables other than the time lag variable. Thus, 
the model has only limited uses in analyzing real estate market behavior 
and policy. Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) model has emerged as a good 
substitute to avoid this problem. The model has been widely appraised as it 
combines ARIMA with traditional structural equation model. But it also has 
some serious defects because it assumes that all the variables are 
endogenous and each of them varies not only with its own time lag, but 
those of other variables. Accordingly, the more time-lag variables one may 
have, the more likely one may lose the degree of freedom. This caused some 
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difficulty when one tests the model's reliability. Equally important is the 
model's assumption that all the variables should be stationary, which must 
be met to guarantee correct forecasting. It takes differencing procedure 
when a certain variable is found to be non-stationary through unit root test. 
In doing so one loses some valuable information from the level data. The 
other disadvantage of VAR model when one uses it for real estate market 
analysis is that it can't take so many variables all at once. Thus it seems to be 
inadequate tool for analyzing real estate market behavior and particularly, 
the effects of real estate policy on the market.  
There are many time series analyses performed for Korean housing 
market. For example, ARIMA model was developed for a short term 
forecasting of housing price and also a number of VAR models have been 
tested for the purpose of real estate market forecasting since early 1990's. 
(Suh S.H, 1993; Kang W.C and Kim B.S, 1997; and Kim K.S and Suh S.H 
1998). They studied the structural relationship between real estate price and 
macro economic variables such as consumer price, economic growth and 
business cycle by constructing VAR model. Son J.S and Kim K.Y,(1998.1) 
and Kim Y.C.(1996) analyzed the real estate price changes and found that 
the land price inversely varied with the yield rate of corporate bond. The 
lower the bond rate, the more funds tend to be invested into real estate 
(land) market. Also the variables that influence the land price most are the 
first differencing lag variables of own price, land transaction, and GDP. 
Land price is more likely to rise when there is high rate of economic growth 
and also relatively high frequency of land transaction.  
Finally there are a large number of literatures on housing price 
determinants through using the traditional regression analyses. They 
normally have two objectives in mind; one, to test some hypothesis 
regarding housing market behavior or decision making behavior of an 
individual agent. For example, demand model is constructed to test the 
hypothesis that the price elasticity of housing demand is 1.0. In this simple 
case a regression model with one equation or a limited number of 
simultaneous equations would suffice. The other objective is to identify the 
real estate price determinants through estimating relevant parameters and 
to use them for policy impact analysis and also for real estate price/and 
demand forecasting. But clearly the power of forecasting is relatively weak 
when one uses a simple regression model for such a purpose unless time 
series elements are incorporated into the modeling structure. 
The size of model varies from one extreme to another. It could be a single 
equation model or a large number of simultaneous equations, depending on 
the study purpose. For example, Chung J (1976) constructed 30 
simultaneous equation model when he studied Canadian housing and 
mortgage market, He analyzed equilibrium price and housing rent behavior 
through estimating the model. He also worked on a time series model to 
analyze housing price determinants as well as short and long-term factors 
that might affect housing construction cycle in Korea. (1984.12) 
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Another study by Kim K.S et al (2003) analyzed a set of determinants 
which explain spatial differences in housing price. They used traditional 
regression model. Tthe housing price in time t is hypothesized to be a 
logarithmic function of chonsei price, total money flow, and rate of change 
in lagged price, etc. The model turned out to be as predicted; housing price 
increases with chonsei price, increase in money flow, and etc. An interesting 
point is that the lagged price of housing is considered as reflecting the 
expected capital gain. In other words the variable represents speculative 
motivation. Note that this variable has the largest t-value among the 
explanatory variables, implying that people purchase homes for speculative 
purpose in mind.  
The other point to note from the study result is the direction of the stock 
price index. It has an inverse relationship with housing price; investment 
funds move from housing to stock market when stock price rises, resulting 
in a decrease in housing demand and price. 
3.2 Model for Housing Speculation 
This study also opts for a traditional regression model for a few reasons. 
One is possible loss of valuable information by using such traditional time 
series analysis as ARIMA and VAR models. As pointed out above the time 
series model assumes stationarity condition, and to satisfy such a condition 
one has to go through differencing procedure. In this process one loses a lot 
of information. Secondly, one can't incorporate into ARIMA and VAR 
models a large number of market and policy variables. These variables may 
better explain the changes in real estate prices. 
The model for this study is based on both theories of excess demandand 
cost push in housing market. The Figure 1. below illustrates the points. 
Suppose that P1 is the price of housing in time t and at this price level the 
quantity demanded for housing is OH2, but the quantity supplied is only 
OH1. Thus, the excess demand is represented as OH2 - OH1 = H1H2. If the 
market normally behaves, the price will continuously rise until it reaches an 
equilibrium price of P3 in time t + 1. Suppose also that housing production 
cost increases due to an increase in residential land price (land as an input 
for the housing commodity). This will push the supply curve upward from 
S1 to S2 and end up with a new equilibrium price of P4. Consequently the 
housing price moves from P1 to P4 and the difference between P3 and P1 
results from excess demand and that between P4 and P3, from cost push. As 
such housing price hike is assumed to be caused by both factors of demand 
pull and cost push simultaneously.  
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[ Figure 1 ] Mechanism of Housing Price Increase 
 
            
The model to be estimated is as follows 
 
tttttt caHaiaPaIaaP 61541310 +−−++= −−       (1) 
 
Where  :housing price in time t tP
        : household income in time t tI
       : expected yield rate of housing investment 1−tP
       I  : yield rate of alternative investment 
       : housing stock at t-1 1−tH
        : housing cost (land cost, construction cost, etc,) C
 
This model can easily be estimated through OLS method. 
3.3 Estimation Results 
The data used are the index of housing price estimated by Kookmin 
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Bank (formerly Korea Housing Bank) covering the period, 1987-2003. Table 
1 presents the estimates of the regression analysis where housing price was 
regressed on a number of independent variables, presumably influencing 
the price one way or the other. They included; per capita GDP as a proxy for 
income, yield rate of 3-year maturity corporate bond, rate of increase in land 
price, expected rate of return on housing investment, and rate of increase in 
housing construction permit representing housing stock. Quarterly data 
were used for the analysis. Also included in this model were two dummy 
variables; one for the third quarter of 1990 and, the other, the first quarter of 
2002. The dummies were added to observe any changes in price by the 
effects of the announcement on anti-speculation measures. 
The dependent variables are the change in the housing price index. The 
independent variables are variations in per capita GDP, representing 
non-speculative demand, change in expected housing price increase and 
bond yield reflecting speculative and investment demand, change in 
housing buildings permit standing for housing supply and finally change in 
land price showing the principal cost of housing production. All the 
independent variables are lagged. The number of lags are selected 
empirically. The first dummy variable (1990, 3/4=1.0) reflects the impact of 
the announcement of the "Public Conception of Land" policy that consisted 
of the upper ceiling on land ownership, tax on unrealized capital gains and 
development gains tax. The second dummy (2002, 1/4=1.0) represents the 
government anti-speculation measures. 
CHAPTER 2-2  Housing Price Hike and Price Stabilization Policy in Korea 195 
[ Table 1 ] Regression Analysis of Housing Price 
Dependent Variable : Rate of Change in Housing Price 
 Independent Variable Korea Kyunggi Seoul Gangnam 
 Constant -0.4364 (-1.070) 
-0.4245 
(-1.3198) 
-0.3855 
(-1.432) 
-0.4804 
(-1.498) 
 per capita GDP ( t-1) 0.0751 (1.529) 
0.0712 
(1.2528) 
0.0624 
(1.2664) 
0.0847 
(1.4760) 
 Rate of Yield of 3-year 
 Industrial Bond (t-1) 
-0.0311 
(-1.8343)* 
-0.0251 
(-1.1702) 
-0.0367 
(-2.0159)** 
0.0357 
(-1.6235) 
 Land Price (t-1) 0.1272 (2.4604)** 
0.1633 
(2.4636)** 
0.1689 
(3.0156)** 
0.1949 
(2.9216)** 
 Expected Housing Price 
  (t-1) 
0.9033 
(21.1467)** 
0.9318 
(20.5817)** 
0.9324 
(22.6109)** 
0.9196 
(22.3515)** 
 Housing Building Permit 
  (t-1) 
-0.0126 
(-2.2216)** 
-0.0136 
(-1.9971)* 
-0.0136 
(-2.3378)** 
0.0183 
(-2.6000)** 
 D 90.3/4 0.9303 (1.6050) - - - 
 D 02.1/4 1.2217 (2.1901)* 
1.6540 
(2.3264)** 
1.4598 
(2.4316)** 
1.9482 
(2.6913)** 
 R2 0.926 0.903 0.923 0.921 
 F 100.27 86.058 111.355 108.182 
 Durbin-Watson 0.6740 0.6224 0.6448 0.6992 
Note :  * - significant at 10% probability 
** - significant at 5% probability 
( ) : t-value 
 
The regression model behaves fairly well as shown in Table 1 above. The 
R-squares are high with over .9 for all four areas under study, implying that 
the models are all well fit. The value of Durbin-Watson is in the 
indeterminate zone. Examining the t-values for each independent variable 
one finds that, in all models, both rate of change in land price and expected 
rate of return on housing investment are statistically significant as predicted. 
The former represents a cost push factor of housing price while the latter, 
the effect of speculative demand of home purchaser. Note also that the 
variable of home building permit, being used as a proxy for change in 
housing supply, is also statistically significant in all four regions. As 
expected, it negatively affects the housing price. Theoretically home price 
ought to decline with an increase in housing supply. However, change in 
per capita GDP, representing non-speculative demand, does not appear to 
be very significant except for Korea as a whole though it shows expected 
Residential Welfare and Housing Policies: The Experience and Future of Korea 196
positive sign. This may well reflect the particular situation of Korea's 
housing market where speculation is alleged to dominate. The second 
dummy variable turns out to have a significant positive impact on housing 
price. This implies a total failure of anti-speculation measures, being put into 
effect as of January and March of 2002. Had those measures been  effective 
in curbing housing price spiral, its sign must have been negative. Distrust in 
government's piecemeal approach to housing speculation may have to do 
with this kind of turn-out. Some argue that speculators may have been 
"immunized" by so many, and so frequent, announcements of 
anti-speculative measures. In fact the government announced over 70 
measures of similar kind over the two-year period of 2001-2003.  
3.4 Decomposition of Estimated Dependence Variable 
The share of an independent variable in influencing dependent variable 
within a certain period of time can be measured with the formula below. 
 
t
T
t
iti
T
t
i YXbW
∧
==
∑∑=
11
/       (2) 
 
Where   :  share of Xi in the value of estimated of Y iW
         :   regression coefficient of Xi ib
         :  Xi at time t,  itX
         t  :   1,2,…T 
         
∧
Y :   estimated value of the housing price 
 
The results of the analysis are shown in table 2. below. During the 21 
quarter period between the first quarter of 2001 and the second quarter of 
2003, the percentage share of the per capita GDP, a proxy measure of 
household income, in housing price inflation amounted to 27.9% while that 
of the yield rate of corporate bond and expected rate of return on housing 
investment (expected housing price) were 15.7% and 54.3%, respectively. 
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[ Table 2 ] Degree of Contribution to Housing Price Inflation (%)  
 Korea Kyunggi Seoul Kangnam 
1. Total Estimated Housing 
Price Variation 100 100 100 100 
2. Contribution of Each 
Independent Variable     
per capita GDP  27.9 14.0 11.1 10.7 
Bond Yield 15.7 6.4 8.8 6.0 
Expected Housing Price 54.3 54.0 57.0 63.1 
Land Price 21.3 14.6 13.4 10.7 
Housing Building Permit -19.3 -11.1 -9.9 -9.4 
3. Ratio of Speculative Demand 
to Normal Demand     
Expected Housing 
Price/GDP 1.94 3.83 5.10 5.87 
Note: The sum of the independent variables' weights cannot be 100 because of  the constant. 
 
On the other hand, the rate of increase in home building permit 
contributes to price stabilization by 19.3%. Clearly, the percentage share of 
speculative demand in housing price spiral is very high. The expected rate 
of return on housing investment which represents speculative demand is 
much more powerful factor in both Seoul as a whole and particularly 
Kangnam area in explaining housing price spiral than the per capita GDP, a 
variable that would represent non-speculative, normal demand for housing. 
In order to investigate more precisely the relative weight of speculative 
demand variable, the share of the expected rate of return on housing 
investment is divided by that of the per capita GDP variable. It should be 
noted that the ratio of speculative demand (expected housing price) to 
normal demand (per capita GDP) for Korea as a whole is 1.94, but it jumps 
to 3.8 times for Kyunggi province, 5.10 times for Seoul and 5.9 times for 
Gangnam area. This clearly demonstrates that the housing price in 
Gangnam area is largely affected by speculation one way or the other rather 
than by real and normal demand. 
3.5 Determinants of Housing Speculation 
What are the causes of the housing speculation?  There seem to be many 
reasons why speculation has occurred particularly over the three-year 
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period between 2001 and 2003. There are five generally accepted scenarios: 
low rate of interest on savings; expansion of money supply (or increase in 
liquidity); availability of home mortgage loan funds; rising demand for 
housing and  demand-supply mismatch; and government measures to 
promote construction economy and expansion. All these factors combined 
together would have drastically increased the expectation for large windfall 
capital gains from housing investment. 
The interest rate fell from 11.3% in 1998 to 6.9% in 2001, and ever since it 
has gradually dropped down to 4-5% level now. A fall in interest rate has 
directly affected the real estate market in many ways. It resulted in the 
reduction of the chonsei3 value from the standpoint of the landlord, who 
would then shift to monthly rental, and this might have caused the number 
of chonsei apartment stock to substantially decrease. And the subsequent 
effect was the rise in chonsei price and more renters would have purchased 
homes rather than paying high chonsei rent. They would have otherwise 
been renters, had the chonsei price not gone up so high. The whole cycle 
that started with low rate of interest would eventually be ended up with rise 
in home purchase demand. Increase in housing demand would obviously 
push the housing price up. In fact the ratio of chonsei over the purchase 
price rose from 60% in January 2000 to 68% in January 2002. 
Secondly, the fall in interest rate would reduce the financial burden of 
interest payment on the part of the consumers, which would have led to the 
increase in the demand for home mortgages. More households would have 
purchased homes through mortgage financing, which would also have 
pushed the demand for housing and eventually raise the price of housing. In 
general a fall in interest rate tends to make investors prefer real estate to 
financial asset because the former yields relatively higher rate of return than 
the latter. And also theoretically if interest falls, the present value of the 
future income streams increases. Asset value is computed simply by 
dividing future income by interest rate (ie, R/i). Therefore, if interest rate 
falls, the real estate value goes up, other things being equal, and again it 
stimulates housing demand and pushes housing price up.  
A substantial increase in money supply is another important factor that 
would have significantly contributed to housing price spiral. Too much 
money has been supplied since the financial crisis of 1997-1998 in part to 
stimulate the depressed economy. Ever since 1999 the rate of increase in M3 
has exceeded that of GDP. The international trade surplus has also 
contributed to the excess supply of liquidity. It amounted to 41.4 billion 
dollars in 1998 and 44.9 billion dollars in 1999. 
Another factor that might have caused the housing price inflation is a 
                                            
3 Chonsei is a typical form of rental tenure in Korea. A renter makes a lump-sum amount of 
chonsei deposit with landlord, and the latter earns monthly rent of the amount equivalent to 
interest income accrued from chonsei. The interest rate runs as high as two to three times the 
market interest rate, depending on rental market situation.  
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record rise in both home mortgage and personal lending. Personal 
borrowing became easy due to low rate of interest and availability of funds 
to go around. Financial institutions carried a sufficiently large amount of 
liquid funds for lending, but private firms hesitated to borrow money for 
facility expansion and addition because of uncertainty about the economy. 
Therefore a huge amount of money have remained "dormant." Meanwhile 
they concentrated on home mortgage loans as such loans were more 
profitable. These loans were securitized with high priced real estate asset 
and thus, almost risk free. Besides those who borrowed money were upper 
middle-class households and credit worthy. Accordingly a large amount of 
liquid money has flown into the housing market, especially the Gangnam 
submarket where the housing price was expected to continuously rise. The 
amount of home mortgage loans outstanding by the financial institutions 
almost doubled within a year from 38.2 trillion won in 2000 to 63.5 trillion 
won in 2001. And the figure reached over 125 trillion won in 2002. Clearly 
credit availability helped increase housing demand and thus, raise the 
housing price as much. 
Finally the government's expansion policy after the financial crisis 
targeted the housing sector as one that could promote national income and 
employment because the multiplier effect of housing investment was 
estimated to be as high as 1.9. The government relaxed, liberalized or even 
repealed various measures being largely geared to preventing speculative 
home purchases and land dealings; including, repeal of new apartment sale 
price control system, ease of the regulation on mandatory percentage ratio 
of supplying small sized apartment units (for example, from 70% down to 
40%), permission of transfer of the priority right to outright purchasing a 
newly constructed condominium unit, and also relaxation of land use 
regulations within the green belt area that surrounded large metropolitan 
areas. Furthermore, various financial and tax incentives were provided for 
both ordinary investors and developers alike to invest money into housing 
and land developments. In particular home buyers were given incentives to 
borrow money for home purchase at subsidized interest rate and also to 
write off interest payments from income taxes. These highly stimulative 
policy packages have clearly resulted in housing price inflation. 
4. Housing Price Bubble 
Real estate price bubble raised some heated discussion among the 
academics in the 90's when Japanese economy experienced "bubble to bust" 
which led the country to financial crisis afterwards. Many scholars and mass 
communication claimed that the recent housing price escalation taking place 
in Gangnam area would be a symptom of a price bubble, and warned that if 
unchecked it would eventually lead to bust and to a serious asset deflation 
as observed in Japan and Thailand.  
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This study is intended to explore and further elaborate on a few 
propositions with regard to the subject of real estate price bubble. What is 
bubble? And if it does exist, how serious is it? Is it serious enough to go bust 
in a foreseeable future? Are there any policy measures that can prevent the 
price bubble, or the bust of bubble if bubble really exists? These are some of 
the questions that this study addresses itself to. 
Generally price bubble is defined to be the substantial difference between 
actual price and imaginary price or between real price and 
theoretical/implicit price. No matter how one may define it, bubble is 
abnormal and irregular price as pointed out by Frankel and Rose (1996). But 
the question then is; what is the normal price level? Theoretically normal 
price is the one that is determined under the normal market conditions; in 
other words as Garber argued (Garber 1998) there would be no bubble, 
where the housing market normally behave. 
4.1 Estimation Models for Speculation 
There are several ways of estimating bubbles. However, relevant 
literature suggests that the most often used models, being applied to real 
estate price, are as follows; 1) long-run equilibrium price approach, 2) 
fundamental market value approach (or also known as discounted cash flow 
approach) and 3) price-income ratio (PIR) approach 
4.1.1  Long-run Equilibrium Price Approach 
Several studies (Samsung Research Institute, 2003. 5; Korea Deposit 
Insurance Corp. 2002; Kim, Kyung Hwan, 2003) assume that variation in 
such macro economic variables as GDP and consumer price index reflect a 
long-run equilibrium housing price. This approach can be summarized; 
 
ttt GDPPB ∆−∆=      (3) 
and  %(%) =∆= t
t
t P
BB  share of  tB
Where     : the amount of bubble tB
          : the rate of change in actual price tP∆
          : the rate of change in GDP iGDP∆
 
4.1.2 The Fundamental Market Value (DCF) Approach 
This approach is based on the assumption that deviation from the 
fundamental market is "abnormal" and bubble. The fundamental market 
value is the present value of future stream of benefit (income on utility)  
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coming from the dwelling. This approach can be summarized as follows : 
Now  
iRp
pPB
t
ttt
/=
−=
∧
∧
  : fundamental market value 
∧
tP
 R : income (or utility) stream of real estate 
   : discount rate   i
 
Monthly rent (income) was estimated as follows: chonsei rent is 
converted into monthly rent by apply 0.9% interest. The discount rate is 
1/12 of the annual yield of 3-year corporate bond. 
 4.1.3 Price-Income Ratio (PIR) Approach 
Some studies (Flood, Carber, 1980, Samsung Research Institute, 2003) 
assume that the "normal" housing price should not exceed excessively the 
household annual income. To be more precise, the normal housing price 
should be the average PIR plus one standard deviation. If we assume 
normal distribution of PIR, the assumed probability range would cover 85% 
of the PIR sample. This approach can be summarized. 
 ∧−= ttt PPB  
∧
tP  = average PIR + standard deviation of PIR 
4.2 Results of Estimate 
The results of the long-run equilibrium approach are shown in Table 3 
and Figure 2. 
The time period in this analysis covered five years, beginning with the 
second quarter of 1997 through the first quarter of 2002. The level of price 
bubble ranges from 1.69 of the third quarter of 2001, to 3.29 of the fourth 
quarter of 2001 and 3.32 of the first quarter of 2002 in case of Seoul. Note the 
contrasting results between Gangbuk and Gangnam; in case of Gangbuk it 
ranges between 0.16, 1.64 and 1.19 for the three periods examined, but the 
figure jumps up to 5.15 from 2.61 and 4.69 for the respective period in case 
of Gangnam. Overall, the price bubble did start in early 2000 and 
particularly it got exacerbated in Gangnam area ever since. The percentage 
share of bubble in the housing price is 56 to 75% in Seoul on average. It is as 
high as 66 to 81% on average in Gangnam area while it ranges between 32 to 
60% on average in Gangbuk area. 
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[ Table 3 ] Estimate of Bubble by Long-run Equilibrium Approach 
Variation of Price tB  Weight of  tB
 
Seoul Gang buk 
Gang 
nam GDP Seoul 
Gang 
buk 
Gang 
nam Seoul 
Gang 
buk 
Gang 
nam 
1997 2/4 1.28 0.61 1.85 2.96 -1.69 -2.35 -1.11 -1.32 -3.83 -0.60 
1997 3/4 0.64 0.32 0.90 1.72 -1.08 -1.40 -0.82 -1.69 -4.42 -0.91 
1997 4/4 -0.18 -0.18 -0.15 0.36 -0.53 -0.53 -0.51 3.04 3.04 3.36 
1998 1/4 -1.88 -1.45 -2.25 -0.63 -1.25 -0.82 -1.62 0.66 0.57 0.72 
1998 2/4 -4.52 -3.39 -5.56 -1.46 -3.06 -1.93 -4.10 0.68 0.57 0.74 
1998 3/4 -4.86 -3.83 -5.83 -1.03 -3.83 -2.80 -4.80 0.79 0.73 0.82 
1998 4/4 -2.12 -2.09 -2.27 -0.01 -2.11 -2.07 -2.25 0.99 0.99 0.99 
1999 1/4 -0.17 -0.43 0.02 1.53 -1.70 -1.96 -1.51 9.96 4.54 -84.47 
1999 2/4 0.50 0.07 0.98 3.44 -2.94 -3.37 -2.46 -5.92 -51.35 -2.50 
1999 3/4 1.37 0.35 2.42 3.34 -1.96 -2.98 -0.92 -1.43 -8.42 -0.38 
1999 4/4 1.80 0.65 2.93 2.27 -0.47 -1.61 0.67 -0.26 -2.46 0.23 
2000 1/4 1.56 0.69 2.41 2.37 -0.81 -1.68 0.05 -0.52 -2.44 0.02 
2000 2/4 1.18 0.54 1.70 2.55 -1.37 -2.01 -0.85 -1.16 -3.70 -0.50 
2000 3/4 0.83 0.37 1.09 1.75 -0.92 -1.37 -0.65 -1.10 -3.69 -0.60 
2000 4/4 0.43 0.19 0.54 1.13 -0.70 -0.94 -0.59 -1.61 -4.90 -1.09 
2001 1/4 0.40 0.22 0.57 1.66 -1.26 -1.45 -1.09 -3.13 -6.66 -1.91 
2001 2/4 1.39 0.89 1.87 2.02 -0.63 -1.13 -0.14 -0.45 -1.26 -0.08 
2001 3/4 3.02 1.94 3.94 1.33 1.69 0.61 2.61 0.56 0.32 0.66 
2001 4/4 4.39 2.74 5.79 1.10 3.29 1.64 4.69 0.75 0.60 0.81 
2002 1/4 5.43 3.28 7.26 2.11 3.32 1.17 5.15 0.61 0.36 0.71 
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[ Figure 2 ] Variation in Housing Price Index and GDP, 1997-2002 
  
The second method used to estimate the price bubble is that of the 
fundamental market value approach. The results of the estimate of bubble 
according to this approach are summarized in Tables 4 and 5 
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[ Table 4 ] Estimate of Bubble by the Method of Fundamental Market Value 
Monthly Rent 3-year bond Yield = R/i  
 
A B C Annual Average 
Monthly
Average A B C A B C 
199703 128 139 100 12.34% 1.03% 12,443 13,485 9,753 32,001 33,062 25,930
199706 128 135 98 12.12% 1.01% 12,673 13,400 9,705 32,236 32,458 25,688
199709 128 137 100 12.11% 1.01% 12,651 13,554 9,876 32,703 33,330 26,531
199712 127 136 99 16.97% 1.41% 8,987 9,637 7,028 33,056 33,502 26,514
199803 112 117 89 20.71% 1.73% 6,499 6,793 5,129 30,978 31,232 24,716
199806 85 86 67 17.54% 1.46% 5,848 5,879 4,618 27,096 27,217 21,450
199809 95 95 75 12.86% 1.07% 8,824 8,887 7,035 27,138 26,841 21,297
199812 98 98 77 9.30% 0.78% 12,588 12,603 9,979 27,290 26,856 21,963
199903 108 112 85 8.33% 0.69% 15,555 16,067 12,231 28,085 27,521 22,643
199906 115 120 93 7.98% 0.67% 17,226 17,983 13,925 28,810 28,352 23,882
199909 125 130 99 9.62% 0.80% 15,615 16,257 12,374 30,979 30,067 25,378
199912 130 133 103 9.50% 0.79% 16,480 16,858 13,040 31,780 30,838 25,908
200003 142 149 112 10.09% 0.84% 16,895 17,689 13,367 33,155 32,166 26,765
200006 148 154 124 9.87% 0.82% 18,048 18,697 15,115 33,356 32,521 28,796
200009 153 162 128 9.04% 0.75% 20,375 21,541 16,991 33,950 33,546 29,294
200012 154 158 128 8.42% 0.70% 21,973 22,579 18,179 33,853 32,893 28,828
200103 159 164 132 7.24% 0.60% 26,388 27,160 21,889 34,226 33,271 29,093
200106 167 173 136 7.62% 0.64% 26,300 27,204 21,366 35,490 34,393 30,306
200109 180 190 142 6.61% 0.55% 32,626 34,557 25,793 38,142 37,270 31,201
200112 193 197 148 6.74% 0.56% 34,284 35,113 26,382 40,636 38,635 33,750
200203 205 210 159 7.00% 0.58% 35,116 36,030 27,180 45,777 43,279 38,179
A : Gangnam-gu,  B : Socho-gu,  C : Sonpa-gu 
CHAPTER 2-2  Housing Price Hike and Price Stabilization Policy in Korea 205 
[ Table 5 ] Estimate of Bubble by the Method of Fundamental Market Value 
∧−= ttt PPB  Weight of  tB 
A B C A B C 
199703 19,558 19,578 16,177 0.61 0.59 0.62 
199706 19,563 19,058 15,982 0.61 0.59 0.62 
199709 20,052 19,776 16,655 0.61 0.59 0.63 
199712 24,070 23,866 19,486 0.73 0.71 0.73 
199803 24,478 24,440 19,587 0.79 0.78 0.79 
199806 21,248 21,338 16,832 0.78 0.78 0.78 
199809 18,314 17,954 14,262 0.67 0.67 0.67 
199812 14,702 14,253 11,983 0.54 0.53 0.55 
199903 12,530 11,453 10,412 0.45 0.42 0.46 
199906 11,584 10,370 9,958 0.40 0.37 0.42 
199909 15,363 13,811 13,004 0.50 0.46 0.51 
199912 15,300 13,980 12,868 0.48 0.45 0.50 
200003 16,260 14,477 13,397 0.49 0.45 0.50 
200006 15,308 13,824 13,681 0.46 0.43 0.48 
200009 13,576 12,005 12,303 0.40 0.36 0.42 
200012 11,880 10,315 10,649 0.35 0.31 0.37 
200103 7,838 6,111 7,204 0.23 0.18 0.25 
200106 9,189 7,189 8,941 0.26 0.21 0.30 
200109 5,516 2,713 5,408 0.14 0.07 0.17 
200112 6,352 3,522 7,368 0.16 0.09 0.22 
200203 10,661 7,248 10,998 0.23 0.17 0.29 
A : Gangnam-gu,  B : Socho-gu,  C : Sonpa-gu 
  
According to Table 5, the percentage share of bubble in the real estate 
price declines since the first quarter of 2000. For example, in case of 
Gangnam-gu the share was recorded up to 40% in the third quarter of 2000, 
but it fell to 16% in the fourth quarter of 2001. Afterwards it rose up to 23% 
in the first quarter of 2001. One can see a similar pattern in Seocho-gu, 
though slightly lower than the former. Note that the percentage share in 
Songpa-gu is much larger than in any other areas. It rose up to 42% in the 
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third quarter of 2000 and fell to 17% in the third quarter of 2001, but it rose 
again up to 29% in the first quarter of 2002. 
[ Table 6 ] Estimate of PIR4
 A B C 
199703 19.094 19.727 15.471 
199706 16.798 16.914 13.386 
199709 16.181 16.492 13.127 
199712 15.786 15.999 12.662 
199803 18.363 18.514 14.651 
199806 15.003 15.071 11.877 
199809 15.255 15.088 11.971 
199812 12.860 12.656 10.350 
199903 15.482 15.171 12.482 
199906 14.026 13.803 11.627 
199909 14.178 13.761 11.615 
199912 12.172 11.811 9.922 
200003 17.277 16.762 13.947 
200006 15.134 14.755 13.065 
200009 14.989 14.811 12.933 
200012 12.665 12.306 10.785 
200103 16.753 16.285 14.241 
200106 15.478 14.999 13.217 
200109 15.742 15.382 12.877 
200112 14.497 13.784 12.041 
200203 20.336 19.226 16.961 
MEAN 15.62233 15.39605 12.81943 
Std. Dev 2.036106 2.1042 1.663397 
A - Ga gnam,  B - Socho-gu,  C - Songpa-gu n
 
                                            
4 The estimated PIR are relatively high. This is due to the fact that we used the average 
household income of Seoul as whole. It is a known fact that household incomes in the three 
Gu(district) are much higher than Seoul's average. By DATA on income by Gu are not available.  
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The estimate of the PIR approach are summarized in Table 6 above for 
the period, 1997.03-2002.03. The average PIR's are 15.62, 15.39 and 12.81 
respectively for Gangnam-gu, Socho-gu and Songpa-gu. The standard 
deviations of PIR for the same three Gu's are 2.036, 2.10 and 1.66 
respectively. Therefore, the critical PIR values are 17.56, 17.50 and 14.48, 
respectively for Gangnam-gu, Socho-gu and Songpa-gu.  
The resulting weight of bubble are summarized in Table 7 below. In 
2003, the bubble were 13.2%, 9.0%, 14.6% respectively for Gangnam-gu, 
Socho-gu and Songpa-gu. 
[ Table 7 ]  Estimate of Bubble by the PIR Approach 
Period Gangnam-gu Socho-gu Sonpa-gu 
1997. 03 0.076 0.113 0.064 
1998. 03 0.039 0.055 0.012 
2002. 03 0.130 0.090 0.146 
 
The weights of bubble vary widely depending upon the kind of 
approach one takes. The analysis suggest that the percentage share is 
more likely to be lower when either PIR or the fundamental value 
approach is used, and it is highest when the long-run equilibrium price 
method is applied. The message is clear! There is no universally 
recognizable method that we can all agree upon and accept as logical and 
objective. But whatever method one may use, there is an unequivocally 
clear sign of bubble, particularly in Gangnam area.  
4.3. Impact of Bubble on National Economy  
In many quarters, real estate experts, reporters, politicians and 
ordinary people wondered about the possible impact of real estate bubble 
on the national economy and many were concerned about the possibility 
of repeating Japanese experiences. It appears that such worries are not 
well founded. In Table 8, the situation of housing price spiral since 2000 
in Korea is compared with that of Japanese housing price crisis in the 
1980's. 
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[ Table 8 ]  Housing Crisis in Japan in the 1980's and Korea since 2000 
 Japan(1980's) Korea (since 2000) 
Real Estate Market -Price spiral on 6 large cities -Housing supply ratio: 100% 
-Price spiral in the Seoul area 
-Housing supply ratio:  82%  
(Seoul) 
Monetary Policy 
-Low-interest rate policy 
-Expansion of money  supply 
(10% of per year) 
-Low-interest rate policy 
-Expansion of money  supply 
(10% per year) 
-Inflow foreign liquid fund 
Real Sector Economy 
-Balance of payment: turned  
to deficit 
-Recovery policy based on  
domestic consumption 
-Reduction in the surplus in the 
balance of payment 
-Recovery policy based on 
domestic consumption 
Prices 
-CPI(1% increase per year) 
-No need for restrictive 
 monetary policy 
-CPI(2% increase per year) 
-No need for restrictive  
monetary policy 
Loans Market -Sudden increase in  household loans 
-Sudden increase in 
 household loans 
Long-to-Value Ratio 120%  50-60% 
Source: Sam Sung Economic Research Institute, 2004 
 
There are more dissimilarities than similarities between the two 
economies with regard to the real estate price bubble. For instance, the 
price bubble in Japan initially started with land and spread throughout 
the country, but the one that Korea went through recently was limited 
largely to housing in Gangnam area and Inchon and Daijun to a lesser 
extent. But similarities exist with respect to financial situation, i.e., the low 
interest rate and abundance of liquid money, and also the recovery policy 
that stimulated domestic consumption through extension of personal 
credit. In both countries the financial institutions "competitively" 
expanded personal loans, particularly mortgage loans. But it should be 
noted that the loan to value ratio (LTV) in Japan was as high as 120% on 
average while that in Korea was only 50 to 60% at the maximum, 
implying that the Korean financial institutions would be significantly less 
venerable than the Japanese counterparts if in fact asset deflation may 
occur. 
What impacts such a price bubble might have on national economy? 
As emphasized, bubble means abnormal or irregular increase in real estate 
price. Bubble has a long history in capitalistic countries and it has affected 
national economy either in positive or negative way. For instance, the 
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history saw to it that the railroad and canal bubbles in Great Britain 
during the industrial revolution contributed to the expansion of major 
transport infrastructure facilities. More recently the price bubble arising 
from the memory system of computer in the U.S. is known to almost 
revolutionize the computer industry.  
Nonetheless, the real estate bubble, particularly the housing price 
bubble, has bad connotations because it is known to do more harm than 
good to the economy. It causes housing costs to rise, and, in this process, 
the hardest hit are the poor and salaried workers who live on fixed 
income. Also hurt are those who save money to purchase a home because 
there is no way for them to catch up with the price increase. It is quite 
clear that housing price bubble is partially, if not totally, correlated with 
labor disputes, because whenever two-to-three year long bubble is about 
to recede, labor unions claim for a raise of wages and salaries to cover the 
additional costs of living resulting from high priced housing. In other 
words housing cost may provoke labor disputes. And such a raise 
eventually undermines not only the competitiveness of the given industry, 
but the national competitiveness itself. Even more serious would be the 
scenario of long lasting economic slump as a result of "bust" and 
corresponding asset deflation that Japan experienced over the last ten 
years. The figure below illustrates in a summary form how housing price 
bubble may affect the national economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Impact of the bust of bubble on the national economy 
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Once bubble busts, the price of real estate goes down dramatically and 
in particular, the value of securitized/collateral/mortgaged asset falls to 
the extent that it becomes well below the amount of loans outstanding. If 
the LTV ratio is high as it was in Japan, there is no way to recover the 
loan and consequently many financial institutions would go bankrupt. 
And those remaining in business would not only hesitate to issue new 
loans, but also request advance payments from the borrowers. The 
incidences of personal bankruptcy would then be on the rise, leading to 
substantial reduction of consumption and production as well, and 
eventually to an increase in unemployment. Such a vicious circle would 
continue for a long time and if so, the economy would suffer from 
depression. This scenario is exactly what happened in Japan in 1990's as a 
result of real estate bubble-to-bust. 
Then, any sign of such a "malignant" real estate bubble in Korea as 
well? The answer is not yet! The magnitude of the bubble's effects on the 
economy may be determined by its level and depth. In Japan the bubble 
spread so widely and deeply that almost every economic agent, household, 
firm and the government alike, felt its effect badly. It was also spatially 
wide spread. But the bubble effects in Korea have been limited to only a 
few areas and to small number of economic agents. Bubble occurred only 
in a few housing sub-markets such as Gangnam and its surrounding 
areas, and only a limited number of financial institutions were engaged in 
mortgage financing. And even those institutions that got involved in full 
fledged mortgage financing would be secure and safe because the LTV 
ratio is not that high, ranging from 20 to 40% on average in real terms. 
The term is also very short, averaging between three and five years at the 
maximum.  
But if the current price spiral continues and spreads fast as it has been 
over the last few months, it would certainly be disturbing. And that is 
why the government announced the 10.29 (October 29th, 2003) measures 
to prevent the bubble from further spreading and to contain it from 
ultimate bust. But price bubble is likely to reoccur any time because those 
factors, as pointed out in the earlier discussion, which might cause the 
price bubble, remain unchecked as yet. Besides the government has 
announced so many development plans and programs which may ignite 
another round of real estate bubble very soon, land price bubble this time.  
Koreans are very much used to making capital gains through 
speculative transactions of real estate deals. There underlies a speculative 
mind among many Koreans, particularly among "the haves." Unless such 
a mind stops once and for all, there is always a chance for real estate price 
bubble to reemerge. Therefore, a monitoring system must be designed 
whereby one must closely watch the sign of price bubble and if such a 
symptom arises, one must activate the early warning mechanism. 
CHAPTER 2-2  Housing Price Hike and Price Stabilization Policy in Korea 211 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The following conclusions can be made from this study.  
First, as the theory suggested, the housing price spiral in Korea is 
attributable to excess demand and cost of production, especially, land cost. 
However, the most significant finding is that the speculative demand is 
far more important than normal housing demand. In fact, the contribution 
of speculative demand to the determination of housing price is a few 
times as more important than that of normal housing demand. The surge 
of speculative housing demand since 2001 has been largely attributable to 
the trend of declining interest rate, rapidly increasing money supply, and 
above all the government policy of economic recovery based on very 
liberal housing policy including the allowance of selling the home 
purchase right via pre-sale contract. The negative impact of the corporate 
bond yield on housing price implies that the Korean consumer regards 
investment in bonds as an alternative investment. This behavior can be 
considered as a part of normal housing demand because housing purchase 
is motivated by residence purpose and investment objective at the same 
time, Speculative demand is also investment demand, but it differs from 
bond investment, since it has much higher risk arising from the difficulty 
of predicting the future price.  
Second, the findings do show that there are bubbles in housing price in 
Korea. However, the actual magnitude of the bubble varies widely 
depending upon the estimation methods used. By and large, the long-run 
equilibrium price approach produces the largest amount of bubble in 
comparison with the fundamental market value approach and the 
price-income ratio approach.  
Third, contrary to what many might have thought, the seriousness of 
housing bubble in Korea is much less apparent than it was in Japan 
because of differences in basic market conditions, in particular much 
lower loan-to-value ratio(LTV) and a greater degree of housing shortage 
prevailing in Korea since 2000. To be more specific, it is unlikely that 
housing price may fall as drastically as it did in Japan, and even if 
housing price does fall, the fact that LTV is below 50 % implies much less 
danger of loan delinquency and banks' insolvency 
These findings have interesting policy implications.  
First, the government should not repeat the policy conducive to 
speculation, including the allowance of the sale of the priority purchase 
right via pre-contract 5  and the announcement of large housing 
                                            
5 There are two types of home-ownership schemes, both administered by the Korea Housing 
Preemption Subscription Time Deposit(HSTD) and the National Housing Preemption 
Subscription Deposit(NHPSD). Those who join the former make a lump-sum deposit ranging 
from 5 up to 15million won, and wait for two years to be eligible for receiving the "priority" in 
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construction projects such as new town projects. Such an announcement 
has often created an environment suitable for housing speculation. 
Second, the policy of increasing capital gains as an anti-speculative 
measure has its limitation because low price elasticity of housing demand 
means forward shifting of the tax burden, leading to housing price hike. 
The capital gains tax is of course needed not only for government's tax 
receipts, but also better income distribution. But it may not be a suitable 
way of discouraging speculative activities, unless it imposes a very heavy 
burden on the seller of house. But if it carries a very heavy burden, then 
the supply of housing is likely to be frozen, ie, lock-in effect. The best 
way of fighting speculation and stabilizing housing price is to minimize 
the excess demand through the sustained increase of housing production 
on one hand, and, on the other hand, cut down land cost through more 
aggressive land banking and well pre-planned land supply through better 
spatial development planning.   
Reconstruction must prevail because unlike redevelopment it is the 
only alternative means to expand housing stock for middle and upper 
middle income households who want to remain in the inner city areas. 
But its development techniques must be drastically revised: it requires 
multi-purpose development whereby a portion of profits generated by 
high density commercial uses can be used to cross-subsidize provision of 
low and moderate income housing units. Then, the project area must be 
fairly large enough to accommodate multiple uses. High density 
development can be allowed in exchange for larger open space. And some 
incentives must be provided to build low and moderate income housing 
as well so that the underprivileged can also enjoy newly created modern 
residential environment.  
                                                                                                    
purchasing a multifamily condominium unit. The NHPSD, on the other hand, is designed to 
draw deposits from the prospective purchasers of the National Housing Funds(NHF) financed 
condominium units, mostly provided by the Korea National Housing Corporation(KNHC) and 
municipal government. The participants make monthly installments at the subscribers 
discretion in order to receive "priority" in purchasing publicly assisted housing units. Normally 
those who own the priority rights to purchase new units are not allowed to sell them for high 
premium.  
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Comments on  
“House Price Hikes and Price Stabilization in Korea” 
Christine M E Whitehead 
( London School of Economics) 
The question addressed in this paper – whether speculative motives lie 
behind the very rapid house prices in Korea experienced over the last few 
years – is an important one, and one which resonates with many other 
countries across the world.  Of particular interest in the Korean context has 
been the fact that particularly rapid rises have been concentrated in certain 
localities in Seoul, raising issues about what is so special about these areas 
which cannot be expected to be replicated or whether speculation is driven 
by local house price movements which would inherently exacerbate the 
pressures for further increase. 
The paper raises a number of issues: first, is it the case that the 
fundamentals of demand cannot explain the house price movements?  
Second, if the source of the increases appears to be speculative in that they 
are driven by house price increases themselves, does this inherently mean 
that there is a bubble? Third, has government policy, which has been heavily 
concentrated on reducing speculation, helped to control the situation or has 
it actually made things worse? And finally, what should government be 
doing.  
The evidence presented relates first to hedonic analyses where the 
literature suggests extremely  -indeed worryingly - high explanatory power.   
It then examines the properties of  VAR and ARIMA models which 
hypothesise that house prices are a function of past house prices and the 
possibilities of estimating more structurally based models of price 
formation.  
The conclusions from the estimation are particularly clearcut showing 
speculative demand against constrained supply and most importantly a 
complete failure of the 70 plus government measures to control speculation. 
This last result, while not surprising given the nature of the interventions 
needs separate analysis and could form the basis for a more policy based 
paper.  This would set out a typology of these interventions with 
predictions of how they might in principle be expected to operate.  Ideally 
this would be compared to other countries that have concentrated on similar 
styles of ant-speculation measures and the Korean experience set against 
wider evidence.  There is an attempt to compare with Japan later in the 
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paper but this, not surprisingly, has not perhaps been subject to the rigorous 
analysis of the core analysis reported here. 
The more detailed discussion of the sources of speculative activity  
suggests a number of structural reasons why house prices in Korea might 
have been expected to rise relatively rapidly.  Interest rate, loss of control of 
the money supply and more general expansionary policies have all been 
shown to have very large scale effects in other countries.   This section of 
the paper is very broad brush – and on occasion appears to double count 
possible sources of house price rises.   If we are to understand processes – 
especially how rises vary across regions this is an important field for further 
work. 
A final substantive section in part addresses this issue by setting out 3 
main approaches to measuring speculation.  What is interesting about the 
results here is how much they differ – even in a country where descriptive 
statistics suggest that speculative demand appears to dominate.  Moreover 
while the location based results are particularly strong the underlying 
rationale for these findings is weakest. 
Overall the paper undoubtedly answers the questions it sets out to assess 
in clearcut terms- the fundamentals are not enough; house price rises feed 
on themselves; and the government has so far been powerless to improve 
the situation.  The implication is that their broader policies are feeding the 
expectational frenzy and knee jerk responses only makes things worse.  In 
stead the government should think more carefully about shifting from a 
piecemeal to an integrated approach which addresses more directly the 
relationship between macro economic factors and the housing market. 
In looking at the answers given in the paper at least two fundamental 
issues are clarified. First, is it enough to say that prices feed on themselves or 
should we also be analysing the mechanisms by which this can occur.  For 
example while incomes and other fundamentals may not be the immediate 
drivers someone has to pay the purchase price or borrow the money to do so 
– so there must be a constraint somewhere in the system.  A clear answer to 
this question would help to clarify what types of government policy might 
be expected to be effective rather than simply relying on taxation as a means 
of reducing the expected rates of return. 
Secondly, does it matter whether there actually is a bubble – or is the 
search for a bubble a waste of time as compared to understanding more 
about the mechanisms and indeed the fundamentals.  Underlying all of the 
discussion of bubbles is the need for some more basic understanding of the 
nature of adjustment process starting perhaps from those very simplistic 
notions of relative elasticities, first set out in the first year textbook example 
of the cobweb theory.  Add to this, questions of how prices adjust across 
space and evidence of wave motions in house prices from the locations of 
greatest economic activity and there starts to be a much  richer way of 
addressing he issue of both what causes rapid relative house price rise – and 
falls – and what government might actually be able to do about them. 
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The paper presents important material in a way which is clearly policy 
relevant, if not necessarily easily acceptable.  The implications are clear: it is 
not helpful to spend time and energy on asking is this or is this not a bubble.  
Instead it should be recognised that there are massive adjustment problems 
– on both the demand and supply sides which must be addressed before 
stability can be achieved.  The questions of the costs of failure in a rapidly 
growing economy is less straightforward – but were the economy to slow 
down the adjustment process would undoubtedly be extremely 
uncomfortable.  
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Low Income Housing Policies in Korea:  
Evaluations and Suggestions 
by 
Eui-Chul Chung 
Abstract 
In this paper, current housing conditions of low income households as 
well as institutional arrangements for low income housing policies are 
carefully analyzed. Also, current housing policies for low income 
households in Korea are systematically evaluated and suggestions are made 
for future directions of policy changes. 
For several decades, direct provision of public rental housing has been 
the main vehicle of low income housing policies in Korea. However, 
housing conditions of low income households have not been much 
improved as expected, and the gap of housing conditions between income 
classes is still large. These were the inevitable results of the previous supply-
side policies which failed to carefully select appropriate target groups of 
households and therefore benefits from public rental housing have been 
inequitably distributed. 
Recently, the government has put more emphasis on low income 
housing policies. Plans for providing 1.5 million units of long-term public 
rental housing in ten years, establishment of minimum housing standards, 
and introduction of housing benefits system are good examples. While all 
these efforts should contribute to improve housing welfare of low income 
households to a great extent, there remain many tasks to be discussed and 
resolved.  
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1. Introduction 
Government intervention in housing markets is mostly based on 
efficiency and equity grounds. From the viewpoint of efficiency, it is for 
reducing market failure in housing markets and enhancing efficient 
allocation of resources. From the equity viewpoint, it is for providing 
adequate housing services for those who cannot afford themselves on their 
own in housing markets. It is generally believed that most countries 
emphasize the equity aspects of housing policies on the grounds that a 
number of low income households are not capable of consuming the 
‘socially agreed’ minimum level of housing services and that it is one of the 
duties of the government to provide them with adequate housing and 
therefore to improve their housing conditions and to increase their housing 
stability. 
Housing stability has significant impact on the quality of life; Housing is 
one of basic necessities for living and housing stability encourages work 
incentives and relieves pressure of wage and price increases caused by 
excessive costs of housing. Also,  fair distribution of housing wealth 
alleviates feeling of deprivation and distrust among social classes. For theses 
reasons, most countries place a high value of housing policy on providing 
people with adequate housing and favorable living environments. This is 
based on the belief that housing policies toward these directions will 
contribute to social cohesiveness and to economic development. 
Housing stability and improvement of housing conditions have been the 
main goals of housing policies in Korea for the last several decades. In the 
past, in the face of housing shortages, the government’s main policy had 
been to provide abundant housing. Solving housing shortage problem was 
the prior consideration. Due to continuing efforts, the housing supply ratio 
measured by dividing the total housing units by the number of households 
reached over 100 percent in 2002 and the average housing conditions have 
been greatly improved. 
Unfortunately, however, it is reported that the differences of housing 
conditions are still quite significant among different income classes. 
Analysis of the data of the Korean Population and Housing Census in 2000 
shows that about 3.3 million households, approximately 23 percent of the 
total number of households, are living in deteriorated and very poor 
dwellings which do not meet the minimum housing standards. About 1.12 
million households, approximately 8 percent of the total number of 
households (730 thousand households except one-person households), are 
living in single room dwellings. Furthermore, their burden of housing costs 
has been growing heavier due to sharp increases in housing prices since 
2001 and housing wealth distribution has become worse than income 
distribution. 
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Recently, the government has put more emphasis on low income 
housing policies. Plans for providing 1.5 million units of long-term public 
rental housing in ten years, establishment of minimum housing standards, 
and introduction of housing benefits system are good examples. While all 
these efforts should contribute to improve housing welfare of low income 
households to a great extent, there remain many tasks to be discussed and 
resolved.  
In this paper, current housing conditions of low income households as 
well as institutional arrangements for low income housing policies are 
carefully analyzed. Also, current housing policies for low income 
households in Korea are systematically evaluated and suggestions are made 
for future directions of policy changes. 
2. Low Income Housing Programs in Korea 
As in developed countries, low income housing programs in Korea are 
largely divided into two parts: supply-side programs and demand-side 
programs. The major type of supply-side programs is to construct and 
provide public rental housing for low income households. Construction of 
public rental housing is regarded as one of effective ways to support low 
income households in that the government directly provides them with 
decent rental housing at the below-market rents. Various kinds of supports 
are implemented in the construction of public rental housing, which 
includes provision of residential land at the below-market prices, financing 
construction costs at the below-market interest rate. Demand-side programs 
aim at reducing housing cost burden of low income households. These 
programs include Chonsei1 deposit loan programs and housing benefits 
program. 
2.1 Public Rental Housing 
Public rental housing programs began in 1988 on a full scale when the 
“two million units of housing construction project” was initiated. This 
project planned construction of 1.5 million new housing units for sale and 
construction of 500 thousand units of rental housing. 500 thousands rental 
unit construction plan included 250 thousand units for Permanent Public 
                                            
1 Chonsei is a unique form of rental contract in Korea whereby a tenant pays an up-front 
lump-sum deposit at the beginning of the contract period with no requirement for paying 
monthly rent. The deposit is fully refunded at the end of the contract period. 
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Rental Housing2, 150 thousand units for Five-Year Public Rental Housing, 
and 100 thousand units for Rental Housing for Workers. Among these 
public rental housing programs, the Permanent Public Rental Housing 
program had been regarded as a typical public rental housing program for 
low income households because 85 percent of construction costs was 
assisted by the national government budget and the beneficiaries were 
confined to the extremely poor households such as the recipients of 
livelihood benefits. 
From 1992, the government provided public rental housing for the 
households with income higher than the extremely poor. The public rental 
housing was of two types with regards to the rental period: five years and 50 
years. For the 50-Year Public Rental Housing3, 50% of construction costs 
were supported by the national government budget and 20% financed by 
the public housing funds called the National Housing Funds (NHF). 
However, the assistance from the national government budget was stopped 
in 1994 and was replaced by the financing from the NHF. For the Five-Year 
Public Rental Housing4, only the NHF financed the construction costs in the 
form of loans from the beginning. Households who were not homeowners 
and who held national housing subscription savings accounts 5  were 
qualified for these public rental housing programs. 
The National Public Rental Housing program was introduced in 1998. In 
the beginning, this public rental housing had two different rental periods: 10 
years and 20 years. For the 10-Year National Public Rental Housing, 
households who were not home owners, held national housing subscription 
savings accounts and earned income less than 70% of the average income of 
urban households were qualified for application. In the case of the 20-Year 
National Public Rental Housing, applicants should not have home and their 
income should be less than 50% of the average income of urban households. 
There was no requirement for holding national housing subscription 
savings accounts. 
This program was revised in 2002 in such ways that qualification 
requirements were differentiated by the size of the public rental housing 
and that the rental period was unified to 30 years. Current government 
                                            
2 Permanent Public Rental Housing is a publicly-constructed rental housing which can be 
rented for 50 years. Rents for this housing are very low so that the recipients of the livelihood 
benefits (extremely low income households) are affordable.  
3 The 50-Year Public Rental Housing can also be rented for 50 years. However, rents for this 
housing is relatively higher than those for the Permanent Public Rental Housing. 
4 The Five-Year Public Rental Housing should be rented for five years and then can be sold to 
existing renter households at the regulated price. This program was introduced with the 
purpose of allowing renter households to pay rents for five years, inducing them to accumulate 
wealth during the rental period and then giving them opportunities to purchase the unit. 
5 Due to excess demand for housing, the government introduced a system to ration newly 
constructed housing to households. Under this system, households who want to rent or buy 
publicly-provided rental housing or housing for sale should open national housing subscription 
savings accounts and deposit some money every month. Based on the number and the amount 
of deposits, households obtain opportunities for subscription to newly constructed housing.  
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regards the National Public Rental Housing program as the most important 
low income housing program and plans to provide one million units for the 
period of 2003 to 2012. Depending on the size of the public rental housing, 
10% to 40% of construction costs are now assisted by the national 
government budget. Table 1 describes the shares of construction costs by 
involved parties and qualification requirements for the National Pubic 
Rental Housing. 
Table 1. Qualification Requirements and Shares of Construction Costs of 
National Public Rental Housing 
Size of Rental 
Housing Qualification Requirements Shares of Construction Costs 
Less than 50m2 
Non-homeowners with income less 
than 50 % of the average income of 
urban households 
National Gov’t Budget 40% 
NHF 40% 
Recipient 10% 
Construction Firm 10% 
50m2 ~ 60m2 
Non-homeowners who have national 
housing subscription savings 
accounts and whose income less than 
70% of the average income of urban 
households 
National Gov’t Budget 20% 
NHF 40% 
Recipient 30% 
Construction Firm 10% 
Greater than 60m2 
Non-homeowners who have national 
housing subscription savings 
accounts and whose income less than 
100% of the average income of urban 
households 
National Gov’t Budget 10% 
NHF 40% 
Recipient 40% 
Construction Firm 10% 
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation (2004), Handbook of Housing. 
 
In addition, construction of 500 thousand units of the public rental 
housing with 10-year rental period (10-Year Public Rental Housing) is under 
progress. While the National Public Rental Housing is constructed by the 
government-sponsored enterprise such as the Korea National Housing 
Corporation (KNHC), the 10-Year Public Rental Housing is mainly 
constructed by the private sector to which favorable conditions in terms of 
residential land purchase prices, deductions of taxes, financing construction 
costs through the NHF at the below-market interest rate are provided. The 
10-Year Public Rental Housing program was designed for the moderately 
low and middle income households. Table 2 shows the 10-year plan for 
supplying the public rental housing. 
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Table 2. Government Plan to Supply Public Rental Housing (2003-2012)   
(thousand units) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
National Public 
Rental Housing 80 100 100 110 110 100 100 100 100 100 1,000 
10-Year Public 
Rental Housing - 30 50 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 500 
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation 
 
Table 3 shows the pattern of housing construction from 1982 to 2003. 
About 10.5 million housing units were constructed during the period. 
Among them, 14.7% (1.54 million units) were constructed in the form of 
public rental housing: 190 thousand units for the Permanent Public Rental 
Housing, 1 million units for the Five-Year or 50-Year Public Rental Housing, 
70 thousand units for the Rental Housing for Workers, and 190 thousand 
units for the National Public Rental Housing. 
While varying across years, the share of public rental housing 
construction was relatively higher in the period of 1996 to 2001. However, 
the share has been decreasing since 1998. In 1998, total units of housing 
construction were about 0.3 million in which public rental housing took 
30.6%. However, the share gradually decreased, and as a result, it became 
less than 15% in 2002 and 2003. 
Looking at the composition of public rental housing by types, it can be 
said that the share of the Five-Year or 50-Year Public Rental Housing has 
been decreasing and gradually replaced by the National Public Rental 
Housing. With the start of constructing 2,500 units of the National Public 
Rental Housing in 1998, the supply of the National Public Rental Housing is 
gradually increasing with the exception in 2000. Especially, its volume of 
construction has increased at a faster rate since 2001. 
On the other hand, contribution of the private sector to rental housing 
construction has been decreasing after reaching a peak in 1997. Table 4 
shows rental housing construction by local governments, the KNHC, and 
private companies. In 1998 and 1999, the private sector has constructed 
about 79 thousand rental housing units which further decreased to about 63 
thousand units in 2000 and to about 10 thousand units in 2003. While the 
private sector contributed to 84.4% of the total rental housing construction in 
1997, its contribution has gradually decreased, being only 11.6% in 2003. 
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Table 3. Housing Construction 1982-2003 
Public Rental Housing 
Year Total Units Constructed Subtotal 
(share%) 
5-year or 
50-year Permanent Workers National 
’82-‘86 1,155,071 77,719(6.7%) 77,719 - -  
’87 244,301 51,918(21.3%) 51,918 - -  
’88 316,570 52,218(16.5%) 52,218 - -  
’89 462,159 82,475(17.8%) 39,222 43,253 -  
’90 750,378 144,544(19.3%) 64,890 60,004 19,650  
’91 613,083 76,391(12.5%) 15,074 49,607 11,710  
’92 575,492 62,679(10.9%) 15,121 36,706 10,852  
’93 695,319 41,525(5.9%) 30,912 507 10,106  
’94 622,854 74,862(12.0%) 65,751 - 9,111  
’95 919,057 82,032(13.2%) 77,584 - 4,448  
’96 592,132 111,063(18.8%) 104,648 - 6,415  
’97 596,435 108,728(18.2%) 108,115 - 613  
’98 306,031 93,795(30.6%) 91,294 - - 2,501 
’99 404,715 109,417(27.0%) 89,107 - 84 20,226 
’00 433,488 95,932(22.1%) 85,923 - - 10,009 
’01 529,854 102,557(19.4%) 66,980 - 350 35,227 
’02 666,541 86,586(13.0%) 35,767 - - 50,819 
’03 585,382 86,005(14.7%) 12,977 - - 73,028 
Total 10,468,862 1,540,446(14.7%) 1,085,220 190,077 73,339 191,810 
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation (2004), Handbook of Housing. 
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Table 4. Rental Housing Construction by Project Initiators 
Year Total 5-Year or 50-Year Workers National 
 Local Gov’t KNHC Private
Local 
Gov’t KNHC Private
Local 
Gov’t KNHC Private
Local 
Gov’t KNHC 
’97 1,057 15,941 91,730 (84.4) 1,057 15,941 91,117 - - 613 - - 
’98 160 13,958 79,677 (84.9) 160 11,457 79,677 - - - - 2,501 
’99 441 30,115 78,861 (72.1) 441 9,889 78,777 - - 84 - 20,226 
’00 1,714 30,953 63,265 (65.9) 1,714 20,944 63,265 - - - - 10,009 
’01 2,438 40,908 59,211 (57.7) 2,088 5,681 59,211 350 - - - 35,227 
’02 4,033 55,403 27,150 (31.4) 1,831 6,786 27,150 - - - 2,202 48,617 
’03 10,331 65,698 
9,976 
(11.6) 1,816 1,185 9,976 - - - 8,515 64,513 
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation (2004), Handbook of Housing. 
 
As of 2003, the total rental housing stock in Korea is about 1 million 
units6, taking 8.3% of total housing stock (about 12 million units). However, 
as can be seen from table 5, a huge portion of rental housing stock has 
relatively short rental period; the Five-Year Public Rental Housing stock 
takes 61.2% of total rental housing stock and rental housing operated by 
private landlords which has three years of rental period takes 5.7%. Also, the 
                                            
6 This is officially announced figure in the formal rental sector. There is an informal rental 
sector in Korea in which owner households rent their houses informally. There is no official 
figure of how many households live in the informal sector rental housing. According to Korean 
Population and Housing Census in 2000, 6.15 million households (43% of the total number of 
households) are renters.  
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Rental Housing for Workers with little public characteristics takes 4%. 
Hence, the public rental housing units in which long-term rental contracts 
are possible are about 300 thousands, just 2.4% of the total housing stock. 
Table 5. Composition of Rental Housing Stock 
Types Permanent 50-year 5-Year National Workers Private Landlords Total 
# of Units 190,077 92,730 640,031 20,862 42,392 59,994 1,046,086 
% 18.2 8.9 61.2 2.0 4.0 5.7 100 
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation (2004), Handbook of Housing. 
2.2 Demand-Side Programs 
The major demand-side programs for low income households in Korea 
are two types: Chonsei deposit loan program and housing benefits program. 
The demand-side programs have been widely used in developed countries 
because of several advantages. Under the demand-side programs, 
beneficiaries can select their residential locations, housing types and housing 
sizes depending on their preference for rental housing. Also, such programs 
can better guarantee residential mobility of households and improves the 
usage of existing housing stock. 
2.2.1 Chonsei Deposit Loan Program 
The Chonsei Deposit Loan Program is that the public sector (NHF) lends 
some portion of Chonsei deposit to low income households at the below-
market interest rate. This program has been developed because a large 
number of low income households are tenants under Chonsei contracts. The 
beneficiary low income households obtain implicit rent subsidies as much as 
the difference between market interest and interest actually paid. The 
program is operated for two different target groups. 
The Chonsei Deposit Loan Program for the extremely low income 
households has been introduced in 1990. There are some qualification 
restrictions on this program. Their Chonsei deposit should not exceed the 
caps imposed by the government. The caps depend on their residences. In 
2004, Chonsei deposit should not exceed 50 million Won (about 50 thousand 
dollars) in Seoul, 40 million Won in the other metropolitan cities, and 30 
million Won in small and medium cities and rural areas. Also, they have to 
make Chonsei rental contracts for rental housing of the size under 60m2. But 
the size restriction can be relaxed up to 85m2 under the authority of the local 
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governments. If they are qualified, they can borrow up to 70% of Chonsei 
deposit at the annual interest rate of 2% but have to fully repay their loans in 
four years. 
The Chonsei Deposit Loan Program for the moderately low income 
households are for those who are not homeowners and whose annual 
income is less than 30 million Won (30 thousand dollars) in 2004. They have 
to rent a housing of the size under 85m2 and the maximum amount of 
borrowing is 70% of the contracted Chonsei deposit with the maximum of 
60 million Won. The borrowing rate is 6.5% per year and loans have to be 
fully returned in four years. 
Table 6 provides some information on Chonsei deposit loan programs 
operated by the NHF. The NHF’s funding on Chonsei deposit loans has 
been continually increasing. In 1996, Chonsei deposit loans made for the 
extremely low income households were merely 73 billion Won. But the 
loans have increased to 480 billion Won in 2003, six times larger than the 
amount in 1996. Also, Chonsei deposit loans for the moderately low income 
households, which were just 50 billion Won in 1996, has increased by as 
much as about 19 times in 2003. 
Table 6. Chonsei Deposit Loans for Low Income Households by NHF  
(billion Won) 
Year ’96 ’97 ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 
Loans for 
Extremely Low 
Income Households
73 75 75 300 169.2 244.2 488 485.4 
Loans for 
Moderately Low 
Income Households
50 70 130 0 960.8 716.9 480.8 964.7 
Total Funds 4,628.3 4,627.1 5,589.4 7,449.2 8,419.9 10,209.2 7,003.6 7,889.7 
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation (2004), Handbook of Housing. 
 
In spite of this tremendous increase in the amount of Chonsei deposit 
loans, the portion of Chonsei deposit loans to the total volume of the NHF 
funds is unfortunately small. In 2003, Chonsei deposit loans for the 
extremely low income households took just 6% of the total NHF funds, and 
Chonsei deposit loans for the moderately low income households took 12%. 
Hence, the two loan programs together took only 18%. 
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2.2.2 Housing Benefits Program 
Housing benefits program in Korea is not independently operated. Rather, it is a 
part of the general public assistance system. Housing benefits program was newly 
introduced under national livelihood protection system established in 1999 with the 
purpose of providing adequate housing benefits to the recipients and leading them to 
better housing conditions. Housing benefits are made in the forms of either cash 
(rental payments) or in-kind (housing repair and maintenance services). 
According to the National Basic Livelihood Security Act, housing benefits 
consist of explicit housing benefits and implicit housing benefits (included in 
livelihood benefits), both of which are paid depending on the household size. The 
procedure to determine livelihood benefits and housing benefits are as follows: First, 
the minimum living costs are determined for each household depending on the 
household size. Then, the cash subsidy basis is calculated by subtracting the other 
transfers such as medical care and educational services from the minimum living 
costs. Finally, the cash subsidy basis is divided into livelihood benefits and explicit 
housing benefits. Subtracting explicit housing benefits from the cash subsidy basis 
yields the livelihood benefits. Table 7 shows minimum living costs, cash subsidy 
basis, and minimum housing costs in 2004. 
Table 7. Minimum Living Costs, Cash Subsidy Basis and Minimum 
Housing Costs  
( Won) 
 One person Household 
Two-person
Household 
Three-
person 
Household 
Four-
person 
Household 
Five-person 
Household 
Six-person 
Household 
Minimum Living 
Costs (A) 368,226 609,842 838,797 1,055,090 1,199,637 1,353,680 
Other Transfers 
(B) 44,040 72,937 100,321 126,189 143,477 161,900 
Cash Subsidy 
Basis (C=A-B) 324,186 536,905 738,476 928,901 1,056,160 1,191,780 
Explicit Housing 
Benefits (D) 33,000 42,000 55,000 
Livelihood 
Benefits 
(E=C-D) 
291,186 503,905 696,476 886,901 1,001,160 1,136,780 
Implicit Housing 
Benefits (F) 38,436 85,309 120,726 162,687 177,730 207,614 
Minimum 
Housing Costs 
(=D+F=A×19.4%)
71,436 118,309 162,726 204,687 232,730 262,614 
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare (2004), A Guide to National Livelihood Protection System. 
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The minimum living costs vary across the household sizes: 370 thousand 
Won for the one-person household and 1.35 million Won for the six-person 
household. The cash subsidy basis is about 320 thousand Won for the one-
person household and 1.2 million Won for the six-person household. The 
livelihood benefits are 290 thousand Won for the one-person household and 
about 1.1 million Won for the six-person household. 
The amount of explicit housing benefits are rather small: 33 thousand 
Won for one or two-person household, 42 thousand Won for three or four-
person household, and 55 thousand Won for five or six-person household. 
While the amount of implicit housing benefits included in the livelihood 
benefits varies over the household sizes to a greater degree, the amount of 
overall housing benefits (explicit benefits plus implicit benefits) appears to 
be still small, taking 19.4% of the minimum living costs. 
3. Housing Conditions of Low Income Households 
In spite of improvement of housing conditions on the average, it appears 
that housing conditions of low income households have not been much 
improved. According to the survey results of the Korea Research Institute 
for Human Settlements (KRIHS) in 2002, the average housing size of 
households under lowest 10% of income distribution is 15.7 Pyung (51.81m2), 
74% of the average housing size of all households (21.2 Pyung, 70 m2), and 
the average number of rooms of those households is 2.7, 77% of the average 
number of rooms of all households (3.5). Furthermore, over 60% of 
households under lowest 20% of income distribution live in relatively 
inferior and deteriorated housing such as old single-detached houses or 
multi-family houses. 34% to 40% of those households are tenants under pure 
monthly rental contracts or monthly rent-with-deposit contracts7, which are 
rental contracts inferior to the usual Chonsei contracts.  
In terms of facilities, many of those households do not live in houses well 
equipped with western-style kitchens, flushing toilets, and hot-water 
supplied baths and live in very old houses. According to the statistics 
published by the Ministry of Construction and Transportation, the price-to-
income ratio (PIR) of the households under the lowest 10% of income 
                                            
7 Under the monthly rent-with-deposit contract, a tenant pays a substantial amount of the up-
front deposit (but smaller than the deposit in Chonsei contract) at the beginning of the contract 
period during which a comparatively small amount of monthly rent is paid to fill the gap 
between the corresponding Chonsei deposit and the deposit in the monthly rent-with-deposit. 
As with the Chonsei, the up-front deposit is refunded to the renter at the end of the contract 
period.  
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distribution is 6.7, which is twice higher than that of the average PIR of all 
households. Also, their rent-to-income ratio (RIR) is very high implying that 
they cannot afford adequate housing without appropriate public assistance. 
Table 8 shows per capita housing size Gini coefficient, housing-related 
assets Gini coefficient, and income Gini coefficient in 1993 and in 2002. The 
per capita housing size Gini coefficient has decreased during the period 
from 0.35 to 0.235, but the housing-related assets Gini coefficient has rather 
increased from 0.489 to 0.51. In 2002, the housing related assets Gini 
coefficient was greater than the income Gini coefficient, indicating that 
housing-related asset distribution was worse than the income distribution. 
Table 8. Distributions of Per Capita, Housing-related Assets, and Income 
Gini Coefficients Per Capita Housing Size Housing-related Assets Income 
1993 0.35 0.489 - 
2002 0.235 0.51 0.351 
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation (2003), The Comprehensive Housing Plans: 
2003-2012. 
 
As of 2000, the number of households who do not meet the minimum 
housing standards8 is about 3.3 million households, 23.4% of the total 
number of households. Table 9 shows the percentage of those households by 
the criteria of minimum housing standards.  
The largest percentage (71.3%) of those households does not meet the 
facilities criterion. The percentage of the households who do not meet the 
housing size criterion is the next (39.1%), and the percentage of the 
households who do not meet the number of rooms criterion is 14.8%. 5.3% 
of the households do not meet all the criteria. 
In terms of household types, 40% of one-person households, 50.8% of 
child-headed households, 31.4% of single male-headed households, 26.3% of 
single female-headed households do not meet the minimum housing 
standards. Especially, for the one-person household, the aged households, 
and child-headed households, the percentage of not meeting the facilities 
                                            
8 The minimum housing standards were established by the Ministry of Construction and 
Transportation in 1999. But the standards have not been used as a policy indicator so far. There 
are three criteria for evaluating whether housing is below the minimum standards: size, number 
of rooms, and facilities. The first two criteria are established by the characteristics of households 
such as the number of household members and the composition of households. For a 
representative household composed of four members (parent, a male child and a female child), 
the minimum housing size is 37m2 and the minimum number of rooms is 3 together with a 
dining room and a kitchen. The housing should be equipped with a western-style kitchen, a 
flushing toilet, and a hot water-supplied bath (the third criterion). 
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criterion is 95.8%, 94.1%, and 86% respectively, showing that they are 
residing in houses with very poor facilities. 
Table 9. Size of Households not Meeting Minimum Housing Standards 
Type of Households Ordinary One-person 
Child-
headed 
Single 
Male-
headed 
Single 
Female-
headed 
Aged 
# of households (thousand) 14,311.80 2,224.40 18.7 220 903.7 523.3 
# of households below 
Minimum Housing 
Standards(thousand) 
3,344.00 890.2 9.5 69 237.4 189.8 
Below Minimum
Standard for 
Housing Size 
39.1 12.3 41.7 46.8 42.9 10.8 
Below Minimum
Standard for 
Facilities 
71.3 95.8 86 76.7 73.8 94.1 
Below Minimum
Standard for # of 
rooms 
14.8 1.6 19.9 17.2 18.8 2.7 
Reasons 
for not 
meeting 
minimum 
standards
(%) 
Below All 
Standards 5.3 3.2 11.5 10.4 9.4 1.1 
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation (2003), The Comprehensive Housing Plans: 
2003-2012. 
 
Table 10 compares housing conditions between ordinary households and 
households below the minimum housing standards in terms of housing size, 
housing tenure, and facilities. 
The average housing size of the households below the minimum standards is 
13.1 Pyung (43.2m2), which is just 68.5% of the average housing size of the 
ordinary households, and the per capita housing size and the number of family 
members per room are 6.2 Pyung (20.5 m2) and 1.23 rooms. Compared with those 
statistics for ordinary households, it can be understood that the residential conditions 
of households below the minimum standards are very inferior. Among the 
households below the minimum standards, 83.8% reside in detached houses, while 
49.6% of the ordinary households reside in that type of houses. Furthermore, 42.9% 
are owner-occupiers, and 51.1% are renters. Especially, the percentage of tenants 
under the contracts of   monthly rent with deposit or pure monthly rent is twice 
higher than that of renters in ordinary households. 
The table also shows that over 87% of ordinary households reside in such houses 
equipped with western-style kitchens, flushing toilets, and hot water-supplied baths, 
while only 29 % of the households below the minimum standards reside in houses 
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with flushing toilets and 50% of them in houses with hot water-supplied baths. The 
average age of houses for them is 22 years, about nine years older than the average 
age of houses for ordinary households (13 years). 
Table 10. Comparison of Housing Conditions 
 Ordinary Below Minimum Standards 
Number of households (thousand) 14,311.8 3,344 
Average number of household members 3.1 2.8 
Average housing size (Pyung) 19.1 13.1 
Per capita average housing size (Pyung) 7.3 6.2 
Average number of rooms 3.4 2.5 
Number of household members per room 0.98 1.23 
Single Detached 27.6 58 
Apartment 36.6 6 
Tenement 5.8 1.8 
Detached for Multi Families 22 25.8 
Multi-Family 3.2 1 
OfficeTel 0.1 0.1 
Housing 
Type (%) 
Others 4.5 7.3 
Owner-Occupied 54.2 42.9 
Chonsei 28.2 22.5 
Monthly Rent with Deposit 10.7 18.7 
Pure Monthly Rent 2 5.9 
Declining Rent 2.2 6 
Housing 
Tenure    
(%) 
Others 2.8 4.1 
Western-style Kitchen 93.9 71.2 
Flushing Toilet 87 29.1 
Facilities 
(%) 
Hot Water-supplied Bath 87.4 50.7 
Average Age of Housing (Yrs.) 13.3 22.2 
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation (2003), The Comprehensive Housing Plans: 
2003-2012. 
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4. Evaluation of Low Income Housing Policies 
4.1 Evaluation of Public Rental Housing Programs 
Even though public rental housing provision has been the primary low 
income housing policy, several problems have been raised. Various public 
rental housing programs operated under different government regimes 
have no continuity. Those programs have not been systematic in selecting 
appropriate target groups and the size of rental housing for them. The Five-
Year Public Rental Housing program under which 530 thousand rental units 
have been constructed for the period of 1992 to 2001 did not contribute to 
the accumulation of public rental housing stock, raising a question of what 
the purpose of that program was (Kim et al., 2003). 
The primary reason for these problems is that those policies did not 
clearly recognize and classify the target groups for each program. That is, 
there have not been serious considerations about what the levels of their 
income were, how much they were affordable, what programs better fitted 
to improve their housing conditions. Yoon and Kim (1997) showed based on 
the survey results of rental housing tenants that 10%~50% of households 
residing in public rental housing were middle income households who were 
no longer qualified for public rental housing. They also argued that there 
has been mismatch between target households and tenants in the public 
rental housing. Among the tenants of public rental housing provided from 
1991 to 1996, only 46% of them could have been qualified as target 
households. This mismatch problem caused a leakage of public rental 
housing provision, and also caused the government to provide additional 
units of public rental housing for those households who were qualified but 
did not obtain public rental housing.  
Another critical problem is that favorable treatments for public rental 
housing through below-market rate construction loans and below-market 
rents do not take account of regional and income differences. For example, 
the amount of construction loans made by the NHF depends on the types of 
programs and the size of public rental housing. There is no consideration 
about market conditions of the regions where public rental housing is 
constructed. The amount of construction loans is uniform across regions. 
Because the total construction costs are relatively higher in metropolitan 
cities than in small and medium cities due to higher land acquisition costs in 
metropolitan cities, the ratio of construction loans to total construction costs 
is lower in the metropolitan cities. Considering that there is more demand 
for public rental housing in the metropolitan cities, it had to be more 
desirable to provide more loans for constructing public rental housing in the 
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metropolitan cities (Chung, 2001). 
The amount of rents actually paid by tenants in public rental housing is 
not differentiated among regions and income classes. In the case of the 
Permanent Public Rental Housing, different amount of rents are imposed 
based on the types of households rather than their income levels. In the case 
of the 50-Year Public Rental Housing, rents are calculated based on 
construction costs. This suggests that the income levels of tenants are not 
taken into consideration when rents are determined for each tenant. 
Therefore, there has been criticism that public rental housing programs 
do not improve horizontal and vertical equities. Chung (1999) and Oh (2000) 
empirically showed that benefit distribution of the Permanent Public Rental 
Housing and the 50-Year Public Rental Housing programs was income 
regressive and these programs did not maintain regional equity. Also, there 
is another equity problem between recipient households and qualified non-
recipient households. While the recipient households pay below-market 
rents for public rental housing, non-recipient households who have the 
same characteristics and the same income as do recipient households have 
to pay relatively higher market rents for consuming the same amount of 
housing. 
4.2 Evaluation of Demand-Side Programs 
As introduced in the previous section, demand-side programs are 
Chonsei deposit loan program and housing benefits program. In spite of 
continual increase in the volume of Chonsei deposit loans, its share in total 
volume of the NHF is not yet sufficient (18%). Even though the volume of 
loans for other low income housing programs is included, the total volume 
of the NHF operated for low income households has to be increased. 
Housing benefits program newly introduced under national livelihood 
protection system is in the right direction. However, there are rooms for 
improvement. Koh et al. (2002) suggests the following: First, explicit housing 
benefits do not actually guarantee the minimum housing costs. The explicit 
housing benefits are just 33 thousand Won to 55 thousand Won per 
household. Also, even though implicit housing benefits included in the 
livelihood benefits are taken into consideration, the total housing benefits 
are 19.4% of the minimum living costs. Considering that housing costs of 
low income households takes 20% to 30% of their minimum living costs, the 
amount of housing benefits is not yet sufficient. Second, because the total 
living costs do not take account of differences of regions and household 
characteristics except household size, housing benefits are not also 
differentiated among regions and household characteristics. Further 
modifications have to be made to improve equity across regions and 
households. 
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4.3 Evaluation of Recent Low Income Housing Policies 
Low income housing policies under current government have been 
improved to a large extent. A representative example is the enactment of the 
Housing Act. The Housing Construction Promotion Act, which played an 
important role in mass production of housing in the past, was not 
appropriate to meet diversified housing demands and to improve housing 
conditions of low income households. Enacting the Housing Act means a 
change in policy direction from supply-oriented policies to welfare-oriented 
policies. The Act stipulated to establish comprehensive and long-term 
housing policies for improving housing welfare and living environments. 
Especially, the Act requires the government to set up the minimum housing 
standards and to use the standards as one of major policy indicators. 
In 2003, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation announced the 
10-year comprehensive housing plan for the period of 2003 to 2012. Because 
of its comprehensiveness, the plan deals with many aspects of housing 
problems and policies. However, much of the plan is focused on 
improvement of housing conditions of low income households such as plans 
for continual provision of public rental housing and classification of target 
groups and housing programs appropriate for them (see table 11 and table 
12). 
Table 11. Classifications for Public Assistance 
Target Households Classifications 
Households for Prior 
Assistance 
Below minimum housing standards 
Income less than the lowest 30% 
RIR to reach minimum housing standards greater than 0.3 
Households for Direct 
Assistance 
Below minimum housing standards 
Income less than the lowest 40% 
Excludes households for prior assistance 
Households for Indirect 
Assistance 
Below minimum housing standards 
Income less than the lowest 40%-60% 
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation (2003), The Comprehensive Housing Plans: 
2003-2012. 
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Table 12. Target Households and Related Assistance Programs 
Owner-Occupiers Renters 
 One-Person 
Household 
Over Two-
Person 
Household 
One-Person 
Household 
Over Two-
Person 
Household 
Household for Prior 
Assistance Assistance for house renovation Demand-side housing assistance 
Cities 
Assistance for 
house 
renovation 
Provision of 
national 
public rental 
housing 
Demand-side 
housing 
assistance 
Provision of 
national public 
rental housing 
Household 
for Direct 
Assistance 
Rural 
Areas Assistance for house renovation Demand-side housing assistance 
Household for Indirect 
Assistance 
Provision of 10-year public rental housing, assistance for home 
purchase or assistance for renovation 
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation (2003), The Comprehensive Housing Plans: 
2003-2012. 
 
In addition, the government announced housing welfare improvement 
measures for low income households in May 2003, in which various 
different programs are applied to different income groups, and in 
September 2003, a 10-year plan for providing 1.5 million units of long-term 
public rental housing was announced (see table 2). It is expected that 
introduction of minimum housing standards, housing programs 
differentiated by income classes, and continual provision of public rental 
housing can contribute to enhance housing conditions of low income 
households. 
5. Suggestions and Conclusion 
The fundamental direction for low income housing policies in Korea is to 
improve housing conditions of low income households by establishing a 
‘household-based’ housing assistance system to meet their housing needs. 
For this direction, continual provision of public rental housing including the 
National Public Rental Housing, expansion of housing benefits, and 
assistance for house renovation will be important policy instruments. The 
minimum housing standards will be an effective policy evaluation criterion. 
In fact, the government plans to reduce the number of households below the 
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minimum housing standards by as much as 1 million by 2007. 
Introduction of the minimum housing standards is considered as the 
government’s promise to make efforts to accomplish the goal that every 
household resides in a house which meets the minimum housing conditions. 
Even though the government announced that various policy instruments 
can be used to achieve this goal, it is yet unclear that what policy 
instruments can be used to reduce how many households below minimum 
housing standards and whether it can be possible to accomplish such task. 
Further action plans have to be prepared in order for the minimum housing 
standards to be an effective system for improving housing conditions of low 
income households. 
According to the long-term comprehensive housing plan, the 
government will provide 1 million units of the National Public Rental 
Housing, thereby increasing the ratio of public rental housing stock to total 
housing stock to 10%. Additional 500 thousand units of the 10-Year Public 
Rental Housing will be provided, further increasing the ratio to 15% by 2012. 
Considering that the major criticism on public rental housing programs was 
centered on the lack of continuity and systematic operation and on the 
provision of short-term rental housing which did not contribute to the 
accumulation of public housing stock, the government’s plan can be 
evaluated as appropriate. 
However, the long-term comprehensive housing plan states that about 
480 thousand units of the National Public Rental Housing are needed in 
Seoul metropolitan region. It is wondering whether it is possible to acquire 
residential land to accommodate such a huge volume of housing units in the 
Seoul metropolitan region where the shortage of residential land has already 
been a big problem.9 This leads to the questions of whether construction of 
1.5 million units of public rental housing is a realistic plan and whether the 
government adheres too much to the ‘maybe’ impossible goal. Also, the 
plan for constructing 500 thousand units of 10-Year Public Rental Housing 
by the private sector has to be thoroughly investigated to find out whether 
demand for such type of rental housing exists as much as that large volume 
and whether it is profitable enough for the private sector to participate in the 
construction of rental housing. 
In order for existing public rental housing programs to be effectively 
operated, a consolidated management system has to be established. Under 
the consolidated management system, beneficiary households from the 
existing public rental housing programs should be pooled and have them 
pay rents based on their affordability. This system should ultimately 
enhance horizontal and vertical equities. Also, current criteria for selecting 
beneficiary households for public rental housing should be completely 
modified in such a way that household’s income and the minimum housing 
standards are major selection criteria and that the cost-based rent 
                                            
9 3 million units of housing construction have also been planned in the region. 
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determining rule is replaced by the income-based rent determining rule. 
Under the current condition that the public rental housing stock is not 
sufficient, efforts to increase the public rental housing stock should be 
continued for the time being. However, additional efforts to expand 
demand-side programs have to be made. For the extremely low income 
households most of whom are beneficiaries of the national basic livelihood 
protection system, housing benefits should be adjusted to the realistic level. 
The present level of implicit and explicit housing benefits is not sufficient to 
cover market rents. Together with this, housing benefits system has to be 
separated from the current national livelihood protection system in the long 
run. Under the current system, only those who are the beneficiaries of 
national basic livelihood protection system are eligible for the housing 
benefits. Even though housing cost burden of the households at the next 
income level is high, they are not eligible. And the level of housing benefits 
should be determined by their income and the minimum housing standards. 
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Comments on “Low Income Housing Policies in Korea: 
Evaluations and Suggestions” 
Susan Wachter 
(The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania) 
The paper analyzes and evaluates low income housing policy in Korea; 
the starting point of the analysis is that such policies support social 
cohesiveness and help to minimize both deprivation and distrust across 
economic groups. The paper points to the initial goal of policy of  
increasing the total number of units of housing to ease the "shortage" of 
housing, identified as the gap between the total number of housing units v. 
the number of households, a goal achieved, the paper points out, in 2002.  
Nonetheless, the authors note that a relatively large share (23% in 2000) 
of the population lacks housing that meets "socially adequate" standards. 
Also while there has been some (actually substantial) improvement in the 
Gini coefficient for housing size, there has been deterioration in the a 
similarly measured Gini coefficient for housing related assets .  
The paper summarizes existing housing policy which attempts to 
ameliorate housing outcome disparities. The authors point to the important 
role for public rental housing, although as a share of construction, this sector 
has now declined to a low of 14%, privately provided rental housing is 
almost irrelevant at a less than 6% market share. The authors also point to 
the growing role of housing assistance as part of the government provided 
assistance system starting in 1999 and to the continuing importance of 
subsidized loans provided for Chonsei housing.  
The authors do an excellent job of summarizing historical and new 
housing initiatives and this article will be a contribution to those who seek 
an understanding of the sources and direction of government low income 
policy. The authors also concisely summarize the conventional 
understanding of the benefits of demand-side v. supply-side policies: that 
the former are generally preferable because they support location choice, 
increased mobility and allocative efficiency. They also point to the need to 
better target current housing assistance (both supply and demand side) by 
income and region to remedy horizontal and regional inequities. The former 
occurs when households in the same situation receive different levels of 
benefits and the latter occurs when households in different parts of the 
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country receive different benefits, so that those in Seoul, for example, receive 
less assistance through supply side policy than elsewhere. They conclude by 
supporting both demand side and supply side policy and essentially argue 
for more of the former to meet the need. While this conclusion is not 
unreasonable it might be useful to raise some questions as well. If supply-
side policy is counter mobility, what are its advantages in the Korean 
setting? If greater assistance is to be provided going forward to those who 
choose to locate in Seoul where presumably jobs and public service access 
are superior, does this actually enhance regional equity? If demand-side 
policy is the way forward, where do Chonsei interest subsidies fit? Finally in 
a country where homeownership could be particularly important in 
protecting against the frequent episodes of rising rents and prices, how does 
a low income housing support system help expand access to 
homeownership?  
While this paper cannot address all questions, the authors have 
contributed to informing public policy through their excellent analysis of the 
current status and goals of low income housing policy in Korea.  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3-2 
Restructuring the Role of the National Housing Fund 
and Policy Recommendations∗ 
By 
Hyeon-Wook Kim 
Abstract  
This paper analyzes various NHF loan programs and provides policy 
recommendations to enhance their efficiency and legitimacy. First, analyses 
on household loan programs revealed that a discrepancy exists between 
target households (total income of households is lower than the 6th decile) 
and actual beneficiaries. This is due to the fact that loan eligibility has been 
determined not by total household income but rather by the income of the 
head of the household. On the other hand, analyses on the financial status of 
construction companies, which were approved for loans from the NHF, 
show that the profitability of construction companies is not sound.  
Based on the above evaluation and operational changes, the policy 
recommendations are as follows: First, financial support for housing construction 
should focus on the construction of rental housing units. Second, the NHF’s 
financial support of households should target lower-income groups and accessibility 
to NHF programs should be improved.  
This paper also proposes detailed operational improvements based on the 
analyses of existing NHF programs. First, loan eligibility should be modified to 
warrant the original NHF mission. In the long run, eligibility should be based on the 
total income and wealth of households. In the short run, eligibility should be based 
on total household income. Second, NHF programs for the construction of middle-
sized rental units should be modified to enhance the efficiency and soundness of the 
Fund. 
                                            
∗ This paper originally in Korean written by Kim, Park, and Lim (2004) has been revised and 
translated into English. 
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1. Introduction 
The National Housing Fund (NHF) is a government-based fund 
established under the Comprehensive Housing Construction Plan to 
enhance the stability and quality of housing for Koreans.1 At the time of the 
NHF's establishment in the late 80s, the housing supply rate (the number of 
housing units per one hundred households) was 71.2%. At the end of 2002, 
it rose to over 100%. Considering that the NHF supported 33% of housing 
units built between 1981 and 2003, it can be said that the objectives of NHF 
were achieved. Also, the NHF has continued to strengthen many of its 
programs, such as providing stable housing support and Chonsei2 support 
for low-income households, improving housing conditions, and so on. 
Funds amounting to over two trillion won have been used to support the 
construction of rental housing units since 2000. Also, funding support in the 
form of Chonseis and housing improvement for low-income households was 
steadily increased to about 700 billion won in 2003.  
However, the housing environment for low-income households, the 
main focus of the NHF’s support, still needs to be improved greatly. Despite 
improvements in the housing stock and housing supply rate (the number of 
housing units per one hundred households), the home ownership ratio 
(number of houses occupied by owners per one hundred housing units) and 
the stock and proportion of small houses 85㎡ or less - the primary means of 
housing for low-income households - continues to fall. At the same time, 
overcrowding due to multiple households living in a single house continues 
to rise. In terms of housing conditions, it is difficult to say whether the NHF 
has adequately accomplished its goals. Therefore, housing policy must be 
changed from increasing quantity through construction to improving the 
stability and quality of the housing environment. Also, the objectives of the 
NHF need to be changed to reflect changes in the economic and social 
environment such as persisting low interest rates, and the expanding 
housing finance market. From the perspective of households, there is 
demand for greater variety as housing preferences have become more 
diversified, as well as for improved quality for a more pleasant residential 
environment. Also, regulatory liberalization in the housing finance market 
following the economic crisis in the late 1990s opened the door for private 
financial institutions to enter the housing market. This, in turn, has eroded 
                                            
1 NHF was established in 1981 with the enactment of the Housing Construction Promotion 
Act. 
2 The Chonsei is the traditional Korean real estate finance system. In Chonsei system, a lump 
sum is deposited in lieu of rental payments and the leaseholder generates income through 
investment of the deposit over the period of the lease.  
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the NHF’s effectiveness as a low interest rate financing method, in particular, 
as a financial support policy for low-income housing.  
This study examines the NHF from various angles, and seeks to offer 
recommendations for enhancing the NHF’s role and operational structure to 
meet the new demands that have emerged. While reaffirming the NHF's 
overall role as a public fund for improving the housing environment by 
addressing market failures and decreasing risk in the financial system, we 
seek to find ways to improve its efficiency by evaluating the various loan 
programs.  
The analyses and policy suggestions in this report are based on two basic 
viewpoints. The first is that there remains a need for a funding policy to 
ensure stability by guarding against market failures in the housing finance 
market. Stable housing is a basic necessity, so there is a need for the 
government to actively intervene when market failure threatens stability. 
Second, the roles of the public and private financial institutions in the 
market must be clearly distinguished. The NHF must stay true to its pump-
priming role as a public housing finance organization, and avoid 
performing the functions of private financial institutions.  
With these two standpoints in mind, the report is organized in the 
following. Chapter 2 takes a look at the NHF's role and its importance in the 
housing finance market. Chapter 3 analyzes the NHF's loan programs and 
the structure under which individual loan programs are operated, and 
evaluates whether their objectives have been achieved. Chapter 4 considers 
results of the analysis and offers policy recommendations for the NHF, as 
well as, improving the management of the fund. Chapter 5 concludes by 
summarizing the analysis and offering policy suggestions.  
2. NHF's Programs and Performance 
2.1 NHF and Housing Finance Market 
The NHF has continuously expanded funding to the housing finance 
market to support public housing3 and to alleviate the burden of housing 
finance of low-income households. After it was established in the 1980s, the 
NHF has accelerated the construction of public housing by financially 
                                            
3 In Korea, public housing is defined as housing units constructed with the supported of 
public housing funds. Public housing has two tenure types: public for-sale and public rental. In 
Korea, housing loans from NHF and KHB (Korea Housing Bank) provided major financial 
sources until the mid 1990s. The NHF and KHB loans combined accounted for more than 80% of 
housing related loans during the 1980s and 1990s. NHF housing loans were allocated to the low-
income housing group and KHB loans were allocated to the middle income housing group. 
After the late 1990s, when KHB was privatized, KHB stopped providing loans. 
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supporting the construction of 150~200 thousand public rental or for-sale 
housing units each year. In addition, over 3.4 million houses have been 
financed through the NHF between 1981 and 2002, 35.7% of total houses 
constructed during that period.  
The NHF was successful in that it helped low-income households gain 
housing stability and reduce their financial burden. In doing so, the NHF 
attained its original goal of increasing the supply of homes. Though the 
housing supply rate decreased to 70% in the 1980s due to rapid 
industrialization and rural-to-urban migration, the rate steadily rose after 
the NHF's establishment to over 100% in 2002, surpassing its initial goal of 
100%.  
The NHF's share in the housing finance market rose to 55% in 2001, as 
the role of public housing finance increased in order to revitalize the 
housing market following the economic crisis in the late 1990s. Even with 
the expanded participation of private financial institutions, the NHF had 
total loans outstanding of 41.2 trillion won in 2002, which is 49.8% of the 
overall Korean housing finance market which totaled 82.4 trillion won.  
<Table 1> NHF’s Housing Support  
(Unit: thousand houses)  
Category 1981~ 1990 
1991~ 
1995 
1996~ 
2000 2001 2002 
Total 
(1981~2002) 
Newly Constructed 
Houses(A) 3,079 3,125 2,332 530 667 9,733 
Constructed by Public 
Sector(B) 1,340 1,080 873 128 - 3,421 
Housing Supported by 
the NHF(C) 1,017 1,140 1,036 148 131 3,472 
C/A (%) 33.0 48.2 44.4 27.9 19.6 35.7 
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation. 
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<Table 2> Overall NHF Loan Programs 
(Unit: hundred million won, %)  
Loans to Housing 
Constructors Other Loans 
Year 
Loans to 
Housing 
Consumers 
Rental 
Housing 
Construction 
For-sale 
Housing 
Construction 
Housing 
Reconstruction 
Other 
Programs 
Capital 
Contribution 
Total 
1995 1,750 (4.0) 
12,523 
(28.7) 
24,800 
(56.9) 
3,367 
(7.7) 
1,127 
(2.6) - 43,567 
1996 1,730 (3.7) 
17,211 
(37.2) 
22,379 
(48.4) 
3,601 
(7.8) 
1,362 
(2.9) - 46,283 
1997 2,250 (4.9) 
21,179 
(45.8) 
18,948 
(41.0) 
2,698 
(5.8) 
1,196 
(2.6) - 46,271 
1998 22,721 (40.7) 
19,555 
(35.0) 
9,102 
(16.3) 
2,262 
(4.0) 
2,254 
(4.0) - 55,894 
1999 33,262 (44.7) 
22,870 
(30.7) 
9,540 
(12.8) 
1,872 
(2.5) 
1,497 
(2.0) 
5,451 
(7.3) 74,492 
2000 37,931 (45.0) 
34,355 
(40.8) 
8,945 
(10.6) 
1,303 
(1.5) 
1,665 
(2.0) - 84,199 
2001 27,207 (26.6) 
41,194 
(40.3) 
6,454 
(6.3) 
1,514 
(1.5) 
12,932 
(12.7) 
12,791 
(12.5) 102,092 
2002 22,171 (31.7) 
36,904 
(52.7) 
4,146 
(5.9) 
1,485 
(2.1) 
5,273 
(7.5) 
57 
(0.1) 70,036 
  Note: 1) Numbers in parenthesis are a percentage of the total. 
2) Capital Contribution includes capital investment to the KHGC (Korea Housing 
Guarantee Co., Ltd.), MBS, and KoMoCo (Korea Mortgage Corporation). 
Source: Annual Statement of NHF accounts, Ministry of Construction and Transportation. 
2.2 NHF Loan Programs 
There are many ways to classify the NHF's various loan programs, but in 
this paper they are divided into 3 groups depending on usage; Loans to 
Housing Consumers, Loans to Housing Constructors, and other housing 
related loans. The Loans to Housing Consumers provides various loans that 
can be used to make a chonsei deposit or purchase a house.  To qualify, 
borrowers must meet certain loan eligibility conditions such as level of 
income. The Loans to Housing Constructors supports the construction of 
various rental and for-sale housing units. Also, the NHF runs many 
different housing related loan programs, including loans for reconstructing 
houses in poor condition, and so on.  
From the <Table 2>, we can see two major changes after 1995 in the 
allocation of resources. First, overall Loans to Housing Consumers rose 
                  Residential Welfare and Housing Policies: The Experience and Future of Korea 
 
250
dramatically in years after the crisis in late 1997. Before the crisis, loans to 
housing consumers totaled only less than 5% of all new loans while loans to 
housing constructors totaled 85%. After 1998, housing consumer loans took 
a higher proportion and in 1999 its proportion was greater than that of loans 
to housing constructors. The large amount of loans to housing constructors 
before the crisis is believed to have stemmed from the string of policies that 
increased the housing supply by constructing new houses. With the massive 
bankruptcies of construction companies after the crisis, the demand for 
loans from housing constructors dropped while housing consumer loans 
increased as policies focused on ensuring a stable supply of housing. Second, 
Loans to Rental Housing Constructors steadily rose while the proportion 
and amount of Loans to For-sale Housing Constructors rapidly declined. 
This can be attributed to the shift in government's policy view of houses as a 
means of living.  
2.2.1  Loan Programs for Housing Consumers4  
The Loans to Housing Consumers is a program that provides loans with 
preferable terms such as low-interest rates to target low-income individuals. 
The Loans to Housing Consumers consists of two loan programs: loans that 
can be used to purchase a house, and loans that can be used to make a 
chonsei deposit. The housing purchase loan program supports wage earners 
with a annual income of 30 million won or less and do not own a house by 
providing a loan of up to 70% of the total price for a home of 85㎡ or less 
with an upper limit of 100 million won at low interest rates.  However, the 
chonsei deposit loan program is offered to two income groups: wage earners 
and low-income households.  For wage earners with a annual income of 30 
million won or less and do not own a house, the program provides a chonsei 
deposit of up to 60 million won or 70% of the deposit for a house of 85㎡ or 
less at low interest rates.  For low-income households who do not own a 
house, the program provides a chonsei deposit of up to 70% of the deposit 
for a house of 60㎡ or less at an annual rate of 3%. Besides the 
aforementioned programs, Loans for Housing Purchase Installment 
Payment, Loans to First-time Home Buyers, and others are operated by the 
NHF.  
<Table 2> and <Table 3> both show that the basic operational structure 
of the NHF changed after the crisis. No longer focusing on loans to housing 
constructors, it shifted focus towards loans to housing consumers. Also, the 
program called Loans for Housing Purchase Installment Payment and Loans 
for Chonsei Deposit Repayment was added to the three major programs 
including the chonsei deposit loans for both low-income households and 
wage earners, and housing purchase loans for wage earners. The data on 
Loans to Housing Consumers in <Table 3> show that loans for housing 
                                            
4 Discussions below are based on the statistics of NHF loan programs as of the end of 2003. 
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purchases increased greatly, this increase was mainly came from the new 
programs including Loans for Housing Purchase Installment Payment, 
Loans for Chonsei Deposit Repayment, etc. Second, as shown, chonsei deposit 
loans surpassed housing purchase loans.  
<Table 3> NHF Housing Consumer Loan Programs 
(Unit: hundred million won, %) 
  
Chonsei 
Deposit 
for Low-
income 
Housing 
Purchase 
for Wage 
Earners 
Chonsei 
Deposit 
for Wage 
Earners 
Housing 
Purchase 
Installment 
Payment 
Purchase 
of Rental 
Housing 
First-
time 
Home 
Buyers 
Chonsei 
Deposit 
Repayment 
Total 
Loans  
1995 750 (42.9) 
700 
(40.0) 
300 
(17.1) - - - - 1,750 
1996 730 (42.2) 
500 
(28.9) 
500 
(28.9) - - - - 1,730 
1997 750 (33.3) 
800 
(35.6) 
700 
(31.1) - - - - 2,250 
1998 750 (3.30) 
600 
(2.64) 
1,300 
(5.7) 
18,521 
(81.5) - - 
1,550 
(6.8) 22,721 
1999 3,000 (9.0) 
9,000 
(27.1) - 
20,913 
(62.9) - - 
349 
(1.0) 33,262 
2000 1,692 (4.5) 
10,613 
(28.0) 
9,608 
(25.3) 
15,937 
(42.0) 
26 
(0.0) - 
55 
(0.1) 37,931 
2001 2,442 (9.0) 
4,282 
(15.7) 
7,169 
(26.3) 
9,502 
(34.9) 
256 
(0.9) 
3,555 
(13.1) 
1 
(0.0) 27,207 
2002 4,880 (22.0) 
1,345 
(6.1) 
4,808 
(21.7) 
2,081 
(9.4) 
262 
(1.2) 
8,795 
(39.7) - 22,171 
  Note: 1) Numbers in parenthesis are a percentage of the total. 
2) Loans for Chonsei Deposit Repayment Program were discontinued in 2002. 
Source: Annual Statement of NHF accounts, Ministry of Construction and Transportation. 
2.2.2  Loan Programs for Housing Constructors 
The Loans to Housing Constructors program provides low interest loans 
to construction companies building rental or for-sale units in a certain size at 
a preset amount. Loans for housing constructors can be divided largely into 
two groups: Loans for Rental Housing Construction and Loans for For-sale 
Housing Construction. The loan program for the construction of rental 
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housing includes the Loans for National Rental Housing Construction, 
Loans for Public Rental Housing Construction, Loans for Middle-sized 
Rental Housing Construction, Loans for Reconstructed Rental Housing, and 
Loans for Company Employee Rental Housing. The loan program for the 
construction of for-sale houses includes the Loans for Public For-sale 
Housing Construction, Loans for Middle-sized For-sale Housing 
Construction, Loans for Welfare-enhancing Housing Construction, and 
Loans for Reconstructed For-sale Housing. Of these, the Loans for National, 
Public and Middle-sized Rental Housing Construction and the Loans for 
Public and Middle-sized For-sale Housing Construction are the largest and 
most important.  
The Loans for National Rental Housing Construction program provides 
loans of 24.7 million won per household at an annual interest rate of 3% over 
30 years, for homes with an expected rental period of over 10 or 20 years 
and 60㎡ or less in size. The Loans for Public Rental Housing Construction 
provides loans of 45 million won per household at an annual interest rate of 
3% over 30 years, for homes with an expected rental period of over 5 years 
and 60㎡ or less in size. The Loans for Middle-sized Rental Housing 
Construction was introduced to help revitalize the real estate market after 
the crisis, and to provide loans of 60 million won per household at an annual 
interest rate of 5.5% over 18 years, for homes with an expected rental period 
of over 5 years and between 60㎡ and 85㎡ in size. Loans for Public For-sale 
Housing Construction provides loans of 45 million won in support per 
household at an annual interest rate of 6% over 3 years, for homes 
constructed for sale and 60㎡ or less in size. The Loans for Middle-sized 
For-sale Housing Construction provides loans of 60 million won in support 
per household at an annual interest rate of 7% over 3 years, for homes 
constructed for sale and 60㎡ and 85㎡in size.  The Loans for Middle-sized 
Rental and For-sale Housing Construction were also introduced after the 
crisis.  
According to <Table 4>, the Loans for For-sale Housing Construction 
that were previously prevalent, decreased in proportion and amount to 
around 10% of total Loans to Housing Constructors in 2002. On the other 
hand, Loans for Rental Housing Construction rose to 90%. This reversal in 
proportion is deemed to have been a result of policies that focused on 
increasing the supply of rental housing.  
While there are small variances, funding support has been concentrated 
in the construction of public rental or middle-sized rental housing units 
which requires rental periods of only 5 years, especially in the construction 
of middle-sized housing units which exceed the size of public housing units. 
In terms of Loans to For-sale Housing Constructors, loans for small for-sale 
houses under 60㎡ decreased sharply especially after 2000, and accounted 
for only 2.3% of total Loans to Housing Constructors at the end of 2002, 
while Loans for Middle-sized For-Sale Housing Construction took up the 
majority.   
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<Table 4> NHF Loan Programs to Housing Constructors 
(Unit: hundred million won, %) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Loans for 
Rental Housing 
Construction 
12,523 
(33.6)  
17,211 
(43.5)  
21,179 
(52.8)  
19,555 
(68.2)  
22,870 
(70.6)  
34,355 
(79.3)  
41,194 
(86.5)  
36,904 
(89.9) 
National Rental 
Housing 
924 
 (2.5) - - - 
2,620 
(8.1) 
1,600 
(3.7)  
8,134 
(17.1)  
11,665 
(28.4)  
Public Rental 
Housing 
9,423 
(25.2) 
14,508 
(36.7)  
17,448 
(43.5) 
14,975 
(52.3)  
11,405 
(35.2)  
12,810 
(29.6)  
13,596 
(28.5)  
10,618 
(25.9)  
Middle-sized 
Rental Housing - - - 
363 
(1.3)  
3,938 
(12.2)  
15,527 
(35.9)  
16,955 
(35.6)  
13,137 
(32.0)  
Reconstructed 
Rental Housing 
134 
 (0.4) 
228 
(0.6) 
918 
(2.3) 
737 
(2.6) 
2,226 
(6.9) 
1,966 
(4.5)  
694 
(1.5)  
0 
(0.0)  
Company 
Employee 
Rental Housing 
1,055 
 (2.8) 
1,115 
(2.8)  
696 
(1.7) 
209 
(0.7) 
19 
(0.1)  
0 
(0.0)  
14 
(0.0)  
55 
(0.1)  
Rental Housing 
Installment 
987 
 (2.6) 
1,360 
(3.4)  
2,117 
(5.3) 
3,271 
(11.4) 
2,662 
(8.2) 
2,452 
(5.7) 
1,801 
(3.8) 
1,429 
(3.5) 
Loans for For-
sale Housing 
Construction 
24,800 
(66.4)  
22,379 
(56.5)  
18,948 
(47.2) 
9,102 
(31.8) 
9,540 
(29.4) 
8,945 
(20.7) 
6,454 
(13.5) 
4,146 
(10.1) 
Public For-sale 
Housing 
19,894 
(53.3) 
17,617 
(44.5)  
15,515 
(39.7) 
7,049 
(24.6) 
6,674 
(20.6) 
3,625 
(8.4) 
1,927 
(4.0)  
959 
(2.3)  
Middle-sized 
For-sale 
Housing 
- - - - 1,343 (4.1)  
4,717 
(10.9)  
4,275 
(9.0)  
3,072 
(7.5)  
Welfare-
enhancing 
Housing 
3,411 
 (9.1) 
3,700 
(9.3)  
2,838 
(7.1) 
1,427 
(5.0) 
855 
(2.6) 
190 
(0.4) 
18 
(0.0) 
0 
(0.0)  
Multi-family 
For-sale 
Housing 
498 
 (1.3) 
262 
(0.7) 
117 
(0.3) 
9 
(0.0)  
57 
(0.2)  
121 
(0.3) 
143 
(0.3) 
71 
(0.2)  
Multi-
household For-
sale Housing 
997 
 (2.7) 
800 
(2.0) 
478 
(1.2) 
65 
(0.2) 
49 
(0.2) 
72 
(0.2) 
91 
(0.2) 
44 
(0.1) 
Redeveloped 
For-sale 
Housing 
- - - 552 (1.9)  
535 
(1.7) - - 
0 
(0.0)  
Reconstructed 
For-sale 
Housing 
- - - - 27 (0.1)  
220 
(0.5)  
0 
(0.0)  
0 
(0.0)  
Total 37,323 39,590 40,127 28,657 32,410 43,300 47,648 41,050 
  Note: Numbers in parenthesis are a percentage of the total. 
Source: Annual Statement of NHF accounts, Ministry of Construction and Transportation. 
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2.2.3  Other Loan programs  
Aside loans to housing consumers and housing constructors, the NHF 
provides loans for reconstructing and improving houses, and for various 
other special purpose activities.  
The Loans for Housing Improvement provides support to homes under 
85㎡ in size in “residential environment improvement areas” for restoring, 
and making additions and improvements. Similarly, funding support is also 
given to old homes or houses in poor condition outside of “residential 
environment improvement areas.” The Loans for Rural Housing 
Improvement and Loans for House Remodeling are also included under 
housing improvement loans. 
Other housing loans as of 2003 include the Loans for Bankrupted 
Construction Business Normalization, Loans for Housing Site Preparation, 
Loans for Repairing Disaster Affected Houses, etc., but only the Loans for 
Housing Site Preparation was significant in terms of size or performance. 
The NHF also operated funds for capital contribution to housing-related 
organizations such as, the Korea Housing Guarantee Company (KHGC), 
and the Korea Mortgage Corporation (KoMoCo). 
2.2.4  Revisions to Loan Programs in 2004 
As this study tries to offer policy direction and suggestions for the NHF, 
the various programs operated by the NHF as of 2003 were outlined. 
However, in 2004, the NHF made sweeping revisions on its loan programs, 
so these changes must be mentioned before proceeding further.  
Of the 25 loan programs under NHF in 2003, three programs were 
terminated, 12 were reorganized under four programs, and two new 
programs were introduced, bringing the total to 14 loan programs as of 2004.  
Specifically, loan programs for Public Rental Housing Construction, 
Middle-sized Rental Housing Construction, and Company Employee Rental 
Housing Construction were combined with the Loans for Public Rental 
Housing Construction. Loan programs for Public For-sale Housing 
Construction, Middle-sized For-sale Housing Construction, Welfare-
enhancing Housing Construction, and Reconstructed For-sale Housing were 
combined into the Loans for Public For-Sale Housing Construction. The 
loans for Housing Improvement were combined into the Loans for 
Residential Environment Improvement, while the Loans to Housing 
Purchase for wage-earners, Loans for First-time Home Buyers, and Loans 
for Housing Purchase Installment Payment were combined into the Loans 
for Public Housing Purchase. The Loans for Housing Site Preparation and 
Repairing Disaster Affected Houses programs were terminated due to a lack 
of demand and need.  
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3. Evaluation of the NHF's Loan Programs 
3.1 Loans to Housing Consumers 
3.1.1  Scope and Criteria of the Evaluation 
The 'Housing Construction Promotion Act' states the NHF's purpose 
which is to “effectively secure and supply funding to carry out the 
government's comprehensive housing construction plan of stabilizing and 
improving housing conditions for Korean citizens.” Also, the ‘Housing Act’, 
which replaced the 'Housing Construction Promotion Act', states the NHF's 
role which is to “effectively secure and supply funding to carry out the 
government's comprehensive housing construction plan.” Under these legal 
definitions of the NHF’s role, it is difficult to assess whether the NHF's has 
implemented appropriate loan programs, as well as, properly executed 
them.  
The Ministry of Construction and Transportation, which manages the 
NHF announced the ｢Plans to improve the residential welfare of low-
income households｣ in 2003, which states the objectives of the government's 
housing policy towards low-income households and clearly sets the criteria 
for beneficiaries of the policy. So, in carrying out the evaluation of the NHF, 
this paper will use the criteria set in the “Plans” as its benchmark.  
The “Plans” states that households in the lowest 10% income bracket, 
which cannot afford to pay even rent, should be supported through the 
provision of low interest loans for chonsei or rent, or small-sized National 
Rental Housings. Though the next 2~4 decile income households are 
somewhat considered to be able to pay rent, they still are unable to purchase 
a home. For these groups, the government also recommends the provision 
of financial support through chonsei and rent, or National Rental Housings. 
In this respect, the NHF's loan programs for chonsei deposit were established 
for the bottom 4 decile income group.  
The next 5~6 decile income group are considered to be able to purchase a 
house with government support. Hence, policy efforts have focused on 
providing small-sized for-sale housing and expanding home financing. The 
loans for purchasing houses for wage earners, and chonsei deposit for wage 
earners and low-income households are programs aimed at this group. The 
last group of 7~10 decile, middle income households and above, are 
considered to be able to purchase houses without government support, and 
are excluded from the NHF's coverage. 
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3.1.2  Analysis and Resources  
The NHF's program of loans under the Loans to Housing Consumers is 
currently being provided through Kookmin Bank, Woori Bank, and 
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF). Kookmin Bank has 
taken over the NHF programs from Korea Housing Bank through a merger. 
Woori Bank runs the programs including the housing purchase and chonsei 
deposit loans for wage earners, and the Loans for Housing Purchase 
Installment Payment Program, which it took over after the merger with 
Peace Bank. To increase competition amongst the financial institutions and 
to enhance accessibility to the programs, NACF was allowed to participate 
and to run the NHF's programs since January 2003.  
Through the data obtained, we were able to evaluate the appropriateness 
of fund operation and whether the NHF has achieved its goals. Due to data 
limitations, however, not all of the housing consumer loan programs were 
evaluated. For example, financial institutions do not have detailed 
information on income of households in the low income group who 
received loans for chonsei deposit, since the only requirement needed to 
qualify for this loan is meeting the local government's criteria of being a 
‘poor household’. Thus, we were able to only carry out a limited analysis on 
housing purchase and chonsei deposit loans for wage earners. There were 
114,258 cases of unpaid loans in May 2003. While the structure of the data 
set differs for each individual loan program, information on the borrower 
including gender, age, address, size of loan, and housing type were included. 
Also, there was some data on home size, home price, and income level of 
borrower. Cases of borrowers with multiple loans were considered as one 
case, whereas cases without income or employment information were 
removed, leaving a total of 46,063 cases.  
This paper uses the National Statistical Office's「Annual Income and 
Expenditure Trends of Urban Households in 2002」for the analysis. This 
provides a large set of survey data taken from sample households in urban 
areas, excluding farmers, fishers, and self-employed workers. When only 
including households in urban areas and excluding self-employed 
workers, problems arise in using this sample as an indicator of income 
distribution for all households in Korea. Since housing is an issue that 
corresponds more to urban areas, however, we thought that the sample 
problem would not be significant in our analysis. 
CHAPTER 3-2  Restructuring the Role of the National Housing Fund and Policy Recommendations 257
<Table 5> Statistical Data by Income Group: Total Household Income  
(unit: 10,000 won, Age, Persons)  
Decile Annual Income Average Income 
Average Age of 
Head of 
Household 
Average 
Household Size 
Total  3,305 42.0 3.41 
1 ~1,442 1,124 44.7 2.72 
2 1,442~1,850 1,656 41.5 3.00 
3 1,851~2,198 2,026 40.4 3.27 
4 2,199~2,547 2,373 41.6 3.34 
5 2,548~2,906 2,720 40.7 3.51 
6 2,907~3,299 3,097 40.0 3.48 
7 3,300~3,804 3,533 41.5 3.62 
8 3,805~4,516 4,136 42.2 3.62 
9 4,517~5,543 5,006 42.8 3.69 
10 5,544~ 7,389 44.9 3.83 
Note: Sample consists of 6,121 households.  
Source: National Statistical Office,「Annual Income and Expenditure Trends of Urban 
Households in 2002」. 
 
<Table 5> provides average income, average age and average household 
size of 10 evenly divided income groups using data from「Annual Income 
and Expenditure Trends of Urban Households in 2002」. The upper range 
of annual household income in the first low income group is 14.4 million 
won (1.2 million won a month), and this is nearly equivalent to the annual 
income criteria - 10 million won or less - to qualify for the government’s loan 
program that provides small-size National Rental Housings as described in 
the ｢Plans to improve the residential welfare of low-income households｣ in 
2003. The annual household income in 2~4 decile group ranges from 14.4 to 
25.5 million won, and this is also similar to the Plans’ income criteria for 
programs that provide chonsei deposit loans, or National Rental Housings 
that require an applicant’s annual income to be 22.8 million won or less. The 
annual household income in 5~6 decile group, which is on the verge of 
being considered as the middle income group, qualifies for programs 
providing small for-sale housing and housing finance is in the 24.5~33.0 
million won range, again similar to the income criteria of 30 million won or 
less as presented in the Plans. 
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3.1.3  Evaluation of Loan Programs Housing Purchase and Chonsei Deposit for 
Wage Earners 
The loan programs for housing purchase and chonsei deposit for wage 
earners require that the borrower’s annual income to be less than 30 million 
won, which is similar to the average household income of the 6th decile of 
the urban households. [Figure 2] shows detailed information on the 
distribution of borrowers separated by 10 income groups as defined above 
using the「Annual Income and Expenditure Trends of Urban Households 
in 2002」. Since households earning more than 30 million won a year do not 
qualify for the loan programs, subsequently, the borrowers fall in the 6th 
decile and below. The first decile group, which is determined as being 
unable to purchase a home or use chonsei were provided national rental 
housing, accounted for 21.2% of all housing purchase loans and 18% of 
chonsei deposit loans for wage earners. This implies that, surprisingly, a 
large portion of the lowest income group is attempting to purchase houses 
or secure chonsei, both of which are very burdensome financially to those 
households. 
The fact that the proportion of lowest income group is greater than the 
proportion of other income groups among the beneficiaries of loans for 
wage earners for housing purchase and chonsei deposit is of particular 
interest and warrants further interpretation.  In a system where a loan is 
available as soon as certain conditions – such as upper income limit – are 
met, motive always exists to under-report income. Further, the financial 
institutions themselves have no incentive to question the accuracy of a 
borrower’s income if they are sure their income is lower than 30 million won 
a year. Thus, the number of borrowers from the 1st decile in [Figure 2] has 
been inaccurately recorded as too high.  
While there are small differences between the groups targeted by the 
housing purchase loans and chonsei deposit loans for wage earners, there is 
actually no real difference in the income distribution of the borrowers. 
According to the Plans, the chonsei deposit loans mainly target households in 
the 2~4 decile group, while the housing purchase loans target the 5~6 decile 
group. However, the 2~4 decile group accounts for 61.7% of chonsei deposit 
loans, only slightly more than it's 57.8% share in the loans to housing 
consumers. This is simply due to the 30 million won income criteria applied 
on both programs, which differs from the standards found in the Plans. To 
be in line with the principles of the Plans, there should be different criteria 
for borrowers of each program. Hence, there should be deep consideration 
of whether that would be realistically needed.  
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[Figure 1]  Distribution of Borrowers by Income Groups: Total 
Household Income 
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  Note: 1) Includes loan programs for wage earners, where the left numbers are of the housing 
purchase loans and right numbers are chonsei deposit loans. 
2) Income groups are divided according to the same ranges of annual income that is 
used to divide the households in the「Annual Income and Expenditure Trends of 
Urban Households in 2002」by 10 income groups. 
 
[Figure 1] has two major short-fallings in assessing the operations of the 
NHF's program of loans under the Loan to Housing Consumers, specifically, 
in the way support is actually provided to its target groups. First, there is the 
problem of measuring or defining household income. Our analysis is based 
on the premise that income includes the entire household, not the individual 
borrower. However, an official from a bank running the loan program 
brought to our attention that the definition of annual income that is being 
used as the income criteria for the loans in practice only includes the income 
of individual borrowers, not the total income of all household 
members. This is contrary to the interpretation of the income criteria set in 
the “Plans,” which refers to income as total income of all household 
members. Since only the borrower's income is reported in practice, and the 
borrower is usually the head of the household, the comparison should be 
done using the income of the head of the household rather than total 
household income. Using the data from the「Annual Income and 
Expenditure Trends of Urban Households in 2002」on head of household 
income, we can compare the income distribution of the borrowers from the 
different standard. When only the head of household income is used, we 
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find a discrepancy between the group to which these loan programs are 
supposed to target and the groups that are actually benefiting.  
[Figure 2]  Distribution of Borrowers by Income Groups: Income of 
Household Head 
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  Note: 1) Includes loan programs for wage earners, where the left numbers are of the housing 
purchase loans and right numbers are of the chonsei deposit loans. 
2) Income groups are classified according to the range of annual income of household 
heads, which is used to classify the households in the「Annual Income and 
Expenditure Trends of Urban Households in 2002」by 10 income groups. 
 
[Figure 2] shows that, when we use the head of household income for 
wage earners rather than total household income, 34.5% of total borrowers 
of housing purchase loans, and 35.1% of total borrowers of chonsei deposit 
loans are in the 7th and 8th decile, which are outside the NHF's target group. 
This discrepancy can be easily expected when we consider that heads of 
households with an annual income of 30 million won, the upper limit for 
income as presented in the “Plan,” now fall in the 8th decile income group. In 
fact, over half of the borrowers – most being heads of households – in these 
loan programs reported an annual income of over 20 million won, which 
places them in the 7th decile when only income of the head of the household 
is considered. 
The second reason [Figure 2] should be interpreted with caution is 
because how "wages" is defined in the “Plans” differs from how it is actually 
applied in practice. The financial institutions running the loan programs 
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determine wages by including the base salary only, rather than total salary. 
For the manufacturing industry, usually only 2/3 of total wages are paid in 
base salary, while the remaining 1/3 are paid in extra wages such as 
bonuses. This leads us to believe that there is a larger difference between the 
target group and the groups actually receiving support than shown in 
[Figure 3]. Some are expected to be in the 7th decile or above, and a very 
small number may even be in the 10th decile.  
The NHF seems to be providing these loans to its target group in the 
1st~6th decile income group if the income criteria includes total income of 
all household members, however, differences in how ‘income’ is interpreted 
causes significant discrepancies in actual practice. If the 30 million won 
annual income limit is to be kept, the borrower's entire household income 
should be reported and utilized in the qualification process. However, it is 
difficult to even record the income of the individual borrower, let alone the 
entire household. Due to this problem of practicality, the next best thing 
would be lowering the income limit to 25 million won, and firmly defining 
‘wages’ as total wages. If the limit is lowered to 25 million won, it would 
seem that over 65% of wage earners would meet the requirements and be 
eligible for loans.  
3.2 Loan Programs for Housing Constructors 
As the NHF’s Loans to Housing Constructors can mostly be converted to 
Loans to Housing Consumers, loans to constructors is a key part of the 
NHF's soundness and operational efficiency. Loans to Housing Constructors 
have contributed to housing stability by stimulating housing constructions 
and supplying rental housing units. However, changes in real estate and 
financial markets are forcing a large scale re-examination of the objectives 
and operation of these programs. Since 1981, the NHF has supported the 
construction of 150,000~250,000 rental and for-sale housing units a year 
through various loan programs to construction companies. With the 
housing supply rate over 100%, and competition from private housing 
finance firms, the NHF’s loan programs to construction companies must 
take a new direction. 
If we take a look at the state of the Loans to Housing Constructors, the 
amount of bad loans in NHF’s construction companies was approximately 
2.5 trillion won, 6% of the total 41 trillion won of loans. This is a very high 
rate compared to the 2.0% ratio of non-performing loans at commercial 
banks. However, a direct comparison is not wise, as banks have paid off a 
large amount of the bad loans while the NHF has yet to do so.  
The Ministry of Construction and Transportation tries to minimize the 
NHF's bad loans by using a loan screening system and continuously 
updating the system. After the 2001 revision of the loan screening system, 
there have been no cases of bad loans. However, this may also be a result of 
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the favorable business conditions in the construction market in the period 
between 2001~2003. In particular, with recent concerns surrounding the 
housing market, there is a need to observe the financial soundness of 
construction companies receiving the NHF loans. Thus, this section 
examines the system used to screen Loans to Housing Constructors, the 
current condition of companies receiving loans, the risk of bad loans, and 
the performance of private banks running the NHF loan programs.  
3.2.1  Loan Screening System 
In this subsection, the composition and current status of the loan 
screening system used for Loans to Housing Constructors will be examined, 
and recommendations will be suggested for improving the system. In the 
scoring and screening process, only loans that score 40 points and over are 
being approved. The items subject to scoring roughly include profitability, 
business capability, current status of company, and some other 
considerations regarding the financial status and non-financial status that 
may result in the addition or reduction of points.  
<Table 6> Distributions of Screening Scores for Loan to Housing 
Constructors  
(unit: million won)  
  Score Number of Loans 
Approved 
Amount Average 
70 and over 1 9,360 9,360 
60~69 14 57,334 4,095 
50~59 23 66,028 2,871 
Public For-sale 
Housing  
40~49 21 69,225 3,296 
70 and over 8 138,434 17,304 
60~69 36 422,077 11,724 
50~59 41 299,905 7,315 
Middle-sized 
For-sale 
Housing 
40~49 23 145,077 6,308 
70 and over 3 58,860 19,620 
60~69 17 128,257 7,544 
50~59 69 373,458 5,412 
Public Rental 
Housing 
40~49 76 269,386 3,545 
70 and over 0 0 0 
60~69 28 13,980 16,023 
50~59 68 891,449 13,110 
Middle-sized 
Rental Housing 
40~49 61 637,151 10,445 
Source: Loans to housing construction companies approved during the period of March 2001 
to December 2002. 
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The analysis uses data on 165 loans to public rental housing constructors, 
59 loans to public for-sale housing constructors, 157 loans to middle-sized 
rental housing constructors, and 108 loans to middle-sized for-sale housing 
constructors approved during the period of March 2001 to December 2002. 
In <Table 7>, there are many companies that scored just slightly above 40 
points. This means that, if the threshold for loan approval were raised to 
guard against bad loans without having a back-up policy, the NHF would 
have difficulties meeting its operational objectives. 
3.2.2  Financial Status of Construction Companies 
As seen in the table above, there is a possibility that financially unsound 
construction companies are being approved for loans. However, it is 
difficult to measure the risk of bad loans from just examining these statistics, 
so detailed statistics for individual companies must be acquired. Assessing 
the negative impact of loan borrowers’ defaulting on the NHF’s loans under 
the program for housing constructors warrants an analysis of the 
companies’ financial statements. Thus, we used financial statements of 
construction companies listed in the D&B Korea Co.’s database and 
compared the financial conditions of companies that received NHF loans to 
those of other companies.  
Among the companies with records of NHF loans, 117 companies are 
listed in the database and their financial statements were used. The 
comparison group consists of companies from the D&B Korea database that 
were classified as general construction companies.  
The analytical method used was to classify all construction companies in 
the D&B Korea database into 10 groups by each selected items in the 
financial statements. Then we checked which group the companies that 
received the NHF loans fell in. The selected items for comparison were total 
capital, total assets, owners’ capital, debt ratio, ratio of return on asset (ROA), 
ratio of return on sales, and interest coverage ratio.  
First, total capital, total assets, and owners’ capital can be used to 
measure company size. There are many companies which rank high in those 
three criteria, showing that large companies tend to receive NHF loans. This 
is due to the many scoring items in the screening system that are related to 
company size, such as the ratio of owners’ capital to total cost of 
construction planned, and size of constructions (in the case of Loans to For-
sale Housing Constructors).  
On the other hand, the debt ratio which is an indicator of a company's 
financial soundness, tells a different story. For instance, 76 of the 109 
companies (about 70%) fell in or below the bottom 6th group, indicating that 
a large amount of companies were financially unsound. However, it should 
be noted that the companies, which received loans for rental housing 
construction, with rental housing businesses recognized collected deposits 
on rental housing units as debt, and thus may have a higher debt ratio until 
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their rental units are converted into for-sale houses. This should be taken 
into consideration before using the debt ratio as a measure of a company’s 
soundness. Unfortunately, even if only for-sale housing constructors are 
taken into consideration, 68% of companies that received loans for public 
for-sale housing fell in the below 6th group, and 80% in the case of 
companies that received loans for middle-sized for-sale housing. 
<Table 7> Comparisons of Financial Status of Construction Companies 
that Qualify for NHF Loans  
 (Unit: hundred million won, %)  
Decile Total Capital 
Total 
Assets 
Owners’ 
Capital Debt Ratio ROA 
Return on 
Sales 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
1 14 (24443~94)
18 
(52665~1127) 
14 
(17343~239) 
4 
(0.2~52.9) 
5 
(690.2~13.6) 
15 
(~13.9) 
9 
(~3963) 
2 20 (93~45) 
22 
(1118~467) 
18 
(229~91) 
5 
(54.3~111.9) 
9 
(13.6~9.0) 
19 
(13.9~9.1) 
7 
(3951~1216) 
3 18 (45~30) 
17 
(462~251) 
9 
(91~58) 
4 
(111.9~178.5) 
3 
(8.9~6.1) 
17 
(9.1~7.3) 
6 
(1208~629)
4 15 (30~22) 
8 
(250~160) 
14 
(57~37) 
9 
(178.9~268.6) 
5 
(6.1~4.2) 
10 
(7.3~5.9) 
8 
(627~380) 
5 15 (22~18) 
7 
(159~117) 
12 
(37~24) 
11 
(270~391.2) 
16 
(4.2~2.9) 
9 
(5.9~4.7) 
11 
(379~257) 
6~10 
27/109 
25% 
(18 ~) 
37/109 
34% 
(117 ~) 
42/109 
39% 
(23 ~) 
76/109 
70% 
(392.7 ~) 
71/109 
65% 
(2.8 ~) 
37/107 
35% 
(4.7 ~) 
65/106 
61% 
(257.2 ~) 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are the range of each financial indicators of companies included 
in each group. And numbers with % in the last low indicates a percentage of companies 
with loan approval and included in 6~10 decile group to the total. 
 
Many of the approved companies fell below the 6th group also in terms 
of ROA and interest coverage ratio. This shows the low profitability of 
companies receiving loans. In particular, 40% of the companies are not even 
able to cover interest payments with profits, suggesting that the threshold 
for loan approval must be raised accordingly.  If companies involved in 
rental housing are removed from the sample, 62~78% of companies that 
received loans for for-sale housing are not able to make interest payments 
with their profits. 
To summarize, the lack of financial soundness in most companies 
receiving Loans for Housing Constructors is an issue that must be addressed 
to ensure stable housing. So, policy efforts should focus on the stability of 
rental housing supply, as well as the soundness of the NHF. 
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4. Re-establishing the Role of the NHF  
4.1 Changes in the Operational Structure and Objectives of the NHF  
4.1.1  NHF’s Operational Structure 
Changes in the housing market and housing finance environment are 
causing problems in the NHF's operations. Improvements in the operation 
of the NHF are being proposed for its long-term viability. Continuing low-
growth and low-interest trends are some of the most important changes in 
the environment for the NHF. The expanded money supply, decrease in 
capital demand, and price stabilization after the foreign currency crisis have 
brought about a steady fall in the interest rate. This low interest rate regime 
does not appear to be a short-term trend, but rather looks like it is settling 
into a long-term trend. The continuing low interest rate environment has 
eroded the NHF’s attractiveness it once held when interest rates were more 
competitive. In fact, there are instances where private financial institutions 
are offering the same or even lower interest rates than the NHF. As the 
number of private financial institutions entering the housing finance market 
increases, we can expect increased competition between the NHF and these 
financial institutions for the same consumers.  
The second change in the NHF's environment is that private institutions 
are expanding into the housing finance market using short-term loans. The 
most noticeable change is the expansion of short-term home equity loans. In 
this respect, the need for an active response from the NHF has been looked 
at. The lengthening of home equity loan maturity was not the original 
purpose of the NHF, but it must take a leading role in the immature housing 
finance market, as it has played the sole role in the long-term housing 
finance market.  
The third environmental change is due to housing demand. With 
individual housing preferences varying, many other types of housing have 
become available. Also, there is a demand for a more enhanced residential 
environment and improved quality of housing. In this environment, 
housing policies must be changed from focusing on increasing the supply of 
housing to providing a more desirable housing environment to meet the 
new needs. The NHF's loan programs must be changed, within the 
boundaries of its purpose and to maintain efficiency, in order to meet the 
new demands.5
                                            
5 Another issue is that Korea must prepare for changes in housing demand as it enters an 
aged society. According to the National Statistics Office's population housing census of 2000, 
Korea's population growth will steadily fall and flatten out in 2030. In that situation, special 
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4.1.2  Structural Changes in Public Institutions Regarding Housing Finance 
To actively support housing finance in Korea, the NHF, the Housing 
Finance Credit Gurantee Fund, Korea Housing Guarantee Co., Ltd. (KHGC), 
and Korea Mortgage Corporation (KoMoCo) were established. In 2004, the 
Housing Finance Credit Gurantee Fund and KoMoCo merged with the 
Korea Housing Finance Corporation (KHFC). The Housing Finance Credit 
Gurantee Fund and KHGC have the function of providing guarantees that 
cover credit risk of loans that cannot be covered by the collateral provided 
by housing consumers and constructors. Thus, the NHF is different, in that, 
its function is providing credit through its loan programs. Also, the KHFC 
and NHF have different roles in terms of actuating the long-term housing 
finance market. Here, the NHF provides housing finances in the primary 
market, whereas the KHFC operates in the secondary market.  
4.1.3  Changing the NHF's Objective  
In November 2003, the Housing Construction Promotion Act which 
established the NHF, was changed into the Housing Act, under the new 
objective of "effectively providing the funds to assure a pleasant residential 
environment for Koreans."  The change was made to meet the same 
environmental changes the NHF was and is facing. The new Housing Act 
calls for a “pleasant residential environment,” to meet the needs of the 
socially underprivileged (low-income class, homeless). In this respect, the 
NHF's ultimate goal should change as well, from “promoting the 
construction of homes and effectively supplying homes” to “improving the 
quality of residential life.” 
Thus, a change in the operational structure and objective is unavoidable 
for the NHF, in order to meet the new objectives set out by the 
act.  Specifically, the NHF must be given the support needed to meet its 
goal, and the "low-income households" must be clearly defined to prevent 
conflicts and overlap with private financial institutions, which would distort 
the housing finance market. Since many of the NHF's programs such as the 
loans to public for-sale and public rental housing constructors use home size 
as one of its qualification criteria, it is difficult to distinguish what income 
group the borrower is in. Presently, the income level of borrowers for wage 
earners and low-incomer households is not being accurately determined, as 
it includes only base salary and not bonuses etc. Also, these loans are based 
on the individual borrower's income level, instead of taking into account the 
entire household's income, which often leads to misallocation of loans to 
borrowers that should fall outside the target low-income group. The existing 
requirements should be reinforced, such as value of assets, income from 
assets, household members’ income, bonuses, and so on, so the NHF can 
                                                                                                    
rental housing for the elderly must be increased. 
CHAPTER 3-2  Restructuring the Role of the National Housing Fund and Policy Recommendations 267
measure the borrower's actual economic standing more accurately.  
4.2 Re-establishing the Role of the NHF  
4.2.1  Premise for Re-establishing the Role of the NHF  
Recent changes in the environment, especially achieving a 100% housing 
supply rate, has led to claims that the future of Korea’s housing policy 
should be changed from increasing the supply of housing based on financial 
assistance to stabilizing the housing environment by assisting the low-
income group. In other words, the NHF has already achieved its goal of 
increasing the housing supply through financial assistance, and should now 
turn its attention to assisting lowest-income households with fiscal resources. 
While changing the NHF's operational structure continues to garner 
attention, there is conflicting views on what the exact direction of NHF 
should be. 
However, the housing policy should be drawn to maintain NHF’s role as 
a financial support organization for the time being, to provide an active 
counter against market failures in the housing and finance markets. Even 
though the housing supply rate is rising, the home ownership ratio is still 
low.  The general trend of greater housing may worsen the housing service 
conditions for the low-income households. Also, stronger risk management 
at financial institutions could make housing finance less accessible for the 
low-income group.  
In this respect, we set out basic foundations for a housing finance 
support policy that utilizes public funds such as the NHF. First, funding 
should adapt to changes in the financial market, but continue to provide a 
stable supply of funds for housing finance. Second, housing finance should 
be made accessible to a wide range of income groups through a loan scoring 
system. Third, functions that do not present the risk of a market failure or 
ones for which such risk can be removed should be left to be performed by 
private financial institutions.  
4.2.2  Future Role of the NHF 
The housing finance support policy can be divided into loans for housing 
construction and housing consumers. First, support for housing 
construction should come as an intervention policy to offer construction 
companies access to funds at low interest rates when there is a need to 
increase the housing supply. Loans for housing construction tend to be very 
risky, and consequently, construction companies would face problems of 
very low accessibility and/or very high interest rates if there was no policy 
at all. If the housing supply cannot be increased through just financial 
support, the public sector may directly intervene in the construction of 
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houses.  In terms of loans for housing consumers, financial support lowers 
the financial burden of the citizens when purchasing a home to increase the 
home ownership ratio.  Since houses and housing services are very costly 
commodities compared to other assets or household income, most income 
groups require a loan to purchase a home.  Further, middle and low 
income groups hold high credit risks, making it nearly impossible to get 
approval for a loan at an acceptable interest rate, hence, making intervention 
unavoidable. 
4.2.2.1  NHF's Role in Supporting Construction of Housing 
The NHF's financial support of housing constructors must be 
restructured to focus on supporting the construction of rental housing. The 
NHF must play a key role in constructing a mid-to-long-term support 
system to improve the residential stability of the low-income group. To that 
end, the direct supply of small-sized housings, or supplying construction 
support funds for that purpose, will be an important part of the NHF's 
future. In particular, the supply of small to middle-sized housing units for 
the low-income group in the lower 1~4th decile should be focused on rental 
housing rather than for-sale housing units. As of 2002, 23.4% of all regular 
households were below the minimum housing standard. Considering the 
income level of these households, it would be very difficult for them to 
purchase even a small house, making the supply of public rental housing 
critical in addressing this problem.  
As mentioned before, the recent low interest rate trend has weakened the 
NHF's past competitiveness in interest rates. Because large construction 
companies with credibility and technology bypass the rental housing 
business, many of the companies receiving support for the construction of 
rental housing are companies with inadequate technology and unsound 
financial standing. This will continue to be the trend unless there is a 
dramatic shift in policy. The rental housing units built by these companies 
are mostly converted to for-sale housing after 5 years. This has left the rental 
housing stock at 0.9 million homes in 2001, only 8% of the total housing 
stock of 11.9 million homes. The NHF must play an active and direct role in 
continuously supplying rental housing.  
Since competent construction companies are avoiding the rental housing 
market in the first place, there is no need in trying to use market 
mechanisms. Accordingly, directly implementing adjustment measures to 
counter market failures may bring about better results. In other words, 
public organizations such as the Korea Housing Corporation and local 
governments should be used to actively expand the supply of rental housing 
units. The housing supply rate has already surpassed 100%, so there is no 
longer such a great need to rely on private companies to supply mass 
housing within a short amount of time. The constructing long-term rental 
housing and improving the long-term soundness of the NHF are not 
unrelated to the long-term stability of Korea's housing environment. So, 
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competent construction companies should be incentivized to enter the long-
term rental housing market by being offered loans at attractive interest rates.  
4.2.2.2  NHF's Role in Supporting Housing Consumers  
The NHF should focus its financial support of housing purchases by 
improving the accessibility of the private housing finance market for the 
low-income and under-privileged groups. The recipients of Loans to 
Housing Consumers have a relatively higher income and more assets than 
the group that directly receives rental housing. However, this low-income 
group is unable to access the private housing finance market not just 
because of higher interest rates, but also because of the higher risk of default. 
In a loan market with information asymmetry, borrowers with a higher risk 
of default are offered loans at higher interest rates and lower Loan-to-Value 
(LTV) rates even when the house is put up as collateral. The low-income 
group often does not even get access to the private housing finance market 
from the start since their accumulated assets are unable to cover the initial 
down-payment required to purchase a home. Thus, financial support for 
housing purchases should be focused on those who can not gain access to 
the private housing finance market in the first place, rather than providing 
low interest loans to those who can participate on their own means.  
As seen in the analysis above, those who could easily gain access to the 
private housing finance market are receiving support from the NHF. So, the 
conditions for eligibility must be reestablished. In the case of urban workers, 
the fund's primary target, the requirements must be clarified so only the 
lower 6th income decile is eligible. Also, support for those below the 4th 
decile and those in the 5th and 6th decile should be differentiated. Those in 
the 4th percentile and below should be given loans with a lenient limit and 
at low interest rates to offset the disadvantages of a higher default risk. The 
program for those above the 5th percentile should focus on reducing the 
interest burden. These policy measures should work to improve vertical 
equity.  
4.2.2.3  NHF's Role in Developing the Housing Finance Market  
In addition to providing stable housing, the NHF’s secondary function is 
to help develop the private housing finance market in a stable manner. In 
particular, the NHF must move towards actuating the long-term housing 
finance market. This is required to establish stability in meeting housing 
demand. Household loans and home equity loans increased greatly after the 
crisis caused a sharp increase in home prices, revealing the risk factor in the 
financial system. The lengthening of the housing finance market has been 
pointed out as a fundamental solution. In developing the long-term housing 
finance market, the NHF helped establish the Korea Mortgage Corporation 
(KoMoCo) which is now KHFC. The NHF also played an active role in 
issuing Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS), but neither of the two 
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approaches can be said to have achieved their aims. The Korean MBS 
market started when KoMoCo received funding from the NHF, then 
structured and securitized them as MBSs. However, there is a lack of 
issuance of new MBSs and the existing bonds are poorly traded. The reasons 
for this poor performance can be attributed to the difficulty faced in 
acquiring the mortgages to securitize, and low demand for new loans from 
financial institutions due to the low interest rate trend. In 2004, the 
government consolidated KoMoCo into the Korea Housing Finance 
Corporation (KHFC) to try and stabilize the long-term housing finance 
market. However, the real problems related to the current state of the 
market cannot be easily overcome over a short period of time. Even so, prior 
policy restrictions (inability to purchase and hold mortgage assets and fixed 
maximum guarantee limit of 30 times capital when it suffers a low capital 
condition, etc) have been eliminated, so the KHFC should be able to help 
improve the environment for mortgage securitization.  
4.3 Improving the Operational Structure of NHF 
4.3.1  Improving Loans for Housing Consumers  
We must recognize the NHF's true role as a policy fund in the housing 
finance market, and the most efficient way it can achieve its goals, when 
planning a way to improve the NHF's loan programs for housing consumers.  
The NHF's loan program for housing consumers focuses on those who 
are able to purchase a home through their own means or private financial 
institutions when given support. The lowest-income groups that are unable 
to purchase houses even with support can be excluded from the NHF's 
program, as they are covered by other public social welfare programs such 
as「National Basic Livelihood Security Act」. However, the criteria for 
whether one can purchase a house or not is very vague, so a level of wealth 
(including income, assets etc) should be determined, and the benefits should 
be differentiated depending on the level of wealth.  
The loan program also covers middle and low-income groups that have 
not accumulated enough assets to purchase a home. However, if the NHF 
does not select its targets carefully, it may encroach into areas already 
covered by companies in the private housing financial market.  If the loan 
approval criteria can be properly differentiated for each income group and 
type of loan, the NHF can minimize interference with the private market 
and focus on its own target group. However, the current system can 
possibly lead to unfair practices on the part of the managing financial 
institutions, damaging the soundness of the fund.  
With this in mind, the biggest problem with NHF’s individual loan 
programs for housing consumers is that the definition and classification of 
the target groups is neither clear nor adequate. The NHF targets the socially 
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disadvantaged groups, generally groups with low income and little assets, 
and are poverty stricken. The NHF tries to improve the housing welfare, so 
all Koreans can improve their housing situation. However, as seen in 
chapter 3, 34.55% of the borrowers of housing purchase loans including 
wage earners and low-income group are in the 7th income decile or higher. 
The inadequate definition of income causes this large discrepancy between 
the target group and the actual receiving group. In particular, only the 
income of a household's head is considered when a loan is actually given, 
which leads to great difficulty in supplying the loans to the actual targeted 
groups. Also, only the base salaries of wage-earners are included, leaving 
out a large amount of extra wages, which distorts the target group even 
further. The NHF can focus its support to the appropriate groups by 
including income, house size, assets held, assets income etc. as part of its 
loan criteria.  
However, implementing a new evaluation system would take a very 
long time, so some of the more urgent problems should be addressed first. 
The annual wages for wage earners and low-income households seeking 
loans for housing purchase and chonsei deposit should be clearly defined as 
total wages. Also, a new income criteria should be introduced, using the 
total income of a household divided by the number of household members. 
For the self-employed, whose salary is very difficult to measure, the NHF 
should work with the National Health Insurance Corporation or National 
Pension Corporation and other sources to acquire information on income 
and asset, and compare this with the National Tax Office's statistics.  
While the overly complex loan program for housing consumers had 
many of their individual loan programs consolidated in 2004, there are still 
programs which are difficult to evaluate. The NHF should continue to 
modify such programs, abolishing them or otherwise.  
4.3.2 Improving the Operational Structure of Loans to Housing Constructors 
As the NHF is reestablishing its mission of creating a stable residential 
environment, the time is right to also change the operational structure of the 
loan programs to housing constructors. While the NHF has changed its 
overall operational structure by shifting its focus from for-sale housing to 
rental housing units , the operational structure at the individual funds do 
not yet reflect the changes in the housing market.  
In addition, financial support for the supply of rental housing should be 
in line with the NHF's goal of supplying rental housing to income groups 
that are unable to accumulate the needed assets for purchasing a home. The 
area covered by the NHF's housing construction program should be clearly 
defined, so as not to encroach into the private sector. As increases in the 
construction of middle-sized rental housing reflects further support for 
rental housing construction, the NHF must adjust its loan approval criteria, 
especially the required rental period. The Loan Programs for Middle-sized 
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Rental Housing Construction target private construction companies, and 
require a rental period of only 5 years. This is much shorter than the leasing 
period of 10 to 20 years required under the Loan Programs for National 
Rental Housing Construction. Considering that the NHF's support should 
be used to provide stable and long-term housing for the low-income groups, 
the 5 year required leasing period is far too short. Instead of focusing on 
middle-sized rental housing with a short lease period, the NHF should 
increase support for small-sized rental housing while increasing the 
required rental period for other loans.  
While there have been no reported bankruptcies after the latest revisions 
on the loan evaluation system, this is most likely because the last assessment 
was made during 2001~2002 when the real estate market was recovering. As 
stated before, most of the companies that received loans were of average 
size, but generally ranked low in terms of debt ratio and profitability, both 
of which are indicators of financial soundness. As the fund's objective is to 
ensure stability in the housing environment, and not promote the 
construction industry, the NHF must go further by focusing on financial 
soundness when screening and processing loans. 
5. Summary and Conclusion  
This paper evaluated the performance of the many programs at the NHF. 
We also suggest that role of the NHF should be redefined, and offer ways to 
improve the operational structure of the fund. First, after assessing the 
programs under the Loans to Housing Consumers, we found that there may 
be a discrepancy between the target group and the actual group receiving 
support. This is a result of the methods used by NHF to measure household 
income, in that household income is based on the income of the individual 
borrower (head of household) rather than the entire household. In the case 
of loans to wage earners, the "wages" being reported included only base 
salary, and not total wages which were intended. Thus, a significant 
possibility exists that there are large differences between the target groups 
and the groups receiving support.  
To improve the Loan Programs for Housing Constructors, the loan 
screening system was examined and the present conditions of the 
companies having received loans were evaluated. Considering the loan 
screening system, the spread of companies having received approval 
showed that most of the companies fell slightly above the required level.  
After further review, it was determined that sharply increasing the required 
score for receiving approval in order to prevent bad loans would lead to 
significant negative effects on the goal of expanding the supply of for-sale 
and rental housings. Analysis of the financial statements of companies 
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showed that many had poor profitability. Finally, assessing the bank’s 
management of the NHF funds showed that there was much room for 
improvement in terms of loan monitoring.  
The need to reassess the NHF's role and function amid the changing 
marketplace has been proposed. The continuing low interest rate 
environment has eroded the NHF’s advantage in offering loans at low 
interest rates. Though the NHF is the government's main instrument of 
market intervention in the housing financial market, expectations for the 
NHF continue to drop and its relevance is being questioned. Hence, an 
evaluation of the NHF's role in the economy and its future operational 
direction are desperately needed. The expansion of short-term home equity 
loans has had the most significant impact on the NHF, therefore, addressing 
this issue has been emphasized. The lengthening of home equity loans was 
not one of the NHF's original goals, but since the market is not mature 
enough, the NHF should take a leading role.  
The role of the NHF should be redefined in the following. In terms of 
housing construction, the NHF’s support should be focused on rental 
housing.  In terms of housing consumers, the NHF should strive to improve 
the accessibility of housing finance among the low-income and 
underprivileged groups. Finally, the NHF should take a secondary role in 
helping the stable development of the private housing finance market, aside 
its main role of providing stable housing to the low-income group. 
Especially, the NHF must move towards vitalizing the long-term housing 
finance market. With an inadequate supply of long-term mortgage loans in 
the private sector, the NHF should refocus its operational structure so that 
the financial institutions it supports will focus on long-term loans.  
To improve the loan programs for housing consumers, the criteria for 
loan approval should be changed to improve operational efficiency. 
Ultimately, the targeted group should be divided by wealth (including 
income and assets), and the benefits should be differentiated for each group 
depending on level of wealth. In the short run, the criteria for loans should 
be changed from only including the borrower's base salary to including the 
total income of the entire household. As a result, low-income households 
should receive longer-term and lower interest loans, while households that 
are relatively better off can utilize the private housing finance market.  
To improve the loan programs for housing constructors, loan conditions 
for middle-sized rental housing construction – the required rental period, in 
particular – should be changed. The screening system should be improved 
to reduce poor performance. Since strengthening the criteria could lead to a 
drop in the housing supply, an effective counter measure should be in place 
for the unused funds.  
Though the report does not delve deep into this issue, some discussion 
on reducing the issuance of National Housing Bonds (NHB) as the NHF 
gradually reduces the size of its operations is expected. The method of 
issuing NHBs as part of treasury bonds should be reexamined as well. Since 
                  Residential Welfare and Housing Policies: The Experience and Future of Korea 
 
274
changes in the way funds are raised can lead to more efficiency, it should be 
considered. In concluding, this paper is limited in that it focuses on the 
NHF's operational structure and does not assess the method of fund raising. 
However, since the operation and acquisition of funds are closely 
intertwined, there must be a need for improvement from a policy standpoint. 
It is also an academically interesting topic, and we look forward to future 
studies in this area.  
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Comments on “Restructuring the Role of the National 
Housing Fund and Policy Recommendations” 
Bertrand Renaud  
The paper by Dr. Kim discusses the National Housing Fund (NHF) that 
is the main financial instrument of Korean housing policies.  This 
comments are organized around six main points. First, this discussion offer 
comments about the paper its objectives and its conclusion. Then to provide 
the broader context of Dr. Kim’s paper, it makes comparisons of the 
structure of housing policies in Korean with those of other OECD countries. 
The balance of the discussion focuses on four questions: what are Dr. Kim’s 
finding about the NHF performance between 1995 and 2002?  How suitable 
are the principles selected by Dr. Kim to reform and improve the uses of 
NHF in light of international experience? Chonsei residential lease contracts 
are unique to Korea. They remain a significant if diminishing component of 
financial flows into the housing sector.  Is it right for the new NHF policies 
to expand their support to Chonsei beyond the emergency social measures 
taken after 1997 and thereby extend Chonsei’s life as a financial instrument 
that is not well suited to low-income families compared to a modern 
monthly rental system? In closing, references are made to new international 
comparative analyses of low-income housing instruments – especially 
financial ones -- that could be of use in refining the new NHF policies 
proposed for Korea. 
General comments 
This is a timely and significant paper based on the work carried out by 
Dr Kim with Chang Park and Kyung-Mook Lim in 2004. The NHF is 
practically the only financial tool for housing policy of the Ministry of 
Construction and Transport; other central government tools are taxation, 
regulations, and urban planning and land use tools.  The paper is also 
important because it offers a rare description of the various NHF programs 
and evaluates their rationale and social effectiveness as the housing and the 
financial environments of Korean cities have changed totally from 1981 
when the NHF was created.  
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At the start of the 1980s, the per capita income of Korea was still below 
US $2,000 but the economy was growing very rapidly. Urbanization had not 
yet run its full course and was well below 70%. By KDI estimates at the time, 
absolute poverty was still affecting about 7% of the population (S. Suh, 1982).   
The housing supply ratio was still very low at about 67% and crowding at 
the bottom of the housing stock was serious and extensive. As a result, the 
main focus of Korean housing policies was on the supply of new housing 
and on the city building process. Significantly, financial policies of directed 
credit were repressing consumer finance and housing finance in particular 
in favor of accelerating the growth of ‘priority sectors’. 
Today, the environment of housing policies has completely changed. 
Korea is fully urbanized. In fact, the Republic of Korea has the highest 
urbanization ratio among OECD member countries at 85%, i.e. above the US 
and European ratios.  The Republic of Korea is now a high income country 
with a per capita GNI of $14,700 at the end of 2004 and GI at purchasing 
power parity (PPP) with the US close to $20,000.  The city building process 
being over, new urban investment goes to the replacement of the obsolete 
housing stock inherited from previous decades and on the continuous 
upgrading of private and public urban assets. The long-lasting era of 
financial repression of consumer finance is finally over. A competitive 
mortgage market system is emerging very rapidly and creating fiscal space 
for genuine low-income programs. Another dramatic change is the new 
demographic situation where the Korean population now has the lowest 
fertility rate of all OECD countries and is projected to age more rapidly than 
Japan and Italy, which is bound to have a significant impact on household 
structure and the composition of future housing demand. 
Context of NHF restructuring an OECD perspective 
The paper rightly supports the shift to demand-side, targeted housing 
subsidies for much of the NHF budget. Such a trend is consistent with the 
experience of other OECD countries. As the two following charts show,6 the 
balance between demand-side and supply-side subsidies has shifted very 
significantly during the last two decades. In 1984, supply side subsidies 
were still dominant in Europe. By the end of the 1990s the policy shift to 
subsidy budgets socially targeted to low income households was quite 
evident across the largest economies of Europe.  The social and economic 
rationales behind this shift apply equally well to the allocation of NHF 
resources in the new housing and urban environment of Korea. 
 
                                            
6 These two charts are borrowed from Renaud [2004] “Permanence and Change, East Asian 
Housing Policies after Fifty Years”.  Keynote presentation, 30th Anniversary Conference, Hong 
Kong Housing Authority, February 2004. 
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Note that the budget shifts to demand side subsidies has been far from 
uniform across the six countries between 1984 and 1998. Specific national 
situations have played a role.  For instance, the difference in the reliance on 
demand-side policies between France and Germany is more pronounced 
after 14 years, not less. The continued importance of supply side subsidies in 
Germany might be explained by the very large budget funds devoted to the 
upgrading of the stock of poor quality housing units of East Germany.  
What might be the right balance between demand-side and supply-side 
priorities in Korea in the allocation of NHF funds in the coming years is the 
focus of the Kim paper.  
Findings on NHF performance 1995-2002 
The overall conclusion of the paper regarding the past performance of 
NHF is that “it is difficult to say whether the NHF has adequately 
accomplished its goals;” yet it reports three important findings.  
• First, on the demand side, the evidence provided is that NHF targeting has 
not been effective (Dr. Kim’s Figure 3). The beneficiaries of NHF social 
loans have been mostly low-middle income and middle-income 
borrowers concentrated in income deciles D5 to D8. This outcome is due 
to the incorrect and incomplete measurement of household incomes by 
NHF participating lenders, which leads to reported incomes that are 
significantly lower than total actual household incomes. This income 
reporting bias probably facilitates the loan origination process of lenders 
in two ways: simplification of income verification in the loan 
underwriting process, and selection of a less risky clientele. Officially, the 
NHF’s policy objective is to assist households in deciles D1 to D6.  
• On the supply side, the analysis of the financial status of construction 
companies shows that their financial status ranges between questionable 
and unsound. The quality of NHF developer loans appears to be very 
weak as an extremely high percentage of 78% builders are reporter as 
illiquid (Kim, p.23).  International experience – and surely Korea’s 
experience as well – is that illiquid builders build projects of uneven 
quality for the bid price.  The paper reports only the financial facts but 
does not provide suggest remedies.  What are the causes of such very 
problematic NHF lender programs? What is the distribution system used 
by NHF for these loans: Commercial banks? Other lenders? Local 
government administrations? Why it is that standard bank construction 
lending principles are not applied under NHF programs? Should we be 
asking who the true clients of MOCT are: low-performing construction 
firms or low-income families? Strategically, this analysis of NHF housing 
builders opens up a very important area for a discussion of the design of 
future NHF programs considering that the Korean aggregate housing 
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supply ratio is now above 100% and that the city building process is 
basically over in Korea.  
• NHF pricing policies. Since the actual NHF individual loan beneficiaries 
today belong to a commercial clientele, it is not surprising that NHF 
lending dropped when private mortgage lending rates fell below NHF 
lending rates after 2001. To understand the origins of this inverted price 
relationship between commercial loans and NHF social loans, it would 
have been helpful to learn about NHF loan pricing policies that result 
from the cost of funds raised by NHF such as the mandatory sales of 
housing bonds. 
Using the data provided in TABLE 2 on “Overall NHF Loan Programs” 
one can arrive at two different views of the dynamics of individual NHF 
housing loans.  If we use only the data specifically reported as “individual 
NHF housing loans” we obtain a fairly dramatic and unstable picture of 
rapid changes in this particular program. First, there is very low level of 
activity until 1997 amounting to less than 5% of total NHF activities. Then 
there is a dramatic acceleration in the volume of activity in the aftermath of 
the 1997 financial crisis peaking close to 45% of NHF activities in 2000. 
Finally with the onset of the low-interest environment, there is a contraction 
in the individual loan program as many borrowers qualify for private 
residential mortgage loans.  
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However, if we add to these direct individual loans, the NHF individual 
permanent residential loans that result from the NHF program of builder 
loans used in the “For-Sale Housing Construction” program we get a 
different and more accurate picture of NHF individual loans. When we add 
these two columns, a different picture emerges. NHF individual loans that 
used to represent about 60% of NHF programs have entered a period of 
contraction with the low-interest rate era.  
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Redefining the Role of NHF 
The data provided by the paper and other KDI conference papers 
highlight important structural changes in the Korean housing market that 
are reshaping housing policies.  The list includes:  
• Pre-1997, NHF borrowers overlapped greatly with the commercial 
clientele of the Korea Housing Bank. 
• Post-1997, the private mortgage market is now larger, better, and cheaper 
than NHF old products in the present low-interest rate environment.  But 
what might happen when interest rates start rising again? 
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• The paper refers to the New Housing Act of 2003 but is not very specific 
about its content.  Does this act define a major change of policy direction? 
Does it provide new ways to target social beneficiaries better? 
• In the new supply environment where aggregate quantitative housing 
balance has finally been achieved, the policy dimensions of construction 
programs deserve fuller investigation in the direction of much more 
selective social housing programs.  
• NHF housing construction programs have been seen and used in the past 
as a countercyclical tool -- even if the funding of NHF has so far been 
highly pro-cyclical. But what would constitute sound selective programs 
in the new environment? Certainly proper principles of construction 
lending do apply to “social housing builders”, as the US experience will 
affordable housing builders shows. 
• Another major issue is whether there is a broad case of market failure in 
the supply of rental housing, or whether rental issues are directly 
associated with specific social segments of the Korean housing market. 
Principles of the proposed new NHF framework 
The principles for restructuring NHF operations (see in particular Kim 
p.26) are basically sound by the international experience of fully urbanized, 
high income, post-industrial societies.  These principles are warranted by 
Korean experience as well.  Operationally, the implementation of these 
principles will reflect a mix of sound economic and social analysis, 
administrative feasibility and national policy priorities. 
The leading conclusion of this policy review is that NHF programs must 
now focus on the demand side of housing markets and on better access to 
rental housing services by low-income households. 
A second conclusion that access to NHF programs by low income 
households should be improved is also well supported by the evidence 
provided. 
Another conclusion is that new NHF policies should focus primarily on 
the rental markets. But when it comes to the housing problems of renters the 
paper only sets a general direction and it is not very specific, possibly for 
lack of the necessary studies of low-income rental markets. The 
recommendation that financial NHF support to housing should focus on the 
construction of rental housing may be a good starting point.  Yet, the 
operational issue is what is happening today in the  low-income rental 
housing markets of large Korean cities and what kind of NHF support is 
likely to be most effective, given the finite financial resources of NHF. 
Certainly the review of construction companies finance by NHF programs 
raises very important operational issues deserving immediate attention. 
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Fourthly and finally, the recommendation that NHF lending programs 
should be fully coordinated with the rapid development of mortgage 
market is a sound and very important issue that every other OECD country 
is facing as well. As the study show, older NHF programs were essential 
overlapping, and therefore undercutting, commercial mortgage lending by 
KHB.  The recommendation that NHF home ownership programs should 
focus on more risky, marginal potential borrowers is very important and 
should be fully supported by policy makers. NHF risk-based lending should 
be in continuity with the rapidly growing mortgage market. This means that 
NHF resource should be used to reduce the risks for marginal buyers whose 
income is more volatile and also reduce the risks for participating lenders. 
The challenge and opportunity for NHF is to develop now risk-based 
lending programs that will reach households ‘at the frontier” of home 
ownership.  Using the broad conceptual picture of mortgage market 
segmentation in high-income countries, the challenge for Korean financial 
economists is to develop NHF programs that are complementary – much 
more that substitute – for private mortgage lending i.e. the social segments 
defined in the figure below as market segments S4 and S5. 
 
MORTGAGE CREDIT MARKET SEGMENTATION  -- BASIC RISK PROFILES 
Market 
Segment 
Types of 
Borrowers Credit quality 
Debt to 
Income (DTI) 
LTV and 
Equity Risk Tolerance 
S1 Prime Borrowers 
Strong credit-
worthiness, 
high score 
DTI below 
33%  
significant 
equity  
Prime AU 
candidates 
S2 
Income Stretched 
Standard 
Borrowers 
Good credit 
worthiness stretched High LTV 
Automated 
Underwriting 
S3 
Equity Stretched 
Standard 
Borrowers 
Good credit 
worthiness stretched High LTV 
Automated 
Underwriting 
S4 Sub-Prime Market 
Marginal, 
blemished 
record  
stretched stretched 
Individual 
screening 
required 
S5 
Marginal 
households 
unlikely/unable 
to own  
Impaired 
record? 
above typical 
ceiling 
Little or no 
equity 
Borderline 
cases need 
assistance 
S6 Investors Not impaired Rental Not low 
Individual 
screening 
likely 
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Why does NHF support financially inefficient, income-regressive chonsei 
lease contracts? 
It is beyond the scope of this discussion to consider in detail the financial 
inefficiencies and income-regressiveness of the chonsei lease contracts 
whose market share has declined significantly, but still continue to play an 
important role in funding the housing sector.  The use of NHF funds to 
relieve immediate social problems during the 1997 financial crisis when a 
significant number of landlords were unable to return the chonsei lease 
deposits and other similar problem on the renter side was opportunistic and 
entirely appropriate given the context. On the other hand, the rapidly 
expanded share of NHF programs supporting Chonsei leases since 1999 
seems undesirable from the viewpoint of low income families. Based on the 
data from Dr. Kim’s paper, the share of NHF chonsei activitities as a 
percentage of NHF individual housing loans had risen to 35% of NHF 
housing loans by 2002. 
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Given that the ratio of a chonsei lease deposit to the value of the housing 
unit rented is usually of the order of 65% of the asset value of the rented unit, 
depending on the rate of housing asset price change. Korea’s rental markets 
are unique in the world in the sense that a Korean household has to be 
already rich to become a renter, which defeat the dominant role of rental 
markets for young households and for low-income households.  
Superficially, Chonsei contracts have been praised by some people as 
efficient forced saving vehicles for tenants. Yet, among other chonsei design 
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issues, the yield on these savings is set by the individual landlord and the 
savings are completely illiquid for two years, as was painfully demonstrated 
during the 1997 financial crisis when many (middle-class) tenants wished 
they could access these very large savings, but could not.  
Two public policies that deserve a serious financial review are the use of 
the Korea Housing Guarantee Fund guarantees to insure chonsei contracts 
and the use of NHF fund loan to complement chonsei deposits. From both 
financial efficiency and a social equity and low-income policy viewpoints 
these two programs appear to be questionable and based on opportunistic 
administrative short-term needs. Fundamentally, they two policies are not 
consistent with the rapid growth of private mortgage markets, the 
development of better consumer savings products, and the development of 
more flexible low-income rental markets, as well as the disappearance of 
dual interest rates. Also, do these policies provide the best use of scarce 
NHF resources and Korean Housing Guarantee Fund limited capital? 
Conclusions 
This is an important and timely paper.  NHF is the main financial tool of 
the Korean government. The policy recommendations are well supported by 
international experience. When refining policy criteria and aiming to 
achieve maximum leverage of scarce NHF public funds, Korean analysts 
might wish to consult recent comparative reviews of international 
experiences with both financial and non-financial subsidies.  One critical 
area left out of the paper is the review of the various NHF funding 
mechanisms inherited from the pre-1997 era of directed credit. Among other 
issues, NHF funding has been strongly pro-cyclical with housing markets 
cycles, which is not desirable for the role of NHF as a lender of last resort in 
case of economic and financial shocks. Consistency of NHF funding with 
on-going Korean bond market reforms should be an objective too. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3-3 
Low Income Housing Markets and Policy:  
Some International Perspectives, and Possible  
Lessons for Korea 
by 
Stephen Malpezzi∗  
1.  Introduction 
The housing and housing finance markets of Korea have undergone 
drastic changes during recent decades.  In one sense this is completely 
unsurprising, as one would hardly expect housing markets in one of the 
world’s most dynamic economies to remain static.  Some developments 
have been positive – for example, Korea’s housing market was on balance a 
positive contributor to macroeconomic stability during the 1997 “Asia 
crisis.”1  But in some respects Korea’s housing markets have not quite kept 
up with other aspects of its economy.  For example, a flip side of Korea’s 
dynamic economy is that Korean housing is expensive, and places particular 
burdens on low-income households.  Thus the recent review of Korean 
housing markets and policies edited by KDI’s Dr. MoonJoong Tcha (2005) is 
especially welcome and timely.  The purpose of this paper is to complement 
that effort, and to focus particularly on the supply of low-income housing, 
by surveying evidence from a range of countries on the pros and cons of 
alternative ways of delivering affordable housing. 
The principal theme of this paper is that, when considering low income 
                                                 
∗ Stephen Malpezzi is Professor, Wangard Faculty Scholar, and Department Chair, in the 
Department of Real Estate and Urban Land Economics, as well as an associate member of the 
Department of Urban and Regional Planning, of the University of Wisconsin-Madison   
This paper was prepared for the Korea Development Institute’s June 2005 International 
Conference on Residential Welfare and Housing Policies, held in Seoul.  Useful comments were 
provided by many participants in that conference, particularly discussant Dr. Shinyoung Park. 
1  See Kim (2000) and other contributions to Mera and Renaud (2000) for a discussion of the 
different roles played by housing and real estate markets in the Asia crisis.  See Kim (2004) for a 
broader discussion of the role housing plays in Korea’s aggregate economy. 
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housing, there are important differences among housing subsidy 
alternatives, but that these are often dominated by, and always interact with, 
supply conditions in the market.   Supply conditions in turn are determined 
partly by natural constraint – physical geography – but even more so by 
regulatory decisions and other public interventions.  This paper is certainly 
not the first to make the argument.  Quigley and Raphael (2004) is a concise 
and admirable statement of this theme, albeit a paper focused primarily on 
U.S. markets.  Effects of regulations and other interventions are much 
discussed in Tcha’s (2005) monograph, especially contributions by Hur; Kim, 
Park and Lim; Chung; Kim Jeong-Ho; and especially Lee and Sohn.  The 
message is also consistent with such reviews as World Bank (1993), Buckley 
and Kalarickal (forthcoming 2005), and Zearley (1993). 
The second section of the paper, just after this introduction, presents 
some important prerequisites, including a few fundamentals of housing 
market behavior, and an overall conceptual framework for the analysis of 
housing market interventions by government.  Selected issues related to 
efficiency, distribution, and other criteria are reviewed.  The third section 
focuses on housing subsidies.  The section begins with a typology of 
interventions in housing markets, in order to put subsidies in context.  
Experience in several developed and developing countries is discussed, with 
special emphasis on US experience (because of the wide range of “policy 
experiments” available, and the fact that so much rigorous research on the 
costs and benefits of different subsidy programs has been carried out there) 
and on the Chilean experience (because the Chilean system of up-front 
housing subsidies is much admired, and with some justification).   The 
fourth section discusses the effects supply constraints, especially excessively 
stringent regulation of housing development and management, have on 
housing conditions of low income households.  The final section provides 
some concluding remarks, including possible lessons learned, and 
suggestions for future research. 
2.  Prerequisites 
2.1  A Few Fundamentals of Housing Market Behavior 
The efficacy of different housing programs and policies is partly 
determined by housing market conditions, and the responses of consumers, 
suppliers and governments to those conditions.  If the program or policy is 
of sufficient scale, causality can also run the other way, of course, as we will 
discuss later.  But before we discuss housing programs, policies, subsidies 
and regulations, it will be useful to establish a few stylized facts about 
housing market behavior.2
                                                 
2  See Green and Malpezzi (2003) and Malpezzi (1999a) for more detailed reviews. 
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A theme that runs through much comparative research is that housing 
demand is much more predictable and regular across countries, indeed 
across markets within countries; whereas housing supply is much more 
idiosyncratic.  The demand proposition does not mean, of course, that 
demand is everywhere identical, but that there are regularities that make it 
largely predictable.  In particular, within-market income and price 
elasticities are most often somewhat less than unity in absolute value.  
However, in the very long run, as cities and countries develop, these 
elasticities are somewhat larger.3
However, while demand responses to income or population shocks are 
fairly regular and predictable, as already noted supply behavior is much less 
so.  The price elasticity of supply of housing tends to be larger in markets 
with less stringent regulation of land use and real estate development, and a 
better “industrial organization” of the housing market; and to some extent 
in markets with less geographic constraint.4  
Several related points can be made.  First, when analyzing housing 
supply, note that in a dynamic market like Korea’s, supply can be seriously 
constrained even when increasing housing starts are the norm; it is price, 
not quantity, that is closest to a “sufficient statistic” for the state of the 
housing market.5  Second, note that housing markets are local in nature, and 
that submarkets can be delineated by income level of consumers as well as 
geographically or by structure type.  Malpezzi and Green (1996) and Gillen 
(2003) demonstrate that in very stringently regulated markets, low income 
submarkets may become less connected to the state of the market in general; 
in particular, filtering processes may be impeded.  Third, despite the 
existence of submarkets, note that submarkets are connected, more or less, 
and take care not to overstate the degree of segmentation.  What is good for 
the housing market in general is usually good for low income housing 
consumers.  Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, note the emphasis on 
the stringency of regulation but do not misinterpret calls for appropriate 
regulation as calls for total deregulation.  Regulations, like other private and 
public actions, have costs and benefits; overly stringent regulations are those 
whose benefits are less than their costs, but housing development does 
generate externalities and there are correspondingly appropriate regulatory 
frameworks  (Fischel 1990, Malpezzi 1990, 1996).   
                                                 
3  See Ingram 1998, Malpezzi and Mayo 1987 and Samuelson 1965.  
4  See Malpezzi and Mayo 1997, Bramley 1999, Pollakowski and Wachter 1990, Mayer and 
Somerville 1997, among others. 
5  This is especially important in a dynamic economy like Korea’s, where real incomes per 
capita double roughly every decade, and measuring housing units, including housing starts, 
will fail to capture increasing demand for housing quality, size and location. 
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2.2  A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Housing Programs 
and Policies 
We can divide criteria for the analysis of housing programs and policies6 
into five major categories: 
--  Efficiency (cost-benefit); 
--  Distributional and fairness issues; 
--  Market effects; 
--  Other external benefits (e.g. neighborhood effects, mobility, labor 
market effects); 
--  Administrative and other effectiveness measures. 
We now discuss each in turn.7
2.2.1  Efficiency 
Housing programs and policies, like other social services, are 
traditionally evaluated in terms of efficiency and equity.  A useful 
distinction is often made among production efficiency and consumption 
efficiency.  Production efficiency refers to the economic or market value of 
the unit, in relation to the cost of producing it.  Consumption efficiency 
refers to the value the tenant places on the unit, in relation to its market 
value.8  The concepts are equally applicable to housing and housing finance 
programs as well as other social programs. 
Production inefficiency would not exist if public developer/landlords 
were as efficient as private, and market prices of inputs and outputs were 
not distorted.  There may well be cases where hidden subsidies or hidden 
costs make careful analysis necessary to reveal true relative efficiencies.  Past 
studies have suggested that while Korea’s public developers are technically 
efficient, certainly in comparison to practices elsewhere, input distortions 
(e.g. in land prices or financing costs) can be considerable (Van Meurs 1986; 
Lim 1987). 
Consumption inefficiency implies that the tenants value the housing less 
than the market, or that their consumption is constrained by the 
requirements of the program.  This is a particular problem with public rental, 
since typically the product is very standardized while demand is not.  Cash 
is, of course, the most efficient transfer in the sense that if the market works 
                                                 
6 Housing programs and policies comprise a number of public actions in support of housing 
markets, including but not limited to taxes, subsidies, and regulations.  We discuss taxonomy of 
such interventions further, below. 
7 Additional discussion of these issues, including more technical treatments, can be found in 
Green and Malpezzi (2003) and Mayo et al. (1980 a, b). 
8  Some treatments also refer to administrative efficiency as a third type of efficiency but we 
discuss this separately below.   
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at all well most households would prefer the cash equivalent of a program 
to the program itself.  A priori many housing economists would expect 
policies and programs which rely on private landlords to provide a wider 
range of options and to reduce consumption inefficiency. 
2.2.2  Equity and Fairness 
Of course efficiency is not the only consideration in the analysis of 
housing  policies.  We must also consider distributional issues.  There are 
two main types of distributional or equity issues.  The first, horizontal equity, 
is best phrased as “equal treatment of equals.”  Most commonly in policy 
analysis we define equals as more or less those with equal or similar 
incomes, although there are important exceptions, e.g. when age or physical 
limitations are considered.  This principle is violated if, for example, we 
have two families of a given income, one of whom receives a deeply 
subsidized mortgage while the other, equally deserving, receives no 
assistance. 
The second equity principle, vertical equity, is more problematic.  Vertical 
equity is about the treatment of unequals. It is about how society treats rich 
vs. poor, or for that matter poor vs. middle income, or moderately poor from 
the poorest.  Much of politics is making choices about vertical (as well as 
horizontal) equity.  While vertical equity often requires some political 
judgment, it could be argued that many citizens of Korea (and many other 
countries) would agree with some general propositions; for example that 
larger housing subsidies should go to lower income households, rather than 
higher.  So while it is difficult (and for an outside commentator like the 
present author, impossible) to make precise and very detailed statements 
about the desired outcomes in the housing market in terms of vertical equity, 
we can presumably make general statements of the form “larger subsidies 
are going to richer households, and this violates generally held norms of 
vertical equity in society,” or “poorer households are receiving larger 
subsidies, and this is appropriate.” 
To be sustainable and politically feasible, housing policy must be seen to 
be fair.  Fairness is related to equity, as discussed above, but it is perhaps a 
more general concept.  One way of thinking about fairness is that it is a set 
of rules to which most individuals would agree in advance of knowing their 
endowment or position (Rawls 1971).  In the current context, fair rules 
would be those that most individuals would agree to in advance of knowing 
whether they were to receive, say, a particular housing subsidy or not, 
indeed in advance of knowing whether they were a renter or a landlord, a 
recent mover or a long time tenant, or rich or poor. 
2.2.3  Market Effects 
The efficiency and equity issues discussed above are usually framed in 
terms of the effects of a program or policy on a typical participant household, 
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or in some cases a typical housing unit or project.  However, when 
undertaken at scale, housing programs and policies -- especially those 
related to finance -- have the potential to affect the housing entire market, or 
significant portions of it. 
Consider first a prototypical supply side program.  Suppose, for example, 
that the government decides to undertake a massive increase in the supply 
of subsidized housing finance in a certain market.  Suppose further that this 
increase in supply is targeted at low income households.  What are the 
effects of such a development on the rest of the market? 
The answer depends critically on some assumptions regarding the 
overall responsiveness of the rest of the market, and on some assumptions 
about the behavior of households.  The role of the market's responsiveness, 
i.e. the price elasticity of supply of housing, is well known.  An inelastic 
market is by definition more or less unresponsive to changes in the 
availability of subsidies to low income households (or any other “demand 
shocks,”  such as an increase in availability of finance, or increases in 
incomes), and if the number of low income households is largely unaffected 
by the presence or absence of this additional subsidies, then the addition 
will have two effects, from the point of view of low income households.  
First, households who receive subsidies will presumably benefit from lower 
out-of-pocket housing costs, and possibly better housing conditions.  Second, 
under these assumptions, the price of housing will rise, for the beneficiaries 
for the rest of the market, as demand for that fixed stock increases.  
Economists call such price spillovers "pecuniary externalities." 
On the other hand, if the supply of housing is perfectly elastic (and the 
assumption of no change in number of households is maintained), the 
outcome is quite different.  Under such conditions, an initial increase in the 
availability of housing subsidies will lead to an increase in the supply of 
housing.  No adverse "pecuniary externalities" will be generated.   
2.2.4  Examples of Other Potential External Benefits from Housing 
The “classic” evaluations of housing programs and policies focus 
primarily on the notions of efficiency, equity, and market effects, discussed 
above (Bradbury and Downs 1981; Olsen 2001).  But there are other 
considerations that can be brought to bear.  We discuss examples of these 
briefly in this section.  Most of these are externalities of one kind or anther.  
Of course market effects, discussed above, are external to a particular unit or 
household.  But a wide range of other potential external benefits have been 
mooted.   
For at least a century, social reformers have held that housing quality 
affects health, and in turn this affects employability and income.  Historical 
studies and analyses across countries have linked housing sanitation and 
water supply to health and morbidity, such as Auster and Levenson (1969), 
Bradley et al. (1991), Cohen (1989), and Hardoy et al. (1990).  A recent 
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example pointed out by Newman and Schnare are the deleterious effects of 
lead based paint on children.   
Another category of externalities are labor market effects.  One such 
effect that is of particular interest to those interested in low income housing 
are the links between housing’s location and the availability of suitable 
employment.  According to the spatial mismatch hypothesis unemployment, 
low incomes and high utilization of welfare occurs in inner cities because of 
the mismatch between the location between where the poor live and where 
entry level jobs are.  This hypothesis was first advanced in a systematic way 
in Kain (1968).  Several decades of U.S. research on this issue are 
summarized in Kain (1992) and Holzer (1991).  Research by Ihlanfeldt and 
Sjoquist (1991, 1992) and O’Regan and Quigley (1993) generally supports the 
spatial mismatch hypothesis.  Literature from European countries has 
emphasized regional locational mismatches rather than the within-metro 
area U.S. research, but studies like Muellbauer (1992) and Ermisch (1990) are 
broadly consistent, finding that housing market failures spill over into labor 
markets. 
Another category of externalities relates to security of tenure.  A range of 
research suggests that households which have secure and stable tenure have 
better economic and social outcomes.  Early evidence on this point was 
marshaled in Struyk (1977), and recent research by Green and White (1997) 
and Dietz and Haurin (2001) has added to the previous literature such as 
Jimenez (1984) and Friedman et al. (1988) already cited, and  strengthened 
the hand of those who believe that tenure security, in particular 
homeownership, matters. 9   Using several microlevel data sets, and 
controlling for both observed and unobservable correlates such as income 
and family status, White and Green find that children of homeowners are 
more likely to stay in school, have better test scores, etc.  More recent 
research such as that by Dietz and Haurin lend additional support. 
2.2.5  Administrative and Other Effectiveness Measures 
The simplest kind of administrative effectiveness revolves around the 
ratio of effective benefit delivered per dollar of administrative cost, or 
“teeth-to-tail” ratio.  This can be and is often subsumed in the program 
efficiency measures described above.  But there are other  considerations 
that we can loosely call administrative, or perhaps qualities of a well-run 
system; a very useful framework for the analysis of some of these 
considerations can be found in Myers (1986).10  Note that although Myers 
couches his discussion in terms of subsidies, in general his principles can be 
                                                 
9  In some quarters polemics such as DeSoto (2001) have also proved influential, although less 
carefully done.  See Angel (2001), Gilbert (2001) and Woodruff (2001). 
10 Myers also discusses the Effectiveness of subsidy programs.  Effectiveness comprises both 
efficiency and distributional considerations, which have already been discussed.   
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applied to most public interventions, of whatever type. 
The first consideration Myers discusses is that the subsidy or other 
intervention has Clear Objectives.  Most subsidy programs have more than 
one objective.  In most cases, the first and overarching objective of low 
income housing policy is, of course, to assist low or moderate-income 
households in the purchase or rental of housing.  Among many subsidiary 
goals or objectives are the support of the real estate development industry, 
and the provision of offsets to disincentives to development (such as occur 
through taxation and regulation).  Another objective is increasing incentives 
to save.  Other objectives, perhaps best viewed as constraints, include 
avoiding an implicit tax on the financial system. 
Another consideration discussed in Myers is the appropriate Duration of 
programs.  This can be viewed as the duration of an individual intervention, 
say a subsidy, to a particular individual or firm, but it can also mean the 
duration of the overall program.  For example, subsidies that are a response 
to particular market conditions might be phased out or reduced, if not 
eliminated, when market conditions become more favorable. 
The next important element is the Transparency of a program.  To quote 
Myers, “transparency refers to the ease with which the size or financing 
requirements of a subsidy program can be identified and quantified.  From 
an incentive point of view, transparency relates to the extent to which prices 
can perceived to have been lowered or raised as the result of the subsidy 
and of the taxes needed to finance it ... [a] primary focus of the transparency 
concern is with budgetary clarity.”   
The notion behind transparency, then is that the public at large should 
see clearly who benefits from the subsidy, or other intervention, as well as 
who pays for it.  Those who benefit should clearly appreciate the extent to 
which they benefit.  Better knowledge of the cost and benefit of subsidies 
aids their intelligent design and implementation.   
With respect to subsidies in particular, Myers notes that generally, on-
budget subsidies are most transparent.  Subsidies through the financial 
system or through taxation are generally the most opaque.  For this reason, 
among others, the World Bank and many others generally recommend the 
curtailment of interest rate subsidies, directed credit programs, and similar 
implicit subsidies.  The general recommendation is that subsidies be made 
explicit and on-budget.11  
The next consideration is How the Program will be Financed.  Clearly 
this is related to some of the earlier points.  When program requirements 
exceed the resources available, the obvious choices are to reduce the size or 
scope of the subsidy, gain efficiency by improving administration or subsidy 
design, raise more public resources or redistribute resources from other 
                                                 
11  Chilean housing subsidies are one of the examples used by Myers and the excellent review 
by Renaud (1999) to illustrate the principals of transparency.  We briefly discuss the Chilean 
subsidy program, and its transparency below. 
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public uses to the program.  In many cases the first will be the most 
straightforward and the most powerful corrective. 
Another consideration discussed in Myers is whether the Policy 
Recommendations accompanying the program are Pragmatic.  A realistic 
view must be taken regarding the government's institutional and 
administrative capabilities, political realities, and the government’s need to 
maintain credibility.  Sometimes such a requirement is interpreted as a need 
for gradual change, but experience in Eastern and Central Europe and the 
countries of the former Soviet Union show that sometimes rapid change is 
best.  
Political Feasibility is also important.  Many economists and many 
housing activists will argue that scarce public resources need to be sharply 
targeted to those most in need, generally those with lowest income.  The 
logic of this argument appears unassailable.  Yet such a statement must be 
examined in the light of some hard facts.  In many countries programs 
which focus only on the bottom of the income distribution become 
marginalized and their political support is often tenuous at best.  Programs 
that cater to a wider range of the income distribution are less tainted and 
enjoy broader support.  Consider as just one example the unassailable 
support for the U.S.’s gargantuan social security system, compared to the 
lack of political support for more targeted welfare programs, more than an 
order of magnitude smaller. 
In our discussion below we will comment on each of these areas, pari 
passu.  However, we will focus most on the effectiveness of the subsidy 
programs examining in detail concepts of efficiency, equity and fairness. 
3.  Housing Subsidies 
3.1  Where Do Subsidies Fit In? Typologies of Housing Programs 
and Policies 
In general, there are five major ways governments intervene in housing 
markets: 
• the definition and enforcement of property rights 
• taxation 
• regulation 
• subsidy 
• direct public provision 
 
In this paper we focus on the latter three, regulation, subsidies and direct 
public provision.  But of course it is important to consider the areas we 
temporarily neglect. Other  papers delivered to this Conference focus in 
much more detail on taxation, including that by Dr. Hur; see also Green and 
Malpezzi (2003, pp. 106-15) for discussion of principles of  housing taxation.  
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See Fischel (1985), Jimenez (1984) and Friedman, Jimenez and Mayo (1988) 
for discussion of property rights; and See Hannah et al. (1989), Kim (1991),  
Malpezzi and Mayo (1997) and Bertaud and Malpezzi (2001) for discussion 
of how all five types of intervention interact. 
Of course the distinction between types of interventions, and in 
particular the difference between subsidies to private entities – households, 
landlords, developers – and direct public provision is not as neat in practice 
as it appears when we first make this list.  Many real world housing 
programs have some elements of each.  For the moment, then, we will use a 
slightly different typology, and divide programs up into supply side 
programs (“bricks and mortar” subsidies) and demand side subsidies 
(payments to households to be used for housing). 
3.2  Supply Side Programs 
The simplest working definition of supply side program is one in which 
the subsidy is tied to a particular housing unit.  Within this broad category, 
there are many subcategories.  For example, governments (or quasi-
government agencies) may directly produce housing units for sale (as in 
Korea’s or Singapore’s public housing programs) or for rent (as in U.S. or 
Hong Kong public housing, or Britain’s council housing, or Korea’s public 
rental units; see Chung 2005).   
Increasingly, though, such supply side programs are more complicated 
partnerships between the public and private sector.  For example, in the U.S. 
there is a range of programs in which the government subsidizes particular 
housing units that are privately developed and managed, and rented to 
households that meet income and other criteria, in return for either up front 
development subsidies (Section 236, Section 42 Low Income Housing Tax 
Credits), or recurrent subsidies on rents (Section 8 New Construction).  In 
practice, many units have elements of both due to “layering” of subsidies, 
e.g. many low income tenants in Section 42 units also receive housing 
vouchers, described below.  Korea, of course, has long used private 
construction firms in partnership with public land development, and other 
forms of these partnerships. 
3.3 Demand Side Programs 
The simplest working definition of a demand side program is one in 
which the subsidy is tied to a particular household, and more-or-less 
portable across housing units.  Often called housing allowances or housing 
vouchers, these increase households’ purchasing power for housing (and 
usually for other goods and services as well). 
These may also be upfront one-time subsidies, as in Chile’s best known 
housing assistance program (discussed below), or recurrent, as in U.S. 
housing vouchers.  They may be designed to be tenure-neutral, usable for 
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rental or owner-occupied units, but more often are designed to work with 
one form of tenure or another.  For example, Chile’s best known program is 
a voucher for house purchase, but to date most U.S. vouchers are restricted 
to rental units (though moves are afoot to permit more voucher use for 
house purchase in the U.S. as well). 
It should be pointed out that even this apparent simple bifurcated 
demand-side/supply side taxonomy can be more complicated than it seems.  
In addition to the possible layering or combining of different subsidy 
schemes, one can design a demand side scheme that writes checks to tenants 
that is effectively a supply side program, at least in large part; and one can 
also do the converse.  For example, U.S. Section 8 Existing Certificates, the 
main housing program of the 1980s, paid the difference between 30 percent 
of a participant’s income, and the so-called Fair Market Rent, a rent ceiling 
that was roughly based on the median rent for a metropolitan area.  But 
evidence from Drury et al. (1978) and Gillen (2003) shows that in fact the 
ceiling was also a floor – many landlords of units that rented for less than 
the FMR simply raised their rent to the FMR when a Section 8 tenant moved 
in.  (Note that this was legal under program rules).  In effect then the benefit 
of the certificate was split between landlord and tenant, and to the extent the 
landlord was able to raise the rent, these allowances were partly a supply-
side program. 
3.4  Selected International Experience with Housing Subsidies / Direct 
Provision 
In this section we will examine selected international experience with 
housing subsidies to private agents, and the closely related direct provision 
of public housing.  We draw from a number of sources, but we rely 
particularly on an excellent review by Diamond (1997).12 
Broad discussion of housing subsidies in even a small fraction of the 200 
countries in the world would require a multivolume work.  In this paper we 
focus on experience from comparatively few countries, with particular 
emphasis on some programs in the United States and Chile, although other 
countries are also discussed.  The United States is discussed because it has 
many different kinds of housing subsidy programs, which have been 
extensively analyzed.  Chile is discussed because its program of up-front 
housing vouchers has been widely discussed as a model, so lessons learned 
from the Chilean case may be particularly valuable. 
                                                 
12  In addition to Diamond’s review, Renaud (1999) provides a parallel and largely consistent 
review of subsidy programs, including more detailed discussion of the U.S. and Chilean 
experiences.  Other relevant reviews include Hoek-Smit, Bovet and Diamond (1997) for 
Suriname, and Hoek-Smit (1997) for Indonesia, and Llanto, Orbeta, Sanchez and Tang (1997) for 
the Philippines.  Phang (2005) provides a detailed review of housing subsidies and supply 
systems in Singapore.  These other reviews are broadly consistent with the material in this 
section. 
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3.4.1 Housing Subsidies in the United States 
Over its history, the U.S. has undertaken many kinds of housing 
subsidies, supply side and demand side, direct public provision and 
through the private market, and through the financial system.  One heavily 
researched topic of interest to many other countries is the efficiency – 
production and consumption efficiency, see above – of different generic 
types of housing subsidies. 
Perhaps the most careful analysis of production efficiency to date 
remains Mayo et al. (1980), summarized in Mayo (1986).  While Mayo and 
his colleagues, and others such as Muth (1973), develop formal models of 
production and efficiency, at its heart the arguments can be summarized as 
follows.  First, it is argued that public supply side agents make incorrect 
decisions about housing factor inputs because they act based on the 
“wrong” prices of these inputs.  U.S. public housing location decisions have 
not generally been based on market considerations; in early years of the 
program units had to be built on cleared slum land, which may have not 
been optimal for the location of such units.  Public housing has also had a 
“capital intensity bias” because capital costs were subsidized more heavily 
than maintenance and repair costs. Additional source of production 
inefficiency comes from the different set of incentives that face public supply 
side agents (and private agents acting at public behest).  Private agents 
maximize the difference between value and cost.  Public agents generally 
have a quite different objective, for example maximizing the number of 
units built for a given budget, subject to political constraints on location.   In 
market transactions, developers who produce projects that are worth less 
than they cost go out of business.  In public projects such market discipline 
is absent. 
In the most complete study to date, Mayo (1986) reported that the 
production efficiency of U.S. public housing is about 43 percent (ratio of 
value to costs).  Another study by Olsen and Barton (1983) that took a more 
narrow view of production efficiency reported that U.S. public housing costs 
14 percent more than it was worth.  Green and Malpezzi (2003) review 
findings on production efficiency from a range of studies, and find similar 
results. 
More is known about consumption efficiency than about production 
efficiency.  Green and Malpezzi (2003) reviewed empirical studies of U.S. 
housing programs that computed this consumption efficiency using 
consumers surplus techniques.  In light of the discussion above, we would 
expect to find that unconstrained housing allowances would have the 
highest consumption or transfer efficiency, while the more directly involved 
the government was in the supply side, the lower the transfer efficiency.  In 
fact, study after study -- Mayo (1986), Clemmer (1984), and Sa-Aadu (1984) 
to name just three -- found that consumption efficiency is generally higher 
for allowances and other demand side subsidies, as expected. 
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Evidence on the market effects of housing programs is of two kinds: 
direct and indirect.  Direct evidence stems primarily from the Experimental 
Housing Allowance Program’s Supply Experiment.  Indirect evidence stems 
from several research papers on the price elasticity of supply, or the overall 
responsiveness of the housing market. 
The key issue for understanding market effects of housing programs is, 
of course, the market’s supply elasticity or responsiveness.  If the market is 
generally unresponsive, supply side programs could, in theory, be a net 
addition to the stock, and could, in principle, have price effects, lowering 
housing prices generally.  If the market is unresponsive, spending on large 
demand side programs will be at least partly dissipated in higher prices.  On 
the other hand if the market is highly responsive, supply side programs will 
produce units which will merely substitute for units that would otherwise 
be privately produced.  There would be no significant price effect from 
supply side programs in an elastic market.  And finally, in an elastic market, 
large demand side programs will increase the purchasing power of low-
income households without having significant price effects. 
The weight of the evidence suggest the U.S. market is fairly elastic in the 
long run, and that therefore well designed demand side programs will not 
have undesirable price effects.  Lowry (1983), Follain (1979), and Malpezzi 
and Maclennan (2001) are among studies, and Green and Malpezzi (2003) 
provide a more detailed review.  But it must be emphasized that this finding 
hinges on the existence of an elastic, responsive market, with a well 
functioning mortgage market and an appropriate regulatory environment. 
So far our discussion, and most of the published literature, focuses on 
well-known rental assistance programs.  While less known today than it 
might be, the U.S. has in past had a low-income homeownership program, 
but one with a flawed design that provides a cautionary tale.  The Section 
235 home ownership assistance program was established in 1968.  The 
Section 235 Program is basically an interest rate subsidy tied to a new (or 
substantially rehabilitated) housing unit.  Specifically, the Section 235 
subsidy is lesser of either 
(1)  the difference between 20% of monthly income and the total monthly 
payment for the mortgage, mortgage insurance, taxes and hazard 
insurance; or 
(2) the difference between monthly mortgage payments and mortgage 
interest premia, and the payment to principle and interest at a 1% 
interest rate. 
The key problems with Section 235 turned out not to be with the form of 
the subsidy, but with its overall depth, and with the moral hazard and 
adverse incentives built into the program.  The subsidy was quite deep, and 
allocated through developers and financial institutions who had no direct 
stake in the outcome of a loan after allocation since repayment is guaranteed 
by the government.   
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Severe problems with this program led to a moratorium in 1973.  U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (1974) reviewed the 
Section 235 Program and found developers/redevelopers had strong 
demand for units given the deep mortgage subsidies available (see also 
Mitchell 1985).  However, only about 1 out of 50 income eligible households 
were ever assisted by the program, and those tended to be more lower 
middle income than households near the bottom of the income.   
The government evaluation of Section 235 noted that there were strong 
incentives for units under the program to be priced higher than market price, 
in order to capture part of the subsidy for the developer, although no 
empirical evidence was presented. For a typical participating household, the 
subsidy is typically about 1/8th of the average family’s income.  Since there 
is no household equity in the unit, it is not surprising that the default rates 
for Section 235 units often hit 30 or 40% in selected metropolitan areas.  In 
the words of the government evaluation, “abuses and fraud are an inherent 
and demonstrable danger of such an incentive structure.”   
Among other findings of the government’s evaluation of the Section 235 
Program, we note that most participating households were lower middle 
income rather than low income.  The evaluation found subsidies received by 
recipients increased as family income went up.  Taking transfer and 
production efficiency together (see discussion above), the government 
evaluation found Section 235 resulted in only about $.82 of benefit to the 
recipient per dollar spent by the government.  However, this calculation did 
not incorporate the high costs of default, some of which became more 
apparent after the evaluation was completed.  Other issues raised were the 
actuarial soundness of the insurance fund for Section 235, which became 
insolvent as foreclosures rose in the 70s.  On balance, given this experience, 
it is not surprising that the Section 235 Program was closed down in 1973, 
after less than five years of operation.   
3.4.2  Housing Subsidies in Europe 
Many European countries and to some extent Canadians have also been 
shifting broadly from bricks and mortar, supply side, subsidies towards 
demand side studies.  These shifts are taking place with the backdrop of 
greater economic and social integration generally (Priemus 2000, Maclennan 
et al. 1998, Fallis 2004, Hills et al. 1990, Turner and Whitehead 2002).  Gibb 
(2002) is a particularly good introduction to the complex world of European 
housing subsidies and the social housing system.  Despite some moves 
towards convergence with the advent of the European Union, there is still a 
very wide range of systems and outcomes, far too many than can be 
adequately summarized in a short paper like this one.  Several countries 
such as the U.K., Sweden, and the Netherlands spend a large amount on 
their social housing sector (variously defined, but including both public 
housing, as well as mixed tenure such as municipal housing or nonprofit 
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housing associations).  The high-spending countries often spend as much as 
three percent or more of their GDP on these systems.  Another grouping of 
countries which Gibb notes spend one to two percent of GDP on social 
housing include Germany, France, and Denmark; while the low spenders 
spending one percent or less tend to be southern European countries like 
Spain, Portugal, or Greece.  For comparison, the U.S. spends on the order of 
one-quarter of one percent of GDP on social housing.   
Gibb also notes the widely differing supply elasticities found in 
European markets, although it appears that there is room for much more 
careful cross-country empirical research on this subject.  Two trends that are 
nearly universal are the shift from supply side systems, including council 
housing/public rental housing, to housing allowances or demand side 
systems.   
Many similar points are also made in another excellent survey paper by 
van der Heijden and Haffner (2000).  In addition to reiterating some of the 
points in Gibb, van der Heijden and Haffner present a range of data 
documenting the aforementioned European move towards more market-
based systems, including greater reliance on housing allowances, and a 
concomitant reduction in supply side subsidies.  Other broad trends include 
further relaxation of rent controls, and for many countries (with Sweden a 
notable exception), an increased reliance on home ownership.  This shift has, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, been accompanied by generally increasing rents 
and rent burdens, albeit one that is often cushioned by the continuingly 
large dollar amounts of subsidies provided, now in demand-side form.  
However, there is no simple one-to-one correspondence between high 
subsidies and low rent burdens.  For example, while Sweden is one of the 
highest spending countries, their data on rents net of subsidies shows a 
housing expenditure pattern remarkably similar to many other countries, 
including Korea, the U.S., and virtually all other countries that have been 
carefully studied:  universally, within a city or a country, middle income 
and upper income households tend to spend a smaller fraction of their 
income on rents than poor households do.  In economists’ jargon, housing is 
a necessity, like food.  
3.4.3  Chile’s Housing Subsidy Program 
In international circles, Chile’s system of lump sum grants for housing is 
one of the best known housing subsidy system in the world, and one of the 
most imitated.  However, as we shall see, the exact system that Chile has 
implemented in practice has pros and cons.  Our discussion of Chile is based 
mainly on Diamond (1997), and partly on Ferguson et al. (1996); see also 
Renaud (1999). 
Chile’s government had a strong presence in the housing market for 
many years.  However, by 1980 the limitations of programs based on large-
scale direct public provision of housing have become very clear.  Such 
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housing was often high cost, low quality, poorly located, and associated 
with political corruption.  In addition, the government-sponsored system of 
subsidized lending for housing was effectively bankrupt.  The centerpiece of 
the Chilean system is the replacement of subsidized loans and direct public 
production with lump sum grants to consumers. 
Internationally, the general nature of Chile's up-front grants is well 
known, and much admired for its transparency and for the apparent divorce 
of subsidy from the financial system.  But in fact, the divorce is only partial.  
The majority of Chilean households are eligible for these programs.  
Generally, as incomes increase, the grant element declines but the mortgage 
loan increases.  Evidence reviewed by Diamond (1997) suggest that these 
mortgages remain problematic.  First, while interest rates are indexed, the 
rates are still somewhat below what market rates would be for such lending, 
and in particular, rates do not cover servicing costs or credit risk.  But the 
biggest problem is that many borrowers are delinquent.  The delinquency 
rate on these loans is over 70%.  Diamond reports that local analysts believe 
that because beneficiaries have received a grant of up to 60% of the cost of 
the house, they tie the subsidy to the remaining loan in their minds, and do 
not truly believe that the loan needs to be repaid.  In other words, borrowers 
view the loan as something else they have received from the government, 
rather than as a commercial financial transaction, i.e., a contract that must be 
honored.  Compounding the problem is the implementing agency’s poor 
collection performance and their decision not to foreclose on borrowers in 
default.  As Diamond puts it, “the larger mystery is why anyone pays on 
these loans.”   
A lesson that might be drawn from this experience is that if the same 
agency delivers a large subsidy and a loan, households will have a tendency 
to view the loan as part of the government handout rather than a normal 
business transaction.  This is one of the reasons it was farsighted for Korea to 
separate the National Housing Fund from other parts of the mortgage 
system. 
In a given year, only about 20% of Chilean households eligible for 
housing subsidies receive them.  Chile has introduced a point score system 
based on household need and savings behavior.  Another feature of the 
Chilean program is that the voucher is portable among developments 
(Ferguson et al. 1996).  This is in contrast to practice in a number of countries 
where (in practice) finance will be tied to specific developments. 
However, it remains problematic that while the direct subsidy 
component decreases as income increases, this is more than offset by the 
larger implicit subsidies in loans associated with the program, since loan 
size increases with income.  (Diamond, Ferguson et al.).  This not only 
reduces the progressivity of subsidies, but can greatly increase the risks 
involved for the financial system, since the nature of implicit financial 
subsidies is that they are not at all transparent, and only become apparent 
when the system is under stress, e.g. due to a burst of inflation or rise in 
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market rates of interest.  Renaud (1999) provides a cogent discussion of the 
lessons learned from a variety of countries regarding the benefits of 
separation of housing subsidies from the financial system.  The lessons of 
the Chilean system, in brief, are that targeted, upfront, on-budget housing 
subsidies that are tenure neutral are an excellent way to  redirect a housing 
subsidy system; but care must be taken to keep the subsidies directed and 
constructed as originally designed, and avoid “backsliding” into less 
transparent subsidies entangled with the financial system. 
3.4.4 Housing Subsidies in Other Selected Countries 
A number of other countries have adopted subsidy programs that are 
somewhat similar to the Chilean model.  Uruguay adopted a direct subsidy 
program in 1992 (Ferguson et al. 1996).  Uruguay is a smaller country with a 
much less severe housing problem.  While the number of housing subsidies 
delivered equal about 10% of the housing deficit, supply side problems 
make it difficult for developers to lower costs to the point envisioned by the 
program.  Among these problems are local government approvals.  
Ferguson et al. also report housing prices have been rising at least partly due 
to this subsidy program, and the program has not proven immune to 
political influence.  Beneficiaries are selected by formula.  The formula has 
not been tampered with, but large numbers of vouchers are typically 
produced at election time, exacerbating the boom and bust cycle of the 
Uruguayan housing market.   
Costa Rica is another country that has recent experience with a Chilean 
style program.  Ferguson et al. report that Costa Rica has had more success 
than other countries in getting developers to move down market.  The Costa 
Rican model sometimes makes use of progressive construction and 
household labor.  
Colombia has also adopted some subsidy programs on the Chilean 
model.   In fact, Columbia has a confusing plethora of housing programs of 
every type, and to some extent direct subsidies get lost in the shuffle.  The 
Colombian system of direct subsidies is shallower than many other 
countries; the subsidy works out to be about 1/4 of the value of the unit.  
Ferguson et al. argue that this is in some sense too low, but we will argue 
otherwise below.  The Colombia system also suffers somewhat from 
political manipulation of beneficiary selection and administrative delays in 
developers receiving cash for vouchers.  
4.  The Regulatory Environment and the Supply of Housing 
to Low Income Households 
To repeat from the Introduction, a principal theme of this paper is that, 
when considering low income housing, there are important differences 
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among housing subsidy alternatives, but that these are often dominated by, 
and always interact with, supply conditions in the market.     Excessive and 
inappropriate regulations "in-elasticize supply" so that demand increases 
from population and income growth lead to rising real estate prices, rather 
than increased supply.   
Of course many things besides regulations affect supply, notably natural 
constraints.  Large cities with large bodies of water and/or hilly terrain like 
Hong Kong, Honolulu and San Francisco – and to some extent Seoul –  
would likely be expensive markets even in the absence of stringent 
regulatory regimes.  That said, many studies have demonstrated the 
strength of the relationship between the regulatory environment and 
housing and real estate prices, and the cities named above are even more 
expensive than they need be, given their physical geography and size.  
Studies of the U.S. include Pollakowski and Wachter (1990), Segal and 
Srinavisan (1985), Black and Hoben (1985), Rose (1989), Shilling, Sirmans 
and Guidry (1991), Malpezzi (1996), Malpezzi, Chun, and Green (1998),  
Malpezzi (1999) and Riddiough (1997).  International studies include Angel 
(2000), Cho (1997), Evans (1999), Kim (1993), Kim and Kim (2000), and Monk 
and Whitehead (1995) as well as Bramley (1993), Angel and Mayo (1996), 
and Malpezzi (1990).  
A decade and a half ago, in his careful review of housing supply and 
demand studies, Olsen (1987) wrote  
Empirical studies of the supply of housing service are as scarce 
as studies of its demand are abundant.  Indeed, there are not 
enough studies of any parameter to make it worthwhile to 
discuss the central tendency of the estimates.  [I]t is abundantly 
clear that the marginal benefit from studying housing supply is 
much greater than the marginal benefit from studying housing 
demand. 
Of course at the time Olsen wrote, there were already several important 
studies of the supply side of the real estate market, such as Muth (1960), 
Ozanne and Struyk (1978) and Follain (1979).  But in the past decade or so 
the number of empirical studies of housing supply, including estimates of 
that key parameter, the price elasticity of supply (β), have greatly increased. 
As noted by Malpezzi and Mayo (1997), housing demand parameters are 
remarkably stable and predictable across countries and places; supply 
parameters vary much more.  More detailed surveys can be found in Bartlett 
(1989), DiPasquale (1999), and Malpezzi and Maclennan (2001).  Here we 
briefly summarize a few key points that will be important for our discussion 
below. 
First, several studies of the U.S. housing market, such as Follain (1979), 
Muth (1960), Stover (1986), Smith (1976), and Malpezzi and Maclennan 
(2001) suggest that long run supply elasticities in the U.S. are high; in fact, 
Muth and Follain cannot reject the hypothesis that long-run U.S. supply 
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curves are perfectly flat.  Other studies cited here find supply elasticities on 
the order or 10 or higher. 
Second, a number of other studies, such as Topel and Rosen (1988) and 
Poterba (1991) find positive but distinctly lower elasticities, on the order of 
2-3.  Malpezzi and Maclennan present some evidence that both (a) the very 
high elasticities of Follain and of Muth and (b) the low elasticities of Topel 
and Rosen and of Poterba may be due to the particular time period chosen 
for analysis.  Malpezzi and Maclennan show that there is no long run trend 
in housing prices post-World War II, but there are long cycles.  The low 
elasticity studies tend to use data that begin in a trough and end near a peak, 
while the high elasticity studies pick periods of declining prices or of a more 
complete cycle.  Thus, Malpezzi and Maclennan argue (and present 
estimates consistent with) high long run supply responsiveness, but they 
also point out that full adjustment can take a decade or more.13  On the other 
hand, Malpezzi and Maclennan find a much less elastic supply response in 
Britain, consistent with the more detailed studies of Monk and Whitehead 
(1996) and Cheshire and Sheppard. 
By now the fact that excessive regulation leads to high prices is well 
documented.  What is less widely appreciated is the effect regulations have 
on second moments and risk.  Malpezzi and Wachter (forthcoming) 
demonstrates that more stringently regulated markets are also more volatile.  
Following Malpezzi and Wachter (forthcoming) we can illustrate the process 
in a simple comparative static fashion with Figures 1 and 2.  In Figure 1, a 
heavily regulated market with fairly inelastic supply has an initial demand 
shock characterized by the demand curve moving from D1 to D2.  Given this 
demand shock in a very inelastic short and medium run supply, little supply 
response is observed and prices increase substantially from P0 to P1.  But 
over the very long run, there is some elasticity even in the most convoluted 
markets.  Eventually, markets and governments do respond to 
extraordinary price increases and supply shifts out.  This results in a 
housing price crash from P1 to P2. 
Contrast this with Figure 2, which is more or less the same except that 
the markets are more elastic.  The initial increase does give rise to a price run 
up over the medium term, as one would expect, but the run up is much less.  
Therefore the boom and bust cycle is moderated.  These are indicated by 
shifts from P0' to P1' and back down to P2'. 
These processes are not merely a theoretical curiosity.  Many observers 
have suggested that Korea is a country with an extremely stringent 
regulatory environment that has greatly inelasticized supply.  Many studies 
such as Kim (1993), Hannah, Kim and Mills (1990), Kim and Kim (2000), and 
Green, Malpezzi, and Vandell (1992) have documented the especially 
                                                 
13   Of course, it bears repeating, since the thrust of some of this research is often 
misinterpreted, that regulation per se is neither good nor bad.  What matters is the cost and 
benefits of particular regulations under specific market conditions.  Regulations need to be put 
to the cost-benefit test, as any other private or public economic activity.   
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convoluted Korean regulatory system and Malpezzi and Mayo (1997) have 
shown that this leads to a very inelastic housing supply.  Malpezzi and 
Wachter (forthcoming) also demonstrate that without inelasticity in the 
supply regime, demand-side pressures from speculators are unlikely to have 
any significant impact on the market; indeed, “speculation” is more a 
symptom than a cause of a poorly performing housing market. 
But at some point, as prices skyrocket and shortages become more 
apparent, the Korean government responds as it did with the Two Million 
Houses Program circa 1990.  This has the effect of shifting an inelastic 
supply curve to the right in a series of discrete jumps.  Figure 3 illustrates.  
After the crash from P1'' to P2'', the process starts over again.  As demand 
grows further, prices rise again to P3''. 
Thus a world in which government responds to rising housing prices by 
one time programs to get the market moving, as in Korea's Two Million 
Houses Program, can be characterized as occasionally shifting an inelastic 
supply curve to the right.  This leads perforce to a boom and bust cycle.  
Reform measures that tackle the root causes of inelastic supply have the 
effect of flattening the supply curve and moderating the boom and bust cycle, 
reducing risk for homeowners and investors.   
4.1  Observations Regarding General and Specific Regulatory Actions 
Regulations have benefits as well as costs.  But there are systematic 
reasons why regulatory costs are sometimes – far too often – much greater 
than benefits.  Malpezzi (1999b), on which this section draws heavily, 
reviews the international literature on housing and land regulation..  
According to that review, the systematic tendency to over-regulate can be 
explained by the following: 
• Governments often fail to explicitly consider costs and benefits when 
developing the regulatory framework. 
• Often each interested party adds their own (often small) regulation, which 
may seem reasonable taken on its own.  Generally such regulations are 
never considered together; but the effect of many small regulations can 
add up.  And as Bertaud (1981) shows, there are often significant 
interactions among regulations. 
• Some regulation undoubtedly results from a breakdown in exchange 
between regulators and the regulated.  Coasian exchange (see Fischel 
1985) may not work well. When it doesn't, "informal Coasian exchange" - 
corruption - will be more prevalent. 
• Regulations are also an opportunity for rent seeking behavior.  Over time 
vested interests develop, and the political economy of relaxation of 
regulation becomes quite difficult. 
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Distributional aspects of regulation, particularly land use regulation, are 
often neglected. The distributional analysis of rent control discussed in 
Malpezzi and Ball (1993) is but one illustration.  The corpus of Alain 
Bertaud's work (e.g. Bertaud 1989) shows time and again that inappropriate 
regulations often tilt profitability away from the low end of the market.  
Malpezzi and Green (1996) show that qualitatively more stringent land use 
regulations effect the bottom end of the market more than the high end.   
The political economy of changing regulation can be quite difficult.  It is 
noted above that vested interests arise.  Mills (2002) and Kim and Kim (2000) 
describe some of the problems that arise both generally and in the Korean 
context.  One of the areas of research that is developing in interesting 
directions is the analysis of regulatory choice.  Epple and Romer (1988) and 
Pogodzinski and Sass (1994) are examples. 
Real estate regulation is extremely subject to insider/outsider problems.  
Regulations that excessively constrain the market will reduce supply, and 
drive up prices.  Whether this is a “good thing” or a bad depends largely on 
whether one owns property when the stringent regime is put in place. 
What are the “regulatory fundamentals” in real estate?   How might a 
municipality go about creating effective, efficient and fair regulations for 
consumer protection and safeguard consumers from negative externalities? 
There are examples of model codes and "best practices," for example 
Dewberry & Davis (1991), U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (1993), and Vranicar, Sanders and Mosena (1980).  But it almost 
goes without saying that any model code requires careful thought and 
analysis before application to other countries.  When examining model codes, 
look more at principles, functions and processes, and less at specific 
regulations. 
It is important to link means and ends.  Regulations should be viewed as 
a method to reach a stated goal, not an end in themselves.  Goals should be 
clearly articulated.  The way the regulation takes us towards the goal should 
be clear.  Costs of regulation, including unintended consequences, should be 
laid out clearly ex ante and monitored over time. 
Set performance standards for institutions, e.g. decisions on permits will 
be returned within so many weeks.  Institute a transparent process for 
obtaining exceptions to rules, with clear guidelines on what criteria will be 
used to judge such requests.  Make sure that cost-benefit and distributional 
criteria are part of the decision rules.  Develop some form of quasi-judicial 
appeals process, but keep it straightforward and ensure rapid decisions.  
Appeals that overturn the original decision should be the exception, not the 
rule; if many appeals overturn prior decisions, something is wrong with the 
original decision process, or the appeal process. 
Monitor indicators of market and regulatory performance (Angel and 
Mayo 1996; Malpezzi and Mayo 1997).  Direct indicators of regulatory 
stringency include the time taken to receive approvals for development (e.g. 
six months or so to a decision is good; two years is bad.  Some countries take 
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5-7 years.)  Land development multipliers (the ratio of  the price of serviced 
developable land on the fringe to similar land not yet converted) range from 
1.5 to 3 in well functioning markets.  Poorly functioning markets exhibit 
ratios of 5 and above.  The house price to income ratio is another key 
indicator.  Markets where typical house prices are 2-3 times typical incomes 
are performing well.  Markets where this ratio is running 5-8 or higher are 
distorted.  Regulators must monitor their city.  Planners should follow the 
market as closely as any for-profit developer. 
Review regulations in the large as well the small.  Changes in regulation 
are often among the most pressing areas for reform.  Regulatory reform can 
play a key role in increasing the supply of finance, infrastructure, and 
developable land, while reducing costs and risks.  Zoning, taxes, rent controls, 
and building standards are other obvious regulatory areas to study for 
possible change.  Governments must carefully weigh the costs and benefits, 
and the distributional consequences, of regulation.  Regulation should strive 
for a "level playing field" in so far as is practical. 
Common over-designs, in developed as well as developing countries, are 
codes that specify large lots, that require curbs and gutters for all streets, and 
inappropriately wide roads.  In many cases even in developed countries, for 
example, grassy swales can substitute for full curbs and gutters; 
neighborhood roads that later sport speed bumps are the universal sign of 
an overdesigned street.  Are construction codes linked to local conditions?  
For example, are foundation and footing requirements linked to soil type?  
Are infrastructure standards linked to density and income?  For example, 
low cost sanitation alternatives like Ventilated Improved Pit (VIP) Latrines 
may work well in a range of conditions, but not in a city with the density and 
generally high income of most Korean cities. 
Remember that when considered individually, in isolation from other 
regulations, and outside of the cost benefit framework, most land use 
regulations appear reasonable and benign. Typically each regulation reflects 
a different interest (schools, fire department, roads department, sanitation 
department, water authority, and so on) each of whom consider their interest 
apart from the costs imposed.  Someone outside the individual institutions 
affected has to analyze the big picture.  It's only when you add up the 
regulatory costs and compare them to the benefits that the true picture is 
revealed.  Undertake a “regulatory audit” from time to time.  The "Bertaud 
model" of land use planning and the “Malaysia model” of incentives are 
examples of the kinds of analyses that can serve well here.  Kim (1991) 
provides an introduction to how such models can be applied in Korea. 
4.1.1 Examples of Regulatory Do’s 
Plan trunk infrastructure, and an installation schedule.  To the extent 
possible, such infrastructure should follow current and likely future 
development locations, as revealed by the market.  Well-designed 
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development charges or “impact fees” can finance such infrastructure. 
Permit density, but allow for a mix of densities and income levels.  Do 
not micromanage the development process.  If governments find themselves 
legislating lots of low and middle income development, where the big 
market is, that's a signal that some regulations or other upstream 
interventions are tilting profitability away from the middle and to the high 
end.  Find and treat the disease, don't try to legislate away the symptom. 
Use cost-benefit principles to examine proposed regulations.  
Quantifying benefits, even approximately, with likely bounds when precise 
figures are unavailable, is far superior to making a regulatory judgment 
with no such quantification.  Every regulatory decision imposes real costs 
and confers some benefit; better to measure with error than not to try.  Every 
regulation put in place means we’ve made an implicit judgment about 
benefits and costs.  Put these judgments to the test.  
If necessary undertake “regulatory triage.” Separate regulations into (1) 
those whose benefits clearly exceed costs, and strengthen and enforce them; 
(2) those whose costs clearly exceed benefits, and remove or reform them; 
and (3) a middle category of those for whom the net cost-benefit is too 
imprecisely known to be confident of the need for change.  In many if not 
most cities, an initial focus on (1) and (2) will keep regulators busy enough 
for some time, and will yield significant returns. 
Consider fairness and political feasibility as well as efficiency in the 
design of regulatory regimes.  Real estate regulations have powerful 
distributive effects. 
No regulation is so well drawn that it never needs change, or variances.  
Allow for exceptions and changes, in a transparent process. 
Corner solutions are rarely the best.  Outright prohibitions, e.g. on 
development within a large greenbelt, are rarely an efficient way to obtain 
the desired regulatory benefits.  Encourage negotiated outcomes. 
Use impact fees and development charges judiciously.  Set these fees to 
approximate the (formerly) external costs of development.  Keep a nexus 
between fees and services. 
4.1.2 Examples of Regulatory Don’ts 
Don’t import a foreign system whole.  But do study foreign systems for 
ideas, in light of local conditions.   
Don’t put unnecessary roadblocks to redevelopment and densification.  
New construction on the fringe is important, but so is redevelopment and 
infill.  The latter are not as noticeable, and sorely neglected by many cities.  
Don't adopt regulations that no one can realistically follow.  The rules 
will be broken, corruption will increase, and the rule of law will be 
weakened.  But when regulations are appropriate, that is well founded in 
cost-benefit terms and equitable, allocate sufficient resources for their 
administration and enforcement. 
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Don’t make codes overly detailed and inflexible.  Set performance 
standards, e.g. “a fire door in an office building must test to withstand a fire 
of 2000 degrees for 15 minutes,” not “all fire doors must be 2 inch steel.” 
Don’t rely on rigid quantitative targets for development when setting 
infrastructure or land conversion guidelines.  In market economies, peak to 
trough of the development cycle can easily be 3:1 or greater. 
Don’t prohibit small lots.  Don’t prohibit large lots.  Rather, regulate or 
tax to implicitly price lots to cover the externalities generated, and let the 
market decide. 
Don’t tilt profitability away from the middle and low end of the market 
by imposing differential costs.  Large lot zoning, excessive land use 
standards, and the like, have this effect around the world. 
Don’t neglect commercial and industrial development, and its associated 
infrastructure. 
Don’t limit land purchases to favored developers.  Auction land, and its 
associated development rights. 
5. Some of the Main Lessons Learned from International 
Experience 
5.1 Broad Trends in Markets and Policy 
There seems to be a bias held by many housing activists towards 
programs that deliver new and countable housing units.  In Korea, this has 
led to an overfocus on the housing supply ratio (ratio of units to households).  
These biases are understandable – they are a simple and obvious response to 
a perceived housing shortage.  However this view neglects how housing 
markets work, in particular that it is a market, or in De Leeuw and Struyk’s 
informative phrase, a web of urban housing. 
Of course, housing economists are interested in the number of housing 
units started, or in the stock, compared to households.  It is simply that the 
number of housing starts or completions does not, by itself, tell us 
everything we want to know about the market.  In fact, given a choice 
between knowing quantities – housing starts, for example – or prices, 
economists will always opt for prices, which contain more information.  
Housing prices are closer to a “sufficient statistic,”  in the sense that if 
housing’s relative price is stable (and assuming prices themselves are not 
regulated or controlled), generally that is powerful evidence that the market 
is working well, however many starts or completions were observed last 
quarter.  
Many – not all – housing economists argue for the general superiority of 
demand side programs, i.e. housing allowances or vouchers, over supply 
side.  While most studies find greater micro-efficiency of demand side 
programs, some observers argue that market effects can outweigh these.  
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Apgar (1991) Susin (2002) and Yates and Whitehead (1997) are the most 
prominent examples of arguments based on market effects; see Galster 
(1997) Green and Malpezzi (2003) and especially Olsen (2002) for the 
alternative perspective.  One difference in perspective is based on what we 
believe about the long run price elasticity of supply.  But to the extent one 
accepts the argument that inelastic supply could result in adverse market 
effects of a widespread housing allowance, the latter authors tend to argue 
that it is better to attack the cause of inelastic supply – and high costs for low 
and moderate income households – rather than simply try to treat its effects.  
Regulations, taxes and subsidies matter – in the long run, probably more 
than most direct provision programs.  Work to flatten supply curves, not merely 
shift an inelastic supply curve every few years.  Housing and land and real estate 
markets need to be regulated appropriately.  Use the same cost-benefit 
criteria for regulation that we use for other public activities. 
Worldwide, the trend is towards vouchers and housing allowances and 
away from bricks and mortar subsidies.  While of course there are 
exceptions to the trend, the advantages of demand side subsidies in most 
markets are telling.  This is not to imply that there is no work to be done on 
the supply side – far from it.  Improving the efficiency of land development, 
while safeguarding environmental outcomes, financing and developing 
appropriate infrastructure, re-tuning the regulatory environment for 
housing development and management, and improving housing finance are 
among the many actions that can be taken to improve housing supply in 
general and low income housing in particular. 
5.2 Research and Development 
Housing policy and housing markets are complex, and there is continued 
need for learning-by-doing.  Fortunately there exist well-tested techniques 
for evaluating housing programs and policies.  Such evaluation is hard work, 
and ongoing.  Research on specific programs and policies must be 
complemented with, indeed is much informed by, more basic research on 
key parameters such as key supply and demand elasticities.  Finally, more 
careful thinking about the political economy of housing policy, along the 
lines demonstrated by Kim, will enable the crafting of more effective and 
realistic policies. 
 
 
CHAPTER 3-3  Low Income Housing Markets and Policy 
 
 
311
References 
Angel, Shlomo.  Housing Policy Matters: A Global Analysis.  Oxford, 2000.   
Angel, Shlomo.  Comments on Hernando De Soto's The Mystery of Capital.  
Processed, 2001.   
Angel, Shlomo and Stephen K. Mayo.  Enabling Policies and Their Effects on 
Housing Sector Performance: A Global Comparison.  Paper presented to the 
Habitat II Conference, Istanbul, Turkey, June 1996.   
Apgar, William C. Jr.  Which Housing Policy is Best?  Housing Policy Debate, 1(1), 
1990, pp. 1-32.   
Auster, Richard, Irving Levenson and Deborah Sarachek.  The Production of Health.  
Journal of Human Resources, 4, Fall 1969, pp. 411-36.   
Bartlett, Will.  Housing Supply Elasticities: Theory and Measurement.  York, UK:  Joseph 
Rowntree Memorial Trust Working Paper No. 2, 1989.   
Bertaud, Alain.  The Regulatory Environment for Urban Land in Indonesia: 
Constraints Imposed Upon the Poor.  World Bank, Processed, 1989.   
Bertaud, Alain and Stephen Malpezzi.  Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Urban 
Land Use Regulation: A Simple Model with an Application to Malaysia.  
Journal of Housing Economics, 10(3), September 2001, pp. 393-418.   
Black, J. Thomas and James Hoben.  Effect of Policy Restrictions on Residential 
Land Prices.  Urban Land, 43(4), 1984, p. 4.   
Bradbury, Katherine and Anthony Downs.  Do Housing Allowances Work?  
Brookings Institution, 1981.   
Bradley, David, Carolyn Stephens, Trudy Harpham and Sandy Cairncross.  A 
Review of Environmental Health Impacts in Developing Country Cities.  World 
Bank/UNDP/Habitat, 1991.   
Bramley, Glen.  Housing Market Adjustment and Land-Supply Constraints.  
Environment and Planning A, 31(7), July 1999, pp. 1169-88.   
Brownstone, John and Peter Englund.  Tax Reform and Housing Demand: The 
Distribution of Welfare Gains and Losses.  European Economic Review, 
September 1988.   
Buckley, Robert M. and Jerry Kalarickal.  World Bank Lending for Housing: A 
Strategy Update.  World Bank Research Observer, forthcoming 2005.   
Cho, Dongchul.  Chonsei and Sale Prices of Houses, and their Relationships with 
Interest and Inflation Rates.  In MoonJoong Tcha (ed.), Analyses of Housing 
Markets and Related Policy Issues.  Korean Development Institute Research 
Monograph, 2005.  (English summary, original in Korean).   
Cho, Man.  Congestion Effects of Spatial Growth Restrictions: A Model and 
 
                          Residential Welfare and Housing Policies: The Experience and Future of Korea 
 
312
Empirical Analysis.  Real Estate Economics, 25(3), 1997, pp. 409-38.   
Chung, Eui-Chul.  Housing Policies for Low Income Households.  In MoonJoong 
Tcha (ed.), Analyses of Housing Markets and Related Policy Issues.  Korean 
Development Institute Research Monograph, 2005.  (English summary, 
original in Korean).   
Clemmer, Richard B.  Measuring Welfare Effects of In-Kind Transfers.  Journal of 
Urban Economics, 15, 1984, pp. 46-65.   
Cohen, M.N.  Health and the Rise of Civilization.  Yale University Press, 1989.   
De Leeuw, Frank and Larry Ozanne.  Housing.  H. Aaron and J. Pechman (eds.), 
How Taxes Affect Economic Behavior, Brookings, 1981.   
De Leeuw, Frank and Raymond Struyk.  The Web of Urban Housing.  The Urban 
Institute, 1975.   
De Soto, Hernando.  The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and 
Fails Everywhere Else.  Basic Books, 2000.   
Dewberry & Davis, and the National Association of Homebuilders National 
Research Center.  Affordable Housing Development Guidelines for State and Local 
Government.  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1991.   
Diamond, Douglas B.  The Promises and Perils of Interest Rate Subsidies: A Survey 
of Eight Selected Programs.  USAID, July 1997.   
Dietz, Robert and Donald R. Haurin.  The Social and Private Consequences of 
Homeownership.  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
Processed, 2001.   
DiPasquale, Denise.  Why Don't We Know More About Housing Supply?  Journal of 
Real Estate Finance and Economics, 18(1), January 1999, pp. 9-24.   
Drury, Margaret, Olson Lee, Michael Springer and Lorene Yap.  Lower Income 
Housing Assistance Program (Section 8): Nationwide Evaluation of the Existing 
Housing Program.  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
PD&R, 1978.   
Epple, Dennis and Richard E. Romano.  Public Provision of Private Goods.  Journal 
of Political Economy, 104, 1996, pp. 57-84.   
Ermisch, John.  Housing and the National Economy.  Aldershot: Avebury Gower 
Publishing for the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 1990.   
Evans, Alan W.  The Land Market and Government Intervention.  In Paul Chesire 
and Edwin S. Mills, (eds.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics.  Volume 
3, Elsevier, 1999.   
Fallis, George.  Social Housing Policy in a Mature Welfare State.  Toronto: York 
University, Department of Economics, 2004.   
Ferguson, Bruce, Jacobo Rubenstein and Vicente Dominguez Vial.  The Design of 
Direct Demand Subsidies for Housing in Latin America.  Review of Regional 
and Urban Studies, 8, 1996, pp. 202-19.   
Fischel, William A.  The Economics of Zoning Laws: A Property Rights Approach to 
 
CHAPTER 3-3  Low Income Housing Markets and Policy 
 
 
313
American Land Use Controls.  Johns Hopkins, 1985.   
Fischel, William A.  Do Growth Controls Matter? A Review of Empirical Evidence on the 
Effectiveness and Efficiency of Local Government Land Use Regulation.  Lincoln 
Institute of Land Policy, 1990.   
Follain, James R.  The Price Elasticity of the Long Run Supply of New Housing 
Construction.  Land Economics, 55, 1979, pp. 190-99.   
Friedman, Joseph, Emmanuel Jimenez and Stephen K. Mayo.  The Demand for 
Tenure Security in Developing Countries.  Journal of Urban Economics, 29, 1988, 
pp. 185-98.   
Galster, George C.  Comparing Demand-Side and Supply-Side Housing Policies: 
Sub-Market and Spatial Perspectives.  Housing Studies, 12(4), October 1997, pp. 
561-77.   
Gibb, Kenneth.  Trends and Changes in Social Housing Finance and Provision 
within the European Union.  Housing Studies, 17(2), 2002, pp. 325-36. 
Gilbert, Alan.  On the Mystery of Capital and the Myths of Hernando de Soto: What 
Difference Does Legal Title Make?  Processed, 2001.   
Gillen, Kevin C.  Does the Federal Housing Voucher Program Accelerate Filtering?  
Wharton Department of Real Estate, Processed, 2003.   
Green, Richard K. and Michelle J. White.  Measuring the Benefits of Homeowning: 
Benefits to Children.  Journal of Urban Economics, 41, 1997, pp. 441-61.   
Green, Richard K. and Stephen Malpezzi.  A Primer on U.S. Housing Markets and 
Policies.  The Urban Institute Press for the American Real Estate and Urban 
Economics Association, 2003.   
Green, Richard, Stephen Malpezzi and Kerry Vandell.  Urban Regulations and the 
Price of Land and Housing in Korea.  Journal of Housing Economics, 3, 1994, pp. 
330-56.   
Hannah, Lawrence, Alain Bertaud, Stephen Malpezzi and Stephen Mayo.  Malaysia: 
The Housing Sector; Getting the Incentives Right.  World Bank Sector Report No. 
7292-MA, 1989.   
Hannah, Lawrence, Kyung-Hwan Kim and Edwin S. Mills.  Land Use Controls and 
Housing Prices in Korea.  Urban Studies, 30, 1993, pp. 147-56.   
Hardoy, Jorge, Sandy Cairncross and David Satterthwaite (eds.).  The Poor Die 
Young: Housing and Health in Third World Cities.  London: Earthscan 
Publications, 1990.   
Hills, John, Franz Hubert, Horst Tomann and Christine Whitehead.  Shifting 
Subsidies from Bricks and Mortar to People: Experience in Britain and West 
Germany.  Housing Studies, 5(3), 1990, pp. 147-67.   
Hoek-Smit, Marja.  Indonesia: Alternative Approaches to Low- and Middle-Income 
Housing Finance for Indonesia.  USAID/Bappenas, July 1997.   
Hoek-Smit, Marja, Claude Bovet and Douglas Diamond.  Strengthening Surinam's 
Housing Market and Housing Finance Sector.  InterAmerican Development 
Bank, December 1997.   
 
                          Residential Welfare and Housing Policies: The Experience and Future of Korea 
 
314
Holzer, Harry J.  The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: What Has the Evidence Shown?  
Urban Studies, 28(1), 1991, pp. 105-22.   
Hur, Suk-Kyun.  The Current Situation and Theoretical Analysis of Housing-
Related Taxes in Korea.  In MoonJoong Tcha (ed.), Analyses of Housing 
Markets and Related Policy Issues.  Korean Development Institute Research 
Monograph, 2005.  (English summary, original in Korean).   
Ihlanfeldt, Keith R. and David L. Sjoquist.  The Effect of Residential Location on the 
Probability of Black and White Teenagers Having A Job.  Review of Regional 
Studies, 1990.   
Ihlanfeldt, Keith R. and David L. Sjoquist.  The Role of Space in Determining the 
Occupations of Black and White Workers.  Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, 21, 1991, pp. 295-315.   
Ingram, Gregory K.  Patterns of Metropolitan Development: What Have We 
Learned?  Urban Studies, 35(7), June 1998, pp. 1019-35.   
Jimenez, Emmanuel.  Tenure Security and Urban Squatting.  Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 66(4), November 1984, pp. 556-67.   
Kain, John F.  Housing Segregation, Negro Employment and Metropolitan 
Decentralization.  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82, 1968, pp. 175-97.   
Kain, John F.  The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: Three Decades Later.  Housing 
Policy Debate, 3(2), 1992, pp. 371-462.   
Kim, Chung-Ho and Kyung-Hwan Kim.  The Political Economy of Korean 
Government Policies on Real Estate.  Urban Studies, 37(7), 2000, pp. 1157-69.   
Kim, Hyeon-Wook, Chang Park and Kyung-Mook Lim.  Restructuring the Role of 
the National Housing Fund and Policy Recommendations.  In MoonJoong 
Tcha (ed.), Analyses of Housing Markets and Related Policy Issues.  Korean 
Development Institute Research Monograph, 2005.  (English summary, 
original in Korean).   
Kim, Jeong-Ho.  Housing Program Evaluation Using the Present Value Model: A 
Korean Experience.  Paper presented to the World Bank seminar on Korean 
Housing Markets and Policy, 1991.   
Kim, Jeong-Ho.  A Critique of Urban and Residential Improvement Programs.  In 
MoonJoong Tcha (ed.), Analyses of Housing Markets and Related Policy Issues.  
Korean Development Institute Research Monograph, 2005.  (English 
summary, original in Korean).   
Kim, Kyung-Hwan.  Housing Prices, Affordability and Government Policy in Korea.  
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 6(1), January 1993, pp. 55-72.   
Kim, Kyung-Hwan.  Korea: Could a Real Estate Price Bubble Have Caused the 
Economic Crisis?  In Koichi Mera and Bertrand Renaud (eds.), Asia's Financial 
Crisis and the Role of Real Estate.  M.E. Sharpe, 2000.   
Kim, Kyung-Hwan.  Land Market and Land Policy Issues: A Critical Review.  
Processed, 2001.   
Kim, Kyung-Hwan.  Housing and the Korean Economy.  Journal of Housing 
 
CHAPTER 3-3  Low Income Housing Markets and Policy 
 
 
315
Economics, 13(4), December 2004, pp. 321-41.   
Kim, Kyung-Hwan.  Recent Developments in the Housing Finance Market in Korea.  
In MoonJoong Tcha (ed.), Analyses of Housing Markets and Related Policy Issues.  
Korean Development Institute Research Monograph, 2005.  (English 
summary, original in Korean).   
Lee, Yong-Bum and Jay-young Sohn.  Analysis of Land Supply System.  In 
MoonJoong Tcha (ed.), Analyses of Housing Markets and Related Policy Issues.  
Korean Development Institute Research Monograph, 2005.  (English 
summary, original in Korean).   
Lim, Gill-Chin.  Land Markets and Public Policy: A Korean Case Study.  Habitat 
International, 11(1), 1987, pp. 73-81.   
Llanto, Gilberto M., Aniceto C. Orbeta Jr., Ma. Theresa C. Sanchez and Marie 
Christine G. Tang.  A Study of Housing Subsidies in the Philippines.  World 
Bank, February 1997.   
Lowry, Ira S.  Experimenting With Housing Allowances: The Final Report of the Housing 
Allowance Supply Experiment.  Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 
Inc., 1983.   
Maclennan, Duncan, John Muellbauer and Mark Stephens.  Asymmetries in 
Housing and Financial Market Institutions and EMU.  Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 14(3), 1998.   
Malpezzi, Stephen.  Urban Housing and Financial Markets: Some International 
Comparisons.  Urban Studies, 27(6), December 1990, pp. 971-1022.   
Malpezzi, Stephen.  Housing Prices, Externalities, and Regulation in U.S. 
Metropolitan Areas.  Journal of Housing Research, 7(2), 1996, pp. 209-241 (A).   
Malpezzi, Stephen.  The Relative Merits of Project-Based and Household-Based 
Housing Assistance.  Center for Urban Land Economics Research, 1996 (B).   
Malpezzi, Stephen.  Economic Analysis of Housing Markets in Developing and 
Transition Economies.  In Paul Chesire and Edwin S. Mills (eds.), Handbook of 
Regional and Urban Economics, North Holland, Vol. III, 1999 (A).   
Malpezzi, Stephen.  The Regulation of Urban Development: Lessons from 
International Experience.  Paper presented to the World Bank World 
Development Report Summer Workshop, Washington, July 1998; revised 
1999 (B).   
Malpezzi, Stephen and Duncan Maclennan.  The Long Run Price Elasticity of 
Supply of New Construction in the United States and the United Kingdom.  
Journal of Housing Economics, 10(3), September 2001, pp. 278-306.   
Malpezzi, Stephen and Richard K. Green.  What's Happened to the Bottom of the 
Housing Market?  Urban Studies, 33(10), December 1996, pp. 1807-20.   
Malpezzi, Stephen and Stephen K. Mayo.  The Demand for Housing in Developing 
Countries.  Economic Development and Cultural Change, 35(4), July 1987, pp. 
687-721.   
 
 
                          Residential Welfare and Housing Policies: The Experience and Future of Korea 
 
316
Malpezzi, Stephen and Stephen K. Mayo.  Getting Housing Incentives Right: A 
Case Study of the Effects of Regulation, Taxes and Subsidies on Housing 
Supply in Malaysia.  Land Economics, 73(3), August 1997, pp. 372-91.   
Malpezzi, Stephen and Susan Wachter.  The Role of Speculation in Real Estate 
Cycles.  Journal of Real Estate Literature, forthcoming 2005.   
Malpezzi, Stephen, Gregory Chun and Richard Green.  New Place to Place Housing 
Price Indexes for U.S. Metropolitan Areas, and Their Determinants: An 
Application of Housing Indicators.  Real Estate Economics, 26(2), Summer 1998, 
pp. 235-75.   
Mayer, Christopher J. and C. Tsuriel Somerville.  Unifying Empirical and 
Theoretical Models of Housing Supply.  Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 
Working Paper, 1997.   
Mayo, Stephen K.  Sources of Inefficiency in Subsidized Housing Programs: A 
Comparison of U.S. and German Experience.  Journal of Urban Economics, 20, 
1986, pp. 229-49.   
Mayo, Stephen K. and Stephen Sheppard.  Housing Supply and the Effects of 
Stochastic Development Control.  Journal of Housing Economics, 10(2), June 
2001, pp. 109-28.   
Mayo, Stephen K., Shirley Mansfield, D. Warner and Richard Zwetchkenbaum.  
Housing Allowances and Other Rental Housing Programs: A Comparison Based on 
the Housing Allowance Demand Experiment, Part 1: Participation, Housing 
Consumption, Location and Satisfaction.  Abt Associates, 1980.   
Mayo, Stephen K., Shirley Mansfield, D. Warner and Richard Zwetchkenbaum.  
Housing Allowances and Other Rental Housing Programs: A Comparison Based on 
the Housing Allowance Demand Experiment, Part 2: Costs and Efficiency.  Abt 
Associates, 1980.   
Mera, Koichi and Bertrand Renaud.  Asia's Financial Crisis and the Role of Real Estate.  
M.E. Sharpe, 2000.   
Mills, Edwin S.  Government Urban Growth Controls.  Paper prepared for the 
Asian Real Estate Society and the American Real Estate and Urban 
Economics Association, Seoul, July 2002.   
Mitchell, J. Paul.  Federal Housing Policy and Programs: Past and Present.  New 
Brunswick, Center for Urban Policy Research, 1985.   
Monk, Sarah and Christine Whitehead.  Land Supply and Housing: A Case Study.  
Housing Studies, 11(3), July 1996, pp. 407-23.   
Muellbauer, John.  Anglo-German Differences in Housing Market Dynamics -- The 
Role of Institutions and Macro Economic Policy.  European Economic Review, 
36(2-3), 1992, pp.539-548.   
Muth, Richard F.  The Demand for Non-Farm Housing.  Arnold Harberger, The 
Demand for Durable Goods, University of Chicago Press, 1960.   
Muth, Richard F.  Public Housing: An Economic Evaluation.  American Enterprise 
Institute, 1973.   
 
CHAPTER 3-3  Low Income Housing Markets and Policy 
 
 
317
Myers, Robert.  The Bank's Approach to Subsidies.  World Bank, Country Policy 
Department, November 1986.   
Newman, Sandra J. and Ann B. Schnare.  Beyond Bricks and Mortar: Reexamining the 
Purpose and Effects of Housing Assistance.  Washington: Urban Institute Press, 
1992.   
O'Regan, Katherine and John M. Quigley.  Family Networks and Youth Access to 
Jobs.  Journal of Urban Economics, 34(2), September 1993, pp. 230-248.   
Olsen, Edgar O.  The Demand and Supply of Housing Services: A Critical Review 
of the Empirical Literature.  E.S. Mills (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urbna 
Economics, V. 2, Elsevier, 1987.   
Olsen, Edgar O.  Housing Programs for Low-Income Households.  University of 
Virginia, Department of Economics, Processed 2001.   
Olsen, Edgar O. and David M. Barton.  The Benefits and Costs of Public Housing in 
New York City.  Journal of Public Economics, 20, 1983, pp. 299-332.   
Ozanne, Larry and Raymond Struyk.  The Price Elasticity of Supply of Housing 
Services.  In L.S. Bourne and J.R. Hitchcock, Urban Housing Markets: Recent 
Directions in Research and Policy, University of Toronto Press, 1978, pp. 109-38.   
Peng, Ruijue and William C. Wheaton.  Effects of Restrictive Land Supply on 
Housing in Hong Kong: An Ecometric Analysis.  Journal of Housing Research, 
5(2), 1994, pp. 263-91.   
Phang, Sock-Young.  The Creation and Regulation of Housing Markets: Singapore's 
Experiences and Implications for Korea.  Paper presented to the Korea 
Development Institute's International Conference on "Residential Welfare 
and Housing Policies: The Experience and Future of Korea," Seoul, June 2005.   
Pogodzinski, J.M. and Tim R. Sass.  The Economic Theory of Zoning.  Land 
Economics, 66(3), 1990, pp. 294-314.   
Pollakowski, Henry O. and Susan M. Wachter.  The Effects of Land Use Constraints 
on Housing Prices.  Land Economics, 66(3), August 1990, pp. 315-24.   
Poterba, James M.  House Price Dynamics: The Role of Tax Policy and Demography.  
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 1991.   
Priemus, Hugo.  European Housing Policy: A Ten Points Program.  Paper presented 
to the European Network for Housing Research, Gavle, Sweden, June 2000.   
Quigley, John M. and Steven Raphael.  Is Housing Unaffordable? Why Is It Not 
More Affordable?  Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(1), 2004, pp. 191-214.   
Rawls, John.  A Theory of Justice.  Oxford University Press, 1971.   
Renaud, Bertrand.  The Financing of Social Housing in Integrating Financial 
Markets: A View from Developing Countries.  Urban Studies, 36(4), April 1999, 
pp. 755-74.   
Riddiough, Timothy J.  The Economic Consequences of Regulatory Taking Risk on 
Land Value and Development Activity.  Journal of Urban Economics, 41(1), 
January 1997, pp. 56-77.   
 
                          Residential Welfare and Housing Policies: The Experience and Future of Korea 
 
318
Rose, Louis A.  Urban Land Supply: Natural and Contrived Restrictions.  Journal of 
Urban Economics, 25, 1989, pp. 325045.   
Sa-Aadu, Jarjisu.  Another Look at the Economics of Demand Side Versus Supply 
Side Strategies in Low Income Housing.  AREUEA Journal, 12(4), 1984, pp. 
427-60.   
Samuelson, Paul A.  The Le Chatelier Principle in Linear Programming.  Rand 
Corporation, 1965.  Reprinted in J.E. Stiglitz (ed.), The Collected Scientific 
Papers of Paul A. Samuelson. MIT Press.   
Segal, David and Philip Srinivasan.  The Impact of Suburban Growth Restrictions 
on U.S. Housing Price Inflation, 1975-78.  Urban Geography, 6(1), 1985, pp. 14-
26.   
Shilling, James D., C.F. Sirmans and Krisandra A. Guidry.  The Impact of State 
Land-Use Controls on Residential Land Values.  Journal of Regional Science, 
31(1), 1991, pp. 83-92.   
Smith, Barton A.  The Supply of Urban Housing.  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
August 1976, pp. 389-405.   
Stover, Mark.  The Price Elasticity of Supply of Single Family Detached Housing.  
Journal of Urban Economics, 20, 1986, pp. 331-40.   
Struyk, Raymond.  Should Government Encourage Homeownership?  Urban Institute, 
1977.   
Susin, Scott.  Rent Vouchers and the Price of Low-Income Housing.  Journal of Public 
Economics, 83(1), 2002, pp. 109-52.   
Tcha, MoonJoong.  Determinants of Housing Prices and Policy Issues.  In 
MoonJoong Tcha (ed.), Analyses of Housing Markets and Related Policy Issues.  
Korean Development Institute Research Monograph, 2005.  (English 
summary, original in Korean).   
Tcha, MoonJoong (ed.).  Analyses of Housing Markets and Related Policy Issues.  Korea 
Development Institute Research Monograph (English summary of Korean 
original), 2005.   
Tcha, MoonJoong and Jay-young Son.  Overview: Issues in the Housing Market and 
Policy Studies.  In MoonJoong Tcha (ed.), Analyses of Housing Markets and 
Related Policy Issues.  Korean Development Institute Research Monograph, 
2005.  (English summary, original in Korean).   
Tcha, MoonJoong, Jay-young Son and Eui-Chul Chung.  Trends in Residential 
Environments and Long-Term Forecasts for Housing Demand.  In 
MoonJoong Tcha (ed.), Analyses of Housing Markets and Related Policy Issues.  
Korean Development Institute Research Monograph, 2005.  (English 
summary, original in Korean).   
Topel, Robert and Sherwin Rosen.  Housing Investment in the United States.  
Journal of Political Economy, 96(4), 1988, pp. 718-40.   
Turner, Bengt, and Stephen Malpezzi.  A Review of Empirical Evidence on the 
Costs and Benefits of Rent Control.  Swedish Economic Policy Review, 10, 2003, 
 
CHAPTER 3-3  Low Income Housing Markets and Policy 
 
 
319
pp. 11-56.   
Turner, Bengt and Christine M.E. Whitehead.  Reducing Housing Subsidy: Swedish 
Housing Policy in an International Context.  Urban Studies, 39(2), 2002, pp. 
201-17.   
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.  Housing in the Seventies: A 
Report of the National Housing Policy Review.  GPO, 1974.   
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.  Removing Regulatory Barriers 
to Affordable Housing: How States and Localities Are Moving Ahead.  By Carol 
Robbins and others of Aspens Systems Corp. for HUD Policy Development 
and Research, 1992.   
Van der Hiejden, Harry and Marietta Haffner.  Housing Subsidies (full title needed).  
Journal of Housing and the Build Environment, 15, 2000, pp. 71-92. 
Van Meurs, Arianna.  Public Land Development Agencies in Developing Countries: 
Elements of Financial and Managerial Appraisal.  World Bank, Urban 
Development Department Discussion Paper, 1986.   
Vranicar, John, Welford Sanders and David Mosena.  Streamlining Land Use 
Regulation: A Guidebook for Local Governments.  U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, 1980.   
Whitehead, Christine M.E.  Urban Housing Markets: Theory and Policy.  In Paul 
Chesire and Edwin S. Mills (eds.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics.  
Volume 3, Elsevier, 1999.   
Whitehead, Christine M.E.  The Economics of Social Housing.  In Tony O'Sullivan 
and Kenneth Gibb, Housing Economics and Public Policy.  Blackwell, 2003.   
Whitehead, Christine.  European Housing Systems: Similarities and Contrasts with 
Korea.  Paper presented to the Korea Development Institute's International 
Conference on "Residential Welfare and Housing Policies: The Experience 
and Future of Korea," Seoul, June 2005.   
Willis, K.G. and S.J. Cameron.  Costs and Benefits of Housing Subsidies in the 
Newcastle Area: A Comparison of Alternative Subsidy Definitions Across 
Tenure Sectors and Income Definitions.  In Duncan Maclennan and Kenneth 
Gibb (eds.), Housing Finance and Subsidies in Britain.  Avebury, 1993.   
Wood, Gavin A.  Housing Finance and Subsidy Systems in Australia.  Urban Studies, 
27(6), December 1990, pp. 809-20.   
Woodruff, Christopher.  Review of de Soto's 'The Mystery of Capital'.  Journal of 
Economic Literature, 29(4), 2001, pp. 1215-23.   
World Bank.  Housing:  Enabling Markets to Work.  World Bank Policy Paper, 1993.   
Yates, Judith and Christine Whitehead.  In Defence of Greater Agnosticism: A 
Response to Galster's 'Comparing Demand-Side and Supply-Side Housing 
Policies.  Housing Studies, 13(3), May 1998, pp. 415-23.   
Zearley, Thomas L.  Creating an Enabling Environment for Housing: Recent 
Reforms in Mexico.  Housing Policy Debate, 4(2), 1993, pp. 239-49.   
 
                          Residential Welfare and Housing Policies: The Experience and Future of Korea 
 
320
 
 
Figure 1 
 Demand Shocks with Inelastic Supply:  Boom and Bust 
Supply
Long Run
Demand Increases 
Demand
(original)
Medium Run
Supply
Rent (or 
Price) per 
P 1 Unit of 
Space 
P 0 
P 2 
Number of Housing Units Q0
 
 
CHAPTER 3-3  Low Income Housing Markets and Policy 
 
 
 
321
Figure 2 
Demand Shocks with Elastic Supply:  
Lower Price Shocks, Less Volatility 
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Figure 3 
Demand Shocks with Inelastic Supply,  
Followed by a “Million Houses Program” 
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Comments on “Low Income Housing Markets and Policy: 
Some International Perspectives, and Possible Lessons  
for Korea” 
Shinyoung Park 
(Housing and Urban Research Institute 
Korea National Housing Corporation)  
Professor Malpezzi's paper is comprised of 5 sections in addition to the 
introduction. Reading this paper is helpful for researchers in that it 
introduces many references related to housing economics and provides an 
understanding of the relationship between housing subsidy alternatives and 
supply conditions in the market.  
In section 2, "A Conceptual Framework for the analysis of Housing 
Subsides," what I found novel is that the effect of housing policy for low-
income families depends on the degree of elasticity of housing supply in 
each country's housing market. It is very important to understand that if the 
market is unresponsive, government subsidy programs could not result in 
consumer surpluses but result in an increase in housing prices. Prof. 
Malpezzis's figure 3 Demand Shocks with Inelastic Supply, followed 
by  "Million Houses Program" shows the relationship between a demand 
increase and program supply. His remark that a wide range of other 
potential external benefits have been mooted is appropriate. Therefore, the 
potential external benefits from housing subsidies – including  labor market 
effects and security of tenure will be good research topics.   
In the next section, "A Typology of Housing Subsidies, and Other 
Programs and Policies," the author indicates that bifurcated demand 
side/supply side programs can be more complicated than they seem by 
introducing examples of the Section 8 Existing Certificates in the US. It 
should be said that a rent subsidy would result in higher rents in Korea than 
the US due to a lack of housing stocks for low-income families in Korea.  
Prof. Malpezzi gives many examples to understand the effects of housing 
subsidies in Section 4. He introduces empirical studies on the production 
efficiency of US public housing that range from about 14 to 43 percent. If we 
could measure the production efficiency of Korean public housing, what 
would it be? It is necessary to consider whether the same method would be 
appropriate or not.     
In Section 5, "The Regulatory Environment and the Supply of Housing to 
Low Income Households," he repeats the strong relationship between the 
regulatory environment and housing real estate prices. According to his 
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paper, Korea is a country referred to as an extremely stringent regulatory 
environment that has a greatly inelasticized supply. If we could evaluate the 
effects of price controls of newly constructed housing for sale, it would be a 
good example of government intervention resulting in the inelasicity of 
housing supply.  
 
Questions  
1. In Korea, the success of housing redevelopment projects are evaluated 
based on how many residents living in as area where a project took place 
can continue to live because of their solidarity in the community. I think 
this is quite different from the spatial mismatch hypothesis described by 
Prof. Malpezzi. Do you believe that housing should be provided to 
residents not in areas where they have resided for a long period of time 
but in those in which they can get a job easily even though they would 
have to move?  
2. Don't you need to draw the long term supply line in Figure 3 showing the 
results of the Korean Million housing supply? Korean housing prices 
have been very stable owing to the two million housing projects until 
2001 when very low interest rates hit the Korean economy. Considering 
long term supply, Figure 3 seems a little exaggerated.  
3. In Chile, why did the government give a lump sum grant to buy housing? 
Did the Chilean government have sufficient sources of financing to 
support this system?  
 
 
  
PART  4 
Housing finance and Future Development  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4-1 
Korea Housing Finance Corporation’s Impact on the 
Korean Housing Finance Market 
by  
Kwan-young Kim 
1. Introduction 
The housing finance market in Korea has traditionally consisted of both 
public and private sectors. The public housing finance organizations 
includes the National Housing Fund and Housing Finance Credit Guarantee 
Fund, and the private housing finance institutions consist of commercial 
banks and insurance companies. In particular, before the financial crisis in 
1998 when the Korea Housing Bank was privatized1, public housing finance 
institutions accounted for more than 80 percent of the Korean housing 
finance market. Accordingly, the development of the housing finance 
market, in particular the private housing finance market, was much lagged 
behind.  
Since the financial crisis in 1998, banks and other financial institutions 
realized that the credit risk management is essential in facilitating mortgage 
loans in order to lower default risks. And they started to supply more 
mortgage loans. Since then mainly due to low interest rate, demand for 
mortgage loans has increased, which raises the share of housing loan 
balance quickly. In particular, housing related loans rapidly increased with 
short-term loans having 3-year or less maturities, instead of long-term loans 
found in traditional housing finances.  
                                            
1 After privatization, the Korea Housing Bank was merged into the Kookmin Bank in 1999. 
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In March 2004, the Korean Government established a new institution 
under the long-term housing finance market promotion policy, transferring 
the task of issuing Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) from privately-run 
Korea Mortgage Corporation (KoMoCo) to the publicly-run Korea Housing 
Finance Corporation. The Korea Housing Finance Corporation was 
established as a new public housing financial institution to introduce 
mortgage loans and develop the housing finance remarkably.  
The Korean housing finance market is dominated by short-term loans 
with low floating rates rather than traditional long-term housing finance 
loans. The amount of short-term mortgage loans rapidly increased, which 
can lead to instability in housing finance market in addition to not 
effectively supporting renters.  
In other words, short-term housing loans led to speculative housing 
demand relying upon the rise of housing price, creating instability in the 
housing market as well as finance market. As a result, the Government 
carefully considered long-term housing finance measures to address the 
inadequacies. In March 2004, the Government established the Korea 
Housing Finance Corporation by merging KoMoCo, and introduced long 
term financing method of mortgage loans in order to develop a long-term 
housing finance market and stabilize the housing market.  
The role of the Korea Housing Finance Corporation  (KHFC) was to 
change the housing finance market greatly by introducing a fixed rate 
mortgage loan system. The following objectives were sought:  
 At first, the development of a long-term housing finance market was 
expected to help stabilize not only the housing finance market but also the 
housing market. In other words, the Korea Housing Finance Corporation by 
introducing MBS will help to alleviate constraints caused by short-term 
financings in the commercial market. In addition, the development of a 
long-term housing finance market is believed to be able to increase the 
opportunity for middle-income households, so that they could buy their 
own home. These homebuyers would be able to make monthly repayments 
of the same principal and interest found in short-term financings for 20 
years while reducing the burden of having to pay the principals in a short 
period (3-years). In addition, repaying the principal and interest over 20-
years generally increases nominal income, which spreading the burden of 
principals and interests over a longer period.  
On the other hand, interest rates of long-term mortgage loans are likely 
to fall to 1~2% because of the income deduction scheme of the mortgage 
loan. Koreans took 10.8 years on average to purchase a home after getting 
married. KHFC's long-term mortgage loan program applied a LTV of 70% to 
allow most of households using Chonsei to buy a home at any time. The 
younger first-time home buyers are likely to purchase a home without their 
parent’s help within five years of getting married, which would increase the 
home ownership rate up to 64%, a level equivalent to advanced countries 
within the next five years. 
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 When Koreans buy their home easily by promoting long-term housing 
finance, they regard housing as an object for dwelling and enhance 
transparency of housing prices as well as transactions, which help to 
stabilize housing prices and to curb real estate speculation. In addition, long-
term housing finance is likely to help introduce a sales-on-completion 
system easily, with which the Government is planning to protect consumers 
and to curb speculation. To do so, the Government needs to develop the 
finance market so that a sales-on-completion system can be settled down 
and developers can operate stably by expanding long-term housing fund.  
This study examined feasibility of the Government's expectations in 
introducing the long-term housing finance and changes in the housing 
finance market due to the introduction of the long-term mortgage loan.  
2.  Changes and Analysis of Housing Finance Market 
2.1 Major Trends  
The size of the housing finance market in Korea is as follows: The 
National Housing Fund greatly increased immediately after the Financial 
Crisis in 1998, and has been relatively stable recently. Since 2000, however, 
mortgage loans rapidly increased.  
In particular, the volume of loans in the housing finance market greatly 
expanded because the Government-run loan programs were reformed by 
giving autonomy to the financial institutions, in other words, the system for 
providing funding adopted market functions. During the Financial Crisis in 
1998, financial institutions determined that the default risk in managing 
corporate loans was too great, consequently, commercial banks reduced 
their share of corporate loans and increased their share of consumer loans. 
This led to increased competition in the supply of mortgage loans.  
Based on the experience of foreign countries, the banks found that the 
consumer loan market offered more of an opportunity to produce profits 
than the corporate loan market, as well as, having a low arrear and being 
safer fund management. From 1999 to 2003, consumer loans have increased 
by more than 25% a year as shown in Table 1. In particular, consumer loans 
by banks increased by more than 40% on average during the same period, 
because the banks were competing against each other to expand the 
mortgage loan market.  
Not only the absolute level of consumer credits but also the importance 
of the consumer finance sector gradually increased, which led to consumer 
loans to reach half of all total loans at banks that relied on corporate loans in 
the past. Consumer loans took up less than 30% before the Financial Crisis 
in 1998 and increased 9% in 2001 and finally reached 47.2% in 2003, almost 
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equaling total corporate loans.  
<Table 1> Consumer Credit Trends1)  
(Unit: trillion won, %)  
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 Consumer loan 165.8  (-10.3) 
191.9  
(15.7) 
241.1  
(25.6) 
303.5  
(25.9) 
391.1  
(28.9) 
420.9 
(7.6) 
 Banks2) 52.9  (-10.4) 
76.3  
(44.2) 
107.2 
(40.5) 
156.7 
(46.1) 
222.0  
(41.7) 
253.8 
(14.3) 
 Savings3) 62.2  (-16.6) 
57.1  
(-8.2) 
50.4  
(-11.7) 
49.3  
(-2.2) 
54.9  
(11.4) 
68.3 
(24.4) 
 Insurance 
company4)
21.6  
(-16.0) 
23.5  
(8.8) 
27.1  
(15.3) 
32.6  
(20.3) 
38.7  
(18.7) 
42.9 
(10.9) 
Credit finance 
institution 5)
12.0  
(-23.1) 
16.2  
(35.0) 
33.6  
(107) 
43.7  
(30.1) 
57.1  
(30.7) 
37.3 
(-34.7) 
  
National Housing 
Fund, etc6)   
17.1  
(25.7) 
18.8  
(9.9) 
22.8  
(21.3) 
21.2  
(-7.0) 
18.3  
(-13.7) 
18.7 
(2.2) 
Sale credit7) 17.8  (-32.0)  
22.1  
(24.0) 
25.8  
(16.9) 
38.2  
(47.7) 
47.9  
(25.7) 
26.6 
(-44.5) 
Total of consumer 
credit  
183.6  
(-13.0) 
214.0  
(16.0) 
266.9  
(25.3) 
316.3  
(25.9) 
439.1  
(28.9) 
447.5 
(1.9) 
  Note: 1) Based on the balance at the end of each year  
       2) Including common banks and special banks.  
       3) Including bank trust, mutual finance, savings bank, Community Credit Cooperative, 
and postal office deposits, etc.  
       4) Including life insurance, insurance against loss, and postal office insurance, etc.  
       5) Including credit card company and installment banking, etc.  
       6) Including National Housing Fund and KoMoCo.  
       7) Including loan companies, department stores, automobile companies and home 
appliance companies, etc.  
       8) The figures in the parentheses indicate the increase ratio comparing with previous year.  
Source: The Bank of Korea's ｢Monthly Report of Survey and Statistics｣  
 
An explosive increase in consumer credit is related with housing finance 
market because a considerable part of consumer loans at banks is comprised 
of mortgage loans. Consumer loans in the form of housing mortgages 
increased from 47.8% at the end of 2001 to 59.3% at the end of 2002, and 
stood at 59.2% even at the end of 2003 when the proportion of consumer 
loans rapidly decreased due to credit crunch at the card companies (See 
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Table 2).  
Consumer credit, in particular, mortgage loans greatly increased since 
the banks were trying to secure collateral for loans rather than using a 
system of credit risk management on individuals and the households. As a 
result, consumers were able to easily supply collateral using real estate 
property such as housing and land, etc.  
<Table 2> Ratio of Mortgage Loan of Banks and Consumer Loan  
(Unit: %)  
Year and month 2000.12 2001.12 2002.12 2003.12 
Ratio of mortgage loan 47.8 53.3 59.3 59.2 
  Note: 1) Including commercial banks, special bank and foreign bank's branch.  
         2) Including consumer loan of bank account as well as trust account  
         3) Total of mortgage loan and housing loan of consumer loan of bank account  
Source: The Bank of Korea, Monthly Report of Statistical Data, each year  
 
At first, some of the mortgage loans had a considerably short maturity 
period of 3 to 5 years. Different from mortgages that allow payment on part 
of the principal and interests, however, the borrower of short-term mortgage 
loan pays only interests. The principal is not repaid until the loan matures. 
Unless a borrower delays repayment of interests, mortgage loans that 
mature are rolled over, similar to a long-term loan. The mortgage can offer 
debtors a call option for loan repayment, while the mortgage loan can give a 
debtor more risks than a bank. The mortgage loan may vary depending 
upon the type of housing. In general, LTV of the mortgage loan is known to 
be 60%.  
The banks increased mortgage loans with short-term maturities to 
shorten overall maturity, which allowed mortgage loans to be much more 
vulnerable to economic cycles and temporary credit crunches. The mortgage 
loan with a maturity of 3-years or less amounted 77% to worsen financial 
institutions depending upon economic changes in the future. Loans totaling 
24 trillion won at banks expired in 2003, while 30 trillion won worth of loans 
expired in 2004. Therefore, measures should be taken considering the high 
arrears ratio of mortgage loans.  
The arrears ratio of consumer loans gradually rose in accordance with 
the rapid increase of mortgage loans to reach 2.6% at the end of 2003 as 
shown in Table 3. Therefore, banks play a role in the provision of consumer 
loans despite of having less risk than corporate loan. Korean banks have 
great difficulty in taking action against risks in accordance with changes in 
asset value because of the short maturity of real estate loans.  
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<Table 3> Trends of Arrears Ratio of the Banks' Consumer loan  
(Unit: %)  
 End of 2000 End of 2001 2002 2003 
Arrears ratio 2.0 1.2 1.5 2.6 
Source: Financial Supervisory Service  
2.2 Changes of Housing Finance Market  
 Recently, the housing finance market has rapidly developed in terms of 
not only quality but also quantity to a point where the various demands of 
customers are satisfied and loan products with different interest calculations, 
repayment and maturity, can be developed and provided. The housing 
finance loans are not based on fixed interests but follow variable rates linked 
with market interest rates (90-days CD yields): And, the degree of interest 
adjustment varies from 3-months to 1-year, Also, various methods of loan 
repayment such as fully amortized payment, deferred payment, gradual 
payment and balloon payment, have been designed to satisfy customers' 
demand.  
The housing finance market was reformed based on borrower-oriented 
market to make change of features of the mortgage loan. The average loan 
period for households that secured housing finance from banks, was 12.1 
years as shown in Table 4. Long-term loans exceeding 10-years totaled 44.4%, 
while short-term loans less than 5-years totaled 28.5%. The average loan 
period for households with loans since 2000 was 10.5 years to be 2.4 years 
less than before: In particular, short-term loans less than 3-years was 24.7%, 
double than previous. This is due to the efforts of financial institutions to 
supply short-term mortgage loans combined with the consumers preference 
for short-term loans having low interest rates with a variable interest rate. 
On the other hand, since 2000, long-term loans with loan periods of more 
than 10-years decreased greatly, accounting 33.8%.  
The average LTV (Loan to Value) ratio of the households with housing 
loans from financial institutions accounted for 29.5%. The LTV of the 
households with loans after 2000 accounted for 32.5% increasing by 4.4% as 
shown in Table 5.  
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<Table 4> Loan Period of Housing Loan  
(Unit: year)  
Year (loan) Average 3-years or less 
3 years~ 
5 years 
5 years~ 
10 years 
More than 
10 years Total 
Before 2000 12.90 13.3 12.2 25.5 49.1 100 
After 2000 10.53 24.7 9.8 31.6 33.8 100 
Total 12.11 17.1 11.4 27.5 44.0 100 
Source: Kookmin Bank  
<Table 5> The LTV Distributions  
(Unit: %)  
Year 
(loan) Average ~20% 20~30% 30~40% 40~50% 50~60% 60~70% 70%~ Total 
Before 
2000 28.1 28.8 35.0 17.5 9.2 5.5 2.3 1.8 100 
After 
2000 32.5 27.0 25.9 18.1 10.3 8.9 6.0 3.9 100 
Total 29.5 28.2 32.0 17.7 9.6 6.6 3.5 2,5 100 
Source: Sohn Kyung-hwan (2003)  
 
The ratio of households with LTVs of more than 50%, which was above 
the normal level, was 12.6%. Since 2000, the ratio of the households with 
LTVs of more than 50% increased to 18.8%.   
2.3 Introduction of MBS  
In the past, the housing finance market was considered to be a supplier's 
market, however, after reform, it has become a consumer's market.  This 
enables the development of new funding sources such as the issuance of 
Mortgage Backed Securities(MBS). In Korea, immediately after the Financial 
Crisis in 1998, the Government introduced MBSs that was managed by 
KoMoCo in the initial stages. In March 2004, KoMoCo was reorganized, 
becoming KHFC, a government-funded organization, which took over the 
operation of MBSs.  
The MBS market is expected to provide very beneficial economic effects 
to all market participants, and KHFC is expected to play a role for the time 
being.  KHFC will provide homebuyers with long-term loans, which are 
free from balloon payments. This can allow financial institutions supplying 
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housing loans to address the problems of BIS capital ratio in order to 
overcome difficulties in the financial management of long-term loan.  
MBSs can give investors new financial products that provide risks 
different from stocks, securities and other financial assets, which further 
expand the range of investment opportunities and help in the management 
of risk. In terms of the overall national economy, the MBS market is likely to 
help stabilize the long-term bond market by replacing the underdeveloped 
long-term government bond market.  
3. Introduction and Features of Long-term Mortgage Loan 
In March 2004, the Korea Housing Finance Corporation was founded to 
reform the housing finance market in Korea. KoMoCo, which first oversaw 
mortgage backed securities in Korea, issued MBS several times to establish a 
base for the development of a secondary housing finance market. However, 
KoMoCo could not overcome many difficulties. For instance, the banks' 
enough financial ability, limitations of private financial institution, and 
insufficient market cognition, KoMoCo was not able to securitize new 
mortgages but only existing mortgages held by the National Housing Fund. 
To overcome the inadequacies of KoMoCo, the Government established the 
Korea Housing Finance Corporation to be able to issue MBSs similar to the 
US system and other advanced countries of long-term mortgage loans.  
The Korea Housing Finance Corporation (KHFC) was founded to 
develop a MBS market by actively buying new mortgage loans immediately 
rather than securitizing existing mortgage loans. In 2004, six months 
after KHFC was founded, 2 trillion and 205.6 billion Won of long-term 
mortgage loan were supplied. KHFC was able to develop long-term 
mortgage loans due to several factors including higher income deduction of 
interests on long-term housing loans, alleviated LTV limitations, MBS swaps 
and other incentives, etc.  
Table 6 shows the trend for long-term mortgage loans. Since April 2004, 
KHFC supplied more than 300 billion Won of loans every month, based on 
loan disbursement amount. Of course, this amounts to less than 30% of the 
mortgage loan provided by commercial banks. Even if mortgage loans have 
greatly decreased recently due to a slow housing economy, the provision of 
long-term mortgage loans has been better than mortgage loans, reinforcing 
its position at market.  
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<Table 6> Sales Record of Mortgage Loan Each Month  
(Unit: million won, number of case)  
Classifications 2004.3 2004.4 2004.5 2004.6 2004.7 2004.8 2004.9 Total 
Amount 35,111 363,364 456,445 393,769 335,758 331,792 289,381 2,205,620
Number of case 453 5,357 6,493 5,662 4,861 4,787 4,245 31,858
Number of 
business day 5 20 19 22 22 22 19 129
Average 
amount a day 7,022 18,168 24,023 17,899 15,262 15,081 15,231 17,098
Average 
number of case 
a day 
91 268 342 257 221 218 223 247
Source: Korea Housing Finance Corporation  
 
Table 7 - Table 17 decomposes the assets of KHFC mortgage loans which 
were issued three times by KHFC. For instance, Table 7 shows that 70% of 
the loans were supplied at an interest rate of 6.7%, about 1% higher on 
average than mortgage loans. However, the interest rate was 0.8% lower 
than the 7.51% average interest rate that was applied to loans that had a 
maturity of more than 10-years in accordance with the 2002 survey 
conducted by the Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements. The 
introduction of long-term mortgage loans by KHFC could be regarded as 
contributing to lowering the interest rate of long-term mortgage loans to a 
certain degree.  
The average loan amount was 69,530,000 Won, and the proportion of 
loans that amounted to more than 100 million Won was 36.2%, much higher 
than the amount per loan supplied by the National Housing Fund as shown 
in Table 8. In other words, KHFC provided mortgage loans that were able to 
actually help homebuyers. Table 9 shows the grace period for loan 
repayment. Borrowers were given the option of selecting a grace period: 
48% of the borrowers selected a grace period, while 52% did not. The 
borrowers selecting a grace period were more than half, which was higher 
than expected, indicating that home buyers still felt a great deal of burden in 
repaying the loan. Indeed, the proportion of households selecting a grace 
period was higher with households receiving a loan greater than 100 million 
Won.  
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<Table 7> Interest Rates of Mortgage Loans  
(Unit: number of case, 100 million Won)  
Classifications Number of case Amount Ratio 
6.7 14,553 10,453 69.8% 
6.6 4,511 2,841 19.0% 
6.5 2,482 1,687 11.3% 
Total 21,546 14,981 100.0% 
Source: Korea Housing Finance Corporation  
<Table 8> Principals of Mortgage Loan  
(Unit: number of case, 100 million Won)  
Classifications  Number of case Amount Ratio 
More than 150 million Won ~  
200 million Won or less  1,165 2,054 13.7% 
More than 100 million Won ~ 
150 million Won or less  2,713 3,376 22.5% 
More than 50 million Won ~  
100 million Won or less 8,659 6,317 42.2% 
50 million Won or less 9,009 3,234 21.6% 
Total  21,546 14,981 100.0% 
Source: Korea Housing Finance Corporation  
<Table 9> Grace Period of Mortgage Loan                         
(Unit: number of case, 100 million Won)  
Classifications Number of case Amount Ratio 
Existence 9,642 7,194 48.0% 
Non-existence 11,904 7,787 52.0% 
Total 21,546 14,981 100.0% 
Source: Korea Housing Finance Corporation  
 
Table 11 displays the borrowers by age, where borrowers 30-39 years old 
totaled 50.6% and borrowers 40-49 years old was 33.4%, which comprised 
the largest age groups. The proportion of borrowers in their thirties 
accounted for more than 50%, indicating that borrowers in their thirties 
were first time home buyers. In addition, the Metropolitan Area accounted 
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for 67.8% of loans, where Seoul accounted for 23.9%, 36.9% for Gyeonggi 
and 7.0% for Incheon. However, long-term mortgage loans for housing were 
not provided in other regions, indicating that the housing market in the 
Metropolitan Area took precedence.  
<Table 10> Ages of Mortgage Loan Borrowers  
(Unit: number of case, 100 million Won)  
Classifications Number of case Amount Ratio 
60 years old~ 228 157 1.0% 
50~59 1,729 1,280 8.5% 
40~49 6,652 4,998 33.4% 
30~39 11,224 7,587 50.6% 
20~29 1,713 959 6.4% 
Total 21,546 14,981 100.0% 
Source: Korea Housing Finance Corporation  
<Table 11> Trends of Mortgage Loan Sales by Region                                
(Unit: number of case, 100 million Won)  
Classifications Number of case Amount Ratio 
Seoul 3,704 3,585 23.9% 
Incheon 1,596 1,044 7.0% 
Daejeon 834 571 3.8% 
Gwangju 902 372 2.5% 
Daegu 836 493 3.3% 
Ulsan 624 292 2.0% 
Busan 1,993 1,248 8.3% 
Gyeonggi 6,887 5,528 36.9% 
Chungbuk 495 220 1.5% 
Chungnam 488 261 1.7% 
Jeonbuk 624 257 1.7% 
Jeonnam 372 128 0.9% 
Gangwon 357 148 1.0% 
Gyeongbuk 495 203 1.4% 
Gyeongnam 1,261 594 4.0% 
Jeju 78 36 0.2% 
Total 21,546 14,981 100.0% 
Source: Korea Housing Finance Corporation  
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Table 12 shows the income distribution of borrowers. The borrowers that 
earned 30 million Won or less a year totaled 52.9% and borrowers that 
earned 40 million Won or less a year was 71.5%. The annual income level of 
borrowers was a little lower than the Government’s target income level 
when KHFC was first established. In other words, most long-term mortgage 
loan borrowers could be classified into the income group as given by the 
National Housing Fund. This may retard the development of the Korean 
housing finance market, as housing finance programs could not establish 
complimentary relationships which were an objective of the Government.  
<Table 12> Borrowers by Income Group  
(Unit: number of case, 100 million Won)  
Classifications  Number of case Amount Ratio 
More than 60 million Won ~  1,073  1,198 8.0% 
More than 50 million Won ~ 
60 million Won or less   1,151  1,110  7.4% 
More than 40 million Won ~  
50 million Won or less 2,348  1,966  13.1% 
More than 30 million Won ~  
40 million Won or less 3,872  2,786  18.6% 
More than 20 million Won ~  
30 million Won or less 5,002  3,109  20.8% 
More than 10 million Won ~  
20 million Won or less  5,084  2,923  19.5% 
10 million Won or less 3,016  1,888  12.6% 
Total  21,546  14,981  100.0% 
Source: Korea Housing Finance Corporation  
 
Table 13. shows loan conditions. The proportion of LTV more than 50% 
but less than 70% was 87.7%, indicating that borrowers preferred long-term 
mortgage loans because of their higher LTV than existing mortgage loans. 
The 2002 research by the Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements 
showed that loans with LTV of more than 50% accounted for no more than 
18.8% and the average LTV was 29.5%.  
Also, 86.6% of the borrowers selected loans with a 20-year. On the other 
hand, 25.5% of the borrowers selected loans with lump sum payments, 
consequently, many borrowers preferred fully amortized repayments, 
indicating that mortgage loans helped standardize long-term housing 
finance products.  
43.5% of borrowers bought houses between 100 million Won and 200 
million Won.  Further, the proportion of houses that were 100 million Won 
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or less totaled 27.6% and 22.7% for houses between 200 million Won and 300 
million Won, therefore, 93.8% of house purchases were 300 million Won or 
less. Also, 96.1% of the borrowers bought apartment.  
KHFC's long-term mortgage loans were found to have different features 
from existing housing loans. First, the introduction of mortgage loans has 
extended loan period of housing loan. Despite existing long-term loans, 
mortgage loans had lower interest rates than existing long-term loans to 
reduce the interest rate spread between housing loan products. The LTV 
rose more than 50% to help home buyers reduce their financial burden and 
reform the housing finance market, while a 30% limit on DTI helped 
minimized default risks. 
<Table 13> Mortgage Loan LTV  
(Unit: number of case, 100 million Won)  
Classifications  Number of case Amount Ratio 
More than 60% ~70% or less  9,505 6,907 46.1% 
More than 50% ~ 60% or less  8,352 6,232 41.6% 
More than 40% ~ 50% or less  1,794 1,002 6.7% 
More than 30% ~ 40% or less  898 464 3.1% 
More than 20% ~ 30% or less  577 258 1.7% 
More than 10% ~ 20% or less  330 101 0.7% 
10% or less  90 17 0.1% 
Total  21,546 14,981 100.0% 
Source : Korea Housing Finance Corporation  
4. Prospect and Policy Suggestions of the Housing Finance 
Market 
4.1 The Benefits of Developed Housing Finance  
The purchase of a house that satisfies basic rights of people for housing, 
requires a sum that is several times annual income, consequently, home 
buyers are forced to rely on loans. As a result, financing plays an important 
role in home buying. Considering the importance of housing market 
stability, in many countries the government usually intervenes in the 
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housing finance market. The same principle applies to Korea as well. In the 
past, the Government used the National Housing Fund to provide financial 
assistance for homebuyers. Different from advanced countries, which 
already had established a good housing finance system, Korea had 
inefficient housing finance system before the Financial Crisis in 1998. The 
financial institutions were not able to address the financial problems 
systematically enough to mobilize funds for housing. In the 2000's, the 
commercial banks found that mortgage loans secured by collateral or assets 
presented less of a default risk than corporate loans, so they went on to 
actively participate in the housing finance market. The banks, however, 
were forced to provide housing financing using short-term mortgage loans 
rather than long-term mortgage loans with fully amortized repayments, 
because the secondary housing finance market was not developed enough 
to handle fluctuations in interest rates.  
The banks rapidly increased housing loans by providing short-term 
loans to meet the demand for housing financing and to promote the housing 
market since 2000. This led to an expansion in housings occupied by owners 
greatly. However, the rapid expansion of short-term mortgage loans 
threatened the stability of Korea’s economy. As we saw during the Great 
Depression in the U.S., short-term housing loans may cause a rapid rise in 
housing prices, creating a price bubble. When the price bubble bursts, a 
considerable number of housing loans may become insolvent, whereby 
increasing the amount of non-performing assets at financial institutions, 
which in turn, can lead to another crisis.    
KHFC introduced mortgage loans to reform the housing finance market 
fundamentally. KHFC has taken the lead in the provision of long-term 
housing finance and has provided renters with the means to buy homes by 
raising the LTV, and is selling loan asset at the time of loan disbursement to 
remove interest rate risks of mortgage lenders. This is expected to finally 
expand the housing finance market.  
The housing finance market can increase the use of mortgage loans with 
long maturities to greatly reduce the potential risks faced by the financial 
institutions of stagnation in the real estate market. Furthermore, mortgage 
loans can stabilize the housing market to reduce not only rapid fluctuations 
in housing prices but also real estate speculation remarkably.  
In the USA and other advanced countries, mortgage loans and MBSs 
help to stabilize the housing market. In the USA, the Great Depression led to 
the introduction of fully amortized repayments with long-term fixed 
interests to stabilize the housing market. Also MBSs were used, to smooth 
fluctuations in the housing market greatly by increasing, since the latter half 
of the 1980's (Renaud, 2003). Renaud argues that the fundamental housing 
finance market was newly constructed as funding was injected into the 
finance market through MBSs and both lenders and borrowers accepted 
strict conditions required by the capital market. Better risk management 
techniques were commonly applied to housing finance institutions, home 
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developers and home buyers, etc, and housing and housing finance related 
information were disclosed to reduce variation in the housing market 
remarkably and to improve market disciplines in the housing market and 
housing finance market.  
In most market economies, housing investment took a leading role in the 
economy. The business fluctuation in the housing sector may impact a 
country’s economy. Furthermore, the housing sector may fluctuate greatly 
due to the underdeveloped housing finance market, which would lead to 
more problems.  
In other words, when long-term loans for housing finance are not 
developed, the housing market responds with rapid increases in housing 
prices during booms and sudden drops during sluggish periods, which in 
turn leads to vast amounts of bad debt and financial crisis.  
Korea is known to be facing such a situation. For instance, housing prices 
have increased periodically, which threatened to jeopardize stability not 
only in the housing market but also Korea’s economy. Therefore, the 
housing finance market should be based on long-term loans to stabilize the 
housing market. The MBS market can expand long-term loans in the 
housing finance market, consequently. The development of MBS is believed 
to be the most important initiative in the housing finance area.  
4.2 Expansion of Mortgage Loan  
 Until the end of October 2004 after the KHFC was established, mortgage 
loans amounted to 2.55 trillion Won (36,909 cases in total). The financial 
institutions competitively develop their own mortgage products, however, it 
has limitations in attracting a stable inflow of capital into the housing 
finance market, as they are not securitized rather they are owned by the 
financial institutions.  
The related intuitional framework must be developed to expand the 
provision of mortgage loans. For example, the removal of limits on loans can 
be considered as a way to increase the supple of mortgage loans. In this case, 
the financial supervisory authority should take supplementary actions to 
improve mortgage loan related management standards.  
In addition, the banks, insurance companies, and other financial firms 
are likely to compete and cooperate with KHFC, since there will be 
increased pressure to expand mortgage loans. Private financial institutions 
supplying mortgage loans had to sell them at low commissions to meet the 
low interest rate when mortgage products were introduced by KHFC. 
Hence, their commissions should be raised to a level that reflects actual 
conditions. New mortgage loans and short-term mortgage loans should be 
converted into long-term mortgage loans by KHFC to provide incentives. 
This would work to stabilize the financial system and housing finance 
market can introduce new fund.  
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4.3 Promotion of MBS Market  
The MBS market can promote MBS investment that would help lower 
mortgage loan rates, consequently, expanding the housing finance market 
steadily. The MBS market, however, has not developed fully because of 
small-scaled issuance of MBSs in terms of maturity, call options, and 
insufficient material on early repayment.  
The MBS market can be promoted in the following ways: In the short-run, 
the issuance of MBSs should be standardized. While from point of view of 
long-term, KHFC's MBS should be supported to be as a very long-term 
benchmark bond. At present, there is no benchmark bond of 10-years or 
longer because the longest maturity of a government bond stands at 10-
years. The MBS bond can function as benchmark bond that is longer than 
10-years or more, which would allow the KHFC to increase securitization to 
develop the bond market greatly.  
Both KoMoCo and KHFC have issued various MBS with different 
maturities. In addition, the securities varied by subordinated bond, credit 
enhancement and call options, depending on the time they were issued to 
have limitation on product standardization and market promotion.  
Firstly, standard Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMO) and a Pass 
Through system should be introduced. Also, the Master Trust needs to be 
lengthened and to standardize securitization pool to establish a MBS issue 
system. In addition, an information system needs to be established to 
facilitate early repayment and promote the MBS market. Also, the 
government bond dealer system should be linked to the benchmark bond 
on-the-counter transaction system to make MBS a very long-term 
benchmark bond.  
Secondly, systems need to be improved to lift restrictions on MBS 
investment. In other words, restrictions on MBS investment by pension 
funds should be eased, and MBSs and government bonds and public bond 
fund need to be introduced, and mortgage loan-MBS swap program should 
be promoted in accordance with the new BIS system. At introduction of the 
new BIS system, it is possible to reduce the risk weight of MBSs lower than 
housing loans. Therefore, it is required to activate mortgage securitization 
(otherwise, swap program of both mortgage loan and MBS) as a way to 
decrease the risk weight of loans by the banks.   
4.4 Establishing a Mortgage Bank  
To stabilize the mortgage loan market and enhance efficiency, the 
following need to be implemented including, effective management of 
existing organizations, construction of new business channels and business 
diversification. In addition to banks and insurance companies, a new 
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financial institution such as a mortgage bank needs to be established that 
only supplies mortgages. In advanced countries, home buyers always make 
use of mortgage loans to buy houses, therefore, mortgage banks and brokers, 
which serve important functions, need to be promoted to create distribution 
channels for mortgage loans.  
Therefore, either a mortgage company or mortgage bank should be 
created to supply mortgage loans. In addition, a mortgage broker should be 
utilized to provide advice to homebuyers by recommending the most 
suitable housing finance methods among a variety of loan products. In the 
USA, more than half of home buyers facilitate mortgages through mortgage 
brokers, who offer origination, loan services and other mortgage related 
services outsourcing at sales of mortgage. In 2003, in the UK, mortgage 
intermediaries faciliated 53% of new mortgages, which amounted to 
￡115.9 billion. In doing so, mortgage brokers can expand the mortgage 
market by increasing efficiency.  
4.5 Introduction of Mortgage Insurance  
Lenders need a system to alleviate mortgage risks and to enhance 
stability in the mortgage market. To promote the development of the 
mortgage market, a risk management system needs to be implemented for 
mortgage banks. Some countries have introduced mortgage insurance, a 
typical risk control, to manage credit risks at financial institutions. In the 
USA and other advanced countries where the mortgage market has taken 
off, public mortgage insurance play an important role.  
Mortgage insurance and guarantees can reduce instability in the housing 
finance market to develop secondary mortgage market. And, low- and 
middle-income households can be given more home buying opportunities. 
Expanding the housing finance can contribute to growth of the housing 
market, but can also contribute to increasing risk in the housing finance 
market: The secondary mortgage market linked with capital market is 
expected to impact the business cycle, giving way to possible adverse effects. 
The insurance and guarantees on housing loans can reduce risks associated 
with fluctuations in the financial market and alleviate market instability.  
Enhancing credit on housing loans may help to stabilize the housing 
market for low-income households. The financial institutions can be allowed 
to provide financial assistance within a certain limit of LTV. The limits on 
loans should be controlled because the burden of repayment may exceed the 
ability to repay if the limits are increased too much, since the increase of 
loans and price fluctuations in the housing market in Korea are higher than 
that of foreign countries. The protecting small key money deposits can also 
reduce the limit on loans.5) However, a considerable number of low-and 
middle-income households need financial assistance above the limit on 
loans and some households are in need from the perspective of a housing 
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welfare policy.  
Borrowers may get additional loans amounting to about 20% of the 
house price by using mortgage guarantees and mortgage insurance: For 
borrowers who have the ability to make repayments, the limit on LTV can 
be raised up to 70∼80%. The mortgage guarantee and mortgage insurance 
can effectively support borrowers who need financial assistance above the 
limit on loans or public housing loans.  
At first, from a policy standpoint, the loan more than a certain level of 
LTV shall supply credit guarantee. In the USA, the extra 80% of LTV 
requires either a guarantee or insurance subscription. In the Korean housing 
loan market, the limit on LTV where there is no risk is thought to be about 
60%. Therefore, loans exceeding 60% should have a guarantee.  
5. Conclusion 
The use of mortgage loans in the housing finance market is aimed at 
raising the ability of low-income househoulds to purchase homes, as well as, 
middle income households by raising the LTV. In addition, extending the 
loan period can alleviate the household’s financial burden of repaying loans, 
which would increase demand for home buying.  
The housing market and housing finance market are expected to be 
integrated as the housing finance market and mortgage market are activated. 
This should bring about the enhancement of transparency and effectiveness 
in the housing market.  
The study investigated current conditions of Korean housing finance 
market after introduction of mortgage loans. The study also examined four 
ways of expanding the house finance market: increasing the supply of 
mortgage loans, promoting the MBS market, establishing mortgage banks 
and introducing mortgage insurance. These policy measures are likely to 
promote the housing finance market and improve residential stability for 
low- and middle-income households.  
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Comments on “Korea Housing Finance Corporation's 
Impact on the Korean Housing Finance Market” 
Lee, Joong-hee 
(Korea Housing Finance Corporation) 
 It is my great honor to participate in the international seminar on 
“Residential Welfare and Housing Policies.” I would like to express my 
sincere thanks for KDI’s invitation and Dr. Kim’s presentation. Dr. Kim’s 
paper is sure to be a valuable addition to the business of my company, the 
Korea Housing Finance Corporation (KHFC).  
1. General Comments 
My general ideas are almost the same as those of Dr. Kim. And I believe 
that Dr. Kim’s research is timely and pertinent to the current Korean 
housing finance market and employs accurate empirical methodologies.  
One year after the business inauguration of KHFC, which was founded 
for the formation and development of the long-term housing finance market, 
it is an adequate time for the evaluation of KHFC’s accomplishments. 
Further, for sustainable development, KHFC needs to closely examine its 
business structures and future plans.  
Dr. Kim’s research features major changes in the Korean Housing 
Finance Market after the Currency Crisis and its contents are well organized. 
Also, the key characteristics of the KHFC long-term mortgage loan are well 
analyzed. Dr. Kim’s policy suggestions provide KHFC with good future 
directions. And I believe that KHFC needs to examine his suggestions in 
detail and take proper measures in consideration of market conditions. 
2. Comments in Detail.   
Section 2 (Changes and Analysis of the Housing Finance Market)  
Ratio of Consumer Loans by Maturity   
Dr. Kim provides <Table 4> and <Table 5> to show that the average loan 
period of mortgages are shortening. As <Table 5> is not an average of total 
mortgages in Korea but the survey results, the table below released by the 
Financial Supervisory Commission would be a better choice for the 
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explanation of an increase in short-term consumer loans and the ratio of 
consumer loans by maturity.  
<Ratio of Consumer Loans by Maturity (based on Outstanding Balances) > 
                                                                                                       (Unit: %)  
  End of 2001 End of 2002 End of 2003 
1-year or less 21.2 18.7 27.7 
1 year ∼3 years or less 52.8 62.6 50.0 
3 years∼5 years or less 7.6 6.3 9.1 
More than 5 years 18.4 12.4 13.1 
      Source: Financial Supervisory Commission  
Section 3 (Introduction and Features of Long-term Mortgage Loans)  
Evaluation of the accomplishments of the Korea Mortgage Corporation 
(KoMoCo)  
The Korean government founded KoMoCo to introduce the MBS system 
in 1999 with private investors such as domestic banks, the IFC and Merrill 
Lynch. Nonetheless, KoMoCo failed to boost the MBS market due to 
unfavorable market conditions and legal systems. Additionally, as it did not 
obtain public confidence in the bond market owing to the small amount of 
equity capital and passive government equity participation, its business was 
transferred to the government owned KHFC. 
Although KoMoCo could not overcome its obstacles, it contributed to the 
Korean bond markets by training MBS professionals and building 
infrastructure and eventually transferring its business know-how to KHFC. 
Without KoMoCo’s endeavors and experience, KHFC could not be 
rewarded. I believe that KoMoCo’s operational period was not ‘of any use,’ 
but  rather ‘fruitful’ for the preparation for the new era of the MBS market. 
 
Evaluation of KHFC Mortgage Loans 
Before the foundation of KHFC, most short-term mortgages were 
variable.  KHFC introduced ‘long-term, fixed-rate, level-payment, amortizing 
and securitization-purposed mortgage loans’ and it has boosted the long-
term housing finance market. 
According to the Bank of Korea, the market share of long-term 
mortgages with maturities of more than 10 years was 8.2% in the 4th quarter 
in 2003, and increased to 41.7% in the 4th quarter 2004.  This implies that as 
KHFC introduces its long-term mortgage products, commercial banks will 
begin to compete with one another in the long-term mortgage market.  
 
Borrowers of KHFC Mortgage Loans 
The Korean government publicly announced that the main goal of the 
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establishment of KHFC was to assist middle income citizens to purchase 
homes. Although the definition of middle income citizens is not fixed, one of 
the most outstanding research institutes, Samsung Economic Research 
Institute, defines middle income citizens as those who make 50∼150% of the 
median income.  As a result, target consumers of KHFC’s mortgage loans 
are households with an annual income of KRW 17 ~ 50 million because the 
average annual income per urban household in 2004 released by the Korea 
National Statistical Office was KRW 33 million.  
 
Dr. Kim analyses the fact that the annual income level of borrowers was 
a little lower than the government’s target income level may retard the 
development of the Korean housing finance market. But I believe that KHFC 
will meet the original government’s target income levels. 
<Income Comparison between Urban Households and KHFC Mortgage 
Borrowers>  
(Unit: KRW thousand)  
 Average 1
st 
quintile 
2nd 
quintile 
3rd 
quintile 
4th 
quintile 
5th 
quintile 
Monthly 
Income 2,805.5 777.3 1,734.7 2,454.0 3,348.0 5,712.5 Urban 
Households Annual 
Income 33,666 9,328 20,816 29,448 40,176 68,546 
Annual 
Income 29,480 
Less 
than 
10,000 
10,000~ 
20,000 
20,000~ 
30,000 
30,000~ 
40,000 
40,000~ 
50,000 
More 
than 
50,000 
Percentage 
(%) 100.0 12.6 19.5 20.8 18.6 13.1 15.4 
Mortgage 
Loan  
Borrowers 
Cumulated
% - 12.6 32.1 52.9 71.5 84.6 100.0 
        
Section 4 (Prospects and Policy Suggestions of the Housing Finance Market)  
Expansion of Mortgage Loans 
Currently, although KHFC is providing mortgage loans without serious 
obstacles, its business channel is not elaborately established.  To steadily 
expand market share, KHFC plans to take steps to diversify its current 
business channels.   
 
Promotion of a secondary MBS Market  
The promotion of the MBS market and the increased market liquidity of 
MBS products would help lower mortgage loan rates.  The lower mortgage 
rate would increase the sales volume of mortgage loans.  Taking market 
conditions and the legal environments into consideration, KHFC is planning 
to consistently and continuously promote the MBS market. 
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Introduction of Mortgage Company/Mortgage Bank/Mortgage Insurance 
The Law on Credit-Specialized Financial Business is to be reformed for 
the purpose of the establishment of financial institutions that specialize in 
the mortgage sector such as mortgage companies/mortgage banks in the 
United States. And in the mid-to-long term, the mortgage broker/mortgage 
insurance system is necessary in the Korean housing finance market. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4-2 
Customizing Mortgage Performance Models:   
A Case of Mortgage Curtailment 
By 
Che-Chun Lin and Tyler T. Yang*
Abstract 
Mortgage securitization has gained its recognition as an alternative 
funding channel and as a risk management tool in the emerging market. 
While mortgage performance, i.e., prepayment and default rates, models 
have been thoroughly studied, similar research based on Asian mortgages 
are relatively rare. This paper studies the impact of mortgage curtailment 
behaviors on the subsequent default and prepayment performance. 
Although curtailment is not a popular event in the western countries, it is 
the dominant form of prepayment in Asia and other high saving rate 
regions. Using a sample of loan-level mortgage performance records from 
Taiwan, the results of the multinomial logit regressions indicate that 
curtailment is one of the most significant factors in predicting future default 
and prepayment probabilities of a seasoned mortgage pool. Mortgages with 
past curtailment are estimated to be 85 percent less likely to default and 23 
percent more likely to prepay during the remaining life than a mortgage 
without any curtailment. Hence, ignorance of past curtailment records could 
lead to biased projection of default and prepayment and, hence, the pricing 
and hedging of a seasoned mortgage-backed security. As a result, we 
conclude that building mortgage performance models that are customized 
to the specific local markets is critical for accurate pricing and hedging 
under the Korean secondary mortgage market. 
 
Key words: Mortgage; Curtailment; Default; Prepayment; Multinomial Logit Regression 
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1. Introduction 
Mortgage curtailment refers to the event that a borrower makes a larger 
than scheduled periodical mortgage payment. The extra amount paid will 
be used to reduce the UPB of the mortgage. Although curtailment may not 
be a popular event among the western countries, it is recognized as the 
dominant form of prepayment in some regions with high saving rates, such 
as the Asian markets. In those countries, when a household receives extra 
income, such as a year-end bonus, partially repaying the outstanding debts 
is always a high priority alternative way of using the money. This behavior 
is consistent with the high savings rate observed in these regions. As the 
mortgage market in those regions matures and becomes more competitive, 
there is an increasing need to understand the impact of curtailment. 
Mortgage termination behavior models are critical components of 
pricing and hedging mortgage-backed securities. There are well-developed 
prepayment and default models based on US and European mortgages. 
However, we content that those models could not accurately capture the 
mortgage performance in the Asian markets. In this paper, we demonstrate 
the importance of customizing mortgage performance models to local data 
by focusing on the curtailment, or partial prepayment, behavior that is 
widely observed among Asian borrowers. 
Relative to the extensive academic literature on complete prepayments, 
the curtailment literature is limited. There are only four papers that 
document curtailment studies. Most literature focuses on the estimation of 
the probability of a curtailment to occur. Hayre and Lauterbach (1991) are 
the first to discuss the curtailment behavior and its unique features. To 
capture this effect, they add an average constant dollar amount each month 
in the prepayment model. However, they did not provide a detailed 
discussion of either the theoretical or empirical model underlying the 
curtailment behavior. Chinloy (1993) proposes a theoretical mortgage 
curtailment model based on consumer wealth maximization behavior and 
empirically tested the model using GNMA data. He clearly points out the 
difference between complete prepayment and curtailment, “In termination, 
the loan disappears from a pool, and the scheduled payment to investors in 
the pool is reduced. In curtailment, the loan survives, and the scheduled 
payment is unchanged but term is reduced.”  As a result, Chinloy contends 
that the pricing results at loan level on mortgage-related derivates would be 
biased if a full prepayment and curtailments were not specified separately.  
Budinger and Fan (1995) study the impact of curtailments on “jumbo 
loans”. Their results show that curtailments reflect a small portion of the 
total amount prepaid in the early life of the mortgage, but can be a material 
contributor to prepayments as the pool ages. Abrahams (1997) discusses 
curtailments on prepayment modeling by formulating curtailments as a 
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function of loan age. Fu (1997) provides an empirical analysis of the 
mortgage curtailment to extract expected correlates of the curtailment 
decision and concludes that previous curtailment is strongly predictive of 
future curtailment behavior. 
This paper differs from the previous literature in that we examine the 
mortgage curtailment by focusing on the fact that the curtailment history 
should also provide valuable information about the future default behavior 
and the complete prepayment behavior of a MBS. By incorporating the 
curtailment records, one should be able to more accurately estimate the cash 
flows and the fair market value of a MBS or a pool of whole loans. The 
information provided by curtailment history is an important indicator of the 
heteroschadasticity among borrowers that is otherwise unobservable. 1   
Using a loan level monthly transaction data set, we estimated the impact of 
past curtailment behavior on future mortgage performance. The results of 
the multinomial logit regressions indicate that the curtailment history has 
very strong predicting power over the future default and prepayment rates. 
The impact is sometimes even stronger than that of the more closely 
monitored delinquent history. This finding suggests that the secondary 
mortgage market should consider including curtailment history as an 
important disclosing element to allow the traders or the insurers/guarantors 
to price more efficiently. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces 
the hypotheses regarding the impact of curtailment on future default and 
prepayment. The third section presents the sample data and the econometric 
model applied in the empirical analysis. The fourth section reports and 
interprets the regression results and discusses their implications. The last 
section concludes our study. 
2. Curtailment and Mortgage Performance 
A mortgage loan is a debt contract that is secured by a real property. The 
borrower obtains a loan at origination and promises to repay at a fixed 
amortization schedule. At each point in time during the amortization period, 
the borrower has the right to choose among four payment actions: 
scheduled payment, complete prepayment, default, and curtailment. Much 
of the literature in mortgage finance considers a mortgage contract 
embedded with default (put) and prepayment (call) options for 
mortgagors.2 Default means that the borrower exercises the put option by 
selling the collateralized house to the lenders at the price equal to the unpaid 
principal balance (UPB) of the mortgage loan. The prepayment option gives 
                                                 
1 Many researchers, such as Stanton (1996) and Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2001), use 
advanced statistics tools to explain the heteroschadastic behavior among mortgage borrowers. 
2  For example, Kau et. al (1995), Buist, Megbolugbe, and Yang (1998). 
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the borrower the right to buy the loan back from the lender at the price 
equal to the UPB. The distinct difference is the fact that default only happens 
at the payment due dates, while a partial or complete prepayment can take 
place at any time before the maturity date. 
The past delinquency history of the pool or similar loans is a key 
indicator of the future default risk. Pools with a high past delinquency rate 
are likely to experience high future default rates. As a result, the investor 
would require a higher return for pools with high delinquency records. 
When securitizing a seasoned pool of mortgages, an issuer would usually 
exclude loans with past delinquency records in order to realize a good sales 
price. 
2.1 Background 
Prepayment is the most striking feature of conforming residential MBS. 
With the government insurance or the guarantee by some government-
sponsored housing enterprises such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
investors in conforming MBS are free from default risk. Thus, 
understanding and accurately estimating prepayment is the key to 
successfully pricing a MBS. Typically, a residential mortgage borrower has 
the right to partially or in full prepay the mortgage loan prior to its maturity 
without penalty. 
Prepayment in full is usually a result of the due-on-sale clause or 
triggered by refinancing. Most households in the western countries tend to 
have tenure in a house much shorter than the mortgage maturity term. 
Whenever a house is sold and the mortgage contains a due-on-sale clause, 
the remaining balance of the mortgage loan becomes due in full. Due-on-
sale driven prepayment is usually realized as a result of job relocation, 
change of household size, or change of household income. There is relatively 
little correlation associated with this type of prepayment among households. 
On the other hand, the refinancing driven prepayment can be highly 
correlated among all households in a country. Refinancing usually occurs 
when the market interest rate drops significantly below the interest rate on 
the existing mortgage. The borrower can apply for a new mortgage at the 
lower market rate and use new loan amount to pay off the old mortgage 
loan. In the US market, the interest rate decreased from almost twenty 
percent in the early 1980’s to less than six percent in the 2000’s. Several large 
size refinance waves were realized during that period. During those periods, 
many investors lost money due to the failure of understanding the power of 
refinancing. 
During the beginning of the 21st century, a refinancing boom occurred 
even when the market interest rate rise. Those incidences are later 
recognized as the cash-out refinancing. The US housing market appreciated 
significantly during the 1990’s. With the same collateral house and the same 
loan-to-value ratio limitation, a household can afford to borrow more 
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money for other purposes, such as debt-consolidation. By increasing the size 
of the mortgage loan, the household can use the proceeds to pay off other 
debt of higher interest rates, such as credit cards. As a result, the 
prepayment models used by institutional investors are further refined to 
capture such a phenomenon. 
Although default is not a relevant risk to conforming MBS investors, it is 
a significant risk to investors of the private label MBSs and to the mortgage 
insurance and guarantee providers. Default usually occurs when the value 
of the underlying house drops below the unpaid principal balance (UPB). 
When default occurs, the lender receives the collateral house instead of the 
promised cash flows. As a result, in addition to the early retirement of the 
cash flows, like the prepayment condition, the default sensitive investors 
also suffer from loss of principal recovery. Although some lenders do not go 
after the borrowers’ personal properties with deficient judgment, a typical 
borrower does not default simply because the house price decreases. Most 
mortgage defaults are triggered by two events: a borrower’s income shock, 
making it difficult to continue the scheduled mortgage payments, and the 
decrease of the value of the house, making prepayment by selling the house 
not feasible.3
Numerous research studies have been published during the past three 
decades trying to explain and predict prepayment and default rate of 
mortgages and MBSs. 4  In the mortgage industry, some of the best 
econometricians have developed proprietary prepayment and default 
forecast models to support the trading in MBSs, which is now the single 
largest security type in the world. Typically, the prepayment and default 
rates are estimated based on four categories of explanatory variables: 
information related to the borrower, to the collateral property, to the loan 
contract features, and to the past performance of the loan. The first category 
includes payment-to-income ratio, job stability, credit history, etc. The 
second category includes loan-to-value ratio, geographic location, property 
condition, etc. The third category includes amortization term, interest rate 
adjustment feature, etc. The last and newest category variables are more 
difficult to capture and are only relevant to analyze seasoned mortgages. 
Some examples are burnout, delinquency status, and history. These 
variables require more comprehensive data regarding individual actual 
historical payments of a mortgage or a pool. Nevertheless, these variables 
tend to be very effective in explaining termination behaviors that previous 
models fail to capture. 
In this paper, we argue that curtailment history of a seasoned mortgage 
should serve as valuable information in predicting future prepayment 
default terminations. 
                                                 
3  See Buist, Megbolugbe, and Yang (1998). 
4  See Calhoun and Deng (2001) for a review. 
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2.2 Information Conveyed in Curtailment 
According to Chinloy (1993), a borrower’s behavior of prepay, default, 
curtail, and delinquent are direct results of the personal utility maximization 
choices. As a result, the outcome of a particular mortgage’s performance 
reveals important information about the borrower’s saving/consumption 
habits, income stability, true wealth, and other characteristics that are not 
observable or measurable by the mortgage lender. When complete 
prepayment or default happens, the mortgage loan terminates. Although 
important information about the borrower may be revealed from such an 
event, there is no way to continue business to take advantage of this 
information. Curtailment and delinquency also provide the additional 
information about the borrower’s utility function. More importantly, since 
the mortgage loan will continue to exist after the event, the information 
obtained can serve as important indicators of the future performance of the 
particular mortgage loan. The impact of delinquency is quite intuitive and 
has received vast attention in the industry. However, the potential impact of 
curtailment has not been carefully studied. Most mortgage investors do not 
keep or use such information for business decisions. 
One direct result of curtailment is that the UPB of the loan decreases 
faster than the amortization schedule. Other things being equal, curtailment 
makes the updated loan-to-value ratio (LTV) lower. In addition, since the 
UPB is smaller, if the borrower continues the original scheduled periodical 
payment amount, the speed of UPB amortization will run at much faster 
rate, making the effective maturity term shorter. As the LTV ratio reduces, 
the probability of default in the future will naturally decrease. 
In addition to the direct impact of the lower updated (or current) LTV, 
the borrower’s curtailment behavior also provides otherwise unobservable 
characteristics of the borrower. First, the fact that the borrower is able to 
afford the extra payment is an indication that the borrower has income 
capacity in excess the minimum-underwriting requirement. This excess debt 
coverage capacity has implications to both default and prepayment risks. With 
higher than minimum repayment capacity, the borrower is able to absorb a 
temporarily reduction of income or loss of employment. Compared to their 
counterparts, borrowers that curtail should have lower default risk, after 
netting the current LTV effect. On the other hand, the excess debt coverage 
capacity also suggests that the borrower can easily obtain an alternative 
mortgage on the market. When market interest rates decline, these 
borrowers are more likely to take advantage of the opportunity to refinance 
the existing mortgage. 
Second, the fact that the borrower is willing to save the extra income by 
reducing the outstanding debt indicates the household’s utility of relief from 
debt is higher than that of additional consumption. If a household used 
excess cash flow to partially prepay the mortgage in the past, it is likely to 
do it again in the future. This habit will cause the effective life of the 
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mortgage to be short, which is an undesirable feature by some MBS 
investors, especially the servicers.  
Third, curtailment could indicate that the borrower is less likely to face 
income fluctuation. Liquidity is particularly important to a household with 
high-income volatility. By parking the excess money in a liquid asset, such 
as stocks or money market accounts, the household retains the immediate 
access to the cash when experiencing income difficulties. If the excess cash is 
used to partially payoff the mortgage debt, the household has to go through 
the trouble of cash-out refinancing to regain the immediate control of the 
money. Such a process would require transaction costs and could take a 
period of time longer than the household can afford. Therefore, the income 
stability of borrowers that curtail is likely to be better than their counterparts, 
such as the self-employed borrowers. With the higher income stability, the 
in ability to pay (default) is less likely to occur, making the overall default 
risk lower. 
2.3 The Hypotheses 
Based on the above rationales, we contented that the curtailment history 
provides valuable information in predicting subsequent prepayment and 
default probabilities. In particular, borrowers that curtailed in the past tend 
to experience lower default rate and higher prepayment rate for the 
remaining life of the mortgage. To verify these hypotheses and to measure 
the potential size of such impacts, we conducted an empirical research using 
a loan-level monthly payment record sample from a commercial bank in 
Taiwan, where curtailment is frequently observed. 
3. The Empirical Evidence 
3.1 The Model 
With the loan-level performance information, we are able to adopt the 
multinomial logit regression model to capture the competing risk nature of 
the mortgage contracts. Quarterly conditional default and prepayment rates 
are estimated with the multinominal logit model introduced by Calhoun 
and Deng (2001). The multinomial logit model takes the form of: 
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where πD(t), πP(t), and πA(t) are the single period default, prepayment, 
and active rates conditional on the loan being outstanding at the beginning 
of time period t. The explanatory variables XD(t) and XP(t) are associated 
with a particular loan during the exposure period t, and αD, αP, βD, βP are 
constant coefficients estimated by the regression. 
This equation system captures the competing risk nature of the three 
possible outcomes of a mortgage at any point in time. As the conditional 
probability of default rises, the denominator of equations (2) and (3) 
increases, making the conditional prepayment and active rates lower. 
Similarly, as the conditional prepayment rate rises, the denominator of 
equations (1) and (3) increases, causing the conditional default and active 
rates to drop. It also ensures that the sum of the three possibilities equals one, 
making the three outcomes mutually exclusive. 
With the loan level quarterly performance data, we first estimate the 
coefficients using standard explanatory variables without incorporating the 
information of curtailment. Then the same regressions were estimated by 
adding the additional curtailment information observed at the end of 
different mortgage age. That is: 
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Note that equations (4) to (6) differ from equations (1) to (3) only by the 
additional term of Curtail(τ) multiplied by the regression coefficient, where 
Curtail(τ) represents the cumulative curtailment occurred up to age τ. 
The multinomial logit regression results of equations (4) to (6) enable us 
to derive two levels of knowledge about the curtailment impact on 
subsequent default or prepayment. First, the statistical and economical 
significance of the coefficients γ’s can provide direct evidence in supporting 
or rejecting our hypotheses. Second, by observing the magnitudes and 
significance of the estimated γ’s, we can understand the impacts of 
curtailment to the subsequent prepayment and default with respect to the 
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characteristics of a loan. 
Because curtailment information is only available for seasoned loans, the 
above analysis is performed for loans with age greater than 0. Since the 
sample contains loan performance up to 26 quarters, we chose to repeat the 
above analysis conditional on the curtail information of age being equal to 2, 
4, 8, and 12 quarters. This allows for at least 14 quarters of subsequent 
performance observations. Comparing the significance of the coefficients of 
curtailment information of loans with different seasoning, we are able to tell 
if the effectiveness of the curtailment information increases or decreases 
with the age of the mortgage. 
With the same research setting, we can also test for the effectiveness of 
using past delinquency information to differentiate loan performance. As 
mentioned earlier, the secondary mortgage industry always request past 
delinquency information when purchasing or insuring a seasoned mortgage 
pool. With this comparison, we would be able to quantify the effectiveness 
of this information. As a result, the final models being estimated are 
equations (1) to (3) and equations (7) to (9) below. 
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3.2 The Data 
This section describes technical details of econometric model utilized to 
test the hypotheses introduced earlier. In order to achieve reliable statistic 
results, a mortgage performance with high curtailment frequency is 
necessary. As a result, the sample data are extracted from a commercial 
bank in Taiwan. 
The sample includes 46,440 loans originated between 1992 and 2003. 
However, complete electronic payment records are only available starting in 
January 1997. To avoid any sample bias caused by censoring problem, loans 
originated prior to 1997 are removed from the database. This criterion 
excluded 5,546 loans from the sample. Loans with features outside of the 
reasonable ranges may be involved in non-standard lending situation. To 
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avoid the potential bias of such non-standard terms, an additional 17,539 
loans are excluded based on the following criteria: loan size greater than 
NT$50,000,000 or less than NT$100,000; initial interest rate greater than 13 
percent or less than 2 percent; loan term greater than 30 years or less than 7 
years; interest-only loans; and loans with missing origination dates. 
Because of the loan size limitations of some government subsidized loan 
programs, it is a common practice that a borrower takes out more than one 
mortgage loans toward the purchase of more expensive housing. For these 
loans collateralized by the same property, they always prepay and default 
on the same date. As a result, they should be combined and viewed as one 
single large loan by the borrower. This loan consolidation process further 
reduces the sample size by 5,710, leaving 17,645 loans in the final sample. 
Among these loans, 269 or 1.5 percent loans defaulted and 9,280 or 52.6 
percent loans were prepaid during the sample period. At age equal to 4 
quarters, 3,289 loans were under delinquent and 2,427 loans had previously 
been curtailed. For each loan in the final sample, quarterly performance 
records are constructed based on the monthly payment information. For 
each quarter prior to the maturity and the termination date of a mortgage, 
one observation is created. The dependent variable of each observation is set 
to be active, defaulted, or completely prepaid depending if default or 
complete prepayment is observed during one of the three months in the 
quarter. A total of 224, 853 quarterly loan-level performance observations 
are constructed by the 17,645 loans. These observations are used in the 
multinomial logit regression. 
3.3 Sample Variables 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the sample. Like most 
countries in Asia, mortgage loans in Taiwan are predominantly adjustable 
rate mortgages (ARMs) with no annual or life rate caps. The typical term to 
maturity is 20 years with self-amortization. Each of the explanatory 
variables is described in detail below. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - Sample Used for Estimation 
Explanatory Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Cltv 0.693987 0.021025 0.481717 0.790388 
Relative payment ratio 0.968427 0.073165 0.497059 1.411624 
Relative contract rate 1.159342 0.189823 0.506446 2.032491 
Relative loan size 1.262424 0.917989 0.036552 20.79369 
Exp_yr02_q1 0.205214 0.403859 0 1 
Spring 0.26154 0.439474 0 1 
Summer 0.241207 0.427816 0 1 
Fall 0.249861 0.432933 0 1 
Winter 0.247393 0.431498 0 1 
Term15 0.146287 0.353394 0 1 
Term20 0.662686 0.472794 0 1 
Term30 0.191027 0.393111 0 1 
Age 8.104139 6.161939 0 25 
1. Cltv: time-varying current loan-to-value ratios, updated with Taiwan quarterly house price 
index assuming original LTV is 70 percent for each loan in the pool 
2. Relative payment ratio: the ratio of mortgage payment amount at the end of each quarter 
over the payment amount at origination 
3. Relative contract rate: the ratio of the original contract rate relative to the average for loans 
originated during the same origination year 
4. Relative loan size: the ratio of the original loan amount relative to the average-sized loan 
originated during the same origination year 
5. Exposure_yr02_q1: a variable to account for exposure year and quarter post to quarter 1, year 2002 
6. Seasonality: spring, summer, fall, and winter 
7. Term: maturity of loan 
8. Age: age of loan in quarters 
9. Agesquare: square of age of loan in quarters 
Curtailment 
Curtailment is defined as any amount paid in excess of the scheduled 
monthly payment and these partial payments will be used toward the 
reduction of the unpaid principal balance of the loan. For monthly payment 
transactions, the data only record actual monthly payments and thus 
scheduled payments must be inferred from the amortization schedule. To 
capture the curtailment behavior, we define the cumulated curtailment 
variable as the cumulated actual payment amounts divided by the 
cumulated scheduled payment amounts at the age of the loan in quarters. 
Since most of the loans are adjustable rates, the scheduled payment for each 
quarter is computed using the current UPB and the interest rate for that 
quarter. The actual payment amount is computed by the sum of the 
principal and interest amount paid during the three months of the quarter. 
A curtailment ratio of greater than one indicates that cumulative 
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curtailment is observed for the quarter. A curtailment ratio of less than one 
indicates that the loan has been previously delinquent. A ratio equal to one 
means the loan is actively following the scheduled payments. To avoid a 
rounding error effect, discrete ranges of the curtailment or delinquency are 
used in creating corresponding dummy variables to capture the effect of the 
curtailment. Five dummy variables are included: serious delinquent (ratio < 
0.50), delinquent (0.50 < ratio < 0.95), normal (0.95 < ratio < 1.05), 
curtailment (1.05 < ratio < 2), serious curtailment (2 < ratio). We anticipate 
that curtailment should be positively related to prepayment but negatively 
related with default. Contrarily, delinquency is expected to be positively 
related to default but negatively related to prepayment. 
Current loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) 
In recognition of the impact of the trend of house prices on loan default 
and prepayment probabilities, we update each loan record with quarterly 
Taiwan House Price Indices to arrive at current loan-to-value-ratios. 
According to the general underwriting rule among all Taiwan banks, the 
down payment must be at least 30 percent of the value of the collateralized 
property. Due to lack of information on collateralized property values at 
mortgage origination, we assume the original loan-to-value ratio to be 70 
percent for each loan record in our study. Then this ratio is updated with 
current UPB and the house value is updated by the nationwide house price 
for each performance quarter. Higher values of CLTV could be attributed to 
house price depreciation, all else being equal. 
Following the option theory and previous empirical literature, a 
borrower with a high CLTV is more likely to default because there is a 
greater likelihood that the borrower is in a negative equity position. 
Meanwhile, with a high CLTV, a borrower is less likely to prepay in that 
insufficient property value to qualify for a refinancing opportunity. Thus, 
the coefficient of the CLTV is expected to be positive in the default function 
and negative in the prepayment function. 
Relative payment to income ratio 
Loans included in our sample data are mostly ARMs, which means the 
payment amount could change over time. Since there are no annual or 
lifetime rate adjustment caps, these mortgages are basically free from rate 
refinancing risk. However, due to the interest rate adjustments, ARMs are 
subject to potential payment shocks. When payment shock happens, if the 
borrower’s income does not increase as fast, the borrower may not have the 
ability to pay and this would lead to default. To capture the payment shock 
effect, a relative payment to income ratio variable is created as the updated 
scheduled payment amount divided by the scheduled payment amount at 
the mortgage origination. This ratio measures the payment shock faced by 
the borrower. 
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A relative payment factor with value greater than one indicates a higher 
payment burden compared to the original payment, which implies a higher 
probability of default. Similarly, prepayment is likely to increase when the 
relative payment burden is lower than origination because the relative 
household’s ability to pay an extra amount in addition to scheduled 
mortgage payment becomes strong. 
Relative contract rate 
The credit quality of the individual borrower has a material impact on 
both default and prepayment rates. Unfortunately, there is no explicit 
information within our sample data to exactly delineate the credit quality of 
the loan records. However, the relative contract rate variable, defined as the 
contract rate at origination relative to the average rates of all loans 
originated during the same time period, can serve as a proxy to capture the 
credit quality of the loan. Typically, the borrower with worse credit quality 
would be charged a higher interest rate than other borrowers under the 
same market condition. 
As higher relative initial interest rate implies poor credit quality, higher 
default rate is expected, making the expected coefficient of the default 
function to be positive. Meanwhile, as those borrowers originally penalized 
by high interest rate may improve their credit records over time, they may 
also be able to refinance into mortgages with lower credit risk premium. 
Such a phenomenon is widely observed among sub-prime borrowers in the 
US mortgage market. As a result, the coefficient of the relative contract rate 
variable is also expected to be also positive in the prepayment function. 
  Relative loan size 
Comparing the original loan amount with the average-sized loan 
originated during the same origination year identifies relative loan size 
variable. There are two imperative measures implied by this variable. It can 
be viewed as a proxy to measure the relative income level of individual 
borrower. Higher income borrowers can qualify for a larger loan size, based 
on the maximum payment to income ratio allowed by the lender. It can also 
be viewed as a proxy to measure the relative value of the house. Larger 
loans are usually associated with more expensive houses on the market, 
based on the maximum loan to value ratio constraint. 
In the US residential market, the relative loan size variable is found to 
have a U-shaped effect on default. That is, default probability is high for 
both the largest and the smallest loans, but low for loans in the middle range. 
It would be interesting to learn if the same pattern can be found in a very 
different financial market of different consumption and borrowing culture. 
 Loan term 
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The loan term is categorized into 15-year, 20-year, and 30-year maturity. 
Loan term has a direct impact on a loan’s default and prepayment risks. 
Typically, loans with shorter maturity are less risky than longer maturity 
loans since principal tends to be amortized quicker, making default less 
likely to occur. Meanwhile, borrowers with excess payment capability 
and/or strong preference of quickly repaying debts are more likely to self-
select into the shorter-term mortgages, further making the default risk lower. 
Likewise, we expect that a borrower anticipating a change of residence or 
prepayment in the very near future will be more likely to take advantage of 
lower initial rates associated with a loan of shorter maturity. 
Thus, the coefficient of the 15-year dummy variable is expected to be 
negative in the default function and positive in the prepayment function. 
However, only the most favorable customers of a bank are allowed to 
originate mortgages of maturity longer than 20 years. The default risk of 
these preferred customers is usually very low. Thus, the coefficient of the 30-
year dummy is expected to be negatively related to the default and be 
positively related to the prepayment. 
Exposure quarter market rates 
Prior to the first quarter of 2002, Taiwan’s ARMs were indexed to the 
bank’s prime rate, which is not transparent and is heavily controlled by the 
bank. A different type of ARMs, whose coupon rates adjust periodically 
with the public underlying index, was introduced to the market during the 
first quarter of 2002. Due to its more transparent and stable, the new index 
based product became very popular. Many borrowers chose to refinance 
into the new product, making the overall prepayment rate high after the first 
quarter of 2002. A dummy variable is included to capture this market 
regime shift. 
Seasonality 
In recognition of the impact of seasonal patterns on mortgage 
terminations, we have included a set of dummy variables to account for the 
current season of the year for each quarterly performance observation. To 
accurately capture the season effect that matches the Taiwan weather 
pattern: Spring is defined as from March to May, Summer is from June to 
August, Fall is from September to November, and Winter is from December 
to February. 
Mortgage age 
For each observation, the age of the mortgage is measured in number of 
quarters from the origination date. Both age and the square of age are 
included in the regression to allow for a quadratic relationship between 
mortgage age and the conditional prepayment and default rates.         
 
Residential Welfare and Housing Policies: The Experience and Future of Korea 364
4. The Results and Applications 
Table 2 and Table 3 report the multinomial logit coefficients estimated 
from the quarterly conditional probabilities of default and prepayment. 
Table 2: Multinominal Logit Parameter Estimates for Subsequent 
Quarterly Conditional Probabilities of Default 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Quarter 0 Quarter 4 Quarter 8 Quarter 12 
Cltv 22.30905 
7.05 
21.410483 
6.63 
23.707036 
6.76 
24.736428 
6.17 
relative payment ratio 11.13695 
14.19 
11.091041 
13.64 
11.536372 
13.44 
11.820198 
12.09 
relative contract rate 1.835935 
4.16 
1.4354154 
3.26 
1.0469454 
2.25 
0.9890567 
1.85 
relative loan size 0.269138 
5.59 
0.2976787 
6.16 
0.3527844 
6.78 
0.367496 
5.03 
exp_yr02_q1 1.262873 
6.08 
1.2499617 
5.75 
1.3183071 
5.6 
1.5725903 
5.79 
term20 -0.02473 
-0.13 
0.0586641 
0.3 
-0.030235 
-0.15 
0.0163568 
0.07 
term30 -0.3198 
-1.55 
-0.22447 
-1.07 
-0.299066 
-1.37 
-0.1025913 
-0.45 
Summer -0.2097 
-1.12 
-0.118025 
-0.62 
-0.139245 
-0.67 
-0.1464318 
-0.63 
Fall -0.30887 
-1.71 
-0.224009 
-1.21 
-0.155178 
-0.8 
-0.2255703 
-1.02 
Winter 0.208742 
1.33 
0.2852627 
1.78 
0.286178 
1.68 
0.2702516 
1.43 
Age 0.288889 
6.2 
0.2539701 
3.9 
0.4039769 
3.52 
0.4481511 
1.94 
Age square -0.00343 
-1.98 
-0.002115 
-0.95 
-0.006439 
-1.84 
-0.0072104 
-1.13 
0.05<cum_delin<= 0.50  0.6882586 
2.67 
0.9492671 
3.89 
0.9958295 
4.01 
0.50<cum_delin< 0.95  1.0628098 
4.65 
1.1682536 
6.04 
1.6820666 
9.33 
1.05<cum_curtail<=2  0.8641299 
2.37 
-0.231204 
-0.51 
-0.1388122 
-0.33 
Cum_curtail>2  -1.673352 
-4.34 
-1.696715 
-4.66 
-1.3983335 
-3.77 
Constant -38.6652 
-16.25 
-37.47184 
-14.86 
-40.3824 
-13.43 
-42.34389 
-10.39 
Statistics 
N - (number of observations) 
chi2 - (likelihood-ratio chi2) 
r2_p - (pseudo R2) 
  
224853 
12837.98 
0.157583 
  
158144 
6962.7406 
 0.1223244 
   
106890 
5380.8005 
 0.1214396 
   
65257 
3699.7389 
 0.1181807 
Notes. The t-values are displayed below the estimated coefficients. The values in the Quarter 0 
column are the estimates obtained from the model without accounting for cumulated historical 
curtailment and delinquency experiences. The values under the Quarter 4, Quarter 8, and 
Quarter 12 are the estimates obtained from the model with historical cumulated curtailment 
and delinquency experiences included.  
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Table 3: Multinominal Logit Parameter Estimates for Subsequent 
Quarterly Conditional Probabilities of Prepayment 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Quarter 0 Quarter 4 Quarter 8 Quarter 12 
Cltv 18.91772 
31.43 
9.809399 
13.71 
5.2302792 
6.71 
-0.855131 
-0.91 
relative payment ratio 1.074856 
6.32 
-1.11568 
-6.04 
-1.978945 
-9.75 
-2.948848 
-12.19 
relative contract rate 0.694699 
10.92 
1.424264 
17.44 
1.1378259 
12.63 
1.179379 
11.02 
relative loan size 0.16538 
17.5 
0.086011 
6.12 
0.0867395 
5.12 
0.088599 
4.12 
Exp_yr02_q1 1.264556 
36.69 
0.805073 
18.21 
0.8568912 
17.99 
0.759429 
14.28 
Term20 -0.371 
-11.79 
-0.11508 
-2.92 
-0.011718 
-0.27 
0.100581 
1.99 
Term30 -0.60437 
-15.67 
-0.34615 
-7.8 
-0.258558 
-5.39 
-0.137024 
-2.56 
Summer -0.41543 
-15.09 
-0.30813 
-9.24 
-0.347002 
-9.32 
-0.436179 
-9.95 
Fall -1.12292 
-34.18 
-0.91379 
-23.42 
-1.007026 
-22.63 
-1.156837 
-21.44 
Winter -1.46133 
-40.74 
-1.13061 
-28.03 
-1.235521 
-26.99 
-1.40076 
-25.53 
Age 0.010209 
1.71 
0.087277 
7 
0.0372389 
1.57 
0.258113 
5.01 
Age square -3.2E-05 
-0.12 
-0.00129 
-2.87 
0.0004164 
0.56 
-0.004403 
-3.06 
0.05<cum_delin<= 0.50  -0.54497 
-5.02 
-0.424744 
-3.8 
-0.234534 
-2.53 
0.50<cum_delin< 0.95  -0.10575 
-1.27 
-0.011067 
-0.14 
-0.030736 
-0.39 
1.05<cum_curtail<=2  0.215699 
2.21 
0.1092717 
1.36 
0.125449 
1.64 
Cum_curtail>2  0.398796 
11.68 
0.4825 
13.7 
0.519113 
12.64 
Constant -18.1296 
-37.1 
-11.3787 
-19.1 
-6.836681 
-9.83 
-4.117104 
-4.29 
Statistics 
N - (number of observations) 
Chi2 - (likelihood-ratio chi2) 
r2_p - (pseudo R2) 
 
224853 
12837.98 
0.157583 
  
 158144 
6962.7406 
0.1223244 
   
106890 
5380.8005 
0.1214396 
   
65257 
3699.7389 
0.1181807 
Notes. The t-values are displayed below the estimated coefficients. The values in the Quarter 0 
column are the estimates obtained from the model without accounting for cumulated historical 
curtailment and delinquency experiences. The values under the Quarter 4, Quarter 8, and Quarter 12 
are the estimates obtained from the model with historical cumulated curtailment and delinquency 
experiences included. 
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The results show that the CLTV ratio is positively related to both default 
and prepayment rates. The positive relationship with default is consistent 
with the expectation that borrowers will be more likely to default on their 
mortgages in declining housing markets. Quite interestingly, Table 3 shows 
that the Taiwan data demonstrates a relationship between CLTV and 
prepayment that is opposite to prior prepayment studies of mortgages with 
US data 5 .  One possible reason could be attributed to the “accelerate 
amortization clause” popular to Taiwan mortgage contracts, which forces 
the borrowers to repay their debt obligation by selling the property when 
the loan becomes 180 days delinquent. Therefore, the loans with extremely 
high CLTV are most likely to experience delinquency and be forced to 
completely prepay. 
Examining the impact of the relative payment ratio on mortgage 
termination rates, we find that the estimated coefficients are significantly 
positive in the default function and significantly negative in the prepayment 
function. This indicates that the probability of default of an ARM would rise 
when the borrower experiences payment shock due to the rising interest rate. 
On the other hand, the decrease of payment burden from the original 
payment to income ratio allows the same borrower to qualify for a larger 
loan amount with the same income level, suggesting cash out refinancing is 
more likely to occur with a lower payment to income ratio. 
Relative interest rate is a proxy that captures the credit quality of the loan. 
A loan to a borrower of poor credit quality is usually charged a higher 
interest rate than other loans originated at the same time. The empirical 
results show that default and prepayment are positively related to the 
relative interest rate variable. The fact is that the borrowers who have 
impaired credit histories are prevented from qualifying for lower interest 
rate loans, thereby making default more likely to occur. On the other hand, 
as these borrowers could gradually improve their credit quality through 
time. A few years later, they could be qualified for mortgages of lower 
interest rate. This is similar to the high early prepayment rates observed in 
the US subprime mortgage market. 
The relative loan size effect has a significant impact on prepayment rates. 
From Table 3, larger loans tend to experience slightly faster prepayment. 
This could be due to the fact that the larger loans are often associated with 
borrowers with higher income, making refinancing or a cash-out refinance 
more possible. One interesting finding is that the default rate is higher for 
larger loans. With the same initial LTVs, the larger loans are likely to be 
collateralized by more expensive houses. Housing is very expensive in 
Taiwan relative to the average household income. Very limited households 
can afford the most expensive housing, making the high price housing 
market illiquid. When borrowers of these expensive properties face income 
difficulty, they could liquidate the house to avoid default on the mortgage 
                                                 
5  See Bennet et al. (2000) and Archer et al. (1997) 
 
CHAPTER 4-2 Customizing Mortgage Performance Models 
 
367
loan. However, with few potential buyers, they are usually unable to sell the 
house at the full potential value. Instead, a large liquidity premium would 
be lost. If the highest offering price falls below the unpaid balance of the 
loan, the borrower would be forced to default. The most expensive 
properties on the market tends to be illiquid and could suffer the most from 
such quick sale necessity, making the default rates higher than the 
mortgages collateralized by average quality properties. Similar results are 
also found in the US jumbo mortgage market. 
In Taiwan, owner occupied residential loans usually have a term 
between 15 and 20 years. For non-owner occupied (investor) mortgages, the 
terms are limited to be 10 years or shorter. On the long end, only the most 
favorable customers of a bank could obtain a loan of maturity longer than 20 
years. These borrowers either have demonstrated an outstanding credit 
record to the bank or they have another investment relationship with the 
bank. Thus, the term to maturity in the Taiwan mortgage market actually 
serves as a measure of distinguished borrower segments, instead of being a 
reflection of the borrowers’ self-selection behavior, like the US market. Table 
2 shows that the default rate of the longer than 20 year maturity loans is 
lower than the other two categories. According to Table 3, the prepayment 
rate is negatively related to the term to maturity, reflecting that borrowers 
with a shorter expected tenure in the house would self-select into the shorter 
maturity loans to take advantage of the lower interest rates.  
Table 3 also indicates Taiwan’s prepayments follow a strong seasonal 
pattern. The prepayment rate is highest in the Spring and lowest in the 
Winter. But no significant seasonality was found in the default rates. 
The exposure quarter variable (2002: Q1) is introduced to capture the 
switch of the ARM index from individual banks’ prime rates to a more 
robust publicly observable index.  Because of the lower volatility and the 
more transparency of the new index, many borrowers refinance to take 
advantage of the new product. Surprisingly, this variable also has direct 
positive impact on the probability of default. With only 5 exposure quarters 
in the new index era, the higher default rate could simply be a reflection of 
the market condition of this short time period. 
4.1 Curtailment and delinquency effects 
As to the key variables of this paper, the coefficients of the cumulated 
curtailment variable on mortgage termination rates strongly supports our 
hypotheses. The empirical results show that conditional probabilities of 
prepayment are positively related to the past curtailment and negatively 
related to the delinquency. On the other hand, the conditional probabilities 
of default are negatively related to the cumulated curtailment and positively 
related to the delinquency. By comparing the coefficients and the 
corresponding standard errors of the curtailment and delinquency variables, 
we find that the signs of the estimates are very significant, indicating these 
 
Residential Welfare and Housing Policies: The Experience and Future of Korea 368
relationships are confirmed at high confidence levels. 
The literature documented the adverse impact of full prepayment on the 
quality of the loans remaining in a pool following a major refinancing 
opportunity. The fact is that the borrowers who can afford to refinance have 
already done so and thus the borrowers remaining in the pool tend to be the 
ones unable to refinance due to insufficient income or poor property value 
affecting their ability to qualify for a new mortgage. 
On the contrary, curtailments tend to have a positive impact on the 
overall quality of a mortgage pool. With the reduction of unpaid principal 
balance of individual loans, the average loan-to-value ratio decreases, 
making the loans less likely to experience negative equity. The fact that the 
borrowers are able to pay an extra amount indicates the excess repayment 
capability, making an ability-to-pay problem less likely. Both situations lead 
to lower subsequent default rates. In addition, the borrowers who make 
additional payments on the loans regularly have excess income capacity, 
making refinancing more likely in periods of falling rates or a cash-out 
refinance more likely in a demand of improving house values. Both cases 
result in higher subsequent prepayment rates. 
In the case of delinquency, the explanations previously mentioned are 
reversed in that the borrowers who have been delinquent are more likely to 
default and less likely to prepay possibly due to experiencing an ability-to-
pay problem. Such relationships are intuitive and generally recognized and 
well managed by the industry. One could think of delinquency as negative 
curtailment. That is, curtailment is making payments in excess of the 
scheduled amount, while delinquency is making payment short of the 
scheduled amount. This interpretation is consistent with the exact opposite 
results of these two variables. 
Table 3 also suggests that the inclusion of curtailment/delinquency 
information into the prepayment function significantly reduces the 
significance of several other explanatory variables, such as current LTV, 
relative loan size, exposure policy year, and the maturity term. Without 
incorporating the curtailment information, the model for age equal to 
Quarter 0 suggests that the probability of prepayment is positively related to 
the payment ratio. This effect is reversed when the curtailment information 
is included, confirming the hypothesis that when the market interest rate 
decreases, a borrower has a better chance to qualify for a cash out-refinance 
by the same income level. 
While the cross effect of delinquency on subsequent prepayment 
diminishes as a mortgage ages, the curtailment effect remains to be a strong 
indicator of subsequent prepayment even 3 years following the origination. 
This indicates that by examining the up to date curtailment information, one 
could successfully differentiate fast prepayment mortgage pools from slow 
prepayment pools. Such information is particularly valuable for interest-
only mortgage strip investors, such as mortgage servicers. 
With respect to the indication of the subsequent default rate, Table 2 also 
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suggests that the significance of other variables weakened when including 
curtailment/prepayment information. The impact of delinquency on 
subsequent default grows stronger in both the size and the significance over 
time. Except for the marginal curtailment in the Quarter 4 equation, the 
cross effect of curtailment on default remains strongly negative, suggesting 
curtailed loans are less likely to default, after controlling for the updated 
LTV ratio. 
4.2 Magnitude of The Curtailment Impact 
The empirical results provide strong support for the importance of 
curtailment information on the future performance of seasoned mortgage 
loans. That is, by reviewing historical cumulative delinquency together with 
cumulative curtailment, one would be able to more accurately project the 
future prepayment pattern and default probability of mortgages in an 
existing MBS pool. To obtain insights to the effect of the magnitude of the 
curtailment history has on future performance, the model coefficients are 
applied to a typical mortgage to estimate the prepayment and default rates 
during its remaining life. The typical mortgage has the following 
characteristics: current LTV = 65%, relative payment ratio = 1.1, relative 
contract rate ratio = 1.2, relative loan size ratio = 1.5, current season = 
summer, term = 20 years, current exposure year = 2003, and current age = 8 
quarters. Figures 1 and 2 plot the conditional default and prepayment rates 
of this typical loan over the remaining life. Three curves are presented in 
each figure. The Normal curves represent the cumulative default and 
prepayment rates of the loan starting from quarter 9, assuming there was no 
curtailment or default up to the end of quarter 8. The Delin curves represent 
the conditional default and complete prepayment rates conditional on the 
mortgage is slightly in delinquent (0.50<cum_delin< 0.95). The Curtail 
curves depict the rates of a loan with a history of curtailment 
(cum_curtail>2.0). 
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Figure 1a: Conditional Default Rate 
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Normal is the probability default curve without historical cumulated curtailment and 
delinquency experiences. 
Delin is the probability default curve with historical cumulated delinquency experience 
included. 
Curtail is the probability default curve with historical cumulated curtailment included. 
Figure 1b: Conditional Prepayment Rate 
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Normal is the probability default curve without historical cumulated curtailment and 
delinquency experiences. 
Delin is the probability default curve with historical cumulated delinquency experience 
included. 
Curtail is the probability default curve with historical cumulated curtailment included. 
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Figure 2a: Cumulative Default Rate 
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Normal is the probability default curve without historical cumulated curtailment and 
delinquency experiences. 
Delin is the probability default curve with historical cumulated delinquency experience 
included. 
Curtail is the probability default curve with historical cumulated curtailment included. 
Figure 2b: Cumulative Prepayment Rate 
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Normal is the probability prepayment curve without historical cumulated curtailment and 
delinquency experiences. 
Delin is the probability prepayment curve with historical cumulated delinquency experience included. 
Curtail is the probability prepayment curve with historical cumulated curtailment included. 
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Figures 1 and 2 reveal several practical insights. First, they confirm the 
industry intuition that delinquency is a strong indication of future default. 
Figure 1a further demonstrates that for a typical mortgage, past delinquent 
experience implies that the future conditional default rate to about double. 
On the prepayment side, Figure 1b shows that the delinquent loans are 
about 40 percent less likely to prepay than the normal loans without either 
delinquency or curtailment. However, the business impact is even stronger. 
Because the delinquent loans are prepaid much slower, they would have a 
higher survival rate. When more loans remaining in the pool are exposed to 
default risk, the higher conditional default rates in the future will be have a 
compounding effect. Figure 2a shows that the cumulative default rate of 
loans with delinquent history is about 2.74 times of the level of the normal 
loans. 
Second, the generally ignored curtailment history information has an 
almost equally significant impact on the future default risk. Figure 1a shows 
that the loans with strong curtailment history are 80 percent less likely to 
default than the non-curtailed loans. From Figure 1b, we understand the 
previously curtailed loans are 25 percent more likely to be completely 
prepaid in the future. Combining these two impacts together, Figure 2a 
shows that the cumulative default rate of a previously curtailed loan is only 
about 10 percent of an otherwise identical loan with no curtailment history. 
On the other hand, these curtailed loans will experience about 23 percent 
higher cumulative prepayment rates. 
Practical Implications 
As Chinloy (1993) pointed out, complete prepayment and curtailment 
have very different impacts to the cash flow of MBSs. Our empirical 
evidence reveals an additional dimension the curtailment can affect, the 
investor’s interest of an MBS. Given a fixed amount of cumulative 
prepayment by the end of the second year of the life of an MBS, it could 
have very different performance for its remaining life, depending on 
whether the previous prepayment is attributed mostly to complete 
prepayment or curtailment. 
Let’s assume there are two MBSs both experienced 10 percent cumulative 
prepayment rates during their first two years. MBSA involves all complete 
prepayments. Therefore, 10 percent of the loans disappeared from the 
original pool A. On the other hand, all prepayments of MBSB are curtailment. 
Thus, the number of loans in pool B did not reduce, but the principal 
amount of each loan is 10 percent less than the scheduled amortization 
balance. Our results indicate that the default risk of MBSA would be about 
575 percent higher than that of the MBSB. Furthermore, since the average 
UPB of MBSB is 10 percent lower than MBSA, MBSB’s exposure at default 
(EAD) is likely to be lower. As a result, the default risk of a curtailed MBS 
could be significantly lower in comparison with an identical MBS 
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experienced a similar size of complete prepayments. 
On the other hand, with the smaller average UPB, MBSB will be 
amortized much faster than MBSA, making the remaining life much shorter. 
Meanwhile, from Figure 1b, MBSB is going to experience a 25 percent higher 
conditional prepayment rate in the remaining life, further reducing the 
expected life of the security. As a result, MBSB could have a much shorter 
duration than MBSA. 
To mortgage insurers, mortgage default insurance covers any expenses 
and deficiency not covered from the proceeds of foreclosure sales. In the 
above example, MBSA would certainly be much more costly to a mortgage 
insurer and should be charged a higher insurance premium if the insurer is 
considering insuring this seasoned pool. Being able to accurately account for 
the percentage of loans in the pool experiencing previous curtailment is as 
important as identifing previous delinquency history. Figure 2a indicates 
that the fair insurance premium of MBSA should be about 6.75 times that of 
MBSB. 
For mortgage servicing business, a servicer’s profit is greatly dependent 
on the length of time that the mortgage will survive. Although MBSA has the 
higher default risk, the much longer expected life would make it the 
preferred product for a servicer. Secondary market MBS issuers are also 
deeply concerned with the potential default and prepayment risks of the 
whole loans remaining in the warehousing pool since it will affect issuance-
related costs and accuracy of valuation. The curtailment history information 
can help the issuer more accurately differentiate loans of different future 
performance, making the hold vs. sell decision more effective. Obviously, 
the impact of the significant different behavior revealed by curtailment 
would be even more important to investors in multi-class securities, such as 
the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs) or the Interest-
Only (IO) and Principal-Only (PO) strips. It should be an important variable 
to be disclosed for issuance of a MBS of seasoned mortgages. It should also 
be included as an indicator of the risk associated with a mortgage related 
portfolio in terms of determining the risk-based capital and other risk 
rebalance strategies. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper uses the mortgage curtailment impact the future performance 
of the mortgage during its remaining life as an example to demonstrate the 
importance of customize mortgage analytical models to local consumption 
habit and market convention.. The empirical study using a Taiwan 
mortgage sample provides strong support to our hypotheses. That is, past 
curtailment indicates low subsequent default rates and high subsequent 
prepayment rates. The magnitude of the impact appears to be quite 
substantial. 
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The differential performance indicated by the curtailment can 
substantially affect the mortgage security’s value and risk. For transaction 
purposes, mortgages with past curtailment tend to have shorter expected 
effective remaining life and much lower default losses. Such loans favor the 
PO strip investors while providing lower value to the IO strip investors. As 
the design of mortgage securities is getting more complicated, the additional 
accuracy in the estimation of prepayment and default becomes more critical 
for mortgage portfolio investors. Although curtailment may not be a 
popular action of US borrowers, it is frequently observed among Asian 
mortgages. With relatively long housing tenure, curtailment is the dominant 
form of prepayment in those regions, such as Taiwan. As there is an increase 
in the volume of securitization activities from these regions, there needs to 
be increasing attention by global mortgage securities investors to the 
information conveyed by historical curtailment behavior. 
Our findings also have significant implication associated with the newly 
released Basel II risk-based capital rule. It indicates that internal rating based 
minimum capital could be significantly biased in the absent of the 
curtailment information. For mortgage portfolio mangers, the accuracy of 
the hedging strategies would also be heavily affected by the curtailment 
history. For this type of application, the impact of curtailment would be 
relevant to even the deeply seasoned mortgage pools. 
In summary, this paper is the first attempt to investigate the effect of 
curtailment information embedded in seasoned mortgages. As more and 
more MBSs issued from the regions with high curtailment rates are traded 
on the global capital market, more in depth research towards this issue 
using data from different locations and different mortgage product types is 
highly encouraged. It provides a clear evidence that mortgage prepayment 
and default behavior models are highly localized phenomena. In order to 
support an accurate mortgage pricing and risk analysis model, these models 
must be customized to the local environment. 
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Comments on “Customizing Mortgage Performance 
Models:  A Case of Mortgage Curtailment” 
Man Cho, Fannie Mae 
(Johns Hopkins University) 
Goals and Findings 
Lin and Yang (2005) examine several contemporary issues related to 
prudently managing two particular risk factors embedded in mortgage 
contracts – borrower’s default and prepayment: namely, “curtailment” (or a 
partial prepayment) and its role in estimating the probability of the 
mortgage default and prepayment; “competing risk model” to jointly 
estimate the both risk events (as the two are correlated and work as a 
substitute to each other); and, “credit premium” (the observed spread of 
mortgage note rate over benchmarking rate) as a proxy for unobserved risk 
factors. Although these issues may be unfamiliar to emerging mortgage 
markets such as the one in Korea, all these represent real and current issues 
in the US mortgage finance industry. 
The study also presents various facts and findings in an organized 
fashion – a good literature survey, the sound and up-to-date econometric 
method, a thorough description of the data and variables included, and a 
discussion of policy implications in terms of mortgage pricing. The fact that 
the authors used the loan performance data from Taiwan, another emerging 
market in Asia, makes the study more relevant to the audience in Korea. 
Hence, I recommend the interested parties in Korea, both in the research 
community and in the industry, to read the paper as it will offer insights as 
to the best-practice in measuring and managing mortgage risk.           
Main results reported by the authors include the following: ceteris 
paribus, seasoned mortgage loans (i.e., loans aged one year or older) with a 
curtailment history are 85% less likely to default because of the substitution 
relationship between the default and prepayment as well as the self-
selection of those borrowers who are resourceful enough to put more than 
required in each mortgage payment; and, those loans with the curtailment 
history are 23% more likely to prepay because of the decreasing unpaid loan 
balance and the improved chance to qualify when refinancing their loans. 
These results, which confirm those from prior studies, indicate that the 
curtailment poses a challenge in managing the prepayment (hence, interest 
rate) risk as it essentially reduces the effective durations of mortgage loans, 
and one has to predict and control this factor in balancing (or immunizing) 
the asset-debt duration gaps.     
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One limitation of the study that I want to point out is the fact that the 
data covers a relatively short time span between 1997 and 2003. This may 
represent only a favorable interest rate and macroeconomic environment, 
and, if so, then the parameters estimated are likely to be biased as the 
sample covers only a part of business cycle. It is also usually the case that a 
subsequent use of the calibrated model in pricing simulation also yields a 
biased result in cash flow projections. Another point to make, possibly a 
minor one, is the severe data reduction in the editing process, from 46,000 
observations to 17,000. I recommend the authors to provide a further 
explanation on why certain loan cohorts are excluded from the estimation 
(e.g., all Interest-Only loans).  
 Policy Implications to Korea 
The mortgage finance industry in Korea represents one of the fastest 
growing mortgage markets in the world: since the financial crisis in the late 
1990s, the total mortgage debt outstanding (MDO)  increased over a 25% 
compounded annualized growth rate (CAGR), and the competition in the 
primary mortgage market has been stiffening, evidenced by various 
consumer-oriented loan products offered by the commercial banks and 
other issuers. The secondary market is also being formed fast with the 
creation of  Korea Housing Finance Corporation (KHFC) in 2004, which 
issued MBS ten times since its inception. 
Nonetheless, I also observe that the risk-based pricing and transaction in 
the mortgage market are still in its very early stage; and, Lin and Yang’s 
analyses offer insights as to several enabling factors to establish a more risk-
based mortgage intermediation process in Korea. As shown in the figure 
below, a big-picture schema of things in developing a sound mortgage risk 
management system involves with three main steps: (1) developing the best-
practice models (Box A) to estimate the idiosyncratic risk factors (i.e., 
borrower and product risks) in mortgage lending such as the competing risk 
model, and to estimate the systematic (or market-driven) risk factors with 
the term structure models and the home price models being the key inputs; 
(2) performing financial engineering to estimate present values of risky cash 
flows (due to those embedded default and prepayment options) from 
different mortgage products, which yields profit-loss (P&L) distributions to 
be used in different business applications; and, (3) applying the risk 
indicators obtained (e.g., various VaR measures) to pricing, underwriting, 
capital deployment, and other business issues.         
 
 
Residential Welfare and Housing Policies: The Experience and Future of Korea 378
• Competing-risk models:
Default behavior
Prepayment behavior
• LGD models
• Term structure models
• Home price models
HPI
HP forecasting
• Credit scoring models
• Others
• Pricing
• Underwriting
• Capital mgt. & deployment
• Risk-sharing (MI)
• Hedging
• Transfer pricing
• Servicing & QC 
• Disclosures
• etc. 
Segmentation/
Correlation
Financial
Engineering
Data
Forecasting
Loss 
Distribution
A. “Best-Practice” Models B. CF & F-Engineering C. Applications 
Research Community – A & B
MF Industry – C & B
 
As the market further matures in Korea, I expect that all three steps will 
evolve, and that the mortgage product development and the transactions in 
the market place (for lending, funding, and servicing) will become more 
risk-based. This evolution toward the risk-based business process is 
important in that, on the one hand, it will expand the market to serve more 
“marginal” borrowers (as the system will become more confident in 
measuring and managing the risk), and, at the same time, it will reduce the 
extent of cross-subsidization from low-risk borrowers to high-risk 
borrowers (as the system will become more capable in risk-sorting for 
different borrower and loan segments and, hence, in practicing a marginal-
risk pricing across those product-borrower combinations). 
Another related issue to comment on is the industry-academia 
collaboration in the market development. In the US, it is usually the case 
that the research community leads in coming up with the best-practice 
models (Box A), with the competing risk model, the repeat sales home price 
model, and various term structure models as key model inputs. On the other 
hand, applying these models to come up with business rules and policies to 
be used in actual trading (Box C) is the conventional realm of the industry. 
The middle part (Box B) is where both communities can collaborate through 
a close interaction to further develop the market and to extend its service to 
more diverse borrower groups.          
One last comment to make is on the “sequencing” issue: that is, through 
what steps the mortgage market in Korea today can reach to the point where 
one can utilize the more advanced risk management measures as discussed 
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by Lin and Yang. As a reference, Appendix depicts the 180 years’ history of 
the evolution of the US mortgage banking system (from Cho (2004)). The 
question to ask is, can we compress the history such as the one in the US in 
achieving a similarly advanced mortgage financing system in Korea? I think 
the answer is yes, and, using my recent observations of the Korean system, I 
provide the following as a reasonable sequence to follow to achieve that.  
 1. Reduce the systemic risk caused by existing mortgage products (short-
term IO-ARMs in particular), via (1) increased market share of safer & 
welfare-enhancing products (long-term FRM, hybrids, ARMs with cap 
structure, etc.); (2) consumer education via pre-sale disclosures on 
product features & interest rate risk.  
2. Develop and share critical data inputs, including (1) consumer credit 
data & consumer risk ratings, (2) home price indices (a quality-controlled 
HPI), (3) prepayment speed factors (e.g., CPR and PSA factors), (4) loan 
performance data. 
3. Develop “customized” behavioral models (to estimate PD, CPR, LGD∗) 
based on real data from Korea and by benchmarking the best-practice 
loan performance models published in other countries. 
4. Establish the culture of risk-based pricing and transaction, by raising the 
confidence in measuring and controlling the default and prepayment 
risks and by sharing risk views (or pricing grids) among trading partners  
5. Extend the market-based mortgage service to “marginal” borrowers, 
including (1) income-stretched borrower cohort, (2) wealth-stretched 
borrower group, (3) credit-impaired borrowers (e.g., those who defaulted 
credit cards), (4) those with special financing needs (e.g., house-rich and 
cash-poor senior citizens); via risk-sharing (public and/or private MIs) 
and product development 
6. Then, repeat Step 3 with the control of “curtailment,” to refine and 
increase the accuracy of the performance models.   
 
                                                 
∗ They stand for probability of default (PD), cumulative prepayment rate (CPR), and loss-given-
default (LGD). 
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 Appendix: Evolution of the US Mortgage Market 
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Corporate bond vs real estate lending – Trend between 1895-2004: Spread of real estate lending (NYC real estate
transactions between 1895-1920, effective mortgage rates between 1920-1971, and 30-yr FRM rates 1971-current) over
high-quality corporate bond rate)  
Communal solution (TBS) to localized S&L (from 1835): Terminating Building Society (TBS) – the communal
solution for housing finance, to Permanent Building Society (PBS), to Building and Loans, and eventually to Savings
and Loans (S&L); Completely localized lending based on locally-drawn deposits   
Failed MBB experiment (mid- to late-1800s):  Separation of funding and lending in the mid-1800s with the insurance
companies in the Northeast being investors on MBB issued by the lenders the West and Midwest to finance the
development there; rampant moral hazard problem in underwriting loans, and the experiment failed during the
recession in the 1890s, pulling the insurance companies out of the mortgage market 
Great Depression (GD) and national-wide policies (1930s): GD, started with the stock market crash in 1929, made
the Roosevelt administration introduce several national-wide mortgage market innovations – 30-year leveled
payment loan, the national funding entity (Fannie Mae), the public mortgage insurance program (by Federal
Housing Agency) 
Emergence of Private MIs (1950s): Private Mortgage Insurance companies created in the 1950s, after observing the
successful operation of FHA; All 51 states passed the legislations to authorize the mortgage insurance business  
Inflation cycles and structural shifts (1970s and 1980s):  Three inflation cycles and the competition in attracting small
savers (in particular, by the mutual funds established in the early 1970s) as the cause of demise for S&Ls, with
Regulation Q as the contributing factor; various risk management methods (derivative products to hedge interest rate
risk) and new products (MBS, CMO, and re-introduction of ARMs in the early 1980s); Documentation
standardization occurred 
AUS technology and efficiency gain (1990s); Automatic Underwriting System (AUS) and other tech-driven
innovations enhanced the intermediation efficiency, with the spread in the 1990s mostly reflecting the prepayment
risk embedded in mortgage loans but not corporate bonds 
Re-created from Cho (2004), “Evolution of the US Housing Finance System: A Historical 
Survey and Lessons for Emerging Mortgage Markets.” Mimeo.  
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MORTGAGE FINANCE IN THE 
POST-LIBERALIZATION ERA:  GLOBAL TRENDS 
AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO KOREA 
by 
Bertrand Renaud 
1. Introduction 
How has the role of government in mortgage finance changed in the 
post-liberalization era?  What might be relevant to Korea in the 
experience of other high income economies, especially in the European 
Union (EU) and the US?  To address these two questions this paper 
outlines the basic framework of competitive mortgage credit markets that 
reflects a broad international consensus.  Within that framework, the 
paper highlights some current issues in the development of Korean 
mortgage markets. 
To fully understand where priorities and policy opportunities are 
today in Korea it would be necessary to analyze three distinct markets: the 
housing market, the mortgage market, and the fixed-income securities 
market, all three of which have been changing rapidly since the financial 
crisis of 1997.   This paper focuses only on the core components of 
residential mortgage market development in Korea.  Other papers 
presented at the conference offer important insights in the current 
dynamics of Korean housing markets. In particular, Moonjoong Tcha 
[2005] shows the continuing high level of housing prices in the Seoul 
region and major Korean cities.  
Before proceeding, a clarification may be in order. This paper 
distinguishes between “housing finance” and “residential mortgage 
finance.”  “Housing finance” might be defined as the total flow of funds 
that finances the production of new housing units and the trading or 
upgrading of existing ones. This total flow of funds includes as a subset 
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financing that is secured by a lien on the housing unit, which is actual 
‘mortgage finance”. “Housing finance” includes unsecured financing akin 
to consumer finance that is not collateralized by a lien on the property. 
Such fund flows are still quite large in the case in Korea where “Chonsei” 
residential leases continue to form a major component of the total flow of 
funds financing housing. The total flow of housing fund also includes 
significant central and local fiscal resources.  This paper focuses only on 
the efficiency, completeness and stability of private residential mortgage 
markets and the current state of development of the Korean retail and 
secondary market components, and on their interactions. 
The paper is organized in three parts. Part I provides a historical and 
global perspective for the discussion. In particular, Part I discusses how 
the financial liberalization policies that started in the early 1980s have lead 
to the progressive disappearance of ‘special housing finance circuits’ in 
high-income economies. These special circuits are being replaced 
everywhere by competitive mortgage finance systems accessing capital 
markets and fully integrated with the overall financial system.  Part II 
discusses the core functions of a mortgage finance system that underlies 
the framework of comparative mortgage finance within which we explore 
where the Korean system appears to be today compared with high-income 
EU and US systems. In closing, Part III raises two policy questions 
regarding the relationship between the current mortgage finance system 
and macroeconomic stability in Korea. 
2. IMPACT OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION ON 
MORTGAGE FINANCE 
Direct contribution of financial development to economic growth 
and poverty reduction  
A growing body of new research shows that financial markets do make 
their own contribution to growth and that improvements in financial 
systems precede growth.  Sound financial systems also contribute to 
poverty alleviation by promoting economic growth and reducing 
economic volatility. After decades of debates, the cross-country evidence is 
emerging rapidly that the relation is a causal one. These findings are 
considerably at variance with widely held views during the post-World 
War II reconstruction era that finance was not really an economic sector of 
its own and should be used as an instrument of industrial policy.  The 
policy rational for government dominance of financial markets was based 
on concerns with market failures, which led to the ironic remark by Nobel 
Laureate George Stigler that preferring the government to markets on 
those grounds was “reminiscent of the emperor who, when judging a 
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contest between two musicians, gave the prize to the second musician after 
hearing only the first one.” 
The pre-liberalization era of directed credit limited financial market 
depth 
In the pre-liberalization financial era, the growth of housing finance 
systems was often stunted by inappropriate public policies. Alternative 
non-market devices then developed for financing and subsidizing the 
housing sector, creating negative externalities for the rest of the financial 
system.  On the other hand, well functioning mortgage markets will 
provide large external benefits to the national economy. The potential for 
real estate collateral to secure large amount of secured debts can also be an 
engine of innovation for the rest of the financial sector: the securitization of 
residential mortgages and other types of mortgage securities are now 
major components of the capital markets in OECD countries.  
The era of financial liberalization began globally in the early 1980s. It 
had evolved gradually during the 1970s with the demise of the Bretton 
Woods Accord followed by the free-floating exchange rate system 
officially mandated by the IMF in 1978. In addition to the exchange rate 
and macroeconomic policies, the information technology revolution 
together with a high rate of financial innovations have led to a 
considerable deepening of financial markets and an increasingly rapid 
cross-border transfer of innovations.  A new study estimates that global 
financial markets have grown from USD12 trillion in 1980 at the start of 
the financial liberalization era to USD 118 trillion in 2003. (See McKinsey 
Global Institute, April 2005). Financial markets have grown more than 
twice as fast as the global GDP leading to a rapid deepening of financial 
systems with financial assets expanding from 109% to 326% of global GDP 
in less than 25 years. As Figure 1 shows, the most rapidly growing 
component of financial markets has been private debt securities, of which 
mortgage securities are a major component in high-income economies. In 
country after country “there has been a striking shift within the global 
financial stock from bank intermediation to market intermediation and from 
non-tradable bank loans to tradable debt and securities” (MacKinsey, 2005, 
p.16).    
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FIGURE 1 
 
  
Korea’s share of Asia’s financial assets currently places the country in 
third place after Japan and China as shown on the top line of data in 
FIGURE 2 (McKinsey, 2005, p.132). But Korean financial assets have grown 
less rapidly than those of China and India during the period 1993-2003 at a 
CAGR of 11.2% compared with 14.5% in China and 11.9% in India. The 
estimated Korean share was 1% of the global financial markets and 5% of 
the Asian financial stock in 2003.   The broad structure of the Korean 
financial system differs significantly from that of other Asian countries. It 
can be said that since 1997 Korea has already achieved a better financial 
macro-structure between bank-based and capital-market-based activities 
than the systems of Japan, China or India.  Korea has a large and rapidly 
modernizing private debt market in contrast with Japan where public debt 
has crowded out private debt for the last decade.  Korea is also less 
dependent on bank deposits than China. Yet, Korea is still coming out of 
its long period of financial repression and government directed credit: the 
depth its financial system as a ratio of GDP is still considerably lower than 
that of the US, the EU and the UK.  In contrast, China’s financial system 
has reached a much greater depth after only two decades of market 
reforms, even if much of that depth results mostly from the growth of the 
banking system.  FIGURE 2 also reveals the considerable degree of 
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heterogeneity across Asian financial markets compared to Western 
systems.  
FIGURE 2 
 
 
The post-liberalization era: financial deepening and end of special 
circuits for housing finance 
The post-liberalization era has been marked by a very significant 
deepening of mortgage markets in OECD countries. Mortgage finance 
systems have also become less volatile in high income countries since the 
early 1980s as the result of significant changes in the structure of their 
mortgage markets, especially the expanded access to capital markets. 
However, many mortgage markets around the world remain credit 
constrained with a large population of under-served borrowers. Like 
elsewhere, the financial systems of East Asia are moving away from 
predominantly bank-based financial systems to better balanced systems. In 
mortgage finance, this development is leading to a greater focus on risk 
management and on the diversification of financial instruments that can 
permit a diversity of retail lenders to better manage their risks through 
access to investors in the capital markets.  
Since the 1997 financial crisis, there has been a significant liberalization 
of the financial markets and of the commercial real estate sector.  
However, present Korean housing markets remain subject to very frequent 
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government interventions in the form of demand and supply restrictions 
in residential real estate markets.  Yet, the Korean mortgage finance 
system has grown quite rapidly at a CAGR of 23.4%. Such a growth rate is 
high by international standards and compares with the very rapidly 
emerging mortgage markets of Portugal, Ireland and Spain at the 
periphery of the EU. 
 TABLE 1: GROWTH RATES OF MORTGAGE FINANCE SYSTEMS 
Economy Growth Rate (CAGR) Period Covered 
Greece 23.5% 1992-2002 
Korea 23.4% 1996-2003 
Portugal 22.5% 1992-2002 
Ireland 18.0% 1992-2002 
Spain 17.0% 1992-2002 
Germany 6.0% 1992-2002 
France 4.0% 1992-2002 
Finland 3.5% 1992-2002 
Sweden 2.5% 1992-2002 
EU-15 8.2% 1992-2002 
US 8.3% 1993-2003 
Korea: KDI housing markets study, Chapter 6, 2004. 
European Union: Mercer Oliver Wyman Study 2003, Hans-Joachim Dübel 
US: Economic Report of the President 2005,  Table B-75 
  
In 1996, the depth of the Korean mortgage system measured by the 
ratio of outstanding housing finance depth to GDP was low at 10.0 % of 
GDP and reflected decades of financial repression. The small and very 
basic Korean special housing finance circuit structure remained almost 
unchanged for three decades until the commercial bank charter and 
privatization of the Korea Housing Bank in 1997.  By 2003, however, the 
depth of the Korean mortgage finance system is reported to have grown to 
27.2% of GDP. Two intervening factors behind this rapid mortgage market 
deepening have been the government policies to revive the economy by 
encouraging consumer finance after the 1997 crisis, as well as the 
reluctance of restructured commercial banks to resume their corporate and 
SME lending.  
FIGURE 3 compares Korea with other OECD economies and shows 
that Korea’s mortgage market depth remains well below average among 
OECD countries. Equally significant, FIGURE 3 reveals the wide 
dispersion of mortgage market depth ratios across countries of comparable 
income levels, which raises the central question for this paper of the 
structural and public policy factors that contribute to these wide 
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differences.   
A note of caution appears to be in order regarding the value of 27.2% 
for the ratio of outstanding mortgage debt to GDP in Korea in 2003 used in 
FIGURE 3. This ratio differs significantly from previous historical data 
collected and published by the Korea Housing Bank for many years. For 
instance based on KHB data, K.H. Kim [2004] reports the MDO/GDP 
ratios since  the crisis year 1997 as follows in Table 2: 
TABLE 2: KOREA MORTGAGE MARKET DEPTH, 1997-2002  
                                                                      (Trillion won, %) 
YEAR Outstanding Balance GDP MDO/GDP ratio 
1996 45.0 448.5 10.0 
1997 53.0 453.3 11.7 
1998 55.5 444.4 12.5 
1999 61.3 482.7 12.7 
2000 67.6 522.0 13.0 
2001 72.9 545.0 13.4 
2002 n.a. n.a n.a 
2003 196.3 721.3 27.2 
Source: K.H KIM [2004], Table 5, p. 331,  J.H. LEE [2003], H.W. Kim[2005] 
 
The time series suggest a very high growth of mortgage loan 
production in years 2002 and 2003. and a possible change in data collection 
methodology. Data prior to 2001 were collected and published by 
Kookmin Bank as a legacy of the Korea Housing Bank market monitoring 
function in the past. Possible sources of discrepancies may be the total 
amount of outstanding NHF loans, data from non-bank mortgage lenders 
such as insurance companies, as well as a different reporting of mortgage 
loan data by new bank lenders that were not reporting previously.    
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FIGURE 3.  Mortgage Finance Depth in KOREA, EU-15 and USA, 2003
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Housing sector strategies across East Asia in the 20thCentury and 
their 21st Century Legacy 
The performance of a mortgage finance system is not only shaped by its 
internal organization and structure but also by the  structure and 
performance of the housing market, and the state of development of the 
fixed-income securities market. It is beyond the scope of this paper to look 
at the Korean bond market, but Korean housing policies can at least be 
contrasted briefly with those followed in other East Asia economies 
because these policies had a direct bearing on the growth of mortgage 
finance given the rapid growth of Korean incomes.  
The second half of the 20th century was the period of the urbanization 
take-off around the world. In East Asia, four very distinct types of housing 
sector strategies were adopted in the late 1950s and early 1960s and 
continued for several decades. There has been the central planning’s view 
of housing as a social good to be distributed by the state in the socialist 
economies of China and North Korea. Since the late 1980s the transition to 
markets in China has led to massive privatization changes in the housing 
sector, especially in the coastal provinces; but in North Korea, housing 
reforms have not yet occurred. A second strategy has been associated with 
the push toward rapid industrialization that led to the suppression of 
consumer finance and to attempts to redirect household savings to designated 
“priority sectors,” which resulted in significant under-investment in housing 
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in Japan and in South Korea in a context of rapid economic growth.  A 
third strategy has been the creation of large-scale public housing programs 
to support the labor force of a small open market economy (Hong Kong, 
Singapore). The fourth and most successful strategy is the least frequently 
discussed: it is the set of non-interventionist, market-based housing 
policies based on income equality and a balanced growth path in Taiwan 
where the state has played a very limited direct role in the supply of 
housing.   
The legacy of decades of under-investment in housing during the 
second half of 20th century is a Korean housing stock that remains 
quantitatively less developed than those of the EU-25 countries. A simple 
initial physical indicator is the number of housing units per 1,000 
inhabitants.  This ratio is much lower in Korea than in the Eu-25, even 
compared with some of the Central and Eastern European EU-10 members 
who joined the EU in May 2004 and have lower per capita incomes than 
the EU-15 members, and Korea.    
   
FIGURE 4. Dwelling per 1000 inhabitants. Korea, EU-25, 2000
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Over the last two decades, a number of studies have tested and 
confirmed the hypothesis that Korea has underinvested in housing as a 
result of government policies. In the most recent review of housing and 
the Korean macroeconomy, Kyung-Hwan Kim still concludes that “the 
gap in the rate of return for housing and that for non-housing capital is 
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found to have narrowed but has not been completely eliminated” ([2004], 
p.326).  By international standards Korean housing policies have 
remained interventionist until today.  One notable feature is that Korea 
appears to be the only OECD country where government policies aim to 
regulate directly the price of housing.  
Late emergence of market-based housing finance in Korea: the 
special circuit legacy 
Until the mid-1990s Korea presented a rather extreme form of “special 
housing finance circuit” (see Diamond and Lea, 1992) under the close 
control of financial authorities where the allocative role of interest rates 
was subordinated to direct administrative decisions. The primary 
mortgage market was dominated by the National Housing Fund (NHF) 
providing loans below market to low to moderate -income households  
and the Korea Housing Bank serving an overlapping if higher income 
clientele with 10-15 year amortizing loans. The entire system was subject 
to a very significant level of credit rationing. To manage the queue of 
potential borrowers, the supervisory authorities imposed a combination of 
very low loan-to-value ratios below 30% and restrictive administrative 
criteria based on the socio-economic characteristics of households and 
housing floor area and price. There was no genuine secondary mortgage 
market: the resources from the NHF came from the mandatory sale of 
housing bonds at coupon rate below market imposed on purchasers of 
new units.  This process contributed its share to the significant 
fragmentation of the Korean bond market until 1997. As a result of these 
financial policies, informal financial markets provided most of the 
financing for housing during the peak period of urbanization of Korea. 
Estimates of the flow of new funds in the year 1984 indicate that over 75% 
of new financing came that year from informal markets as shown in 
FIGURE 5. The combination of strong credit rationing with a rigid urban 
planning system that made housing supply very inelastic goes a long way 
in explaining why the number of housing units in Korea is significantly 
lower than in comparator countries as shown in FIGURE 4.  Korea had 
one of the simplest and most concentrated housing finance special circuit 
with the Korea Housing Bank completely dominating the distribution of 
mortgage credit and having a monopoly on the distribution of loans from 
the National Housing Fund as shown in FIGURE 5.  Before 1997, financial 
policies of directed credit and interest rate controls suppressed every form 
of consumer finance, including housing finance.  These policies induced 
the growth of a large informal market that still provided three fourth of 
total sector financing in the mid-1980s as shown by FIGURE 5.   
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FIGURE 5: Pre-liberalization Korean Housing Finance System, 1984
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The financial liberalization plans initiated in the mid-1990s that saw the 
partial privatization of the Korea Housing Bank in 1997 were both 
disrupted and accelerated by the 1997 crisis.   The public policy paradox 
today is that Korea is liberalizing and modernizing its mortgage credit 
system only after the country has already become fully urbanized. In fact, 
statistics show that Korea is the most urban member of OECD based on 
the share of its population living in cities.   
The dominant perspective of the liberalization era is that financial 
policies are more effective when they focus on developing and 
strengthening the financial infrastructure rather than relying upon direct 
interventions into the financial market itself through banking regulations, 
interest rate guidance, taxation and state-owned banks.  As already noted, 
global financial markets have been deeply restructured by revolutionary 
changes in information technology, the creation of new markets in 
financial instruments for risk management, and major innovations in 
credit information techniques. This applies to mortgage markets where 
securitization and structured finance have originated in the US. In this 
profoundly changed new context, what kinds of government policies are 
needed and how does the Korean mortgage finance system compare with 
other high-income OECD markets?  
 
                  Residential Welfare and Housing Policies: The Experience and Future of Korea 
 
392
3. GLOBAL TRENDS IN MORTGAGE MARKETS AND 
THE KOREA CASE 
What are the core building blocks of a competitive mortgage market 
today? What are their functions in reducing financial risks, lower costs and 
improving access to mortgage credit for different segments of the 
consumer population? Reviewing the risk mitigating functions that each of 
these building blocks perform is one way to present the basic structure of a 
competitive mortgage credit market - and to define the elements of well 
integrated mortgage finance public policies. Aggregate indicators are then 
used to compare the performance of the Korean mortgage credit system 
with more fully developed systems.  
3.1 The three core functions of a mortgage credit system  
A mortgage credit market is a dynamic and interactive system.  As the 
market gradually develops and deepens, one should be prepared to 
encounter legal issues, collateral issues, insurance and guarantee issues, 
industry organization and loan distribution issues, loan product issues, 
transaction costs and taxation issues, consumer education and protection 
issues, as well as the funding and capital market issues that are central to 
the entire industry’s dynamics. To avoid being overwhelmed by such 
complexity it is helpful to keep in mind the three core functions that a 
mortgage lender must perform. (See Jaffee and Renaud, 1998  or Renaud 
2004):  
 
• Mortgage loan origination is the process through which mortgage debt is 
created, comparable to the underwriting function for other capital 
market securities. 
 
• Mortgage loan holding refers to the activity of institutions and other 
investors who own or hold mortgage debt.  When the mortgage 
originator and the mortgage holder differ, it is necessary to transfer 
mortgage ownership.  The high risk, high information costs, and small 
size of individual mortgages complicate the mortgage transfer process.  
 
• Mortgage loan servicing refers to a series of activities, including (1) 
collecting the monthly payments from the borrowers and transmitting 
the funds to the holders, (2) confirming that the borrower maintains 
property insurance and pays property taxes, and (3) carrying out the 
foreclosure process in cases of default. 
 
From a financial risk management point of view it is the mortgage 
holding function that is the strategic function in any mortgage system. 
While there are important operating risks associated with the mortgage 
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origination and the mortgage servicing functions, it is the mortgage 
holding function that carries the four  majortypical financial risks 
encountered in mortgage lending: (a) borrower default risk; (2) liquidity 
risk and (3) interest rate risks associated with the long maturities needed 
in mortgage lending; and (4) prepayment risks triggered by movements in 
market interest rates, in housing prices and the circumstances of 
individual borrowers. Credit risk can cause costly loan origination and 
servicing issues, liquidity is the most immediate financial risk, but for a 
lender it is the interest rate risk that is potentially high and typically 
exceeds default risk.   The coverage and pricing of prepayment risks has 
gained in technical prominence with the growth of secondary mortgage 
markets and the sale of mortgage securities to capital market investors.  
The financial liberalization era is seeing a trend toward separating or 
unbundling these mortgage market functions. As a result, market 
operators, market analysts as well as regulators and public policy makers 
need to gain a deeper understanding of the critical features as well as the 
pricing of each of these functions. This unbundling trend has progressed 
particularly far in the US where mortgage markets are the largest and 
among the deepest in the world as seen in FIGURE 3.    
What characterizes mortgage markets among developed and emerging 
economies in the current era is the rapidly growing significance of 
secondary market systems (SMM). These are markets in which mortgages 
are originated by one agent (a depository institution or a specialized 
mortgage originator), but are then transferred to a capital market 
institution or another investor who serves as the final holder.  The rise of 
SMMs is playing a major role in reallocating mortgage risks to those best 
able to bear them, which leads to deeper, more liquid, and more stable 
mortgage markets with lower spreads. Another differentiating feature 
between the two financial eras is the shift in policy focus from the creation 
of often public specific financial institutions to the development of 
different mortgage securities that can be freely issued and traded by 
various types of financial institutions according to the specific economics 
of their individual circumstances. For instance depository institutions 
greatly differ in the economics of their funding requirements from 
non-depository mortgage finance companies, and so will their use of 
different types of securities. (See Chiquier, Lea, Hassler [2004] and 
Mercer-Oliver- Wyman [2005]).  
There is a powerful policy rationale for the systematic development of 
SMMs for government facing constrained fiscal resources.  Access to 
SMMs for expanded funding and better risk allocation creates a significant 
fiscal space by expanding access to market loans for a much larger share of 
the middle-class through lower lending spreads thereby leaving on-budget 
resources to social housing programs for the most vulnerable members of 
society.   In this new environment of risk reallocation and mortgage 
securities trading, the performances of the retail markets and SMMs 
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interact intimately.  What is often missing in emerging markets is an 
integrated policy view of the functional interactions between primary 
(retail) and secondary (capital) markets.  Piecemeal approaches to 
mortgage market development by financial authorities in the absence of an 
overall strategy integrating secondary mortgage market development 
objectives and bond market development objectives can lead to significant 
delays in modernizing the systems.  
 
Korea:  The need for an overall, stable mortgage market strategy in Korea 
is suggested by the opportunistic incorporation of Komoco under 
a mixed public-private ownership model in 1999 followed almost 
immediately by a change in policy direction with the 
incorporation of the fully public Korea Housing Finance 
Corporation in December 2003, which took over the business of 
Komoco. 
3.2 Retail mortgage market performance: Why are loan-to-value 
ratios so low in Korea? 
In spite of the rapid growth recently of the mortgage market, LTV 
ratios remain very low in Korea by international standards as seen in 
FIGURE 6: 
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TABLE 3 also shows that in spite of the deepening of the mortgage 
market, the average LTV has not risen significantly between 1997 and 2003. 
TABLE 3: LOAN-TO-VALUE RATIOS OF LOANS MADE BY THE 
LARGEST LENDER, KOOKMIN BANK (former KHB) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Average 
LTV 28.% 33.2% 30.4% 28.5% 31.6% 32.1% 32.4% 
New loans 
with LTV > 
50% 
  9.6% 6.9% 9.9% 10.7% 11.4% 
Source: S.D. YOU [2003] and K.H.KIM [2004] 
 
Aligning better the interests of creditors and debtors is based on the 
fact that a contract is not a zero-sum game i.e. George Akerlof’s ‘lemon’ 
argument applies to mortgage finance.  The greater the degree of 
information asymmetry between creditor and lender, the stronger is the 
incentive for lenders to engage in defensive credit rationing, especially in 
the form of low LTV ratios.  We now review the core elements of a 
complete mortgage credit market for their risk management benefits. 
(a) Collateral efficiency and its legal foundations 
Collateral efficiency potentially has the greatest ability to mitigate 
credit risk.  The organization, structure and performance of a mortgage 
market always determines how efficiently at what cost the three core 
mortgage market functions are actually performed.   The legal 
foundations of the retail mortgage market are critical to the entire system 
and have a direct bearing on the mortgage origination function.  The  
legal foundations of collateral efficiency have five main dimensions: 
 
• Clear title and ownership rights; 
• A property registration and cadastre system that is up-to-date, reliable, 
complete, transparent in terms of liens, and readily accessible to the public; 
• Efficient foreclosure procedures [in terms of monetary costs and time 
delays] to seize the property collateral after a default has occurred.  
• The ability to evict the defaulting debtor after foreclosure  
• The appropriate priority ranking of the mortgage lien for payment 
disbursement from foreclosure proceeds. 
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Lenders have to evaluate the strength of the legal framework to assess 
their credit risk. What happens when there significant imperfections 
regarding any of this five points?  When the legal framework is weak, 
creditors will compensate by charging higher rates of interest, offering 
shorter loan terms, offering only low LTV loans, they may ask for additional 
guarantees or security. Banks will tend to have small selective loan 
portfolios or may even choose to stay out of that business line, which has not 
been the case in Korea after 1997.  
The contents of the legal framework itself can have a major impact on 
mortgage market depth, loan costs and industry profitability and is country 
specific.  The mortgage as the legal instrument to secure the loan should 
have a lifespan that meets at least the point at which the loan matures.   An 
important factor limiting the growth of mortgage markets in France is that 
the duration of a mortgage is limited by law. This legal weakness has led to 
the development of a mitigating substitute loan insurance (credit logement) 
that lenders prefer to offer to lower risk i.e. higher income borrowers.  This 
mortgage law is contributing factor to the relatively low depth of mortgage 
markets in France as shown in FIGURE 3.  What may have been historically 
an attempt to strengthen property rights is proving difficult to correct due to 
an accumulation of related legal decisions. This example illustrates the 
frequent path-dependency of legal systems where “the path of the law 
shapes the law” in modernizing mortgage laws.   
 
Korea: The 2003 KHFC Law, Article 2 defines as “housing mortgage loan” a 
loan that is “secured by a mortgage (including a keun-mortgage) and 
has a maturity of at least 10 years.” It is not clear to the author 
whether the KHFC law implies that the currently dominant bullet 
loans of three-year maturity with three-month variable rates do not 
qualify as mortgage loans and should be considered as unsecured 
consumer loans; or whether KHFC operations are restricted to 
mortgages of more that 10-year maturity. Does this restriction also 
apply the remaining mortgage maturity of an existing loan? It must 
also be noted that the Korean Civil Code recognizes as a competing 
hypotec the “Chonsegwon” or right of registered lease.  
 
More commonly, we expect that operating costs will be negatively 
affected as the exercise of foreclosure and actual disbursement to the lender 
take more time.  The findings of the 2003 Mercer-Oliver-Wyman study of 
eight European markets bears this out as seen in FIGURE 7. 
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FIGURE 7: TIME TO REPOSSESS AND OPERATING COSTS IN 
EIGHT EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
Source: Mercer-Oliver-Wyman, Financial Integration of European Mortgage Markets, 2003. 
p.61 
 
FIGURE 7 shows that both the Italian and French mortgage markets are 
outlier markets where operating costs are high in the early 2000s. However, 
the reasons are quite different. In Italy, the weak foreclosure process is 
clearly an important contributor to high operating costs, but in France the 
repossession process compares well with the other European markets. Other 
factors are at work such as the legacy of directed   credit policies and the 
impact of social housing finance programs on bank operations.  Globally, 
the Danish market is the most efficient market in practically every 
dimension of mortgage credit in addition to foreclosures that are very 
uncommon and promptly completed.     
The quality of the legal infrastructure also has a direct bearing on the 
development of secondary mortgage markets irrespective of the types of 
mortgage securities traded whether they are predominantly covered bonds 
like in Europe or residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) like in the US. 
Weaknesses or gaps in the five building blocks of the legal system prevent 
access to SMMs. The quality and pricing of a covered bond or a RMBS will 
be determined by the past performance of loans and the effectiveness of loan 
recovery procedures. Bond rating agencies methodologies place a heavy 
emphasis on the legal framework in force in the market. Due diligence work 
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on a new mortgage security issue always includes an evaluation of the legal 
framework currently in place. The other major component of the rating 
process is the use of stress tests.   Because of its immediate impact on 
pricing and liquidity, work toward perfecting the legal framework of 
mortgage markets is a constant process of discussion between the mortgage 
industry, rating agencies and regulators.   
 
Korea: It is well established internationally that some forms of consumer 
protection laws that aim to provide relief to narrowly defined 
categories of individuals by limiting foreclosure rules or changing the 
rank of the mortgage lien can have the perverse effect of lowering 
access to credit to a wider segment of population. In the case of Korea, 
the mortgage liens of landowners are ranked below ‘Chonsei’ 
reimbursement claims of tenants when their Chonsei deposit ranges 
‘from 14 million won to 40 million won per room” depending on local 
housing markets.  This risk factor encourages Korean banks and 
other potential lenders to offer only relatively low LTV loans. (S.D. 
You, 2003, p.26) 
(b) Property valuation 
Property valuation at the time of loan origination and changes in value 
over the life of the loan is the second part of collateral efficiency.  
Conceptually, there is universal agreement on the three approaches to 
valuation (cost approach, income approach and sales comparisons 
approach). In practice there are considerable implementation differences 
across countries and over time so that LTV ratios such as those presented in 
Table 6 should be properly understood.  Some of these country ratios 
represent a percentage of market value. However, Germany and Holland 
use ‘assessed value’ and ‘foreclosure value’ that aim to anticipate the impact 
of real estate cycles over the life of loans. These values are below market 
value at loan origination, which explains why maximum LTV values in the 
Netherlands can be so much greater than 100%.  In these two countries 
valuation rules are not left to professional associations; they are part of the 
regulations monitored by bank supervisors. Valuation rules are also an 
explicit component of the legal framework for covered bonds.   
The reliability of housing price indices for public policies is an issue 
related to valuation, especially for mass valuation techniques. The lack of a 
good housing price index is a rather common gap in the public information 
infrastructure for the sector, even among OECD countries.  The monitoring 
of housing and other real estate prices has very recently become an official 
concern of central bankers related to financial stability and asset price 
inflation; see Bank of International Settlements [2005]. 
 
Korea: As noted, Korea stands out among OECD countries with government 
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policies that attempt to work outside market mechanisms and to 
regulate housing prices directly rather than working on underlying 
causal structural factors. Do policies that attempt to regulate housing 
prices also contribute to regressive housing market outcomes and 
mortgage market distortions? (See Kim and Kim [1999]). What will be 
the short-term and long term impacts of the current administration’s 
decision to double property taxes by raising both tax rates and 
property assessments? How reliable are Korean market valuations 
across the country’s housing markets, and where are improvements 
feasible?   
   (c) Consumer Credit Information 
Efficient loan origination requires effective underwriting procedures to 
evaluate a potential borrower along three interrelated dimensions: (a) the 
legal characteristics of the property offered as collateral, and its valuation; 
(b) the income characteristics and equity contribution of the borrower, and 
(c) the type of mortgage loan selected by the borrower among those on offer. 
Credit information can be described as the second leg of the modern 
risk-based, three-legged stool of mortgage finance.  
Rather than merely mitigating information asymmetries and credit risk 
like the property collateral, consumer credit bureaus and credit scoring can 
significantly lower information asymmetries between creditors and debtors 
and thereby lower the cost of credit and improve access to finance to all 
good borrowers. Using a model of adverse selection, Jappelli and Pagano 
(1993) have shown why and how exchanging information on borrower 
types decreases default rates and reduce average interests. In a later paper 
they have shown empirically in the European context that the credit 
information infrastructure has been a significant factor in widening 
differences in the depth of mortgage finance systems at the lower end of the 
spectrum; see Jappelli and Pagano [2000].    
The public policy question is under what conditions information sharing 
will and will not occur.  “As there are almost certainly increasing returns to 
scale in this industry, and hence there is likely to be market power, less than 
optimal service provision and higher than competitive pricing, an important 
question is whether there should be public sector intervention to enhance 
credit information sharing and, if so, what form that intervention should 
take.” (Power, Mylenko, Miller and Majnoni, 2004, p.2)   The first 
multi-country review of public credit registries (PCR) done by the Word 
Bank argues that PCRs and private credit bureaus are complements and not 
substitutes. Three significant empirical findings are: the importance of 
collecting both positive as well as negative information on borrowers; small 
banks benefit even more than larger banks from sharing credit information; 
bank rating is important as ratings are highly predictive in determining 
default. Not surprisingly, given the governance constraints inherent in 
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public institutions, this World Bank review also finds that private credit 
bureaus can collect new information and produce higher-value services 
faster than public bureaus.  These two forms of credit bureaus are better at 
different things, especially when it comes to sharing information. 
 
Korea: The disastrous and widely commented experience with consumer 
finance and credit cards between 2002 and 2004 has revealed that 
financial authorities as well as banks and credit cards subsidiaries 
were not prepared for the abrupt transition from an environment of 
strong directed credit to that of competitive consumer finance. (See 
for instance the FitchRatings Special Report of April 2003).  The full 
range of possible consequences from the banks’ flight to safety away 
from corporate loans to chaebols into consumer loans were 
apparently not fully anticipated by decision-makers and regulators. A 
fresh public policy toward effective credit bureaus appears to be a 
significant priority for the consumer finance market.  
 
In the specific case of mortgage finance, the very low LTV ratios used by 
all lenders, and the subject of guidance by regulators, are forestalling the 
need for individual consumer credit information. But, as already discussed, 
this is done at the regressive costs of rationing potential good customers out 
of the mortgage market and of substantially delaying access to 
home-ownership for first time buyers. As is very well-known, access to 
loans of longer maturity and higher LTV ratios - and therefore housing 
affordability, others things being equal- are functionally related as shown by 
the EU markets in FIGURE 8 taken from Mercer-Oliver-Wyman[2003], p.25.  
  
FIGURE 8: LOAN TERMS VS. TYPICAL LTV RATIOS ACROSS EU 
MARKETS, 2002 
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(d) Mortgage Default Insurance 
If the foundation of mortgage finance is the risk-mitigating role of the 
property mortgage collateral, a second structural way to actually lower 
information asymmetry problems without resorting to rationing is mortgage 
default insurance (MI).  MI is a specialized form of credit insurance that 
protects both residential mortgage lenders and investors in mortgage 
securities again potential losses caused by a borrower’s default.  The 
potential benefits of mortgage default insurance are multiple: 
• A major obstacle to taking a loan to buy a house is the large-down 
payment. Well designed mortgage insurance can significantly reduce 
non-price credit rationing. MI mitigates significantly the “lemon problem” 
as potential good borrowers are no longer penalized by lenders’ inability 
to differentiate between good risks and bad risks.  
• Mortgage insurance is not a subsidy but a financial market instrument that 
contributes to the public goals of improving housing affordability and 
giving better access to home-ownership to young first-time buyers without 
the expenditure of public funds. 
• To protect itself against the risks that it covers, the MI provider has to be 
proactive in monitoring the market and the performance of its 
participating lenders. As a result, a mortgage insurer can be expected to 
have a very positive catalytic impact on the management of the mortgage 
lending process by introducing a risk-based standardizing of loan 
underwriting and servicing.  Three areas of the housing finance system 
that will be positively affected by the development of mortgage insurance 
are property valuation, credit information system, and delinquency 
management systems.   
• The design of mortgage insurance products can vary. Typically the types 
of risk faced by the insurer include: a borrower’s inability to repay, a 
borrower’s unwillingness to repay, defective property valuation, loss of 
the market value of a house, real estate market risk, adverse risk selection, 
economic catastrophes. Some default risks may be excluded. Uninsurable 
risk such as natural disasters, environmental risk and political risk might 
be covered by backup government guaranties.  
International experience shows that default mortgage insurance can be 
private, public or through a public-private partnership. Historically, the 
introduction of mortgage insurance in a new market has often been by a 
public mortgage insurer, for instance in Canada or in the transition 
economies of Eastern Europe. However, in Hong Kong mortgage insurance 
is provided by a private insurer in partnership with the public Hong Kong 
Mortgage Corporation. The depth and scale of the mortgage market is a 
factor.   
A private mortgage insurer may be reluctant to enter a market for one or 
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more reasons: threshold business volume issues, the specialized regulatory 
framework may not be fully in place, and there may remain ambiguities or 
gaps regarding the treatment of insured mortgage loans by bank regulators.  
Also, initially, a private MI may not be feasible for lack of capital, or because 
the existing private insurance companies are subsidiaries or affiliates of 
banks that would be facing conflict of interest if they entered the MI 
business.  
Creating a viable public mortgage insurance institution requires a 
strategy of risk minimization to insure that the institution will not turn into 
a provider of subsidies and that it will have a charter that will permit it to 
operate on a commercial basis regarding its premia and reserves. The 
regulatory framework of the public MI should be insurance-based and the 
institution should be regulated and supervised by the insurance supervisor, 
not by a line ministry.  The MI charter should also provide for a future 
transition to a private company.   
 
Korea: Some of the mortgage insurance decisions recently made in Korea 
raise the question of whether they result from incremental 
administrative decisions taken over a limited time horizon or are the 
fruit of a strategic view of the default insurance needs of the rapidly 
growing Korean private mortgage market.  The public Housing 
Finance Credit Guarantee Fund which used to operate as a separate 
financial institution has been merged into the new Korea Housing 
Finance Corporation that started operating in March 2004.  This 
merger places KHFC into a situation of conflicting fiduciary 
responsibilities since KHFC has been created to develop the 
secondary mortgage markets by purchasing long-term fixed rate 
mortgages and then issuing RMBS.  
 
Mortgage insurance which can be an important credit enhancement for 
the issuance of RMBS to improve the functioning of the secondary mortgage 
markets should be provided by a independent third party, as is the case for 
instance in Hong Kong.  Mortgage insurance which should be available to 
the entire mortgage market could then place KHFC into direct competition 
with its insurance clients in the RMBS market. 
Expanding the insurance activities of KHFC into student loan insurance 
as provided by the KHFC Law  (Article 46) would add further complexity 
to KHFC operations and distract KHFC from its main strategic mandate of 
developing the secondary mortgage market. 
3.3 Industry Organization and Loan Distribution 
The main question regarding the organization of the mortgage industry 
is whether the structure of the mortgage lending industry encourages 
competition and product innovation?  The 2003 comparative study of 
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European mortgage markets shows that there is strong inverse correlation 
between mortgage market size and concentration indicating significant 
economies of scale up to a certain size with no clear gains beyond it. This 
finding is consistent with banking industry studies.  
The MOW study and Dübel [2003] report that “EU concentration is 
below that of the nearest comparable market, the US.”  In the US the 
market share of the top five lenders was 37% in 2002 and only 24% in the EU. 
Dübel attributes the lower concentration of retail lenders in Europe 
compared to the US to the division of retail markets into differentiated 
national territories. He also finds that the impact of government 
involvement on these national market structures is large in three ways: 
direct lending by state lenders, regulation, as well as taxes and subsidies.  
 
Korea: Prior to liberalization and the privatization of KHB in 1997, the 
structure of the mortgage industry in Korea was highly concentrated 
with the Korea Housing Bank distributing 91% of all mortgage loans 
made in Korea through its branch network. Those were KHB’s 
quasi-commercial loans as well as the social loans from the National 
Housing Fund. As already reported, the depth of the mortgage 
market was low in 1996 with a MDO/GDP ratio of 10.0%. This 
outcome was the result of government policies. Within the banking 
sector, KHB was a medium size bank in terms of assets, but one that 
totally dominated its specialized market, which permitted KHB to 
achieve adequate economies of scale and efficiency. (See Renaud, 
1997) 
The flight to quality away from corporate and SME loans in the 
aftermath of the 1997 crisis together with market deregulation has led 
to a fierce price competition by other banks, as well as non-price 
competition through a lowering of bank fees. The rising market share 
of new bank lenders appears to have been at the expense of non-bank 
lenders whose share of the private sector fell from 10% to a minimal 
1% by 2000, much more than at the expense of Kookmin Bank. The 
dominance of Kookmin has continued at least through 2001 at the 
same concentration level of 91% (J.H. Lee, 2002). Since then Kookmin 
Bank has been pursuing a strategy of diversification away from 
mortgage loans. With the competition of new banks as well as the 
steady decline of the overall interest rate level after 1997, the lending 
rate of public loans by NHF became higher than the rate on private 
loans in 2001.  
In the liberalized mortgage market environment, the government has 
moved toward a more “level playing field” among retail lenders by 
contracting NHF loans distribution with Woori Bank and the 
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF) in addition to 
Kookmin Bank that had initially inherited the monopoly over the 
distribution of NHF loans from its public predecessor KHB. The NHF 
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loan portfolio has grown much less rapidly than the overall mortgage 
market from Won 22.9 trillion in 1996 to Won 41.2 Trillion in 2003 for 
a CAGR of 8.9%.   
3.4 Diversification of Loan Products and Consumer Mortgage Choice  
What is the degree of completeness of the mortgage credit market? 
 
The degree of market completeness is a major dimension of industry 
performance.  The others are costs, prices and competitiveness. Is the 
mortgage credit market seriously credit constrained? How good is the 
coverage of the mortgage credit market?  Do all the main segments of the 
population with their different risk profile have access to suitable loans or 
are some groups rationed out of the system? What are the loan distribution 
channels? Are mortgage information and advice available for consumers to 
reliably compare products on offer?  
From both public policy and market monitoring perspectives, the 
completeness of the mortgage market has to be evaluated according to the 
risk profiles of different social groups and by loan purpose. Market coverage 
along these two dimensions varies from country to country and within a 
country from market to market.  The degree of social segmentation also 
varies. The 2005 MOW study of the market response in the EU to changing 
mortgage credit demand settled on six major consumer risk profiles: 
standard prime borrowers with relatively low loan to income ratios, prime 
borrowers who are relatively stretched with high loan to income ratios, 
borrowers older than 55, standard borrowers with low equity, risky 
borrowers forming the sub-prime markets, and investment borrowers.  
From the perspective of a private lender and for policy evaluations of 
market completeness, the loan purpose also matters: is it a first mortgage? Is 
it a second mortgage? Is it a home equity loan? Is it a loan for a secondary 
residence? Is it an investment loan into a rental unit?  
 
Korea: Given the high degree of market rationing prevailing in Korea prior to 
1997, risk-based measures of market coverage and completeness were 
not used but only administrative criteria. Policy studies available only 
refer to simplistic administrative classifications based on basic income 
data and a few social criteria, not on demand and risk-based criteria. 
However, given the rapid growth of the market it is expected that 
lenders are already developing such risk management measures to 
evaluate market opportunities and gaps.  Financial supervisory 
authorities and policy makers dealing with mortgage credit certainly 
need such risk-oriented information.  
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Lender incentives and diversification of the supply of loans 
 
From a lender’s perspective, the leading concerns of are: the quality of 
the collateral and the level of default risk for specific market segments, the 
availability of long-term funding, the difficulty of hedging prepayment risk, 
the enforceability of early redemption compensation, and consumer 
protection laws such as usury laws. Commercial banks and non-bank 
mortgage lenders typically face different funding and risk management 
issues as analyzed in the new European study by Mercer Oliver Wyman 
2005; (see Table 3.2) 
In addition to strongly stimulating the demand for mortgage finance, the 
worldwide decline of nominal and real interest rates has caused shifts in the 
supply of mortgage loan types. This decline has generally led in Europe and 
in the US to:  an increasing diversification of loan products; an increased 
share of floating rate loans; longer reset periods for fixed rate mortgages 
with reset periods; the introduction of hybrid products with an initial 
fixed-rate period followed by a period of variable rates; and shorter periods 
for initial fixed rate loans. As interest rates are reaching bottom after this 
long period of declining interest rates fixed-rate mortgages are increasing 
again. In some US housing markets where housing price-to-income ratios 
have risen to high levels during this exceptional global housing boom, the 
demand for ARMs and very risky interest-only loans has risen to worrisome 
levels.  
 
Korea: In Korea, loan diversification has taken an unanticipated turn.  
Immediately after its privatization in 1997, Kookmin Bank has 
massively shifted its new loan production from almost 75% of 20-year 
FRM loans to over 75% of 3-year variable bullet loans in 2002 as 
shown in TABLE 4. This shift clearly suggests that KHB’s liquidity 
and interest risks under public ownership were not fully covered by 
KHB’s own capital, but were implicitly guaranteed by the Korean 
government.  
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TABLE 4: KOOKMIN BANK’S MAJOR SHIFT IN LOAN PRODUCTS 
AFTER PRIVATIZATION 
Term of new loans 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
3 years or less 4.1% 55.4% 62.6% 70.8% 75.6% 
3 years to under 10 years 12.7% 19.5% 20.5% 12.4% 9.3% 
10 years to under 20 years 9.1% 3.7% 4.4% 4.9% 1.7% 
20 years or more 74.1% 21.5% 12.5% 11.8% 13.4% 
TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: J.H. Lee [2002], Table 5 
 
What is the dominant mortgage lending rate regime in the system? 
 
The degree of interest rate risk protection for borrowers varies widely 
across countries. Given the sophistication of current IT technologies lenders 
are able to offer a very wide range of products and the former relatively 
clear distinction between fixed-rate mortgage loan products (FRM) and 
adjustable rate products (ARM) has made way a greater continuum of 
products mixing fixed-rate periods with variable rate periods over the term 
of the loan.  
How does the interest rate regime in the Korean mortgage market 
compare with other OECD countries?  FIGURE 9 compares the market 
shares of new loans in Korea with selected OECD countries. The EU data are 
based on an MOW survey in 2002, the Korea data is for 2003.  Various 
classifications of loan products are possible. The Miles 2004 study adopts a 
classification into four major groups in order of increasing variability of 
lending rates as follows: 
 
- Fixed rate to maturity or initial fixed period over 10 years  
- Initial fixed period between 5 and 10 years 
- Initial fixed period between 1 and 5 years 
- Variable rate under one year (either reviewable or referenced)   
Broad patterns are readily apparent in FIGURE 9. The emerging 
mortgage markets of the EU such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain are 
dominated by adjustable rates. The deep and very competitive UK mortgage 
markets also have a variable rate interest regime, This UK regime is a legacy 
of the importance of the Building Societies who have relied on member 
deposits and whose regulations restricts their ability to issue debt. The 
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countries dominated by fixed rate loans are also those that have developed 
access to capital markets, which lenders can use to manage their funding 
risks: Denmark, Germany and France with covered bonds, the US with 
RMBS.   
Only the emerging EU markets such as Spain, Portugal and Italy are 
highly incomplete in term of loan product diversification and coverage of 
risk market segments.  Not surprisingly, Korea is closest to the emerging 
markets of the EU.  Like them, Korea faces the issue of developing access to 
capital market funding in order to diversify its product range and develop 
funding source for fixed-rate instruments. This is the long-term strategic 
issue for Korea that KHFC aims to address. 
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FIGURE 9 - LOAN TYPES AND MORTGAGE RATE REGIMES: 
KOREA vs. OTHER OECD COUNTRIES
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Mortgage choice and borrower risk myopia 
 
Consumer mortgage choice behavior is a central element in 
understanding the dynamics of a mortgage credit market.  Consumer 
myopia may lead borrowers to take more risks than they can really assume 
because they focus only on the short term and base their loan choice on 
initial mortgage payments rather than the long-term affordability and risk of 
debt service over the life of the loan. In competitive market where the 
supply of loans is very diversified, many borrowers have a poor 
understanding of the risks involved with different mortgages. 
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Korea: Short-term, interest-only bullet loans with maturity of less than three 
years dominate the market. However, private banks and insurance 
companies are also offering a small volume of long-term hybrid 
products with fixed rate periods up to five years and theoretical 
maturities up to 30 years. Non-price rationing through low LTV ratios 
is strong: maximum LTVs range from  60% for loans under three 
years in market areas defined as ‘non-speculative’ by the government 
to a maximum of 40%  on loans with maturities under 10 years made 
in an ‘speculative area’.  Comparing the effective lending rates and 
risks on these different products is not within the ability of most 
potential borrowers. Only lenders participating in the public KHFC 
programs are able to offer FRM loans with 10, 15 or 30 year maturities 
with LTV  values up to 70% for apartment and 65% for other 
properties. The maximum payment-to-income ratio is 33% and total 
debt-income ratio is 40%. These loans carry pre-payment penalties 
and a current lending rate of 6.25% that is marginally adjusted for 
loan origination fee. 
Are high levels of household mobility and the short duration of home 
ownership contributing to the heavy dependence on short-term 
variable rate loans? Or is the causation in the other direction and is 
the structure of the mortgage market stimulating high mobility in 
order to meet the repayment of  the bullet loan principal after 3 
years?   
Should there be a future for the Chonsei system?  Should we expect 
that the rapid development of a modern mortgage finance system in 
Korea will lead to the disappearance of the antiquated Chonsei 
(mostly) two-year lease system that owes it origins to the high 
inflation environment during the post-Korean War period and to the 
very strong directed credit policies aiming to suppress consumer 
credit in favor of ‘priority sectors’ in the pre-liberalization era? 
Financially and socially, this informal contract has significant 
undesirable features for both parties in terms of risks and implicit 
costs.  In addition, Chonsei is income regressive:  Korea is an 
exceptional housing market where a young renting family has be rich 
or have rich parents to provide the required lump-sum deposit in lieu 
of monthly rent. This deposit represents a large percentage of the 
value of the unit often of the order of 65%.   
The expansion of fixed rate mortgages is a financially more sound 
way than Chonsei to achieve forced savings through the amortization 
payment mechanism- and at the same time lower wealth 
requirements for achieving ownership.  In general the development 
of higher LTV mortgage credit is also a way to de-link the savings 
market from housing market, thereby improving their financial 
efficiency and probably their equity as well. This raise the important 
issue of the conditions under which a financial system can switch 
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mortgage finance regime from predominantly variable rate 
mortgages to fixed rate mortgages, which is one of the rationales for 
creating KHFC as discussed below. 
3.5 Transaction Costs, Transparency and Consumer Protection Issues 
The demand for mortgage loans can be significantly affected by 
transaction costs in purchasing a housing unit that can usually be divided 
into three groups: (a) fees and discount points associated with the 
origination of the loan by the lender, (2) Third party charges such as 
appraisal fees and other services, and (3) registration and transfer taxes.  
There are considerable variations across countries for these costs and 
accurate representative data are difficult to produce. The available evidence 
suggests that purchase transaction costs in the Korean mortgage market are 
currently of the order of 7.2% of the value of the property purchased, which 
is somewhat above average compared to EU countries as shown in FIGURE 
10 below.  Once again, Denmark scores very well on this efficiency 
measure and so does the UK, while Greece has very high transaction costs of 
the order of 15.5%. 
In the US, a recent two-year effort to reform the notoriously complex 
Real Estate Settlements Procedures Act (RESPA) did not succeed. This effort 
aimed to insure the comparability of loan offers, lower transaction charges 
for buyers as well minimize if not eliminate the process of sequential pricing 
and overcharges associated with a residential purchase. (See Markison, 
2005). Two critical consumer protection instruments under RESPA are the 
Good Faith Estimate form, and the “HUD-1 settlement form. These recent 
efforts focused particularly at two critical mandatory transaction forms: the 
“Good Faith Estimate” of loan closing costs the “HUD-!’ form recording 
actual closing costs.   
Across the EU, the lenders’ Code of Conduct was developed on a 
voluntary basis following the principle of self-regulation of the mortgage 
industry and 3,600 lenders have signed commitments to abide by this code. 
On the other hand, a 2003 survey revealed a weak implementation of the 
‘European Standardized Information Sheet’ or ESIS that is designed to 
insure full comparability of offers by different lenders across the EU.  It 
should be noted, however, that national standards of comparability and 
information disclosure are usually in force already in most EU countries.   
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FIGURE 10- HOUSING TRANSACTION COSTS: 
KOREA, Individual EU countries and EU average
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3.6 Managing Funding Risks with Access to Capital Markets  
Access to capital markets to improve risk sharing and risk management by retail 
lenders 
 
After financial liberalization, one of the most strategic issues for the 
development of a mortgage market is retail lenders access to capital market 
investors. They need this access in order to improve their financial risk 
management.  Related to that question is the choice of capital market 
innovations that would permit the transition from a variable mortgage rate 
regime toward a fixed rate regime.  
As we have just seen, a complete mortgage credit market is one that can 
offer a variety of FRM and ARM products that fit the needs of different 
individual borrowers. There are at least three reasons in favor of a transition 
from a variable mortgage lending rate regime to a fixed-rate one.  From an 
economic and social welfare point of view, long-term FRM loans can 
improve access to home-ownership and also provide a built-in savings 
mechanism through the amortization schedule. Of course, an important 
factor in the demand for FRM loans will be the magnitude of the risk 
premium in the FRM loan cost compared to ARM alternatives. The two 
other reasons are of a macroeconomic nature. First, recent research by the 
IMF across 16 countries over three decades finds that in countries where 
longer-term, fixed loans are dominant housing prices tend to be less 
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sensitive to changes in short-term interest rates. Second, housing markets 
dominated by variable loans can become an important channel of monetary 
policy in a way that may interfere with the objectives monetary policy. 
These two issues have been the drivers of the recent Treasury consultation 
in the UK that resulted in the Miles and Barker reports in 2004 some of 
whose findings are now being reviewed by the UK government for 
implementation. 
 
What kind of mortgage securities: RMBS? Secured Bonds? Others? 
 
Considerable policy progress has been made during the past decade. In 
discussions about what mortgage securities to encourage for the 
development of fixed income securities markets, there is a growing 
understanding that no mortgage security is intrinsically superior to the 
others: some investors may prefer RMBS products others may prefer 
covered bonds. Similarly, the economics of security issuance may lead some 
lenders to prefer funding through RMBS; those are more likely to be 
non-depository lenders. Others may focus on secured bonds, and those are 
more likely initially to be depository lenders.  The type of target market 
also matters for the choice of funding.And the economics of mortgage 
funding is also likely to change over time as a financial system deepens and 
moves from being purely bank-based to having a substantial capital market, 
as shown earlier in Figure 2 if we compare the broad financial structure of 
China with that of the US.  Another important intervening factor will soon 
be the implementation of the Basel II Capital Accord starting in 2006 that is 
expected to affect the relative economics of issuing RMBS or covered bonds 
for different lenders.  
What is highly desirable if not essential to the long-term success of efforts 
to develop a mortgage securities market is that such work be solidly 
integrated within a country’s broader plan to develop its bond market, and 
its private bond market in particular. For instance, the pioneering success of 
Malaysia in creating its mortgage securities market two decades ago 
contrasts with the very mixed experience of other emerging markets that 
Chiquier et al. [2004] report.  False starts in other countries have often owed 
a great deal to policy coordination failures and to a lack of appreciation of 
some important market or infrastructure pre-conditions.  One important 
role that capital market regulatory and supervisory authorities can play is to 
insure that the legal and regulatory framework does not tilt the field in favor 
of one type of securities and that all types of quality securities can be issued 
as market conditions will permit or demand over time.  At the end of the 
day, and trivial as it may seem, the two key determining factors in the 
take-off of a mortgage securities market are whether there is a demand for 
them and whether there is an issuer need for capital market funding.  
When overlooked by wishful thinking, these two prerequisites have led to 
the misdirected use of scarce skills and resources, as well as time wasted. 
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What has been tried and where? 
 
Are centralized second-tier public institutions needed for efficient 
mortgage securities markets? Not necessarily. There are very successful 
examples of mortgage securities markets without centralized issuers in high 
income economies such as securitization in Australia or the very efficient 
and deep Danish market that is increasingly studied? The same is true also 
in the case of middle-income emerging markets. 
The range of experiences accumulated by middle-income emerging 
markets in developing mortgage securities market is quite significant as 
shown in TABLE 5 taken from Chiquier, Hassler and Lea [2004]. Some of 
these experiences have been quite successful and sustained over time, others 
not. The table is not exhaustive as markets keep evolving.  Another 
important point that could be missed in TABLE 5 is that several channels 
and several types of mortgage securities can coexist in markets where a level 
playing field exists,  such as in Colombia and in Chile. 
TABLE 5: MORTGAGE SECURITIES EXPERIENCES IN EMERGING 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Mortgage 
bonds 
Pass-through 
Securities 
Structured 
Finance 
Mortgage 
Conduits 
Liquidity 
Facilities 
Bulgaria 
Chile 
Colombia 
Czech 
Republic 
Hungary 
Poland 
Hong Kong 
Argentina 
Colombia 
Chile India 
Korea Mexico 
Panama 
Philippines 
South Africa 
Trinidad 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Hong Kong 
Korea 
Thailand 
India Jordan 
Malaysia 
South Africa 
Trinidad 
Source: Chiquier, Hassler and Lea [2004], Part VI, Section A. 
 
 
Korea: the Komoco experience 
 
Korea’s experience with the creation the Korean Mortgage Corporation 
or Komoco with a mixed public-private ownership in 1999 in the aftermath 
of the 1997 financial crisis could be described as a false start in developing 
the Korean mortgage securities market. As implemented, Komoco 
functioned as a short-term solution to the Korean government’s serious 
fiscal problems in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis when it faced 
very large budget expenditures to restructure the banking system. Komoco 
securitization of the high quality, high yield social loan portfolio held by 
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NHF was quite successful. But Komoco did not lead to a structural 
improvement of the mortgage market because Kookmin Bank that was the 
dominant lender had no need to issue mortgage securities to manage its 
funding risks, once it has restructured its loan production toward  very 
short-term, variable rate bullet loans as seen in TABLE 4.  
On the other hand, there is an interesting parallel between the positive 
role that Komoco has played in creating fiscal space for the Korean 
Government in the aftermath of 1997 and the Finnish experience in the 
aftermath of Finland’s own banking crisis and the collapse of trade with the 
Soviet Union in the early 1990s. At that time, the Finland Housing Fund 
successfully securitized parts of its seasoned, low LTV portfolio of social 
housing loans to replenish its social housing budget with two large dollar 
denominated FINICA RMBS issues in 1995 and 1996. An important 
difference is that Finland did not create a special conduit like Komoco but 
simply relied on a special purpose vehicle (SPV) incorporated in Ireland to 
maximize international visibility and investor interest.  As government 
budget relief operation, Komoco was a success. As the successful introducer 
of mortgage securitization in Korea, Komoco also greatly facilitate the 
operations of its successor KHFC. 
 
Korea: the new Korea Housing Finance Corporation 
 
The Korea Housing Finance Corporation was created by a special law in 
December 2003 and started its operation in March 2004.  What can be the 
benefits of KHFC as an instrument of public policy? What corporate 
management challenges might KHFC face as a public financial institution?  
An evaluation at this time would be both premature and inappropriate.  
But as an instrument of public policy, the following standard questions may 
be asked about KHFC: 
KHFC is expected to become an instrument for better risk allocation 
across the mortgage market. But can it be more than a backup funding 
option during a business cycle downturn for well rated, diversified 
commercial banks that ordinarily funding their loans from retail deposit? 
What will be its role for non-deposit taking specialist mortgage lenders? Are 
there other options for these specialist lenders? 
What can we expect from KHFC for the standardization of mortgage 
lending and greater liquidity in the mortgage market? 
In what manner can KHFC contribute to the diversification of mortgage 
products to meet the different demand of borrowers in different risk 
segments of the mortgage market?  
A major need of a mortgage credit market is the availability of a 
benchmark mortgage product to improve the transparency and efficiency of 
risk pricing throughout the market. What could be a KHFC strategy to fill 
that need?  
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Should KHFC be prepared to act as lender of last resort in the even of a 
crisis to prevent a shutdown of the mortgage market and the costly impact 
on the wider economy? 
As a public financial institution KHFC faces a duality of financial and 
social objectives. As a financial institution, KHFC is expected to develop and 
grow its “franchise value” i.e. to raise its implicit commercial value thanks to 
the quality and desirability of the services it provides. Yet, at the same time, 
KHFC might be called to meet the non-commercial objectives of social 
policies and as a result KHFC might achieve ‘non-commercial results’.  
Do the KHFC governance structure and managerial incentives facilitate 
good governance i.e. high quality decision making?  
Are the channels and instruments for defining KHFC’s public policy 
objectives supportive of strong financial management? 
The recent GSE debates in the US lead to asking the question whether the 
internal risk management structure is appropriately strong to face financial 
risks.  
Is the level of capitalization of KHFC commensurate with the risk it is 
taking and with public contingent liabilities eventually faced by the public? 
Can KHFC mitigate the lack of development of the Korean financial 
markets and the limits on buying hedges to manage financial risks properly? 
KHFC faces a quasi-monopolistic retail mortgage credit market 
dominated by Kookmin Bank. What are good strategies to develop and 
diversified distribution channels?  
The structure of KHFC 2003 charter combines mortgage lending with 
various insurance functions that might be better kept separated because they 
imply different risks and different corporate cultures. In addition there is a 
conflict of interest between the securitization programs of KHFC and the 
provision of mortgage default insurance by KHFC also since mortgage 
default insurance is one to credit-enhance a securitization. Should KHFC 
become a diversified group of specialized financial companies in order to 
achieve greater transparency and provide more management flexibility? 
4. MORTGAGE FINANCE AND THE MACROECONOMY 
In closing, two structural questions about the impact of mortgage finance 
on the macroeconomy seem to deserve the attention of Korean analysts and 
policy makers. One relates to the structure of the mortgage credit market 
and financial stability.  The other relates to the current variable rate regime 
of the mortgage system and public concerns for housing price stability. 
Mortgage credit market structure and financial stability  
What can be done with the very high percentage of Korean loans that are 
three-month variable rate, interest-only bullet loans of extremely short 
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maturities of three years? Does this market structure create significant 
systemic risks for Korea like those faced in the US in the 1930s? Interest rates 
have declined globally due to a very high level of liquidity in the world 
economy. Interest rates reached their lowest level in 40 years for the US in 
2003. Are interest rates in Korea likely to rise and become more volatile at 
the same time as in the US?  The volume of loans rolled over in 2004 was 
estimated at Won 42 trillion or over 5% of GDP. By some estimates the 
volume of housing loans that will need to be refinanced in 2005 could rise as 
high as 9% GDP. What could happen to the Korean portfolio of outstanding 
mortgages when real and nominal interest rates rise again? Is the problem 
really mitigated by very low LTV ratios when the relevant constraint is the 
borrowers’ dynamic debt to income ratios? In spite of changing market 
shares, a very high percentage of these risky loans is still held by only one 
bank?  In a worst case scenario, could problems at Kookmin bank lead to a 
massive contraction of the aggregate mortgage loan supply? Would KHFC 
be ready to act as a lender of last resort? In what way? On what terms? 
FIGURE 9 compares the composition of loan supply between Korea, the 
EU and the US and might suggest that systemic risks in Korea and in Spain 
are very similar. However, three major structural factors appear to 
differentiate Spain from Korea and suggest that Spain is much less prone to 
a systemic shock related to its loan composition.  First, Spanish loans are 
amortizing ARM loans of long maturity instead of very short, variable rate 
bullet loans like in Korea. Second, this portfolio is not concentrated into a 
single bank but is dispersed across a diversity of national and provincial 
institutions with diversified lines of business. Therefore the likelihood that a 
single bank may fail is lower and the possibility that the failure of one bank 
could lead to a housing market shut down is even more remote. Finally, 
acting on the well-known fact that bank lending to the real estate sector is 
strongly pro-cyclical with rising asset prices, Spain is the first country to 
have implemented ‘dynamic’ provisioning regulations for banks and other 
lenders, see Jaime Caruana [2003].  
Mortgage Rate Regime and Housing Price Stability 
Is the continuing dependence of the Korean mortgage market on 
short-term, variable interest rates creating significant problems for the 
conduct of monetary policy in the same manner that the housing channel is 
a problem for monetary policy in the UK?  What are possible actions in 
Korea? On the financial side? On the urban planning side? A policy issue 
that emerges with clarity from the KDI housing studies of 2004 is the need to 
address more effectively the supply side issues of the housing market. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
This paper has reviewed the risk mitigation role of the core components 
of the mortgage markets operating in high-income economies after two 
decades of financial market liberalization. Given the intrinsic complexity of 
a modern mortgage market, the emphasis has been on presenting the policy 
rationales related to these core components and to the ways they interact. 
Operational discussions of the varied technical options available for each 
market function make another agenda. Wherever possible, the paper 
compares the current Korean market with international experience, which 
often raises public policy questions for Korea. Financial liberalization has led 
to major changes in the Korean mortgage markets that have been growing 
very rapidly after 1997.  
In terms of market completeness, competitive distribution system, as 
well as costs and risk allocation the Korean mortgage finance system is still 
very much in transition from the small and narrow structure inherited from 
the pre-liberalization era before 1997. Seen in international perspective, the 
stability and deepening of the new market will benefit from the successful 
development of KHFC. Agreement between financial authorities and the 
financial industry on a strategic mortgage finance framework that would 
better align the interest and incentives of public and private stakeholders in 
the mortgage credit market would be desirable.  Such a framework should 
help reduce regulatory lags and also lower the risks of piecemeal and/or 
myopic decisions such as some of those observed immediately after 1997 
crisis.  Refining the regulatory and supervisory framework for efficient and 
stable Korean mortgage market would benefit from such a broad strategic 
understanding.  In spite of the broad nature of the overview of the Korean 
mortgage credit system presented in this paper, this conclusion seems 
inescapable. 
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Comments on “Mortgage Finance in the Post-Liberalizatio
n Era: Global Trends and Their Relevance to Korea” 
Tyler Yang 
(Integrated Financial Engineering Inc.) 
This paper provides a comprehensive review of the global liberalization 
of housing finance policies since the 1980’s.  The liberalization led the 
advanced economic countries to increasing competitive mortgage systems 
and the closer link to capital markets.  The core functions of housing 
finance system in the high-income countries are introduced and compared 
to the Korean situation.  Three main functions introduced in the paper are: 
a wide diverse of mortgage providers, having fixed rate, long term, high 
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio mortgage as the dominant product, and risk 
management via capital market.  The paper concludes by raising two 
policies questions related to Korea’s current mortgage finance system and its 
macroeconomic stability. 
Comments: 
While providing an extensive discussion of the situations and rationales 
of the high-income country markets, the paper did not investigate the 
challenges of the common trends to today’s Korean market.  To 
supplement the paper, my comments focus on discussing the challenges 
Korea would face today when trying to implement the systems introduced 
in the paper.   
(1) Diverse Mortgage Providers 
It is observed that mortgage service providers are becoming very 
specialized among the high-income countries, such as the US.  In 2003, the 
total residential mortgages outstanding in the US is about US$6.6 trillion, 
clearly segmented into three sub-markets: 
• government – including FHA insured and VA guaranteed loans, 
• conforming – including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and FHLB purchased 
loans, and 
•others – including jumbo, subprime, home equity loans, and other special 
loan products 
 
CHAPTER 4-3  Mortgage Finance in the Post-liberalization Era 
 
421
The service providers are also divided into originator, servicer, 
insurer/guarantor, holder, and other specialized institutions.  These 
specialized service providers are still going through a mass consolidation 
process.  For example, the top 10 mortgage servicers account for over 50 
percent of the US business in 2002 while it is only 20% in the early 1990’s. 
The economy of scale in mortgage operations is the key reason behind 
the specialization and consolidation.  While the size of the US mortgage 
market can afford multiple players in each specialized fields, whether 
similar trend can be expected to occur in the Korean market is unclear.  The 
following table is a simple comparison in the market size potential of US 
and Korea. 
 
Role Annual Revenue Schedule 
US Revenue Size 
(US$billion/yr) 
Current Korea 
Revenue Size 
(trillion won/yr) 
Potential Korea 
Revenue Size 
(trillion won/yr) 
Outstanding 
Amount  6,500 170 500 
Servicing Fee 25 bps 16.25 0.43 1.25 
Insurance 
Premium 20 bps 13.00 0.34 1.00 
Trustee/Escr
ow 0.3 bps 0.20 0.05 0.15 
Eventual 
Holder 3 percent 200 5 15 
 
The market size for US and the current Korea are as of 2003.  
Thepotential Korea market size is estimated by increasing Korea’s mortgage 
outstanding to GDP ratio from 24.5% to about 73.5%, a ratio comparable to 
other OECD countries.  The mortgage outstanding amount is multiplied by 
the typical annual servicing fee rate to estimate the potential revenue in each 
specialized segment. 
With the limited revenue available in each specialized segment, it is not 
doubtful that the specialization trend found in US would be feasible in 
Korea.  Second, even if specialized function industry is feasible, it is not 
clear if it can support multiple players in each industry to form competitive 
markets like the US.  If competitive market can not be achieved, Korean 
government would need to carefully monitor the monopoly/oligopoly 
power by the providers.  The high cost of new Basel Accord risk-based 
capital requirement is likely to further enhance existing large company’s 
monopoly condition because of the differentiated capital rules for the large 
and small banks. 
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(2) Fixed-rate, Long-term, Self-amortized, High LTV as the dominant mortga
ge product 
The paper pointed out the above common features of the dominant 
mortgage product in the US and suggests it to be the socially optimal 
mortgage product.  It is true that such a product allows optimal allocation 
of interest rate risk and makes homeownership more affordable.  However, 
there are difficulties to introduce such a product to today’s Korean 
environment. 
First, without a liquid interest rate derivative market, most banks would 
prefer to lend floating rate mortgages to mitigate their balance sheet 
duration mismatch problems.  The Korean interest rate derivative market is 
far from complete or liquid, making effective interest rate risk hedging 
impossible.  Second, an ARM has lower interest rate than a FRM at the 
same market condition.  As Korean borrowers are used to borrow at the 
lower rate ARM, it would be difficult to induce them to shift to the initially 
more expensive FRM.  Third, holding everything else constant, high LTV 
leads to high default rate.  As a result, it would be difficult to ask Korean 
banks to relax the LTV limitation without a clear credit risk-compensating 
regime.  As affordability is not yet a big problem in Korea, one possibility is 
to tighten the payment to income ratio while relaxing the LTV limit.  The 
Korean government needs to decide whether they would like to improve 
housing affordability to the income poor or the wealth poor households. 
A side issue discussed in the paper is the benefit of introducing a 
complete mortgage product menu to allow the borrowers self-select into 
different product types.  The challenges associated with implementing this 
concept in Korean market are: 
• Lenders – lack of adequate data and model to accurately price and 
calculate the risk based capital for multiple mortgage products 
• Borrowers – lack of ability to understand and properly choose among 
multiple products 
• Investors – many differentiated products can confuse MBS investors and 
slow down the initial development of a secondary mortgage 
market 
(3) Risk Management via Capital Market 
The high-income countries are moving toward managing mortgage 
portfolio risk via capital market.  By trading interest rate and credit 
derivatives and securtiization, the capital market allows optimal allocation 
of risks to the most capable parties.  However, similar to many other Asian 
countries that recently attempted to introduce secondary mortgage markets, 
Korean will face a difficult time to promote securitization at today’s market 
environment because 
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• The market is dominated by ARM.  Lenders do not face duration 
mismatch problem and have no incentive to sell mortgages. 
• Most banks have excess capital.  There is no incentive to sell off 
mortgages when it is difficult to find good investment targets.  There is 
also no need to raise capital.   
• The newly introduced IAS 39 requires banks reporting all financial 
positions.  The traditional benefit of moving BMS to off-balance sheet is 
no longer applicable. 
• The market will require high-risk premium because of the unfamiliarity 
with MBS products.  The investors will require higher rate spread.  The 
rating agency will require unnecessarily high subordinate levels.  Both 
make MBS less attractive to the issuers. 
Instead of promoting mortgage securitization, the alternative solutions 
that Korean might consider at this moment include: 
• Provide government or promote private mortgage insurance 
• Develop interest rate derivates to allow banks hedge interest rate risk 
• Develop credit derivatives to allow banks hedge credit risk 
• Allow life insurance companies and pension funds to swap interest rate 
risk with banks to reduce the duration mismatch problems on both sides 
(4) Culture Shocks 
Finally, I would like to point out one unique challenge faced by the 
Korean mortgage market.  Korea is currently experiencing a major 
household culture transition.  The traditional multi-family households are 
converting into the newer-generation small family structure.  The 
community is transiting from a high saving rate generation to a high 
borrowing rate younger generation.  The younger generation tends to trade 
housing frequently while the original culture still attempt to keep the 
housing to the heirs.  The rapidly increase in population concentration in 
urban area also considerably changed the housing market dynamics.  As a 
result, mortgage lenders in today’s Korea must pay additional attention to 
differentiate the borrowers among multiple dimensions of culture 
migrations. 
 
 
 
